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ABSTRACT 
The investment needs of the water and sanitation sector and the financing constraints 
facing many developing countries were important catalysts for the promotion of private 
investment during the 1990s. Towards the end of the decade however, the flow of 
private capital began to decline primarily due to the poor performance of some 
investments and difficulties encountered during these transactions. Regardless, private 
investment is still considered an important financial resource for the sector which has 
resulted in considerable attention in addressing governance, economic and socio-political 
factors which can discourage investment. 
The aim of the research is to develop a strategic framework for attracting private 
investment to the Caribbean water and sanitation sector. Using a multiple-case study 
approach, the research examines the phenomenon of private investment in the water and 
sanitation sectors in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago by assessing the 
environment for private investment and determining the specific drivers and deterrents to 
this type of investment. The implications of small size in the Caribbean context for 
institutional requirements to support private investment in the sector are also examined. 
Primary data for the research are obtained from public officials involved in the 
management, operation and regulation of the sector, local and intemational private 
service providers and local financial institutions through interviews and survey 
questionnaires. Documents are used to contextualise, corroborate and augment the 
research. 
The research found that in addition to traditional strategiC and financial criteria in terms of 
provisions of the operating environment and investment performance, behaviour-related 
factors such as interest in job security, recognition and comfort were also important to the 
investment decision in the sector. Investors' perceptions of the utility were also found to 
be a statistically significant determinant of investment. Besides emphasising the 
importance of creating a conducive environment for investment, the research highlighted 
a need to simultaneously focus on generating speCific investment opportunities to build 
investor confidence. The most important consequence of small size to negatively impact 
on creating conducive conditions for investment was the effect of limited professional 
capacity on institutional arrangements in the sector. Accordingly, sharing professional 
expertise to address capacity constraints emerged as the most feasible opportunity for 
regional cooperation to improve the environment for private investment in the sector. 
Key words: private investment; water and sanitation; Caribbean; regional cooperation 
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Chaptar 1 - Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research background 
Despite the gains made during the International Water Supply and Sanitation decade 
(1981-90) and subsequent international commitments to address the worst deficits, at the 
beginning of 2000, one-sixth (1.1 billion) of the world's population was without access to 
improved water supply and two-fifths (2.4 billion) lacked access to improved sanitation 
(WHO and UNICEF, 2000). In its Millennium Declaration, the United Nations set a target 
for 2015 of reducing by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
adequate quantities of safe water and improved sanitation. Developing countries spend 
in the region of US$25 billion per annum on water and sanitation (Briscoe, 1999b). To 
attain the 2015 goals however, developing countries would have to invest an extra 
US$10 billion annually for basic coverage and about US$50 billion more per annum for 
universal coverage (World Bank, 2002b). Although there has been some debate about 
the accuracy of these investment estimates due to the scarcity of reliable data in many 
countries, there is general agreement that the levels of investment required in water and 
sanitation are substantial. 
The sector's monopoly status, need for long-term finance, low rates of return and public 
good characteristics have resulted in the historic dominance of public sector funding in 
most developing countries. During the 1990s however, the financing mix changed with 
private investment emerging as an important supplement to public funding contributing 
up to 15% of total financing (Winpenny, 2003). International private investment in 
particular, dominated this surge in private capital accounting for up to 80% of all private 
investments (Sader, 1999). The private investment bubble did not last long however as 
towards the end of the 1990s, the flow of private capital into the sector began to decline 
by 25% per year between 1997 and 1999 (Ramamurti and Doh, 2004). By 2004, 37% of 
water and sewerage projects with private investments were either cancelled or in distress 
(World Bank, 2005). Most noticeable was the retreat of large international investors from 
projects in developing countries and the emergence of local private investors as 
increasingly important sources for new investments (Izaguirre and Hunt, 2005). 
Despite the fall-off of private investment in water and sanitation, the private sector is still 
considered critical for financial resources given the significant investment needs of the 
sector. This has resulted in considerable attention being paid to investors' criteria for 
investment and the conditions necessary to attract this type of investment. Most prolific 
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is the enabling environment paradigm which seeks to create an environment conducive 
to investment by tackling problem issues such as unclear policy guidelines, inadequate 
regulatory frameworks, inappropriate pricing policies, excessive government involvement 
and outdated institutional arrangements - features that have been found to discourage 
private investment in the sector (Seppala, 2002). 
In addition to the above mentioned obstactes to private investment, small size in terms of 
small country size and small project size is often considered a constraint to attracting 
private capital to the sector. In terms of small project size, most water projects are not 
considered 'bankable' as they tend to be too small to bear the overhead costs of project 
finance (Winpenny, 2003). In terms of small country size, features such as limited 
institutional capacity and limited ability to exploit economies of scale have important 
implications for regulatory and related institutional requirements to support private 
investment and the cost of doing business. In addition, small states are often limited in 
their access to commercial borrowing due to high levels of indebtedness, high borrowing 
costs and a perception by private markets of being inherently more risky than larger 
states (Collier and Dollar, 1 999). Approaches to address these size constraints in the 
sector generally include aggregation (bundling of utilities and/or projects) and the 
formation of multi-utilities. Less commonly used is regional cooperation due to its limited 
scope and application to water and sanitation issues. 
1.2 Research study area 
The general research setting is the English-speaking Caribbean consisting of a group of 
islands located southeast of North America, east of Central America and to the north and 
west of South America. For classification purposes, the Caribbean is included in the 
larger Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) geographical region. They are also 
classified as small island developing states due to shared development challenges such 
as small popUlation, lack of resources, lack of economies of scale and costly public 
administration and infrastructure (ComSec and World Bank, 2000). 
Although perceived to be well advanced compared to other regions in terms of access to 
improved water and sanitation services, investment needs in the sector are still 
Significant due to prolonged underinvestment which has resulted in deteriorating levels of 
service and constrained economic growth. MDG investment requirement estimates for 
example are US$193 million for water and US$254 million for sanitation (Clayton, 2004), 
not to mention investment requirements to replace and rehabilitate aged assets. Most 
Caribbean countries rely on public funds and official development assistance to fund 
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capital investments in the sector with private investment only recently gaining cautious 
acceptance as a source of financing (Jha, 2005). For countries where data are available 
to estimate historic investment flows, a significant increase in their rate of investment to 
meet the most basic requirements is essential (Ibid.). With public sector contributions on 
the decline as Caribbean governments make clear their intention to 'wean' water utilities 
off the public purse, other sources of financing including private investment need to 
emerge to fill the investment gap. 
1.3 Justification for the research 
A regional breakdown of water and sewerage projects with private participation shows a 
concentration of projects in LAC. Between 1990 and 2004, the LAC region accounted for 
45% of these projects and 51 % of investments (World Bank, 2005). Upon closer 
examination however, four Latin American countries - Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico were the recipients of 85% of private investments to the region. Given that these 
countries make up 66% of the LAC urban population, the scale of private investment is 
understandable as investors are partial to countries with large economies and 
populations and high levels of urbanisation (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). 
As previously mentioned, the Caribbean is included in the larger LAC geographic region. 
The Caribbean is however consistently neglected in the privatisation literature as the 
scale and scope for private investment is nowhere comparable to her Latin American 
neighbours. Studies on private investment in the LAC region invariably concentrate on 
Latin America with token reference to the Caribbean if at all. To quote Fay and Morrison 
(2005) as they apologise for omitting the Caribbean in their report on infrastructure in 
LAC: 
"It is difficult in a report of this kind to do justice to the tremendous 
diversity of the region [LAC]- countries vary from Caribbean islands with 
less than 100,000 inhabitants to Brazil with close to 180 million people. It 
is our belief, however, that the key messages of this report apply to all 
countries, regardless of size and income, although the best ways to 
implement the recommendations may vary." 
In light of the relative neglect of private investment issues in the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector by previous authors and Caribbean governments' inclination to have the 
private sector play a more prominent role in water and sanitation infrastructure financing, 
a focused investigation is required to determine issues important and possibly unique to 
the Caribbean. 
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1.4 Research questions and hypothesis 
This research has been developed to investigate the phenomenon of private investment 
in the Caribbean water and sanitation sector. In so dOing, the research was designed to 
assess the environment for investment in the sector, determine investors' criteria for 
investment in the sector and identify strategies to attract private investment to the sector 
given the local context and conditions. The research also examined the implications of 
small size in the Caribbean context for institutional requirements to support private 
investment in the sector. To guide the various lines of enquiry, a primary research 
question and four secondary research questions were formulated as follows: 
Primary research question 
• How can private investment be attracted to the Caribbean water and sanitation 
sector? 
Secondary research questions: 
• What is the current state of the operating environment and how conducive is it to 
private investment? 
• What are the main determinants or criteria for private investment in the water and 
sanitation sector? 
• What is the scope for and strategy to attract private investment to the water and 
sanitation sector? 
• To what extent is size an issue and what is the scope for addressing small size as 
a constraint to attracting private investment? 
The guiding hypothesis for the research was: 
• Factors that determine private investment in water and sanitation vary in 
importance and relevance from location to location; hence a context-specific 
approach is needed to attract private investment to the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector. 
A brief description of the approaches used to answer the research questions and 
investigate the research hypothesis is provided in Section 1.5. 
1.5 Methodology 
A multiple-case study approach was used to examine the private investment 
phenomenon in the water and sanitation sectors in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and 
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Tobago. Three main sources of evidence were used within the case study framework to 
answer the research questions - surveys, interviews and documents. Self-administered 
questionnaires were used to obtain an overview of the attitudes and perceptions of local 
financial institutions. Semi-structured interviews provided a more detailed examination of 
the perceptions and experiences of private service providers, water sector officials and 
local financiers. Documents were used to contextualise, corroborate and augment 
evidence from these data sources. The attitudes and perceptions of international private 
investors in the utilities sector and Caribbean water utility managers were obtained 
outside the case study framework using survey questionnaires. Quantitative data 
generated by the survey questionnaires were subject to various statistical analyses using 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Qualitative data were organised 
and thematically analysed using a code and retrieve method. A more detailed 
description of the research methodology is provided in chapter four. 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is organised into eleven chapters as shown in Figure 1.1. Chapters 2 and 3 
are review chapters. In chapter 2, the core concepts of investment decision-making and 
investment promotion are explored to develop an analogous framework for the private 
investment decision in water and sanitation. In chapter 3, the issue of small size as a 
constraint to private investment is investigated. The chapter concludes with a review of 
response strategies to address size-related constraints in the sector. Chapter 4 presents 
the research questions and hypothesis and outlines the research design and 
methodology for data collection necessary to answer these questions. The chapter 
concludes with some preliminary data analysis. Chapter 5 provides a brief introduction to 
the research study area to contextualise the research. The case studies and their 
research findings are presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8 while chapter 9 presents 
additional research data outside of the case study framework. Chapter 10 provides a 
cross-case analysis and discussion of the data. Finally, chapter 11 concludes the thesis 
with a summary of the research findings, conclusions about the research problem and 
implications for future research. 
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Figure 1.1 Schematic outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Private investment in water and The dynamics of small size 
sanitation: Context, scope and issues 
I I 
Chapter 4 I 
Research design and methodology 
I Chapter 5 I Introduction to the research study area 
CASE STUDIES 
Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 
Jamaica Barbados Trinidad and Tobago 
~ 
I Chapter 9 Intemational private investors and Caribbean water professionals: Perceptions 
Chapter 10 
Cross-case analysis and discussion 
I Chapter 11 Conclusion 
1.7 Definitions 
This section provides a list of key terms which are defined to establish their meaning 
within the context of the research. The list is by no means exhaustive as other terms are 
defined as necessary in the relevant sections of the thesis. The definitions provided are 
for reference only and therefore should not be considered complete discussions of any of 
the terms. 
6 
Chaptor 1 - Introduction 
Capital markets - broad term to include tradable debt, securities and equity, as distinct 
from private markets or banks. Means by which money, stocks or bonds are directed to 
productive uses. 
Debt financing - the provision of funds for capital or operating expenses in exchange for 
a promise to repay the principal and interest on the debt. 
Equity financing - the provision of funds for capital or operating expenses in exchange 
for capital stock, stock purchase warrants and options in the business financed without 
any guaranteed return but with the opportunity to share in the company's profits. 
Foreign direct investment - category of international private investment that reflects the 
objective of the investor in one economy to obtain a long-term interest in an enterprise in 
another economy. 
Investment decision-making - process by which investment decisions are made 
following the screening, evaluation and negotiation of investment proposals. 
Investment promotion - activities that attempt to create a favourable image of a country 
as an investment location. 
Operating environment - the environment (policy, legal and regulatory framework) that 
defines, determines and influences how the water and sanitation sector operates. 
Private investment - used interchangeably with 'private sector participation', 
'privatisation' and 'private involvement' to cover a wide range of arrangements in which 
the private sector partakes in the management and/or financing of water and sanitation 
services. 
Project financing - loan structure that relies on the project's cash flow for repayment. 
with the project's assets, rights and interests held as collateral, rather than the general 
credit of the borrower (project sponsor). 
Regional cooperation - collaboration among neighbouring countries from the same 
geographical area to gain collective advantage in areas such as trade, production and 
international bargaining and to address issues of common interest especially where there 
is some resource constraint at the national level. 
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Regulation - discussed in terms of the economic regulation of water and sanitation 
covering issues such as pricing, investment, cost of services, quality (including service 
standards and service obligations) and the rate of return on assets. 
Water and sanitation - water (supply) refers to the system of delivery of potable water 
while sanitation refers to the management of excreta and wastewater but not the disposal 
of solid wastes. The terms 'sewerage' and 'wastewater' are also used interchangeably 
with 'sanitation'. 
1.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter laid the foundations for the thesis. It introduced the research problem, 
research issues, questions and hypothesis. The methodology was then briefly described, 
the thesis structure outlined and key terms defined. 
8 
Chapter 2 - Private investment in watef end sanitation: Context, scope and Issues 
CHAPTER 2 PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN WATER AND 
SANITATION: CONTEXT, SCOPE AND ISSUES 
2.1 Chapter introduction 
Chapter one provided a brief background to the research and introduced the research 
problem and research issues. This chapter is the first of two literature review chapters 
focusing on the parent and immediate disciplines of the research problem with the aim of 
showing where the research problem fits into that body of knowledge. The chapter is 
organised into four main sections. The first section introduces basic definitions and 
provides a taxonomic classification of private investment in water and sanitation. 
Sections two and three explore the core concepts of investment decision-making and 
investment promotion to develop a framework for application to similar constructs in the 
private investment decision in water and sanitation. Section four focuses on the enabling 
environment paradigm to attract private investment to the water and sanitation sector. 
The chapter concludes by identifying key research issues and areas of interest for further 
exploration. 
2.2 Private investment in water and sanitation: A typology 
The terms 'private investment', 'private sector participation' (PSP), 'privatisation' and 
'private financing' are used interchangeably in the literature to cover a wide range of 
arrangements in which the private sector partakes in the management and/or financing of 
water and sanitation services. Although small-scale and/or informal operators such as 
water vendors are increasingly being recognised and described as private enterprises 
(Solo, 1999), 'private investment' for the purposes of this thesis refers to the use of both 
equity and debt capital by formal private entities to partially or totally finance water and 
sanitation services/projects. 
2.2.1 Operational models for private investment 
The main options for private investment in water and sanitation services can be 
categorised according to how they allocate responsibility for issues such as asset 
ownership and capital investment between the public and private sectors. PSP forms in 
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which private entities provide equity and/or debt capital' are briefly described below 
(Idelovitch and Ringskog, 1995; Lee and Jouravlev, 1997; World Bank, 1997; Haarmeyer 
and Mody, 1998a), ordered in terms of the extent of private sector responsibility and 
financial commitment as summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Allocation of key responsibilities for private investment options 
Management I leasel I Concession I BOT-type I Divestiture contract affennage 
Increasing private investment . 
~ . 
. 
Asset ownership Public Public Public Private/public Private 
Caoital investment Public Public Private Private Private 
Commercial risk Public Shared Private Private Private 
OperationsJmaintenance Private Private Private Private Private 
Contract duration 3-5 vears 8-15 vears 20-30 vears 20-30 vears Indefinite 
Source. World Bank (1997) 
Management contracts transfer responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the 
public utility to a private company. At its simplest, the public utility retains responsibility 
for investment and expansion while the management contractor is paid a fee proportional 
to agreed performance targets such as improved collection rates or reduction of 
unaccounted-for-water. More 'sophisticated' management contracts may require the 
private company to take an equity position in the utility. By 'purchasing' technical and 
managerial skills from the private company, management contracts are often used when 
the main objective is to rapidly enhance a utility's technical capacity and its efficiency in 
performing specific tasks, or to prepare for greater private investment. 
Lease contracts also known as affermage, are arrangements whereby a private 
operator rents the facilities from the utility for a certain period and is responsible for 
operation, maintenance and management of the system. Under a lease arrangement, 
the private operator is not responsible for capital expenditures for major new 
investments, but normally has to finance working capital, maintain and repair the assets 
in use and finance the replacement of capital components with a short economic life. 
The responsibility for fixed investment such as system expansion and debt service 
remains with the public utility owner. In many cases however, the leaseholder pays the 
utility a rental fee sufficient to service debt and finance part of its investment programme. 
The risks involved in a lease arrangement tend to be limited, making it a low-risk option 
1 This strict definition excludes service contracts, the simplest form of PSP whereby a private contractor is paid a 
fixed fee to perform specific tasks while the utility retains overall responsibility for financing working capital and fixed 
assets. Under a service contract arrangement, little or no fixed investment is required from the private contractor. 
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for private investment which allows a private firm to become acquainted with the system 
and possibly pave the way for more extensive investment in the future. Lease contracts 
can be medium or long-term in duration but as a general rule, contract length 
corresponds to the amortisation period of the assets under the responsibility of the 
private operator. 
In a concession, the private contractor or concessionaire has overall responsibility for 
service provision including operation, maintenance and management, as well as capital 
investments for service expansion. Asset ownership remains with the government or 
public utility but is entrusted to the concessionaire for the duration of the concession 
contract. Concession contracts usually run for 20-30 years depending on the level of 
investment and the payback period needed for the concessionaire to recover investment 
costs. Under concession contracts, the contractor is paid for its services directly by the 
consumer based on a contractually set price. 
Build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts2 are similar to concession contracts for 
providing bulk services but are normally used for greenfield projects3 that require large 
amounts of financing such as a desalination plant or a wastewater treatment plant. 
Under a BOT contract, a private firm or a consortium of private firms' usually headed by 
a major construction or engineering company, forms a special project company to 
finance, build and operate a speCific new facility or system. Services are then sold in 
bulk to the utility on a take-or-pay basis at a price calculated over the life of the contract 
to cover its construction and operating costs and provide a reasonable return. At the end 
of the contract the facility is transferred to the utility, usually at no cost. Most BOTs 
involve a combination of equity investment and debt financing raised by the project 
company from commercial sources and from bilateral and multilateral lenders. 
Finally, under the divestiture model, government transfers the water and sanitation 
assets to a private company on a permanent basis through the sale of some or all of the 
shares in the utility. Under this arrangement the private sector has full responsibility for 
operations, maintenance and investment. 
Between 1990 and 2004, 54 low and middle-income countries had private activity in their 
water and sanitation sectors in 307 projects involving investment commitments for about 
2 Variations of the BOT contract model include build-own-operate (BOO), build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) and 
design-build-finance-operate (OBFO). BOT is however the generic fonn of this type of arrangement. 
3 Investment in the construction of new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities. 
4 A typical consortium includes major construction and engineering companies and suppliers of heavy equipment, but 
may also include a separate management company, portfolio investors such as financial institutions and the host 
govemment. 
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US$41 billion5 (World Bank, 2005). Concessions dominated private investment activity 
accounting for up to 64% of total investment. Divestitures and BOTs accounted for 18% 
and 17% of private investment respectively, followed by management/lease contracts 
which accounted for only 1% of private investment in developing countries (Ibid.). A 
regional breakdown over the same period shows a concentration of projects in LAC (51 % 
of total investment) and East Asia and Pacific (38% of total investment). Despite this 
concentration of projects in the LAC region, private investment in the Caribbean water 
and sanitation sector which is of interest to this research, accounted for less than 0.2% of 
private activity in the LAC region. The majority of private investments (85%) were 
attributed to the larger countries in the region namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
2.2.2 Private financing mechanisms and sources 
Delmon (2001) identifies three main means of financing water and sanitation projects -
government, project and corporate financing. Government or public financing has 
traditionally been the most prevalent means of financing the sector providing up to 75% 
of total investments (Win penny, 2003). A government may choose to fully or partially 
finance a project either through its own treasury or by borrowing against its own balance 
sheet. In the case of partial financing or co-financing with the private sectorS, 
government while incurring some of the cost of the project (e.g. by investing equity funds 
in the project company or subsidising tariffs), also benefits from attracting private 
investment to supplement the financing requirements of the project. Financing options 
available to governments include providing subsidies, tax breaks, grants, direct financing 
for capital works and guarantees of repayment of commercial debt to the project 
company. Project and corporate financing on the other hand are the domain of the 
private sector and are the focus of this discussion. 
2.2.2.1 Project financing 
Project financing refers to the financing of the construction or development of a project in 
which the lender looks principally to the revenues expected to be generated from the 
operation of the project for repayment of its loan, rather than to the general credit of the 
project sponsor (Beidleman et al., 1991; Wenner and Feo, 1995; Delmon, 2001). Unlike 
traditional asset-based financing methods, project finance lenders have limited or zero 
5 Investment figure does not refer to private investments alone but reflects the total investment for projects with PS? 
6 Commonly referred to as a joint venture or pUblic-private partnership (PPP) whereby a private company or group of 
private companies and the public authority enter into business as equal or near equal equity partners. 
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recourse7 to, or right to attach claims against the assets of the project sponsors. Project 
finance is a highly leveraged transaction with debt-equity ratios8 approaching 75% in 
some cases, underscoring the importance of debt capital to the financing package. The 
remaining investment (often 5-25%) of the capital invested in the project is supplied as 
equity investment by the project sponsors. In the final analysis, the balance between 
debt and equity in project financing depends on the project structure, the quality of the 
revenue stream and the risk profile of the project. 
Project finance techniques have been the preferred method of attracting equity investors 
and lenders to BOT-type water and sanitation projects (Wenner and Feo, 1995; 
Haarmeyer and Mody, 1997; 1998a; Wolfs and Woodroffe, 2002). A typical BOT usually 
involves two sets of private sector stakeholders involved in project financing, namely: 
(a) private operators and contractors who participate in the equity of the 
project companl commonly referred to as project sponsors; and 
(b) extemal financiers such as international financial institutions, commercial 
banks, leasing companies, export credit agencies, insurance companies 
and pension funds who provide equity and debt finance to the project 
company to effect the desired investment. 
The appeal of project financing lies in the provision of off-balance sheet financing for the 
project which does not affect the credit of the shareholders of the project company or 
government authority. In absolute terms however, project financing is considered 
expensive and time-consuming as the transfer of commercial risk to lenders translates 
into higher rates of interest for debt financing and the need for detailed and complex 
contracts contributes to long lead times and high transaction costs (Haarmeyer and 
Mody, 1998a; Delmon, 2001). For these reasons, the use of project financing in general 
and BOTs in particular has been severely criticised for adding to the long-term financial 
burden of many developing countries instead of reducing or eliminating the need for 
public financing (Hall and Lobina, 2004). 
1 Recourse is the right of lenders on default of payment to claim assets for repayment of debt. This recourse will 
normally be assets belonging to the project company, shareholders or possibly through govemment or parent 
company guarantees (Delmon, 2001). 
a The debt-equity (financial leverage) ratio indicates the extent to which a firm relies on debt financing and is the 
proportion of debt to equity often expressed as a percentage. The higher this ratio, the greater the financial leverage 
of the firm. 
S Project company or special purpose vehicle formed by private investors involved in the early stages of the project 
such as the project developer who obtained the exclusive right to establish the project (usually through the award of a 
competitive tender or direct negotiations with government) and other private entities who specialise in one or several 
of the tasks to be pelformed under the project such as contractors, equipment suppliers and operators. 
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2.2.2.2 Corporate financing 
Corporate financing refers to the situation where lenders provide debt financing to the 
project company or sponsors against proven credit risk and ongoing business (Del man, 
2001). Otherwise known as full-recourse financing or balance sheet financing, corporate 
financing provides lenders with full recourse to the assets of the shareholders and any 
other assets provided as security for repayment of the loan in case of default on the 
financing terms of the project company. Corporate financing is rarely used for BOT-type 
projects because project companies with their limited liability status rule out lenders' 
recourse to the assets of said companies for repayment of debt. 
Despite its appeal over project financing in terms of lower transaction costs and less 
complex financing structures (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998a), the use of corporate 
financing is considered to be a key constraint for water and sanitation projects both in 
terms of volume and maturity for the following reasons (Bond and Carter, 1994; Wenner 
and Feo, 1995; Vinter, 1998): 
(a) it exposes a company to significant risk and therefore requires a strong 
and large balance sheet (i.e. mainly accessible to large investors); 
(b) it usually involves a syndication of lenders since very few commercial 
banks are prepared to underwrite debt financing alone; 
(c) commercial banks are constrained by the time profile of their deposits 
which prevents them prudently lending large volumes of long-term debt; 
(d) limited incentives for lenders who can only look forward to the repayment 
of their loans plus accrued interest with no 'upside' to project success 
such as a share in the profits; and 
(e) the nature of risks in the sector such as the fragmented industry structure, 
the lack of creditworthiness of local governments and uncertainty over 
asset valuation discourage its use. 
2.2.2.3 Capital markets 
Capital markets are considered to be the funding source most suited to the conditions of 
water and sanitation infrastructure financing both in terms of longer maturities and 
increased flexibility for accommodating different maturity ·structures as they provide 
project sponsors access to fixed-term debt (bond and equity issues) over a longer term 
than banks can offer, thus increasing sponsors' return on equity (Haarmeyer and Mody, 
1998a; Ramirez and Parra, 1999; PADCO, 2003). Predominantly done through bond 
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issues 10, capital market financing requires access to accumulated long-term savings such 
as pension and insurance funds to be invested for extended periods in the capital 
markets and managed by institutional investors such as unit/investment trusts, 
brokerages, pension funds and insurance companies. Major investors in capital market 
instruments are rarely individual retail investors 11 but are rather professional institutional 
investors who invest pools of funds gathered from retail sources for specific purposes. 
Domestic/local capital markets in particular, are considered to be more suitable to 
financing water and sanitation infrastructure than international capital markets because of 
(Kumar et al., 1997; Ramirez and Parra, 1999): 
(a) the availability of local currency debt (same currency as the project's 
revenue) which reduces foreign currency risk thereby reducing the cost of 
capital; 
(b) the increased involvement of domestic investors believed to have a lower 
risk perception because they are familiar with local conditions and able to 
finance local projects more efficiently; and 
(c) the possibility of financing smaller projects. 
2.2.2.4 Specialised investment funds 
The limitations faced by banks in lending to projects in developing countries have 
stimulated the development of alternative financing arrangements to meet the large 
demand for water and sanitation infrastructure financing (Bond and Carter, 1994; 
Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998a). Specialised financial instruments such as equity funds 
provide a means by which developers can mobilise funds from investors in the world's 
major financial centres for on-lending and equity investment in developing country water 
and sanitation infrastructure projects. By offering a mix of sectoral/regional expertise, 
pooling of project risks, higher liquidity and reduced transaction costs, infrastructure 
funds enable risk-averse financial institutions such as pension funds and insurance 
companies to invest in long-term capital on a project-by-project basis (Bond and Carter, 
1994). Examples include the Tamil Nadu water and sanitation pooled fund which is a 
pure debt fund raised by bond issues which is later disbursed as sub-loans to 
participating municipalities in India (PADCO, 2003); the Asian Infrastructure Fund which 
was established as a US$500 million closed-end fund to invest primarily as an equity 
10 A bond is a legal promise by the issuer to pay the investor the principal that is being borrowed plus a specified 
interest rate by the maturity date. Bonds are usually negotiable and long-term, e.g. 5-25 years. 
" Investors who buy and sell securities (shares) for their own behalf, Le. not for an organisation. 
15 
Chapter 2 - Private/nvestm8flt in water and sanitation: Context, scope and Issues 
participant in private infrastructure projects in developing Asian countries (Bond and 
Carter. 1994); the Darby Latin American Mezzanine Fund which is a markets fund 
designed to address shortfalls in the availability of long-term subordinated debt financing 
for infrastructure projects in LAC (lDB. 1998); and the Emerging Africa Infrastructure 
Fund which provides long-term debt finance to private infrastructure projects in 44 sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries (PPIAF. 2002). 
2.2.3 International versus domestic private investment 
Discussions of private investment in water and sanitation often take for granted that the 
issue is the involvement of large multinational companies. This assumption although 
understandable given the dominance of multinationals such as Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 
and Vivendi during the 1990s (Finger and Allouche. 2002) and widespread recognition of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) 12 as the driving force behind the surge in private capital 
flows to the sector (Sad er. 1999). has the potential to overlook the involvement of local 
investors in the sector. 
In the mid-1990s. the breakdown of private financial sources as a proportion of total 
investment to the sector was estimated at international private companies (10-15%) and 
domestic private sector (5%) (Winpenny. 2003). Reported levels of international private 
investment in the 1990s as a proportion of total private transactions vary from a high of 
80% (Sader. 1999) to lower estimates of 47% (Ramamurti and Doh. 2004) with 
discrepancies in the local-foreign spilt explained by unreliable data. undifferentiated data 
into local and foreign private investments and different reporting practices (Ramamurti 
and Doh. 2004). Despite these inconsistencies. analyses of the financial structure of 
water and sanitation projects reveal that foreign private financing exceeds local private 
financing particularly during the early stages of a shift towards increased private 
investment in the sector and for BOT-type projects (Bond and Carter. 1994). Local 
private financing was found to be significant either in countries where domestic financial 
markets were already well developed such as India and the Philippines. or in countries 
where domestic financial markets developed rapidly with the entry of foreign institutional 
investors and liberalisation of domestic interest rates such as Chile and Argentina (Bond 
and Carter. 1994; Dailami and Leipziger. 1998). 
12 FDI is defined as that category of international private investment that reflects the objective of the investor in one 
economy to obtain a long-term interest in an enterprise in another economy. 
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The dominance of international private investment in water and sanitation is primarily a 
result of the need for significant up-front financing, a lack of long-term local currency 
financing and technical and managerial expertise requirements for large-scale projects 
(Dailami and Leipziger, 1998; Sad er, 1999). Given the underdeveloped state of local 
capital markets in many developing economies due to narrow equity markets, small 
saving pools, inexperience with commercial contracts and inadequate legal and 
regulatory frameworks (Ramfrez and Parra, 1999; Beato and Vfves, 2003), water and 
sanitation projects have had to tap international financial markets for long-term finance. 
As a result, the private investment literature is replete with the experiences, requirements 
and preferences of international private investors. 
Local private investors in water and sanitation include large and small operators and 
financial institutions such as commercial and development banks, many of which 
establish business relations with the public utility in terms of providing working and 
project capital or participate in joint ventures with large multinationals (Sader, 1999; 
Winpenny, 2003). In many low-income cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America where 
less than half of the population is served by the public utility, basic services are provided 
by small-scale private water providers 13 commonly referred to as the 'other private sector' 
because of their general exclusion from national water supply strategies and service 
development plans (Solo, 1999). Although this category of local private investor is 
significant in terms of providing services to the unserved and poor, they are not included 
in this research's definition of private investment and so will not be considered further. 
2.2.3.1 Differences between foreign and domestic private investors 
The FDI literature identifies several differences between foreign and domestic firms, 
some of which may be of relevance to international and domestic private operators 
and/or investments in the water and sanitation sector, namely (Boddewyn, 1983; Luo and 
Tan, 1998; Bellak, 2004): 
(a) underlying motivation for firm establishment is different; 
13 Range of fonns include: (a) individual families with water and/or sanitation connections who provide services to 
their neighbours; (b) water points and/or latrines managed or owned by individuals; (c) bulk water supply systems 
using holding tanks; (d) privately owned and managed public toilets and bath houses; (e) private competitive water 
networks which provide house connections to water and sanitation; (t) dosed water systems with treatment plants 
and piping networks owned by residents such as service cooperatives; (g) truckers with private wells; (h) sewage 
removal services/septic tank emptiers/night soil carriers; and (i) private wastewater treatment plants that charge 
septic tank emptier trucks to receive and treat sewage (Solo, 1999). 
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(b) different strategic choices as international and local firms are 
heterogeneous in organisational capabilities, market orientations, 
strategic objectives and institutional support; 
(c) the need for more in-depth consideration of certain variables when 
making the international private investment decision due to unfamiliar 
country-specific risks such as government instability, macroeconomic 
planning failures, exchange controls, contract viability and inflation shifts 
which can impact on a project's prospects for profitability. For some 
authors, the presence of country risk is the key factor that distinguishes a 
foreign loan from a domestic one (Dailami and Leipziger, 1998); 
(d) substantial differences in profitability reflected by a gap in the rates of 
return. A common presumption is that international firms are more 
productive than their local counterparts, thus explaining the higher profit 
margins of foreign firms. If foreign investments are focused on more 
viable investments in the first place however, Bellak (2004) posits that 
profitability gaps may merely be due to selection bias as international 
firms are generally good at 'picking the winner' or 'cherry-picking'; and 
(e) international companies are at a greater disadvantage in terms of the lack 
of government and public support for private investment due to their 
'foreignness' (greater biases against foreign private investors). 
Differences between international and domestic private investment are potentially 
important for policy intervention as they can inform government of the 'preventing 
negative effects and stimulating positive effects' strategy required to encourage this type 
of investment (Bellak, 2004). Although no further distinction between international and 
domestic private investment will be made in subsequent sections due to the international 
private investment bias in the extant literature and the general assumption by some 
authors that private investors regardless of origin are affected by similar factors but to 
varying degrees (Feeney et al., 1999), the fact that these differences can impact on the 
private investment decision in water and sanitation requires further examination. 
2.3 Investment decision-making: What do investors look for? 
Investment decisions are generally long-term decisions where expenditure and 
investment alternatives are balanced over time in the hope that investment now will 
generate extra returns in the future (Lucey, 1992). The decision to invest is based on 
many factors including: 
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(a) the investor's belief in the future based on forecasts of internal and 
external factors such as costs, revenues, inflation and interest rates; 
(b) the alternatives available in which to invest; and 
(c) the investor's attitude to risk. 
The literature on investment decision-making spans a number of theoretical perspectives 
including financial theory, strategic theory and organisational decision-making theory. 
Financial theory focuses on how the requirements of capital markets shape investment 
decision-making and internal financial analysis (Grundy and Johnson, 1993; Pike and 
Neale, 2003). Strategic theories deal with the external environment and choices of 
positioning, matching the organisation to that environment and the internal allocation of 
resources to meet those choices (Mintzberg et al., 1976; Davidson, 1985; Papadakis et 
al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2004). Finally, organisational decision-making theory focuses 
on the wider organisational context within which investment decisions are made (Butler et 
al., 1991; Cyert and March, 1992). These theories inform the following review of 
investment decision-making and provide a framework for private investment decision-
making in the water and sanitation sector. 
2.3.1 The investment decision-making process 
Investment decision-making is generally viewed as an incremental activity involving many 
people throughout the organisational hierarchy over an extended period of time. The 
investment decision-making process can be modelled in five stages as shown in Figure 
2.1 and discussed below (Feeney et al., 1999): 
(a) origination during which investment proposals are generated; 
(b) screening during which it is decided whether or not to further investigate 
the investment opportunity; 
(c) evaluation during which detailed analyses of the investment proposal are 
conducted; 
(d) negotiation and closing during which the framework for investment is 
ironed out and the deal is closed if acceptable to the parties involved; and 
(e) post-investment activity in which the investment is monitored. 
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Figure 2.1 Investment decision-making process 
Source: Feeney et al. (1999) 
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Firms either wait for proposals to come to them with most proposals coming by referrals 
(Aharoni, 1966; Fried and Hisrich, 1994), or are constantly in search of investment 
opportunities (Wahab, 1978; Larimo, 1987). Many organisations have firm-specific 
criteria on investment size, industries in which they invest, geographic location of 
investment and stage of financing. Proposals are further screened based on 'substance' 
following a general review of the business plan coupled with existing knowledge within 
the organisation (Feeney et al., 1999). Evaluation may go through several phases but 
generally involves assessment of the likelihood of success and potential of the product or 
service, assessment of other stakeholders and assessment of returns. Evaluation may 
also include formal market studies, reference checks and consultation with third parties in 
an attempt to identify and resolve any barriers to the investment (Fried and Hisrich, 
1994). Negotiations occur over the structure and terms of the investment with the final 
agreed to details specified in a contract. Organisations are free to reject investment 
proposals during any of these stages. Finally, post-auditing of the investment compares 
actual performance with forecasts made at the time of approval to improve the quality of 
future decisions through learning from the investment experience and to ensure 
managerial accountability for decisions made (Pike and Neale, 2003). 
The investment decision-making process used by different types of investors is expected 
to share many similarities with differences prompted mainly by scale and stage of 
• investment and by the nature of the relationships between investor and business owner 
(Feeney et al., .1999). New businesses for example are the most vulnerable to failure 
(Hall and Tu, 2003). As such, evaluation may be more rigorous requiring more time and 
resources than appraisal of more familiar investment opportunities. Similarly, 
international investments may introduce more environmental and behavioural 
uncertainties than domestic investments thereby necessitating more detailed investment 
appraisals. 
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2.3.1.1 Investment evaluation and appraisal 
One of the main tasks of investment decision-making is to select an investment that 
maximises the objectives of an organisation. Investment appraisal is that part of the 
evaluation phase of the investment decision-making process during which investment 
opportunities are assessed by comparing benefits against costs to determine 
acceptability and to set a ranking order among competing investments. Traditional 
investment appraisal methods rely heavily on financial theory and include accounting 
techniques such as payback and accounting rate of return and discounted cash flow 
techniques such as net present value and internal rate of return (lucey, 1992). Strategic 
management appraisal techniques developed to facilitate a more holistic understanding 
of the business environment include matrix approaches such as the SWOT matrix 14 
(Weihrich, 1982), value-based techniques such as 'economic value added' and 
'shareholder value added' (Grundy, 1993; Francis and Minchington, 2002) and 
performance-based techniques such as the 'balanced scorecard' (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996; lipe and Salterio, 2000). 
Companies use a combination of financial and strategic management appraisal methods 
when assessing investment decisions (Akalu, 2003). Grundy and Johnson (1993) find 
however that managers generally find it difficult to link strategic and financial appraisal of 
major investment decisions due to a lack of reliable information on the external 
environment (more crucial for longer-term and more complex investments) and difficulty 
in balancing the often subjective nature of strategic appraisal techniques with more 
quantifiable financial appraisal techniques. Organisations generally display biases 
towards certainty and tangible assets, implicit in the analytical tools used to assess 
investments (Coff and laverty, 2001). As a result, the use of financial appraisal 
techniques predominates (lefley and Morgan, 1998) despite criticisms of their narrow-
minded focus on profits, exclusion of non-financial benefits and over-emphasis on the 
short-term (Adler, 2000; Vining and Meredith, 2000). The implications of the popularity of 
financial appraisal techniques are evident in investors' emphasis on investment 
performance in terms of profit or earnings per share and conservatism when projecting 
benefits that are particularly uncertain. Investment in areas not typically perceived as 
profitable, where there is a high degree of uncertainty or in situations where a significant 
time lag between cost and benefit exists are therefore at risk of not being considered 
viable. 
1" A SWOT analysis is a scan of the business situation to identify internal strengths and weaknesses and external 
opportunities and threats. The findings are then grouped into a SWOT matrix which identifies strategies that are 
either suitable or unsuitable depending on whether and how they address SWOT combinations. 
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2.3.1.2 Rating and assessment systems 
To facilitate like-for-like comparison between investment locations, several rating 
systems are used by investors to evaluate a range of factors. Investment magazines 
such as the Institutional Investor and Euromoney for example, produce country risk 
ratings based on a weighted average method to score variables such as economic 
performance, political risk, debt indicators and access to bank finance and capital 
markets (Pike and Neale, 2003). AT Keamey's annual FDI Confidence Index 15 gauges 
the likelihood of foreign investment in specific markets using survey data obtained from 
senior executives of the world's 1,000 largest corporations (AT Kearney, 2005). 
Investment Climate Assessments conducted by the World Bank provide a standardised 
way of measuring and comparing investment climate conditions in a country from an 
international perspective (World Bank, 2003). Sovereign credit ratings by rating agencies 
such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's provide a forward-looking estimate of the 
relative likelihood that a borrower (usually government) will default on its obligations 
(Cantor and Packer, 1995; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). Despite criticisms with 
respect to rating coverage bias in more developed economies (Ferri et al., 2001), 
relevance bias towards the foreign private sector (Tannenbaum, 2002) and the potential 
for distortion when linking actual ratings to rating criteria due to the unquantifiable nature 
of some criteria (Cantor and Packer, 1995), rating and assessment systems are generally 
considered valuable appraisal tools as they (Ferri et al., 2001; Nordal, 2001): 
(a) reduce investor uncertainty by providing information; 
(b) facilitate cross-country comparisons on a homogeneous basis; 
(c) are often good indicators/predictors of the investment climate; 
(d) communicate concepts that are difficult to quantify; and 
(e) provide a transparent benchmark. 
2.3.2 Investment criteria 
Research on investment decision-making either focus on the decision-making process to 
understand how organisations go about making investment decisions, or concentrate on 
the criteria used to evaluate and ultimately determine the investment decision. 
Understanding what investors consider important when evaluating and selecting 
investments is of particular interest to this research as these criteria inform the strategy to 
15 Weighted average of the number of high, medium, low and 'no interest' responses to a question about the 
likelihood of FOI in a market over the next one to three years. Index values are calculated on a scale of zero to three, 
with three representing highly attractive and zero not attractive (AT Keamey, 2005). 
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attract investment. Researchers have adopted different approaches to examine 
investment criteria such as: 
(a) questionnaires administered to a large number of investors who are 
asked to rate on a scale the importance of predetermined potential criteria 
or to rate various case profiles of investment proposals in terms of their 
attractiveness from which their preferences can be determined (Butler et 
al., 1993; Lamech and Saeed, 2003; IDB, 2003a); 
(b) interviews of investors based on key investment decisions to identify 
factors that discouraged or prompted them to decide to invest (Feeney et 
al., 1999); 
(c) case studies at the firm or industry level of investment decisions (Butler 
et al., 1991; Larimo, 1995); 
(d) f!rotocol analysis which involves investors verbalising their decision 
thought processes which are later transcribed and analysed to identify 
their decision criteria (Hall and Hofer, 1993); and 
(e) statistical studies of firm, industry or country level data to identify 
determinants that explain investment trends (Billington, 1999; Asiedu, 
2002; Chakrabarti, 2003). 
Using a combination of these methodologies, researchers have highlighted various 
investment criteria for different types of investors. Criteria important to venture 
capitalists 16 for example include fit with the firm's lending guidelines (e.g. geographic 
location, size of investment, stage of development, rate of return, risk, investor control, 
equity share, familiarity with technology/product/market and cash out potential); long-term 
growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate (e.g. 
market attractiveness, potential size and technology); nature of the proposed business 
(product/market considerations); characteristics of the entrepreneur (e.g. ability to 
evaluate risk, background/experience, managerial capabilities and management 
commitment); and characteristics of the proposal and strategy of the proposed business 
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; MacMillan et al., 1987; Hall and Hofer, 
1993). In a survey of 194 business angels '7 , Feeney et al. (1999) find that attributes of 
the owner(s) such as management track record, realism and integrity, and attributes of 
the business including potential for high profit, a reasonable exit plan, security and the 
opportunity to get involved in the investment are desirable. 
18 Venture capitalists invest other people's money in businesses with high growth potential that have not yet gone 
~ublic or are in an early development phase, usually in retum for an equity stake in the business. 
7 Individuals who invest their own money in projects and/or small- to medium-sized enterprises. 
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The investment criteria of international investors have received considerable attention in 
the FDI strategy literature due to the revival of FDI in the mid 1980s as an important 
source of private external finance for developing countries. Market size proxied by real 
GDP'8 or GDP per capita is the most robust and significant FDI determinant in most 
studies (Um, 2001). Other important variables include political risk, rnacroeconomic 
stability, labour costs, infrastructure quality, host government policies, degree of 
industrialisation and the businesslinvestment clirnate (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Singh 
and Jun, 1995; Billington, 1999; Asiedu, 2002; Chakrabarti, 2003). 
In assessing borrowers' creditworthiness, commercial banks generally rate the economic 
situation (e.g. cash flow, profitability, capital structure, liquidity), the business situation 
(e.g. industry assessment, market position, special risks, product mix/range, 
forecasts/sales revenue and corporate/legal structure), the quality of management (e.g. 
experience, succession and quality of accounting/controlling) and customer 
relationship/account management'9 (Brunner et al., 2000; Krahnen and Weber, 2001). 
2.3.2.1 Relative importance of investment criteria 
The above review suggests that different types of investors have different investment 
criteria. There is however a tendency in the literature to presume that irrespective of the 
type of investor, there is little difference in investors' range of investment criteria as 
investors generally rely on a similar set of explanatory variables. The reasoning behind 
this is the commonality of investors' objectives - project/investment success, which 
Butler et al. (1993) consider to be the defining measure of decision-making effectiveness. 
In addition, Feeney et al. (1999) suggest that there is wide applicability of investors' 
criteria because of the generic nature of the investment decision-making process. Even 
if one accepts this generalisation of investment criteria, there is no mistaking that the 
relative importance of these determinants varies. Feeney et al. (1999) for example find 
that business angels value owner attributes more highly than business attributes, while 
for venture capitalists, business attributes are more important (Hall and Hofer, 1993; 
Fried and Hisrich, 1994). Feeney et al. (1999) suggest that this difference in criteria 
between both sets of investors is a result of the nature of their relationships with their 
investments. Business angels tend to act as principals20 in the governance of the firms in 
which they invest and so face the full consequence of decisions at the personal level. 
18 Gross domestic product (GDP) is the total market value of goods and services produced within a given period after 
deducting the costs of good utilised in the process of production. Real GDP is expressed in constant prices Le. in the 
dollar values of a particular year which is known as the base period. 
19 Particularly relevant in cases of long-term customer relationships. 
20 In business, the principal is the main person who can make important business decisions and is legally responsible 
for them. 
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Venture capitalists on the other hand are usually paid employees acting as agents of the 
fund owner(s) and have to meet prescribed and relatively short-term targets for rate of 
return and investment management. As such, venture capitalists place greater 
importance on business characteristics/environment. 
The FDI literature also highlights the relative importance of FDI determinants which are 
found to depend on factors such as geographical location, motive for investment, type of 
investment, sector of investment, size of investor and the prevailing investment climate. 
Asiedu (2002) speaks of the "Africa effect" whereby determinants such as infrastructure 
development and a higher return on capital promote FDI to non-SSA countries but have 
no significant impact on FDI flows to SSA. As a result, countries in SSA on average 
receive less FDI than countries in other regions by virtue of their geographic location. 
Based on the uneven distribution of FDI and the relative difference in importance of FDI 
determinants among developing countries, Shatz and Venables (2000) conclude that 
each geographical region has its own set of determinants important to attracting FDI. 
With regard to type of investment, Ferret (2003) finds that acquisition-FDI arises in 
medium-sized markets and that the necessary conditions for greenfield-FDI are a large 
market and small sunk cost of additional investments21 . The sector of investment is also 
strongly linked to the type of FDI and impacts on the relative importance of FDI 
determinants (UNCTAD, 1998). Resource-seeking industrial-FDI for example requires 
an abundance of natural resources, infrastructure and labour resources. The relevant 
determinants for attracting market-seeking manufacturing-FDI include market size, 
market growth and market access. Technology and the capacity for continued innovation 
are key assets for services-FDI in areas such as telecommunications (Ibid.). 
Locational determinants of FDI also differ depending on the size of the investor 
(UNCTAD, 1998). Kinoshita (1998) for example finds that different size-groups of firms 
react to different factors in the host country in making their FDI decisions. Investment 
decisions of large firms were dominated by strategic considerations (e.g. whether or not 
competitors invested in the country), market size and policy environments while small 
firms were more likely to undertake investments where there was abundant low-cost 
labour and sufficient infrastructure. 
The main point highlighted by this review is that investors' criteria for investment although 
similar in a general sense in that they share common explanatory variables, can vary in 
21 FOI normally takes the form of greenfield investments (investments under a contractual bUild-operate type 
arrangement for the construction of new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities) or the merger and acquisition 
of existing local enterprises. 
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importance for different sets of investors and under different circumstances. As such, it 
is essential that the criteria applicable to a specific location, sector and/or investor are 
determined so that an appropriate strategy can be effected to attract this investment. 
2.3.3 The dynamics of investment decision-making 
2.3.3.1 Who makes the investment decision? 
Investment decision-making is invariably a top management exercise because of the 
scale and long-term nature of the consequences of investment decisions (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996; Papadakis et al., 1998). Within the organisational context, persons who 
'influence' investment decision-making have authority over the investment decision, 
generally using information provided by others 'involved' in the decision-making process 
(Gore et al., 1992; Yukl, 1998). Top management is usually more concerned with the 
exercise of broad authority in making long-term plans, formulating policy, planning 
strategies to obtain objectives and allocating resources. Lower level managers on the 
other hand are primarily concerned with structuring, coordinating and faCilitating day-to-
day work activities. As such, their role in the investment decision-making process is 
limited to providing information to support the process. The implication of this 
relationship between management hierarchy and influence on investment decision-
making is the source of information on investment decisions. Consequently, studies 
investigating investment decision-making consistently rely on the accounts of top-level 
managers (Hoskisson et al., 1994; Larimo, 1995; Lien et al., 2005). 
2.3.3.2 Models of investment decision-making 
Investment decision-making is generally considered as both a formal rational process of 
trying to optimise financial returns to the organisation and as an organisational 
behavioural process in which local interests, perceptions and other aspects of human 
behaviour play a vital part. The decision-making literature generally recognises four 
models of decision-making, namely (Butler et al., 1993): 
(a) the rational model which requires decision-makers to search for all 
possible options, to compare and evaluate them and choose the optimal; 
(b) the bounded rational model which emphasises the need for decision-
makers to make decisions with incomplete information, under time 
pressures, when there may be disagreement over goals, and to accept 
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that an optimal solution cannot always be achieved within these 
constraints; 
(c) the political model which is based upon the idea that an organisation 
consists of a number of interests who are potentially competing for 
resources and attention; and 
(d) the garbage can model in which ambiguity characterises the decision 
process, cause and effect relationships are difficult to identify and 
decision-makers have only limited time to allocate to anyone decision. 
The idealised concept of rationality assumes maximisation of a fixed or relatively stable 
objective, a known set of alternatives and their outcomes and computational skill to 
determine the optimal solution with respect to the objective (Northcott, 1998). In reality 
however, objectives are dynamic rather than static, information is seldom perfect and 
alternatives are limited. These constraints and limitations have led theorists such as 
Cooper (1975) and Cyert and March (1992) to consider a bounded rational model of 
decision-making in which decision-makers seek to 'satisfice,22 rather than 'maximise' 
wealth generation of each investment decision. Traditional approaches to investment 
decision-making clearly fall into the rational/bounded rational model with appraisal 
techniques (especially financial methods) designed to assist rational decision-making. 
Individual decision-makers however will have their own goals which may range from 
maximising personal remuneration to enhancing job security, or seeking status and 
power (Northcott, 1998). In extreme cases, the pursuit of these goals by an individual 
decision-maker may not contribute to the maximising/satisficing of organisational wealth. 
The general assumption however is that the decision-maker will choose to act first and 
foremost in the interests of organisational wealth maximisation/satisfication (Ibid.). 
2.3.3.3 Behavioural aspects of investment decision-making 
Regardless of the type of investor, Pettinger (2000) asserts that no effective investment 
decision is taken purely on the basis of mutual, professional and operational 
compatibility. Behaviour-related factors important to investment decision-making as 
highlighted by Pettinger (2000) are: 
(a) confidence in the investment proposal based on an understanding and 
acceptance of the needs and wants of the parties involved; 
22 Word coined to describe the idea that decision·makers will suffice with satisfactory solutions rather than 
continuously search for the ideal one. 
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(b) motivation to see the investment proposal through to a successful 
conclusion which depends on the relationship between what is expected, 
the rewards and returns that are to accrue and the commitment 
necessary to ensure that the rewards are achieved and expectations met; 
(c) perception in terms of the way in which the investment proposal is 
regarded which is affected by the organisation's/decision-maker's 
experiences and knowledge of the external environment; 
(d) culture which refers to the way in which things are done (i.e. the 
attitudes, behaviour, values and beliefs in a particular sector of society); 
(e) sources of power and influence which are important when assessing 
the specific drivers behind particular ventures; and 
(f) leadership to provide direction and overall control of the process. 
2.3.3.4 Relevance of perception to investment decision-making 
In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of acquiring, 
interpreting, selecting and organising sensory information. Many cognitive psychologists 
hold the view that as we move about the world, we create a 'model' of how the world 
works, that is we sense the objective world but our sensations map to percepts23 
(Anderson, 2004). These percepts are provisional however as they change as we 
acquire new information. According to behaviouralist Myers (2000), a person's decision-
making process depends to a significant degree on their cognitive style which is based 
on how they score on a set of four bi-polar dimensions - thinking and feeling; 
extroversion and introversion; sensing and intuition; and judgement and perception. 
Persons who score near the thinking, extroversion, sensing and judgement ends of the 
dimensions for example, tend to have a logical, analytical, objective, critical and empirical 
decision-making style. Conversely, persons who score near the feeling, introversion, 
intuition and perception ends of the dimensions tend to have a more subjective decision-
making style that evaluates things based on experiences and preferences (sees things in 
terms of like and dislike or good and bad). 
Similarly, investment decision-making as a cognitive psychological construct can be 
affected by investors' perception of uncertainties and the attendant risks. Antonides and 
van der Sar (1990) for example, relate investors' expected returns and perceived risks to 
various economic-psychological variables concerning the future development of financial 
and macroeconomic factors by separating the 'expectation' and 'preference' components 
23 A percept is the representation of an external event that affected the senses and which by perceptual processing, 
caused the activation of a certain category in the mind. 
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of the investment decision-making process and operationalising the major influences on 
each component which relate to perception instead of actual events. By multiplying the 
factors by their corresponding perceived importance and incorporating investors' 
subjective weightings, they found that subjective variables such as expected rate of 
return had a positive effect on investors' expectations and thereby on the expected 
profitability of their investments. 
Perceptions can have a significant impact on investment choices. In the case of SSA for 
example, investors' perception of the continent as inherently risky has resulted in 
relatively low FDI flows compared to other regions even with other determinants of FDI in 
place (Asiedu, 2002). Similarly, Collier and Dollar (1999) posit that small countries are at 
a disadvantage in attracting FDI even with good policies and other positive 
characteristics as they are generally perceived to be significantly more risky than larger 
countries. The infrastructure FDI boom of the 1990s as explained by Ramamurti and 
Doh (2004) was partly a result of investors' belief that the risks of infrastructure FDI were 
declining, there was a new climate for FDI in developing countries and that developing 
countries would not expropriate foreign investments as they had in the past. The fall-off 
of private investment by the late 1990s was accompanied by a change in investors' 
perception of the investment climate in many developing countries which was mainly 
informed by their investment experiences. Water and sanitation in particular, consistently 
attracted the least amount of investment as it was perceived to be more risky than other 
infrastructure services (Briscoe, 1996; Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998b). 
The main point highlighted by this review is the importance of investors' perception(s) of 
the investment climate and by extension, the importance of changing negative 
perceptions to more positive perceptions and/or maintaining positive perceptions in order 
to attract investment. This underlies the importance of understanding investors' 
perceptions so that one is in a position to appreciate issues important to them. 
2.3.4 Investment decision-making in water and sanitation 
The characteristics of water-industry assets (e.g. sunk costs and long payback periods). 
and the nature of the sector (e.g. need for regulation and government involvement) 
generally influence investors' appraisal of the sector. Although financial techniques 
dominate reflected in investors' preference for methods such as net present value and 
internal rate of return to analyse project viability (Tung, 1988; Ranasinghe, 1999), 
strategic analyses of the business environment are also significant in informing 
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investment decisions in the sector (Tebbutt et al., 2002). A typical BOT project for 
example as shown in Figure 2.2, appraises the political and economic environment to 
determine how conducive it is to private investment, the risks involved and how these are 
likely to impact on project viability and the provision of support mechanisms such as 
guarantees to mitigate against these risks (Quartey, 1996). Water projects face many 
risks - some specific to the sector, others to the project location (e.g. regulatory, political 
and market risks) and others more general in nature (e.g. construction, operation and 
revenue risks). The successful identification, evaluation, allocation and mitigation of 
these risks are central features of investment decision-making in the sector (Bond and 
Carter, 1994; Grout, 1997; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Froud, 2003). 
Figure 2.2 Selection flow chart for a typical BOT water project 
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Source: Quartey (1996) 
Investment decisions in the water and sanitation sector share many similarities with 
traditional investment decisions (especially FDI decisions). The specific characteristics of 
the sector however, its political economy, the type of investors and the nature of private 
investments also impose additional economic and institutional determinants that are 
more sector-specific and/or project-specific (Jensen and Blanc-Brude, 2006). Commonly 
reported determinants for private investment in the sector include (Jensen and Blanc-
Brude, 2005): 
(a) macroeconomic and political stability to safeguard the investment; 
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(b) legislative and regulatory frameworks that clearly define the processes 
and institutional environment for investment and offer protection from 
political intervention; 
(c) adequate tariffs and pricing policies to realise a reasonable return on 
investment; 
(d) consumers' ability and willingness to pay; 
(e) government effectiveness; 
(f) utility/sector performance; 
(g) market size to generate sufficient revenues; 
(h) availability of financing; 
(i) availability of financial support mechanisms (e.g. government 
guarantees ); 
Ul previous investment performance; and 
(k) government's commitment to the 'contract' and conditions for investment. 
One of the most important criteria for investors in the sector is the potential profit or rate 
of return (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). Another key consideration is scale which 
explains investors' general bias towards large-scale projects with large contract values in 
middle to higher-income cities with large urban populations. BOTs and concession 
contracts dominate as these provide the highest returns (Ibid.). In assessing the sector, 
water utilities (particularly those in developing countries) generally come under strong 
criticism due to the numerous technical/operational, commerciallfinancial and 
human/institutional problems that can render them inefficient and uneconomical 
(Idelovitch and Ringskog, 1995). However, compared to other investment criteria that 
essentially speak to what Feeney et al. (1999) refer to as 'attributes of the business', the 
extent to which the 'attributes of the owner/utility' affect the private investment decision is 
not adequately documented. Besides financial and operational indicators, other factors 
that affect utility performance such as the quality of management and the level of 
independence from political intervention are difficult to quantify. These attributes of the 
utility and the extent to which they affect investors' decisions and reflect their perception 
of the sector are of interest to this research. 
Like FDI decisions, investors' criteria in the sector vary depending on the type of investor 
and their perception of the prevailing business climate. In the UK water sector for 
example, a 2004 survey of over 40 debt and equity investors revealed that the main 
attractions for equity investors included a high relatively safe dividend yield (return on 
investment), predictable earnings and stable businesses (Whelan, 2004). Debt investors 
on the other hand, were attracted by strong cash flow generation, regulatory 
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transparency and long-term assets. The results of the 2004 survey when compared to a 
similar one conducted in 2003 indicated that investors' perception of the regulatory 
process, political situation and overall risk profile of the sector' had changed (Figure 
2.3). Attitudes towards the regulator and the regulatory process for example, were more 
positive in 2004 as investors believed that periodic reviews were being carried out in a 
transparent manner. Conversely, investors believed that the overall risk profile of the 
water companies had increased in 2004 due to less scope for cost-cutting and lower 
credit ratings (Ibid.). Among other factors, this change in perception was reflected in a 
shift in the minimum credit rating investors were prepared to provide debt financing to 
water companies. Such examples highlight the relative nature of investors' criteria in the 
sector. 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of the 2003 and 2004 risk profile of the UK water sector 
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2.4 Investment promotion: How to attract investment 
As highlighted in the previous section, investors are likely to base investment decisions 
on various criteria such as the business/investment climate, the quality of the investment 
opportunity, anticipated returns and the ease with which the investment can take place. 
Image and perceptions are also important factors that influence investment decisions. 
Accordingly, activities that encourage or promote investment, that is increase the 
likelihood that an investor will have a positive response to an investment opportunity, 
must be based on an understanding of what influences the investment decision. This is 
the basis for investment promotion. In its purest form, investment promotion is the 
collective term used to describe a range of activities aimed at attracting foreign capital 
24 Overall risk profile induded the operational and financial risk profile of the water companies. 
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and has come to occupy a prominent place in the development strategies of many 
developing countries evidenced by the growing number of countries undertaking 
proactive approaches to attract FDI (UNCTAD, 2001). As such, the investment 
promotion literature is replete with strategies specific to attracting FDI. For the purposes 
of this research however, investment promotion is used to denote a more broad-based 
process of considering investors' decision-making criteria towards developing a strategy 
to attract private investment to water and sanitation. Constructs based on investment 
promotion with respect to attracting FDI are however used to develop this framework. 
2.4.1 Investment promotion activities 
The main activities of investment promotion as summarised in Table 2.2 are (Wells and 
Wint, 2000; Loewendahl, 2001; Morisset, 2003): 
(a) image-building which is usually general in nature and includes activities 
that enhance a country's image as a favourable place for investment 
(includes policies, laws and regulations that comprise the basic 
framework for creating a business environment conducive to investment); 
(b) investment generation which involves more specific investor targeting 
by region, industry, type or size of investment (includes incentives that 
offer advantages or concessions to promote investment); and 
(c) 
Table 2.2 
investment servicing which involves developing a one-on-one 
relationship with potential and existing investors to facilitate their 
investment experience (converts investors' interests into actual 
investments and ensures investor satisfaction with the business climate). 
Main activities of investment promotion 
Function Ob"active 
Image-building To create the perception of a 
country as an attractive site for 
international investment 
... 
Investment To create investment leads that 
generation/targeting target investment into specific 
sectors, development areas or 
. . comoanies 
'" 
" 
Pre-investment To facilitate a foreign investor's 
" '0 '2: services entry into the economy. To assist 
c " in analvsina investment decisions 
.2 ~ 
'" c 
.s: ~ Post-investment To assist a foreign investor in ~-a. ~ or aftercare maintaining his business in good 
> services standing, facilitating reinvestment 
.5 decisions in the future 
Source: Wells and Wlnt (2000) 
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Empirical research on various promotional techniques finds that although governments 
tend to engage in all three types of investment promotion activities to varying degrees, 
image-building predominates (Wells and Wint, 2000). Wells and Wint (2000) find for 
example that when government policy changes to encourage investment, promotional 
activities tend to focus on image-building so as to advise investors about government's 
new attitude towards investment and interest in attracting investors. Changing economic 
conditions within a country or in the external environment also require continued use of 
image-building activities. 
2.4.2 Investment promotion strategy 
A strategy is a long-term plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal commonly 
associated with business activities and government. In business, strategy provides 
overall direction to a company or gives specific direction in areas such as investment 
decision-making and organisational development. Within government, strategy provides 
guidance for organisational management and the evolution or modification of public 
policy and laws in areas such as infrastructure funding. An effective strategy will: 
(a) obtain the desired objective; 
(b) fit well with the external environment and an organisation's resources and 
core competencies; 
(c) provide an organisation with a sustainable competitive advantage; and 
(d) prove dynamic, flexible and able to adapt to changing situations. 
More specifically, an investment promotion strategy provides a frame of reference and a 
programme of work to guide the investment promotion process (Loewendahl, 2001). The 
development of an investment promotion strategy can be broken down into three main 
steps as summarised in Table 2.3 (MIGA, 2000): 
(a) develop a complete picture of a country's environment in terms of its 
investment needs and investment potential (i.e. assess the internal 
strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats of the 
environment for private investment); 
(b) identify and target sectors that are likely to be attracted to a country's 
investment environment (i.e. determine investors' priorities, investment 
trends, etc.); and 
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(c) develop a strategic mix of investment promotion activities taking into 
account the quality of the business environment, a country's development 
goals, investors' perceptions and available resources. 
Table 2.3 Creating an investment promotion strategy 
!~~,~,~«~SteiJ~f!j R7E·m{·'·"'~#Vt:$~~'ActivitY-i;~~'1ilii'}Y. 
Assess investment • Identify country's development goals 
needs and potential • Assess current global and regional investment trends 
• Analyse country's strengths and weaknesses 
• Assess the strengths and weaknesses of competitors 
Target industries and • Develop a list of potential industries 
geographic sources • Analyse the characteristics of each industry sector 
of investment • Assess each sector's compatibility with country location 
and development goals 
• Develop a short list of industries 
Develop a • Adjust the intermediary's promotional approach 
marketing strategy • Evaluate organisational functions and responsibilities 
• Evaluate the intermediary's partnerships 
• Assess the budget implications of the new focus 
• Develop a strategy document 
Source: MIGA (2000) 
Important to the process of assessing a country's investment needs and investment 
potential is a clear understanding of a country's development goals from which 
investment-related goals are derived and clearly set out in government policy. This may 
involve a survey of existing and potential investors to get their views on the investment 
environment so that issues important to investors are identified and accounted for in the 
promotion strategy (Khalidi-Beyhum, 2002). Also recommended is a systematic 
examination of a country's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT 
analysis) from an investor's perspective to enable an understanding of the positive and 
negative aspects of a country as an investment site (MIGA, 2000; Loewendahl, 2001). A 
final methodological note on developing an investment promotion strategy concerns the 
dynamism of the process. Because a location's attributes relative to other locations are 
constantly changing as a result of both domestic developments and changes in the 
external environment, to be effective, appropriate adjustments to promotional activities 
may be necessary throughout the lifespan of an investment promotion strategy. 
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2.4.3 Investment promotion in water and sanitation 
2.4.3.1 Rationale for promoting private investment 
Investment in the water and sanitation sector has traditionally been a public sector 
undertaking because of its public good characteristics25, monopoly status26, need for 
long-term finance, long payback period, low rates of return and importance to public 
health and national economic developmene7 (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1997; World Bank, 
1997a; Winpenny, 2003). During the 1990s however, private investment in the sector 
gained momentum fuelled by a number of related developments such as declining public 
sector budgets, decreasing flows of official development assistance, increasing 
disenchantment with the inefficiency of public sector provision, encouragement from 
development agencies, economic liberalisation, loosening of the rules governing foreign 
investment and increasing international flows of private capital. Significant investment 
needs in the sector highlighted by international agreements such as the United Nations' 
Millennium Development Goals also contributed to the promotion of private investment as 
an important financing solution to fill the investment gap caused by prolonged 
underinvestment and public sector neglect (Annamraju et al., 2001; Budds and 
McGranahan, 2003). 
Despite the support and encouragement of development agencies like the World Bank, 
international water companies keen to diversify into other markets and developing 
country governments keen to access the finance needed to expand service coverage, the 
expectations of strong prospects for private investment in water and sanitation have not 
been realised. Even during the peak of private activity in infrastructure, water and 
sanitation conSistently attracted the lowest levels of private investment. Data from the 
World Bank's private participation in infrastructure database indicate for example that 
between 1990 and 2004, water and sanitation attracted only 5% of total private 
investment compared to 48% for telecommunications and 32% for energy (World Bank, 
2005). Water and sewerage projects also had the highest failure rates with 37% of 
private investments either cancelled or in distress by 2004 compared to 4% for 
telecommunications and 11% for energy (Ibid.). The private sector's lukewarm response 
is commonly attributed to characteristics of the sector that affect the financial leverage of 
2S A public good is defined as something that is non-rivalrous (one person's use does not deprive others from using 
it), non-exdudable (if one person consumes it, it is impossible to restrict others from consuming) and non-rejectable 
~ndividuals cannot abstain from consumption even if they wish to). 
More feasible for one supplier to serve the market due to high fixed costs (sunk assets) and increasing returns to 
scale. 
27 Water and sanitation projects are considered to have high forward linkages in the economy in that the product is a 
critical intermediate input for other sectors and service levels and prices are of major importance for industrial costs 
and international competitiveness (Stem and Holder, 1999; Ramamurti and Doh, 2004). 
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investments and which have as previously mentioned, historically 'favoured' public sector 
financing (Briscoe, 1999b). The poor performance of some private investments and 
difficulties encountered during these transactions are generally attributed to (Idelovitch 
and Ringskog, 1995; Sad er, 1999; ADB, 2000a; Winpenny, 2003; lOB, 2003a; 
Ramamurti and Doh, 2004; Braadbaart, 2005; Noel and Brzeski, 2005): 
(a) political, administrative and legal impediments that delayed or resulted in 
the cancellation of individual projects; 
(b) inadequate regulatory frameworks which resulted in the inadequate 
specification of risks, performance targets, penalty and reward structures; 
(c) inappropriate pricing policies and resistance to cost-recovering tariffs 
which affected investors' rate of returns; 
(d) political interference and lack of commitment; 
(e) political and social protests against individual projects; 
(I) lack of local financing which increased the cost of financing; and 
(g) macroeconomic and asset-related uncertainties which affected the 
predictability of investments. 
The general consensus in the academic and grey literature is that private investment in 
the 1990s did not live up to expectations and that the experience has caused many 
investors to lose confidence in the sector. Most noticeable is the retreat of large 
international investors from water and sanitation projects in developing countries28. 
Although international investors still account for a large share of investment flows, their 
investments are limited to select developing countries in Europe and Asia, with regional 
and local investors responsible for much of the new investment in many developing 
countries (Izaguirre and Hunt, 2005). Does the fall-off in private activity mean that private 
investment should not be pursued as an investment option for water and sanitation? Not 
necessarily so. What it does highlight are the conditions likely to deter private investment 
from the sector and the type of investor possibly best suited to investments in developing 
countries. In this context, a strategy that promotes conditions conducive to private 
investment and provides investors with the necessary signals to assure them of the 
viability of their investments and the investment climate is essential to regain investor 
confidence and stimulate interest in the sector. In particular, it is important to incorporate 
the factors of interest to domestic investors who may potentially become the most 
important sources of future private capital in the sector. 
28 RWE Thames for example announced that it would Vvithdraw from most regions to focus on Central and Eastern 
Europe; Veolia Environnement that it would concentrate on select Asian countries; and Suez that it would pull out of 
Asia and Latin America (Izaguirre and Hunt, 2005). 
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2.4.3.2 Strategy to promote private investment 
The strategy recommended by development organisations like the World Sank and 
various sector analysts to attract private investment to the water and sanitation sector is 
three-fold, namely (ADS, 2000b; World Sank, 2003): 
(a) create an enabling environment which includes establishing the right 
conditions for business and a policy environment conducive to private 
investment; 
(b) generate business opportunities which includes deliberately 
formulating projects/investments in such a way that they provide specific 
opportunities for private investment; and 
(c) facilitate private investment which includes providing direct assistance 
to projects/investments to encourage and catalyse private investment. 
Creating an enabling environment for private investment usually forms part of a sector 
reform agenda to tackle issues such as unclear policy guidelines, inadequate regulatory 
frameworks, unsupportive legislation, inappropriate water pricing, inadequate cost 
recovery, non-viable utility performance, excessive government involvement, outdated 
institutional arrangements and poorly coordinated water administration - all of which 
have the potential to deter private investors (Abrams, 2000b; Seppala, 2002). 
Macroeconomic and political stability are also crucial elements of the enabling 
environment paradigm (Pargal, 2003). To generate business opportunities for private 
investment in the sector, governments are encouraged to 'champion' model projects that 
highlight the investment potential of the sector (ADS, 2000b), package 'bankable' 
projects following rigorous project feasibility analysis29 (Howe and Dixon, 1993; Rogers et 
al., 1993; Sad er, 1999; Mehta, 2003; PADCO, 2003) and select private investment 
options that address local needs and suit the local contexeo (Sad er, 1999; ADS, 2000a). 
Finally, to facilitate private investment, governments are encouraged to provide support 
mechanisms such as guarantees to mitigate against risks associated with investments in 
the sector (Dailami and Klein, 1998; Dailami and Leipziger, 1998), participate in joint 
ventures with the private sector to show commitment to private investment, leverage 
29 A project feasibility analysis calculates the rate of retum on the investment by analysing the costs and revenues of 
the project, looks at pricing and cost recovery issues and may recommend water tariff, tax or subsidy revisions that 
would yield revenues necessary to sustain the planned investments and targets user subsidies if required; assesses 
institutional arrangements; and presents options for mitigation of related risks and adverse factors. 
30 The choice of an appropriate private investment option for a particular country at a particular point in time depends 
on a number of factors including the support for commercially viable tariffs; the predictability of the regulatory regime 
governing project income; the level of government and community support for private investment; the desired level of 
PSP; the nature of the problem at hand; existing public sector administrative capacities; the speed with which the 
problem needs to be resolved; and investors' perception of the risks associated with individual projects (Sader, 1999; 
ADB. 20000). 
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international financing to on-lend to domestic investors at reasonable terms (ADB, 2000b; 
PADCO, 2003) and promote local capital markets to increase the proportion of cheaper 
local currency debt (Bond and Carter, 1994; Kumar et al., 1997; Ramirez and Parra, 
1999; PADCO, 2003). 
The proposed strategy to attract private investment to the water and sanitation sector 
bears a close resemblance to the main activities of investment promotion with creating an 
enabling environment analogous to image-building, generating business opportunities 
analogous to investment generation and facilitating private investment analogous to the 
provision of investment services (Figure 2.4). Creating an enabling environment, like 
image-building, dominates the promoting private investment strategy agenda with the 
onus mainly on government to develop conditions conducive to private investment. 
Creating an enabling environment is also an all-inclusive promotional concept as 
elements of generating business opportunities and facilitating private investment require 
and coincide with what constitutes an environment conducive to private investment. On 
this basis, the research focuses on the enabling environment paradigm as the main 
'macro-determinant' to attract private investment to the water and sanitation sector. 
Figure 2.4 Relationship between promoting private investment to the water and 
sanitation sector and investment promotion 
~eioiTiotirig"':lfrivateiii1"vestmelit~i ~liivestjii8nt~p"fo'motio'n'i:activity~: 
Create an enabling environment 4 ~ Image-building 
Generate business opportunities 4 ~ Investment generation 
Facilitate orivate investment 4 ~ Provision of investment services 
2_5 Creating a conducive environment: Framework for private 
investment in water and sanitation 
The theoretical and empirical literature on private investment in water and sanitation 
consistently points to the importance of a core set of factors that strongly influence the 
private investment decision and hence require special attention when devising a private 
investment promotion strategy for the sector. These factors can be broadly grouped into 
three main categories, namely (Figure 2.5): 
(a) institutionaVgovernance factors which include the policy, legislative, 
and regulatory frameworks within which investors have to operate and the 
institutions responsible for their implementation; 
(b) economic and financial factors such as macroeconomic stability and 
pricing policy which affect investment performance; and 
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(c) socio-political factors such as public resistance and political 
commitment which affect investment success. 
The importance of these factors to the enabling environment paradigm is discussed in 
the following sections. 
Figure 2.5 Constraints to and drivers for private investment in water and sanitation 
Environment conducive to private investment 
i ij~!lm: Rl COnstraintsltl!mWJlmBMM&Rm! m~ ! DiiVers'l¥t! mi MI§ '-Illi~!!!l 1m2 
Institutional/governance Institutional/governance 
• Poorly defined policies • Clearly defined policies 
• Inadequate legislation • Enabling legislation 
• Inadequate regulatory framework • Regulatory credibility and commitment 
• Poorly definedlfragmented institutions • Clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
• Inefficient and ineffective institutions • Capacity and capability building 
• Inadequate expertise 
Economic and financial Economic and financial 
• Macroeconomic instability • Stable macroeconomic environment 
• Inappropriate pricing policy • Tariff reform to achieve full cost recovery 
• Low revenue recovery • Collection discipline 
• Poor utility performance • Adopt commercial principles for utility 
• Lack of long-term debt capital operation 
• Underdeveloped local capital markets • Develop/promote local capital markets 
• Financial support and incentives 
Socio·political Socio·political 
• Public rejection and resistance • Stakeholder consultation/participation 
• Low willingness-to-pay • Transparency 
• Government interference and control • Education about economic value of water 
• Government reneging on commitments • Clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
• Conflictirtg opinions, priorities, objectives • Political will and commitment 
• Political instability • Political endorsement and support 
• Political continuity. 
2.5.1 Institutional 
Saleth and Dinar (2000) identify three main components of water institutions namely: 
(a) water policy which refers to the policy environment; 
(b) water law which refers to the legal and regulatory framework; and 
(c) water administration which refers to the administrative arrangement. 
Collectively. these describe the institutional frameworks and arrangements for the sector 
and are discussed below. 
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2.5.1.1 Policy framework 
Policy as defined by Abrams (2000a), is the set of decisions made at the highest political 
level in a country to determine what and how things will be done in any given sector. 
Broad policy guidelines for the water and sanitation sector are usually embodied in 
various international declarations which generally inform more speCific national strategies 
to reflect prevailing social, political, environmental, technological and economic 
perspectives. The emphasis on the economic value of water, universal access and 
financing needs of the sector in the 1990s is credited with encouraging private 
investment in the sector (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). The Second World Water 
Forum for example, proposed to mobilise additional annual investments of about US$100 
billion from the international private sector (Winpenny, 2003). Similarly, the International 
Conference on Freshwater at Bonn recognised the need to augment public funding with 
private capital by making the sector a more attractive investment opportunity (Ibid.). 
Such international declarations with the encouragement of international development 
agencies like the World Bank, have had a direct effect on the level of private investment 
in the sector with private commitments rising sharply up to 1997 (Estache, 2004). 
Policy also matters at the national level in terms of informing investors of government's 
long-term vision, intentions and provisions for the sector and hence the environment in 
which they will operate. In Mexico for example, policy changes to focus on privatisation 
initiatives in the urban water sector realised the creation of financially autonomous 
utilities and private companies (Saleth and Dinar, 2000). In East Africa, policy changes 
to address the role of the private sector and remedy regulatory uncertainties have had a 
profound effect on people's access to efficient, effective and equitable water and 
sanitation services (Seppala, 2002). Although difficult to isolate and quantify because of 
cross-cutting issues such as the importance of effective institutions and political 
facilitation for policy implementation (Saleth and Dinar, 2000), the general consensus in 
the theoretical literature focusing on reform efforts in the sector is that policy is important 
in setting the stage and tempo for attracting private investment to the sector (Saleth and 
Dinar, 2000; Seppala, 2002). 
Policy considerations for private investment 
Policy issues of interest to private investors in the sector include (Foster, 1996; 
Winpenny, 2003): 
(a) the legal framework guiding policy implementation; 
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(b) how the sector will be regulated (e.g. the nature of the regulator, 
predictability of the regulatory regime governing project income, degree of 
contract enforcement and level of political interference); 
(c) the roles and responsibilities of various institutions operating in the sector; 
(d) the role and extent of PSP (i.e. the desired level of private investment); 
(e) the support for commercially viable tariffs and effective cost recovery; 
(I) the provision of support mechanisms such as incentives, guarantees and 
subsidies; and 
(g) the balance of social, environmental and commercial aims. 
The extent to which these provide for the financial viability of private investments and 
promote good corporate governance practices in the sector help determine how 
conducive the environment will be for private investment. 
2.5.1.2 Legislative and regulatory frameworks 
Throughout the private investment literature, the regulatory framework31 is often singled 
out as the greatest detriment to private investment in the sector due to its far-reaching 
effect on determining the conditions under which investment takes place and the ability of 
investors to effiCiently conduct business. In the UK water sector for example, the risk of 
adverse regulatory decisions is identified as one of the largest business risks in the 
sector (Whelan, 2004). In Bolivia, weak regulatory capacity, political pressure and limited 
consumer participation in the regulatory process contributed to the early demise of the 
Cochabamba concession (Nickson and Vargas, 2002). The importance of the regulatory 
framework is also substantiated in the empirical literature. Pargal (2003) for example, 
finds that private investment in infrastructure32 is significantly positively correlated with 
the passage of reform legislation and the existence of a regulatory body. For the water 
sector however, the relationship between legislation and investment does not hold as the 
sector's natural monopoly and public good characteristics make it riskier than other 
sectors. As such, Pargal postulates that investors are inclined to look for better 
developed regulatory frameworks and more detailed investor protections (compared to 
other infrastructure sectors) before committing funds to water and sanitation. This 
emphasises the overarching importance of the regulatory framework in the sector as 
31 For the purposes of this research, regulation is discussed in terms of the economic regulation of the sector to cover 
issues such as pricing, investment/costs of service, quality (including service standards and service obligations) and 
the rate of return on assets. 
32 Study covered the water. power. telecommunications, roads and railway sectors in Argentina, Brazil. Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela between 1990 and 1998. 
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sectoral legislation though important, is neither necessary nor sufficient for private 
investment (Jensen and Blanc-Brude, 2005). 
As highlighted by Guasch and Spiller (1999) and Pargal (2003), the sector's public good 
characteristics, large sunk costs and limited scope for direct competition are at the core 
of contractual problems that determine the importance of the regulatory framework. 
Concerns about government seizing control of assets, reneging on agreements (such as 
commitment to cost-recovering tariffs and performing certain duties under contract), the 
predictability of a project's return and the judicial mechanisms in place are crucial to 
investors' risk perception of the regulatory framework (Sader, 1999; Ramamurti, 2003). 
Besides deterring private investment, this risk perception can also diminish the potential 
benefits and gains of private investment (Spiller and Savedoff, 1999). Investors for 
example, may choose to invest exclusively in areas where market return is very high and 
where the payback period is relatively short (Le. cherry-picking more viable service 
areas). In the absence of an adequate regulatory framework, investors may also insist 
on high up-front costs. Guasch and Spiller (1999) for example, find that investors' 
allowances for regulatory risks (such as government guarantees and indemnities) can bid 
up the cost of capital by 2-6% which makes private transactions more expensive and 
cumbersome to finance. Adequate legal and regulatory frameworks are therefore 
necessary not only to attract private investment, but also to reduce the cost of attracting 
private investment, improve the benefits of private investment and protect consumers' 
interests. 
Indicators of an adequate regulatory framework 
An adequate regulatory framework is defined as one in which consumers can have 
access to utility services of acceptable quality at the lowest minimum cost and private 
(and public) investors can expect to earn a reasonable real rate of return on their assets. 
To appraise the performance or adequacy of the regulatory framework, Stern and Holder 
(1999) propose six criteria as listed below and detailed in Table 2.4: 
(a) clarity of roles and objectives particularly between government and 
regulators; 
(b) autonomy from political intervention; 
(c) accountability so that regulators' decisions can be challenged; 
(d) participation of relevant parties in contributing to the regulatory process; 
(e) transparency in the decision-making process; and 
(f) predictability in the 'rules of the game'. 
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In broad terms, these features describe both the likely degree of political independence 
and the processes which might increase the likelihood of the regulatory framework being 
acceptable to investors, consumers and governments. Best practice recommendations 
call for a regulatory framework under an autonomous regulator supported by primary 
legislation which is accountable in terms of appeals, facilitates consultation, provides 
information and is consistent in terms of the decisions reached. A caveat to these 
recommendations however is offered by Levy and Spiller (1994) who emphasise that the 
regulatory framework must take account of the constitutional, legal and political 
characteristics of a country. As such, different regulatory mechanisms will evolve in 
different countries according to their institutional endowment33. 
Table 2.4 
Indicator 
Clarity of roles 
a'nd objectives 
. . .. 
'~ut~m~~y,: 
. 
.. . '. ..,. 
Accountability 
, 
Participation 
,.';;.i .. :, 
... 
Criteria and rankings used in regulatory appraisal 
. Best practice 
Regulatory function well-articulated and well-
enshrined in primary legislation. Clearly 
separated in practice from policy and 
commercial functions. 
Separate regulator with arrangements for 
appointment and financing which appear to 
auarantee autonomy of action . 
Unfavourable to private investment 
No apparent specification of separate 
regulatory functions. No primary law covering 
regulatory issues. No effective distinction 
between policv and reQulation. 
No separately identifiable regulatory function, 
or it is performed mainly or solely by a senior 
political official. 
Full accountability in terms of appeals including No appeal or redress available. No formal 
a specific legal right to redress. mechanism of accountabilitv. 
Comprehensive process of formal consultation 
followed before decisions are made. 
Regulatory documents available to the public 
unless classified as confidential. Regulator 
publishes major decisions as well as the 
reasoning behind these decisions. 
Regulatory powers and duties cannot be 
changed without changes in primary law. Key 
regulatory instruments or documents cannot be 
changed without undergoing appropriate 
processes. Clear policy and coherent 
approach behind all decisions. 
Little or no formal consultation takes place. 
No significant public information available 
regarding regulatory instruments or decisions. 
Changes to all aspects of regulation can be 
undertaken relatively easily. Little or no 
consistency observed in regulatory practice. 
Source: Stern and Holder (1999) 
Regulatory instruments and institutions 
Guasch and Spiller (1999) identify four types of basic regulatory instruments: 
(a) specific legislation whereby regulation is delegated to a regulatory body 
(usually used in countries where legislative action is costly and where the 
judiciary is relatively independent from the executive); 
33 The institutional endowment of a country is defined as its legislative and executive institutions; its judicial 
institutions; informal norms; administrative capabilities; and the character of the society's contending social interests 
(Guasch and Spiller. 1999). 
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(b) presidential decree which is a popular regulatory tool in Latin America. 
In Bolivia for example, the enabling legislation for the public utility 
regulation law was approved by presidential decree which established the 
procedures for awarding concessions and outlined the functions of the 
regulator (Nickson and Vargas, 2002); 
(c) contracts or licenses whereby the regulatory framework is embedded in 
formal contracts which take the form of operating licenses that specify the 
regulatory framework in which the firm operates. Usually used for 
performance contracts or BOT-type arrangements; and 
(d) administrative procedures which determine how agencies make 
decisions and specify the independent appeals process. Requires a 
previously developed body of law and judiciary that is accustomed to 
challenging administrations on procedural grounds. The regulation of 
utilities in the USA for example, is based on a well-specified body of 
administrative procedures at both the federal and state levels. 
Regarding regulatory institutions, there is a wide array of regulatory approaches due to 
different sector designs (i.e. public, private and restricted competition). In some cases, 
the process of regulation may not be separate from other functions such as policy-
making in which case regulation may be carried out by government ministries or 
government-appointed secretariats. The establishment of a credible, independent 
regulatory agency however, has become a standard feature of the privatisation process 
in Europe, Latin America and Asia to signal private investors that the sector will not be 
subject to arbitrary political interference (Stern and Holder, 1999). As such, independent 
regulation has become largely synonymous with private ownership/investment. 
As previously mentioned, the extent and characteristics of a country's institutional and 
administrative endowments govern the choice of regulatory instruments and institutions. 
In countries like the UK for example where decision-making is highly centralised, Spiller 
and Saved off (1999) suggest that more rigid institutions and restraints are required as 
laws can be changed relatively easily and utilities often dominate line ministries. 
Conversely, in countries like the US that are more decentralised, specific legislation may 
be difficult to introduce due to political fragmentation. As a result, institutions and the 
regulatory system should be adapted to the current state of sectoral evolution instead of 
attempting to adapt the sector to a restrictive and incomplete legal and regulatory 
environment (Ramirez and Parra, 1999). 
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2.5.1.3 Institutional arrangements 
Besides developing sound policies and adequate legal and regulatory frameworks 
conducive to private investment, effective institutions are also necessary to ensure 
appropriate implementation of these provisions (Seppiilii, 2002). Effective institutions as 
described by Mullins (2005) have clear roles and responsibilities and have the capacity to 
carry out their mandate. Government's traditional assumption of several roles in the 
sector (policy-maker, investor, service provider and regulator) has in many cases led to a 
'confusion' of roles and responsibilities with institutions either performing similar tasks 
(overlap of roles) or assuming multiple and conflicting roles (Beato and Vives, 2003; 
Ramamurti, 2003). Most relevant to the enabling environment paradigm is what Foster 
(1996) refers to as the 'poacher-gamekeeper problem' whereby there is the confusion or 
juxtaposition of regulatory and operational roles and the 'politicisation of management' 
whereby the external influence of government interferes in the operation of public 
entities. Both situations have been found to contribute to problems inherent to the sector 
such as poor accountability, low levels of efficiency, low tariffs, poor quality of service and 
insufficient investment with the potential to deter private investment (Ibid.). These 
problems are further complicated by the fragmented nature of the sector whereby there is 
a split in functions between central and local government authorities and a general lack 
of well-qualified staff which results in 'weak' institutions (Beato and Vives, 2003). 
Recommendations to address these institutional shortcomings and create more 
conducive conditions for private investment include (Foster, 1996; Sad er, 1999; ADB, 
2000a; Beato and Vives, 2003): 
(a) the identification of the different roles that exist (e.g. sector strategy, 
social policy, regulation, investment and operations); 
(b) the allocation of these roles between different tiers of government (need 
to decide if the different roles should be allocated to separate entities. 
Where roles are identified as institutionally separated, Foster (1996) and 
Sader (1999) stress the importance of ensuring an adequate degree of 
coordination between institutions); 
(c) the creation of autonomous corporatised public entities to reduce 
government interference and introduce market force discipline; and 
(d) the development of adequate institutional capacity to enable institutions to 
efficiently and ably carry out their mandates. 
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2.5.2 Economic and financial 
2.5.2.1 Macroeconomic environment 
The demand side of FDI theory argues that investment will go primarily to markets large 
enough to support the scale economies needed for production (Trevitio and Mixon, 
2004). This premise is also relevant to the water and sanitation sector. The large market 
economies of Latin America and East Asia for example, have consistently attracted the 
lion's share of private investment in the sector (recipients of 89% of total private 
investment between 1990 and 2004). In terms of per capita income34, upper-middle 
income countries attracted 1.5 times as much private investment in water and sanitation 
as lower-middle income countries and close to 40 times as much as low income 
countries (Table 2.5). Similarly, non-IDA35 countries attracted the bulk of private 
investments in the sector compared to poorer countries. These statistics therefore point 
to a strong economy status-private investment relationship. 
Table 2.5 Income-related distribution of private investment in water and sanitation 
(1990-2004 ) 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
Empirical research also provides evidence of a positive relationship between the 
macroeconomic environment and attracting private investment. Pargal (2003) for 
example, finds that private investment is positively related to past period real GDP, 
indicating that richer economies generate higher private investment flows. In assessing 
the determinants of private investment in several Latin American countries, Pargal 
established that a 1 % increase in previous period real GDP was associated with an 
increase of 4.6% in private investment levels. Interest rates were also found to impact 
the cost of financing on investment decisions and were negatively related to investment 
volume. Dailami and Klein (1998) also find evidence of a strong relationship between 
country credit ratings and private capital flows. Governments were able to attract more 
34 Income group classifications according to gross national income per capita using the World Bank Atlas method are 
low income (US$B25 or less), lower·middle income (US$B26-$3,255), upper-middle income (US$3.256-$10,065) and 
high income (more than US$10.066). 
35 Developing countries with the financial ability to borrow non-concessional loans from the World Bank. 
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project finance (deals per capita and deals as a percentage of GDP) as country ratings 
improved. 
I n an analysis of the importance of macroeconomic factors in determining the risk 
premium on infrastructure projects, Dailami and Leipziger (1998) find that inflation is 
dominant in explaining the spread of foreign loans to infrastructure projects with the 
market imposing a high-risk premium on loans to countries with high inflation. To 
advance this finding, Dailami and Leipziger theorise that a high rate of inflation is a sign 
of internal economic instability and of government's inability to maintain expedient 
monetary policy. From the investor's point of view, high inflation creates uncertainty 
regarding the net present value of costly long-term investment (Trevifio and Mixon, 
2004). Countries with higher than average inflation are therefore 'singled out' and 
'penalised' in the international capital markets. 
Investors generally associate stable and predictable macroeconomic conditions with 
environments conducive to investment where they are able to realise reasonable rates of 
return and reduce the cost of doing business (Estache, 2004). The fate of several 
infrastructure projects after the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 is a practical example of 
the importance of a stable macroeconomic environment (Sader, 1999; Baietti, 2001; 
Green and Campos, 2001). The economic fall-out caused by currency devaluations 
across several southeast Asian countries resulted in a general collapse in investor 
confidence manifested in infrastructure FDI falling by half in 1998 (Box 2.1). 
Box 2.1 Impact of the Asian financial crisis 
The currency crisis that hit several southeast Asian economies in mid·1997 had a devastating impact on private 
infrastructure projects with infrastructure FDI falling by half in 1998. In late 1997, the currencies of Thailand, 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines all experienced sudden, relatively unexpected 
depreciation. The impact of the crisis varied across the region being more important in those countries with the 
weakest overall public sector financial position. Currency devaluation increased the domestic cost of external debt 
servicing. placing considerable strain on public budgetary resources. In addition, falling property values erased 
future income potential for projects relying on real estate development and the general economic slowdown made 
demand projections and associated revenue forecasts questionable. The crisis profoundly affected the infrastructure 
market in several ways. Investor confidence collapsed and financing for infrastructure projects dried up as many 
commercial lenders abandoned the project finance market, and projects that had not yet reached financial closure 
suddenly faced a lack of commercial debt. Overall new Investment activity in various infrastructure sectors stalled as 
fiscal restrictions meant that governments could not afford their planned involvement in intended projects or continue 
to honour payments to existing ones (no new investments made in the water sector). The demand for infrastructure 
services also decreased as the economic slowdown made it more difficult to cover the economic cost of services 
(including the effects of the currency devaluation) through increased tariffs. The net result was a sudden recession in 
the private infrastructure market with projects being delayed, cancelled or on the brink of bankruptcy. 
Source: Sader (1999); Baietti (2001); Green and Campos (2001) 
Economic indicators such as per capita income have a strong association with investors' 
concerns about consumers' ability and willingness to pay for water and sanitation 
services, reflected in a general bias towards high-income and/or highly urbanised service 
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areas. The importance of the macroeconomic environment in attracting private 
investment has important implications to this research as the status of a country's 
macroeconomic environment can serve as an indicator of the private investment potential 
of that country. 
Macroeconomic indicators 
Indicators commonly used to define and rate a country's macroeconomic environment 
include (Cantor and Packer, 1995; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005): 
(a) per capita income which is often used as a measure of the wealth of the 
population; 
(b) GDP growth which is a measure of the change in GDP on a year-over-
year basis; 
(c) inflation which is an increase in the money supply commonly reflected in 
an increase in prices and the cost of living; 
(d) exchange rate which indicates the costs in one country relative to 
another with negative numbers signalling a depreciation; 
(e) 
(f) 
2.5.2.2 
interest rate which is the price a borrower pays for the use of money and 
the return a lender receives for lending to the borrower; and 
public debt which is a measure of the total debt of government held by 
the public. 
Tariff structure and revenue recovery 
Briscoe and Garn (1995) identify the low level of cost recovery in the water sector 
compared to other infrastructure as a fundamental reason why so little private investment 
has gone into water supply and sanitation. Water charges unable to cover operation and 
maintenance costs and lack of continuous adjustment of tariff levels are considered to be 
major constraints in developing countries (Katko, 1990). Subsidised rates often form part 
of government's social policy in developing countries or are used to gain political favour. 
Some researchers criticise this approach claiming that the intended beneficiaries are no 
better off and have to rely on water vendors who supply water up to ten times the cost of 
the formal system (Briscoe, 1999b). In addition to inadequate tariffs, poor collection of 
rates is also identified as another problem with cost recovery in the water sector. The 
widespread practice of water vending in developing countries however, is perceived by 
some to indicate a high level of affordability and willingness-to-pay for water (Katko, 
1990). 
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The promise of steady, long-term future cash flows is the basis of the private sector's 
interest in financing projects (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998b). Projects must generate 
revenues that cover operating costs and debt-service payments and earn a competitive 
rate of return on equity (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1997). As such, cost recovery is essential 
to private sector operations. In recent years, a number of innovative approaches have 
been adopted to address the issue of cost recovery and foster a more financially viable 
sector. In Chile for example, the welfare and business functions of water utilities are 
separated by introducing the idea of 'water stamps' which are provided by the 
government to means-tested poor people as part payment of water bills (Briscoe, 1999b). 
In order to attract the private sector in water utilities in the city of Conakry in Guinea, the 
government assured the private operator of sufficient revenue by a combination of initially 
low, but rising revenues from users and initially high, but declining subsidies from the 
government paid out of a World Bank credit (Ibid.). 
2.5.2.3 Financial support and incentives 
Although more specific to the facilitating private investment phase of the investment 
promotion strategy, governments typically use an array of mechanisms to provide 
financial support to water and sanitation projects, thereby creating favourable conditions 
for private investment. These include (Dailami and Klein, 1998; Dailami and Leipziger, 
1998; Sad er, 1999; Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001; Mehta, 2003): 
(a) direct financing which refers to government or government agency 
equity contribution to the project through a joint venture participation or 
the provision of local currency term loans/grants; 
(b) guarantees which are the most important form of support to mitigate risks 
faced by lenders and project sponsors (e.g. exchange rate guarantees 
against currency devaluations and change of law guarantees against 
legislative and regulatory changes that may affect anticipated revenue); 
(c) tax incentives which include favourable tax treatment of income, special 
depreciation allowances and the lowering/exemption of import duties on 
machinery and equipment; and 
(d) subsidies which can be explicit or implicit mechanisms used to correct 
the mismatch between affordable tariffs and the cost of service provision. 
The premise for the provision of support mechanisms is to compensate investors and 
mitigate against risks associated with low tariffs, low levels of cost recovery, unstable 
macroeconomic conditions, poor performance by the public utility, government and/or 
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public authorities reneging on contractual obligations and the challenge of sustaining 
reform policies over long periods of time. For these reasons, the use of credit 
enhancement mechanisms is more prevalent among countries with a high risk premium 
on infrastructure projects as the intention is to lower this risk premium and render 
projects attractive to private investors. Dailami and Klein (1998) for example find that 
support arrangements are more likely to be used in non-investment grade economies 
than in investment-grade economies. Support mechanisms are also more widely used in 
BOT projects. This is primarily because new investments such as BOTs (compared to 
existing assets) are characterised by Significant upfront costs, long payback periods and 
various unknowns (e.g. revenue stream, inflation, interest and foreign currency exchange 
rates over the long-term) which present additional economic risks to investors (Dailami 
and Klein, 1998). As a result, government often shares the project risk by providing 
undertakings, indemnities or guarantees to the project company and project financiers. 
The importance of support mechanisms such as guarantees in creating conditions 
favourable to private investment is also supported in the empirical literature. Griffith-
Jones and Fuzzo de Lima (2004) for example, find that the difference in maturities in 
guaranteed infrastructure projects is up to twelve times what it would have been without 
guarantees. Interest spreads were also found to be less for guaranteed projects. In 
Thailand for example, the interest spread over US Treasury for infrastructure finance in 
2001 was calculated as 8.5% without guarantees and 2.9% with guarantees. In terms of 
actual private capital commitments, each dollar of guaranteed mobilised financing for 
US$11 of project cost was found to catalyse US$4.7 of private finance. Support 
mechanisms therefore reduce risk and make projects more financially viable to private 
investors. 
2.5.3 Socio-political 
2.5.3.1 Stakeholder support 
Green (2003) identifies two sets of stakeholders in any PSP process - stakeholders 
directly involved in private investment transactions such as lenders, project sponsors, 
and government, and stakeholders affected by or interested in private investment such 
as consumers, trade unions and civil society organisations. The cost of social resistance 
to private investment in the sector is well documented and includes contract cancellations 
and renegotiations (Sad er, 1999; Nickson and Vargas, 2002; Braadbaart, 2005). As 
such, social acceptance and support for private investment is considered a pivotal factor 
in successfully completing PSP processes and attracting future investment. 
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As parties directly involved in searching for, setting-up, negotiating, facilitating, partnering 
and regulating private investment transactions, the acceptance and cooperation of 
government and public sector stake holders are also important for successful private 
investment in the sector. Conflicting views and objectives among different government 
departments, lack of coordination, misunderstanding about what private investment can 
offer and what investors require and resistance to change are identified as important 
obstacles to private investment in the sector (Sad er, 1999; Beato and Vives, 2003). 
Within government, the different priorities and goals of various public departments can 
manifest into varying levels of support, expectations and attitudes towards private 
investment. Ministries of Finance for example, tend to be more positively inclined 
towards private investment due to their concerns about a country's macroeconomic and 
financial performance (Sad er, 1999). Conversely, managers and employees of the water 
utility may consider private investment a threat to job security, loss of high-income 
consumers as investors cherry-pick more profitable project locations and loss of control 
over service provision. If not supportive of private investment in the sector, the action (or 
inaction) of water utility decision-makers can frustrate, delay or even contribute to project 
cancellation (Ibid.). 
The long-term nature of water and sanitation investments over the life cycle of several 
different political leaderships makes lack of pOlitical commitment an important concern of 
investors as changes in fiscal, exchange rate or pricing policies for instance, can 
dramatically alter investors' economic prospects (Sad er, 1999). With the enabling 
environment paradigm mainly focused on government's role in creating the right 
environment to attract private investment (Winpenny, 2003), sustained political 
commitment to and support for what may sometimes be 'painful' reforms to make the 
sector financially viable is essential to see the sector through these changes (Fay and 
Morrison, 2005). 
2.6 Emerging issues 
The review of literature highlighted the following: 
• There is a distinct international private investment bias in the literature due to the 
prevalence of FDI during the 1990s surge in private capital flows to the sector. 
Similarly, the investment promotion literature is mainly geared towards attracting 
FDI. In both cases, the general assumption is that private investors regardless of 
origin are affected by similar factors but to varying degrees. There are however 
several differences between foreign and domestic investors such as familiarity with 
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a country's/sector's investment climate, motive for investment and their relationship 
with local decision-makers which have the potential to affect their investment 
choices and hence the required strategy to attract this investment. The retreat of 
several large international investors and the emergence of local private investors in 
much of the new investments in the sector in many developing countries therefore 
suggest that factors of interest to domestic investors need special attention to 
determine whether or not they are indeed similar to those generally accepted in the 
extant literature. 
• Perceptions can have a significant impact on investment choices. As such, it is 
important to understand investors' perceptions of the utility/sector/environment for 
investment and how these influence their investment decisions with a view to 
identifying and accounting for these perceptions in the investment promotion 
strategy. 
• The uneven distribution of private investment in the sector and the relative 
difference in importance of investment criteria stress the importance of determining 
location and/or project-specific factors that influence investors' choices. Similarly, 
since there is no single best practice for investment promotion, strategies to attract 
private investment to the sector need to adapt to the prevailing investment climate. 
Countries must therefore take stock of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats to the environment for investment from an investor's perspective and 
devise investment promotion strategies appropriate to the local needs and context. 
2.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the theoretical dimensions of investment decision-making and 
investment promotion using a general to specific approach to develop a framework for 
attracting private investment to the water and sanitation sector. By considering investors' 
criteria for investment and recommended strategies to promote this investment, the 
enabling environment paradigm was identified as the main 'macro-determinant' to attract 
private investment to the water and sanitation sector. The concept of a conducive 
environment is however not universal and cannot be generalised as investors' criteria 
vary and investment promotion strategies have to be developed to suit a country's needs 
and prevailing investment climate as what may work in one pOlitical or institutional 
environment will not necessarily work in another. This research's interest in attracting 
private investment to the Caribbean water and sanitation sector must therefore assess 
both the environment for investment and investors' criteria for investment in the sector to 
develop an appropriate framework for the Caribbean with respect to attracting this type of 
investment. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE DYNAMICS OF SMALL SIZE 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
The previous chapter developed a framework for promoting private investment in the 
water and sanitation sector guided by the investment decision·making and investment 
promotion literature. Given the intended geographical focus of the research - the 
Caribbean, this chapter examines a major developmental issue relevant to the Caribbean 
- small size, to highlight issues of relevance to the application of the promoting private 
investment framework in a small island context. The chapter is organised into three main 
sections. The first section provides an overview of the characteristics of small states that 
pose special challenges to their development. Section two examines the effect of small 
size on attracting private investment to water and sanitation. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of various approaches to overcome size constraints with special emphasis 
on regional cooperation and its possible application in the water and sanitation sector. 
3.2 Characteristics of small states 
The definition of a small country varies depending on the indicator(s) used. Four main 
economic and geographic indicators have been used to measure small size - population, 
geographical area, GDP, and the terms of trade. Although no single criterion adequately 
classifies all small states, population is often used as it is highly correlated with territory 
size and GDP (ComSec and World Bank, 2000). In addition, it is often the best available 
measure of size in terms of information content and ease of conceptualisation (Read, 
2001), and is currently used by several international development institutions. The 
choice of a population threshold to define small states is often a figure selected at the 
discretion of the user. Kuznets (1960) for example, used an upper limit of between 10 
and 15 million people. The steady emergence of new and smaller states however, has 
resulted in the progressive lowering of this threshold to a commonly used upper limit of 
1.5 million (ComSec and World Bank, 2000). Countries above this threshold like 
Jamaica, Lesotho and Papua New Guinea are also included in the small state category 
as they share many of the phYSical and economic characteristics of small states. 
Using the number of small states defined by the Commonwealth SecretariaUWorld Bank 
Joint Task Force (2000), there are 49 developing small states worldwide. Small states 
are scattered across every geographic region but most countries fall into three main 
groups namely Africa (15), LAC (13) and East Asia and Pacific (14). Thirty-two out of the 
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49 small states are small island countries. Most small states rank in the list of medium 
human development, 15 are designated as least developed countries while 4 as highly 
indebted poor countries36 (liou and Ding, 2002). 
Small states, particularly small island developing states (SIDS), have attracted a large 
amount of research due to common characteristics that impact on their development and 
determine how they are perceived by the international community. The most important 
vulnerabilities of SIDS are generally classified under five headings - small size, 
remoteness and insularity, disaster proneness, environmental fragility and other factors 
(Briguglio, 1995). Remoteness and insularity and disaster proneness are not of particular 
interest to this research and so will not be examined further. 
3.2.1 Small size 
The main features of small size include (Farrugia, 1993; Streeten, 1993; Briguglio, 1995; 
ComSec and World Bank, 2000): 
(a) limited natural resource endowments and high import content in relation 
to GDP (makes the economy highly dependent on foreign exchange); 
(b) small domestic markets and dependence on export markets; 
(c) limitations on import-substitution possibilities due to the small size of the 
domestic market (results in a protected economic environment); 
(d) dependence on a narrow range of products (small size restricts a 
country's ability to diversify its exports so that it is dependent on a very 
narrow range of goods and services); 
(e) limited ability to influence domestic prices (small states tend to be price-
takers due to the relatively small volume of trade compared to the world 
markets in which they operate); 
(f) limited ability to exploit economies of scale (results in high per unit costs 
in production, high costs of infrastructural construction and utilisation per 
capita, high per unit costs of training specialised manpower and a high 
degree of dependence on imported technologies); 
(g) limitations on domestic competition (small size does not support a large 
number of firms producing a similar product which generates a tendency 
towards oligopolistic and monopolistic organisation); and 
36 Classification system used by the United Nations Development Programme to rank countries in terms of 
development progress and income. 
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(h) problems of public administration (small manpower base from which to 
draw experienced and efficient administrators. Related problems include 
expensive government functions per capita and impartiality in public 
service due to familiarity and accessibility). 
3.2.2 Environmental fragility 
Environmental issues of importance to small states include (Briguglio, 1995; Khaka, 
1998): 
(a) pressures arising from economic development and high population 
densities resulting in an increased demand for and stress on resources; 
(b) limited and fragile freshwater resources (small catchment areas and 
limited surface storage capacity result in heavy dependence on 
groundwater resources); and 
(c) fragile ecosystems (pollution caused by inadequate treatment and 
disposal of sewage can have long-lasting effects). 
3.2.3 Other factors 
Other important characteristics of small states include (Jalan, 1982; Collier and Dollar, 
1999; ComSec and World Bank, 2000; Pelling and Uitto, 2001): 
(a) limited access to commercial borrowing (perceived as less attractive than 
larger states due to the smaller absolute size of financial transactions and 
as more risky due to greater economic vulnerability and volatility); 
(b) difficulty in attracting FDI as generally rated to be significantly more risky; 
(c) likely to face diseconomies of scale in developing an indigenous banking 
sector (dominance of foreign banks results in high costs of banking and 
financial intermediation. Range of services/products provided by banks 
also likely to be narrower than that available in larger countries); 
(d) heavy dependence on international development assistance and official 
aid to help finance development expenditure; and 
(e) heavy reliance on international trade and FDI to overcome inherent scale 
and resource limitations. 
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3.2.4 Consequences of being a small state 
Most of the small states literature concentrates on the drawbacks of 'smallness'. There is 
however a growing view that small size might not be a disadvantage after all. Easterly 
and Kraay (2000) for example contend that small states are no different from large states 
and so should receive the same policy advice that large states do. After controlling for a 
range of factors, they find that small states have on average higher income and 
productivity levels per capita than large states and grow no more slowly than large states. 
While this may be true in some cases (especially for resource-rich countries like Bahrain 
and Trinidad and Tobago, countries offering offshore financial services such as the 
Caymans or countries with a strong tourism product such as Barbados and the 
Bahamas), very often this relative prosperity is built on fragile economic foundations 
which are highly vulnerable to resource depletion, changes in consumer taste, 
disruptions in world markets and natural disasters (Pelling and Uitto, 2001). As such, the 
general consensus of the theoretical and empirical literature is that small states are 
different from their larger counterparts and by virtue of their small size, face special 
challenges that can potentially affect their development and how they are perceived. 
Some of these challenges are presented below. 
3.2.4.1 Economic and financial 
The characteristics mentioned earlier have important economic and financial implications 
for small states. A narrow resource base and small domestic markets have negative 
implications for competition and limit local private sector capacity (ComSec and World 
Bank, 2000). Limited producUservice diversification and heavy reliance on exports make 
small states vulnerable to changes in the external environment over which they have little 
if any influence. Even though access to global capital markets is important to 
compensate for adverse shocks and income volatility, empirical evidence indicates that 
private markets tend to see small states as inherently more risky than larger states so 
that spreads are higher and market access more difficult. Collier and Dollar (1999) for 
example find that controlling for factors such as human capital, aid and different policy 
measures, small states are perceived to be 28% more risky than larger states and that 
this risk perception affects actual FDI flows. Similarly, many small states are limited in 
their access to commercial borrowing and other financial flows due to high levels of 
indebtedness and high borrowing costs. While there are no major differences in the cost 
of monitoring loans made to small and large states, there are large differences in the 
absolute size of the underlying financial transaction making lending to small states less 
attractive (ComSec and World Bank, 2000). The higher cost of enforcing contracts, 
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information costs and country risk issues often result in small states facing higher 
spreads for their borrowing. 
Limited freshwater resources, vulnerability to pollution, susceptibility to adverse climatic 
and other natural events, rapid urbanisation and pressures arising from economic 
development can have significant financial implications for water and sanitation service 
provision in small islands. With costs of raw water increasing by a factor of 2 to 3 each 
time a new source is developed (Briscoe and Garn, 1995), the costs of replacing polluted 
sources and/or developing new sources for system expansion can be prohibitive. To 
resolve limited water resource concerns, many small islands have had to adopt 
technologies such as rainwater harvesting, desalination, infiltration galleries, dual water 
distribution systems and wastewater reuse (SOPAC, 1998). Imported technologies like 
desalination which are expected to feature highly as future water supply options for small 
islands like Barbados where the desalination capacity exceeds 10-50% of the renewable 
groundwater resources (Bremere et al., 2001), are particularly expensive water supply 
options as a major portion of their operational costs (e.g. electricity) require foreign 
capital. 
3.2.4.2 Institutional and socio-political 
Besides economic effects, small size impacts the way small states are governed and the 
type of institutions they have. In general, small states tend to have proportionately larger 
governments with highly centralised political and administrative systems usually incurring 
higher costs per capita compared to larger countries. Public sector wage bills in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat group of small countries for example, are considerably higher 
at 31% of GDP than in larger states which average 21% of GDP (ComSec and World 
Bank, 2000). Despite a tendency for big government, many small states suffer from 
limited institutional capacity due to limited human resources especially at the technical 
level. To lower per capita costs and extend resources, persons often act in 
multifunctional roles which also tends to weaken technical expertise (Farrugia, 1993). 
Like other countries, senior public officials in small states play a crucial role in the 
economic, social and political development of their countries. In small states however, 
senior public officials tend to be highly influential (i.e. they contribute significantly to the 
success or failure of policies adopted by their political bosses) due to their small 
numbers, demand for their technical expertise and their multifunctional duties and 
responsibilities (Ibid.). 
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Small states usually tend to develop closely integrated societies containing an intricate 
network of personal relationships (Farrugia, 1993). While this may enable easier 
communication, it can also disable policy-making and decision-implementing processes 
through personal intervention, especially of major stakeholders. In addition, it is also 
possible that these close-knit political arrangements and centralisation can lead to higher 
levels of corruption (Brautigam and Woolcock, 2001) and greater opportunity for political 
interference. Social cohesion is often strong due to a common history and cultural 
identity. This can affect communal interactions with 'outsiders' who are viewed 
suspiciously as exploiters (Farrugia, 1993). 
Finally, related to the issue of dependence on foreign technologies and limited technical 
resources is that of reliance on foreign experts for advice. Tisdell (1993) contends that 
small states are likely to rely more heavily on foreign experts for advice than large states 
which has the disadvantage in that such experts may have limited knowledge of local 
conditions and may not feel the same duty of care in giving advice as would a local 
person. As such, there may be a tendency for foreign countries providing advice to 
assign their least experienced and qualified advisers to small countries as postings to 
SIDS are frequently less favoured than those to larger countries (Ibid.). 
3.3 Small country versus small project 
The development literature recognises two main types of small projecls - those in small 
countries and those being developed in small political units of larger countries such as 
local communities, municipalities, towns, cities and regions37. The typical characteristics 
of projects that are small because of country size are (World Bank, 1999): 
(a) remoteness and insularity - SIDS that are located far from major 
markets (e.g. Mauritius, Maldives and many Pacific islands) making it 
more expensive for investors to transport needed materials; 
(b) limited institutional capacity - small states find it more difficult to meet 
the fixed costs associated with developing institutions, thereby increasing 
the risk to investors (e.g. through the lack of a regulatory framework); and 
(c) limited diversification of production - small states often have a small 
resource base and industrial sector concentrated in a few areas, thereby 
increasing the risk to investors of any adverse market conditions. 
37 The criterion used to define project/system size varies. Small systems can range from systems serving less than 
3,300 persons to systems serving less than 10,000 persons (Clark et al., 1994; Okun, 1996). 
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Projects that are small because they are undertaken at a sub-national level face similar 
problems as those in small countries, but also have their own specific characteristics 
which include (World Bank, 1999): 
(a) the potential for support from a larger government entity; and 
(b) more restrictions as a result of national policy and law. 
In addressing size in water and sanitation, much of the literature concentrates on small 
projects/systems undertaken/operated at the sub-national level due to the fragmented 
nature of the sector. Given that both types of small projects face similar problems and 
the prevalence of small projects undertaken at the sub-national level in the literature, the 
ensuing discussion on size-related issues in the sector relies heavily on the concept of a 
small projecUsystem at the sub-national level. 
3.4 The significance of small size in attracting private investment 
The water and sanitation sector is highly fragmented as the product is expensive to 
transport and cheap to store thereby making it more of a local service. In the USA for 
example, 31 % of public water systems are community water systems serving 91 % of the 
population (Clark et al., 1994). In Spain, 86% of municipalities serve less than 5,000 
persons (Amil and Serra, 1996). The local nature of these services means that 
investments tend to be smaller than in other more centralised infrastructure sectors. 
Even where large investments are expected, they are spread out over time (to keep pace 
with growth in demand) so that the sector is characterised by small incremental 
investments. The Manila concessions for example, are expected to invest about US$5 
billion over 30 years but the initial round of financing did not exceed US$350 million 
(Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998c). Decentralisation also means that facilities are often 
under the control of local government entities, many of which have weak management 
structures, are not creditworthy and financially inexperienced (Haarmeyer and Mody, 
1997; 1998a). 
These features have important implications for financing. Many local governments and 
water utilities are not considered 'investment grade,38 which limits lenders' willingness to 
participate in bond financing or syndications. Banks tend to have a natural bias against 
small projects due to proportionately higher transaction costs and reduced arrangement 
38 Investment grade ratings assigned by credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's assess the 
relative likelihood that a borrower will default on its obligations. Investment grade rating categories can range from 
high quality ratings (AAAJAaa) to below investment grade quality (less than BBB/Baa2) (Cantor and Packer, 1995; 
Winpenny. 2003). 
60 
- -- --~~~~~~~~~~~-
Chaprer 3 - The dynamics of small size 
fees (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998a). Because of their size, water projects tend to be too 
small to bear the overhead costs of project finance but too large to be funded from aid 
(Winpenny, 2003). As mentioned in Section 2.2.2.1, project financing, although the 
preferred method of attracting private investors to BOT-type projects, is an intensive, 
time-consuming and expensive financing option. Project finance is generally available 
subject to a minimum size (usually US$50-100 million) which depends on the bank and 
the project. Below US$50 million, returns to scale tend to make project financing 
uneconomical so that smaller projects are generally funded by government or the 
corporate sector using balance sheet financing. Local government entities and/or water 
utilities with below investment grade ratings usually require the support of credit 
enhancement mechanisms such as political insurance or sovereign guarantees to make 
projects financially viable. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between investment 
grade rating and project size and the implications for financing options. For sub-
investment grade locations (less than BBB), project sizes between US$10,OOO-$100,OOO 
are considered too small for the corporate sector (Winpenny, 2003). Projects that fall 
within the 'exposed segment' generally do not get financed. With the majority of 
prospective projects falling within the exposed segment (US$10-50 million is a common 
size for water projects), many water projects are therefore not considered bankable 
(Ibid.). 
Figure 3.1 Water projects: Segmentation and financing options 
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Small size also has important implications for regulatory and related institutional 
requirements necessary to support private investment in the sector. Because of limited 
human resources and considerable fixed costs, small countries generally have difficulty 
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recruiting and retaining qualified persons to staff regulatory institutions, manage the utility 
and provide the policy capacity in the relevant Ministries (Stern, 2000). Buckle (1999) for 
example, finds that it is difficult to provide a fully effective decision-making regulatory 
capacity (rather than advisory or recommendatory) with less than 30-40 staff. Genuine 
separation of powers can also become virtually impossible due to the regular interaction 
of the political, economic and social elite (Stern, 2000). With the success of regulatory 
institutions dependent to a considerable degree on creating autonomous institutions that 
are sustainable and possess an effective regulatory memory, and the importance of 
regulatory capability to the enabling environment paradigm, small countries potentially 
face a serious problem of establishing the requisite regulatory environment to attract 
private investment. A variety of approaches including advisers (consultants), regulation 
by contract, multi-utility regulation and regulation by a multi-national regulatory agency39 
have been adopted with varying levels of success to address problems related to 
providing and funding specialist regulatory staff in many small countries (Stern, 2000). 
The validity of a size-investment relationship is substantiated by the private investment 
literature. Unfortunately, the World Bank's private investment database lacks good 
coverage of small-scale projects due to poor reporting of these activities (Izaguirre and 
Hunt, 2005). What it does report however, is the investment activity bias in large urban 
cities especially in Latin America and East Asia due to investors' fondness for countries 
with large economies and populations and high levels of urbanisation. In Latin America 
for example, 85% of private investment activity between 1990 and 2004 was attributed to 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (World Bank, 2005). In East Asia, 90% of this activity 
over the same period took place in China, Malaysia and the Philippines. The fact that 
these countries account for 62% (LAC) and 70% (East Asia) of their regional populations 
and 66% (LAC) and 65% (East Asia) of their regions' urban populations (United Nations, 
2004) is significant and supports the claim that private investors, particularly large 
international investors are more attracted to large-scale investments than small-scale 
ones. 
3.5 Overcoming the disadvantage of small size 
To address size-related and scale-related issues in water and sanitation, several 
approaches have been adopted including: 
38 For example, the establishment of the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL) by the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (Dominica, Grenada, SI. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines) to regulate the telecommunications sector in the Eastern Caribbean. 
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(a) aggregating or bundling utilities andlor projects; 
(b) the formation of multi-utilities; and 
(c) regional cooperation. 
Regional cooperation is of special interest to this research because of the Caribbean's 
history, reputation and relative success in using regional cooperation as a strategic 
response to overcome size constraints (see Section 5.5). Aggregation and multi-utilities 
are however briefly discussed as they have specific applications to water and sanitation 
and highlight various size-related concepts. 
3.5.1 Aggregating or bundling utilities and/or projects 
Aggregation is the grouping of several municipalities into a single administrative structure 
for the provision of a particular service or function (ERM et al., 2005). Aggregated 
structures generally vary by scale where two or more neighbouring municipalities 
combine, by scope to provide a range of related services or by process (voluntary based 
on mutual interests or imposed by government). The main driver for aggregation is 
usually the potential to realise economies of scale4o• Other drivers relevant to this 
research include access to finance and PSP. These are briefly discussed below. 
3.5.1.1 Aggregation to increase efficiency through economies of scale 
For water supply, the conventional wisdom supported by empirical research has been 
that the larger the quantity of water produced and the more people served, the smaller 
the unit cost of production. Katko (1988) for example, finds that scale economies exist 
for Swedish water and sewage systems serving over 25,000 persons. Tynan and 
Kingdom (2005) find strong evidence of economies of scale based on utility size in Africa, 
Vietnam, Peru and the United States. Utilities, particularly those serving less than 
125,000 people were found to be able to reduce per customer operating costs by 
increasing their scale of operation. Besides the more traditionally cited sources of scale 
economies in the water delivery network, storage and treatment facilities, scale 
economies also apply to other areas such as professional expertise and procurement. 
Although the range over which these economies persist is of considerable disagreement 
40 Economies of scale refer to an economic property of production that affects cost if the quantity of all input factors is 
increased by some amount. Economies of scale tend to occur in industries with high capital costs in which those 
costs can be distributed across a large number of units of production (both in absolute terms and especially I relative 
to the size of the market). 
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in the literature (Dajani and Gemmell, 1973; Kim and Clark, 1988), there is consensus 
that small systems suffer from poor economies and poor efficiencies of scale. 
The need to improve the efficiency of service provision by generating economies of scale 
to share total production costs over a larger demand base and reduce the unit costs of 
production has been the main factor driving the aggregation of water and sanitation 
providers. In the USA for example, 'regionalisation' through federal legislation was 
founded on the grounds of the effect of economies of scale on water supply technology 
(Clark, 1979). In England and Wales, the 1973 Water Act mandated the aggregation of 
water and sanitation services which saw 200 public water supply undertakers and 1,400 
sewerage authorities consolidated into 10 regional water authorities (Lynk, 1993). Small 
town water services are often inefficient because they are too small to access certain 
services or cannot realise the full benefit of the infrastructure at their disposal. Through 
aggregation, utilities are able to reduce overhead and operational costs and combine 
services and revenue to form a critical mass capable of efficiently supporting the full 
range of utility functions. 
3.5.1.2 Aggregation to access finance and introduce PSP 
Besides improving service efficiency, aggregation has also been used to access finance 
and introduce PSP. The Hungarian government for example, has determined a minimum 
loan size and provides a bonus to municipalities applying as a group versus individual 
municipalities (ERM et al., 2005). In Brazil, although water and sanitation services are by 
constitution a municipal responsibility, a number of state water companies were created 
in the 1970s to accelerate the pace of investment to develop access to services (Ibid.). 
The basis for aggregation to access finance has been that it is more efficient to provide a 
longer-term loan to a single entity than smaller loans to a number of entities. Pooling 
projects for financing also makes it more economical for credit rating agencies to 
evaluate credit risks due to the importance of the size and composition of the borrower 
pool (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998b). Smaller pools (20-100 borrowers) generally face 
more stringent credit requirements from lenders than larger pools that are able to access 
finance at lower interest rates (Ibid.). Aggregation in this context has been achieved 
mainly by (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998c): 
(a) bundling water and sanitation projects to form economically viable entities 
than can be attractive to investors (e.g. Malaysia bundled its entire 
sewerage system under one concession); 
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(b) consolidating equity funds to leverage sponsors' equity and attract a 
larger group of investors; and· 
(c) increasing balance sheet financing by consolidating the ownership and 
operation of water utilities. 
Aggregation has also been used to introduce PSP. In the Philippines for example, PSP 
acted as an important driver in the creation of water districts (ERM et al., 2005). In 
England and Wales, the creation of regional authorities provided an attractive demand 
base for the privatisation of the sector (Ibid.). Aggregation in this context has been 
achieved by (ERM et al., 2005): 
(a) consolidating well-performing utilities with less successful entities to 
prevent 'cherry picking' by private operators and to increase investments 
in areas that otherwise would be undesirable; and 
(b) creating a larger entity out of several smaller entities which would be 
unable to attract private investment by themselves because of their size. 
3.5.2 Multi-utilities 
Internationally, the term 'multi-utility' is generally associated with big multinational 
companies active in more than one utility sector in national and international markets. In 
this context, the main drivers for operating as a global multi-utility include (Sommer, 
2001a; Finger and Allouche, 2002): 
(a) reducing costs through economies of scale in areas such as project 
development and implementation and administration; 
(b) entering and developing new markets through strategic alliances with 
existing companies41 (establishing a local presence); 
(c) increasing market share and market concentration; and 
(d) diversifying risks by operating in several sectors/markets. 
The more traditional concept of a multi-utility however, is that of multi-service provision at 
the municipal or regional level to offset disadvantages from insufficient size of the 
customer base in smaller and/or more remote communities. In Germany for example, 
900 municipal multi-utilities offer electricity, gas, water and district heating to their 
.1 Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux for example, through its subsidiary Aquas de Barcelona was able to gain rapid market 
access in Latin America (e.g. Santiago in Chile; Buenos Aires. Cordoba and Santa Fe in Argentina; La paz and El 
Alto in Bolivia; Limeira in Brazil; and Bogota in Colombia). 
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respective municipalities (Rothenberger, 2002). In Gabon, electricity and water are 
provided to 39 and 32 centres respectively with some of these centres serving as little as 
1,000 inhabitants (Tnimolet, 2002). Advantages of multi-utility operation include 
(Sommer, 2001a; Rothenberger, 2003): 
(a) reduced costs through economies of scale and scope42 involving physical 
assets, customer service functions, technical expertise and 
administration. British gas and electricity utilities for example report 
savings of up to 10% while German multi-utilities estimate a 25% 
reduction in staff costs and 33% reduction in meter reading, billing and 
collection costs (Rothenberger, 2002); 
(b) the opportunity to cross-subsidise less profitable utility operations such as 
water and sanitation with more viable operations. In Gabon for example, 
even though water accounts for only 15% of the multi-utility's revenue, it 
receives 60% of pledged investments (Tremolet, 2002); 
(c) improvement in willingness-to-pay for some services (e.g. water and 
sanitation) due to credible threats to withhold other 'priority' services such 
as telecommunications and electricity that are easy to disconnect; 
(d) the opportunity to extend different services to smaller and/or more remote 
communities due to the use of shared networks and assets; and 
(e) the provision of a 'one-slop shop' to customers - able to provide 
integrated full service packages. 
Several countries have adopted a multi-utility strategy to attract private investment by 
removing barriers to competitive entry, lowering payment risks and lowering political risks 
(Sommer, 2001 b). The opportunity to leverage existing distribution networks, customer 
bases and other assets already in place to provide one utility service can reduce barriers 
to entry of companies interested in providing additional utility services in the same 
market. Electric utilities for example, have the potential to allow voice and data 
transmission directly over the electric power grid. Firms offering several services also 
have greater leverage in collecting revenue and greater political clout and so are less 
vulnerable to such risks (Ibid.). 
42 Economies of scope arise when it is less costly to combine two or more outputs from the same organisation than to 
produce them separately. In utility operation, economies of scope are induced by the common production of two 
different goods such as joint pipe laying for gas and water or centralised metering and billing. 
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3.5.3 Regional cooperation 
The term 'regional43 cooperation' is more frequently associated with political and 
economic regional integration in the form of free trade areas, custom unions, common 
markets and complete economic and political unions. In this context, regional integration 
frameworks improve a region's investment climate by increasing the geographical scope 
and size of markets, enabling policy coordination and harmonisation and reducing 
business transaction costs (UNCTAD, 1998; Lim, 2001). The promise of regional 
cooperation however as a means by which countries can jointly affect the dynamics of 
their development, goes beyond trade and politics and has found favour as a strategic 
response to non-economic and non-political issues of regional interest especially where 
there is some resource constraint at the national level. Regional cooperation to realise 
the efficient operation of common services and activities (formally referred to as 
'functional cooperation') can occur independently of the formal integration process and 
usually involves the adjustment of policies and activities between countries to achieve 
common goals (Samuel, 1990; Bryan and Bryan, 1999). The range of issues for which 
functional regional cooperation has been applied spans various areas of public policy 
including education, the environment, disaster management, culture and health. It is this 
form of regional cooperation that is of import to this research. 
According to Smith (1993), the process of regional cooperation can differ in terms of: 
(a) scope - the range of issues and transactions falling under the 
cooperation scheme; 
(b) depth - the extent of policy harmonisation or coordination; 
(c) institutionalisation - the degree to which accommodation and decision-
making takes place in organised and predictable ways; and 
(d) centralisation - the extent to which there exists a supra-national 
decision-making apparatus to establish common policy and to resolve 
disputes. 
The 'scope' for regional cooperation is of interest to this research because of the 
intended focus on the application of regional cooperation in the water and sanitation 
sector to help foster an environment conducive to private investment, especially where 
small size is a disadvantage to attracting this type of investment. 
.(3 For the purposes of this research, 'region' refers to a geographical area comprised of neighbouring countries that 
are socially, economically or politically interdependent (e.g. the European Union and the Caribbean). 
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3.5.3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of regional cooperation 
The use of a regional approach to develop strategic responses to issues of common 
interest has several advantages which include (Tutangata and Power, 2002): 
(a) overcoming capacity/capability constraints that arise in small populations; 
(b) achieving economies of scale in the provision of centralised services; 
(c) sharing of investment and transaction costs for capital intensive activities; 
(d) pooling resources to promote and attract external funding; 
(e) better formulation of policies or activities that have 'spill-over' effects that 
create their own economies of scale; and 
(f) providing a stronger voice in the global community. 
More specifically, a coordinated regional strategy (SPFC, 2000): 
(a) provides a more meaningful role in setting regional priorities and 
programmes; 
(b) empowers member countries to determine their own priorities and 
programmes; 
(c) improves the utilisation of limited regional resources; 
(d) enhances the delivery and impact of regional initiatives; and 
(e) addresses issues of wasteful duplication and overlap in regional 
programmes and among regional organisations. 
Despite these benefits, the regional integration literature highlights a number of 
impediments at regional and national levels. Obstacles include waning political will, 
changes in integration/cooperation strategy, national rivalries and technical impediments 
to the implementation and enforcement of common policies (Vaitsos, 1978; Bryan and 
Bryan, 1999). Problems can also arise if national interests are advanced over regional 
ones, or national programmes do not reflect the regional agenda. Lewis (2002) finds this 
especially relevant if member countries are at different levels of development and feel 
'hampered' by the requirements of 'weaker' countries. In the absence of corrective 
mechanisms, the benefits of regional cooperation can be asymmetrically distributed 
among partners with some partners gaining more from cooperation. Weak institutions 
and/or personnel and unstable budgetary support can also be problematic. Montero 
(2002) in his analysis of successful and unsuccessful regional cooperation programmes 
indicates some basic principles for sustained regional cooperation. These include: 
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(a) the existence of a common purpose among members; 
(b) significant national priority in relation to the common purpose to 
ensure the necessary national support and follow-up; 
(c) the availability of a minimum human and material resources capacity 
at the national level or the necessary political will to develop and put 
that capacity into the national and regional interest; 
(d) the identification of a recognised individual and/or institutional 
leadership to guide and develop the programme; 
(e) the development of a promoting, implementing and coordinating 
national and regional institution or body; and 
(f) securing long-term, sustainable financial contributions. 
Small countries, particularly SIDS have a strong tradition of regional cooperation because 
of their geographical proximity to each other and the similarity of the issues that they 
face. Various international fora such as the Barbados Programme of Action for SIDS and 
the Commonwealth SecretariatIWorld Bank Joint Task Force on small states advocate 
the increased use of regional organisations and programmes geared towards sustainable 
development. As mentioned earlier, a range of regional programmes and initiatives exist. 
The application of a regional cooperation framework to the water and sanitation sector is 
examined below. 
3.5.3.2 Regional cooperation in water and sanitation 
Deregulation, privatisation and technological advancement are credited with the 
emergence of complex integration structures in the energy and telecommunications 
sectors (Zhou, 2003). For energy, the nature of regional cooperation is guided by 
specific supply and demand needs, differences in energy resource endowments and size 
of local markets (Hira and Amaya, 2003). In telecommunications, numerous cooperation 
efforts evolve because of the high investment priority placed on the sector for the 
realisation of national and regional socio-economic goals (Dymond, 1987). Compared to 
both these sectors, water and sanitation have experienced modest opportunities for 
regional cooperation as the sector has not experienced major technological breakdowns 
or come close to exploiting economies of scale in management and operations as other 
utilities (Seppala et al., 2001). As a result, separation into production and transmission 
components as is done for developing energy markets is rare and not considered cost-
effective, thereby limiting the range of effective regional cooperation initiatives. 
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The driving force for regional cooperation in the water sector has primarily been the 
management of shared and/or limited water resources. Various treaties, commissions 
and agreements outline the extent and intensity of cooperation and regulate the joint 
utilisation of approximately 261 international watersheds and numerous transboundary 
aquifers which cover about one-half of the earth's land surface and affect 40% of its 
population (Wolf et a/., 1999). Regional cooperation is also traditional in the water-
electricity co-generation industries of many Middle Eastern and North African countries to 
alleviate freshwater shortages (Shamloul, 2002). More recently, many developing 
countries have begun to promote regional cooperation to address institutional capacity, 
governance and investment constraints in the sector. The Asian and Pacific region for 
example is renowned for various regional initiatives to formulate and implement 
strategies and policies that accord appropriate priority to water and sanitation 
infrastructure development and management. High on the agenda is the possible role of 
regional cooperation initiatives to assist in mobilising the required finances for the sector. 
Initiatives in the region which show the scope for regional cooperation in the sector 
include (SPFC, 2000; Zieroth, 2001; PWA, 2002; UNESCAP, 2006): 
(a) strengthening and reforming institutions in the sector (e.g. the 
establishment of a 'utility' section in the South Pacific Applied Geoscience 
Commission44 to specifically address the needs of the sector); 
(b) the creation of an investment forum to help countries assess their needs, 
exchange experiences, raise the profile of the sector and facilitate access 
to potential sources of technical assistance and finance; 
(c) pooling of funds available within the region in search of better yields (e.g. 
expanding the role of the Asian Development Bank in financing regional 
infrastructure; expanding the Asian Bond Fund and making it 
infrastructure financing-friendly; setting up new institutions such as an 
Asian investment bank for cross-border financial intermediation; and 
establishing/reinvigorating sub-regional banks/funds); 
(d) the establishment of a regional regulatory framework to overcome 
capacity constraints, achieve economies of scale and attract private 
investment through improved credibility; 
(e) the establishment of financially viable utilities that result in improved 
performance by developing appropriate financial and cost recovery 
policies, tariffs, billing and collection systems, financial and operating 
systems; 
.... An independent, inter-governmental regional organisation that provides technical assistance, strategic planning 
and policy development support to Pacific Island countries in the field of geosciences. 
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(f) collaboration on certain projects across national boundaries that require 
cooperation and coordination among one or more countries; and 
(g) harmonising regional standards and developing best practice guidelines. 
In the context of introducing PSP into the provision of water and sanitation services, Jha 
(2005) suggests a regional contract for these services whereby a single contract is 
developed to provide these services to more than one country or a single investor 
procures compatible contracts in each country. Such initiatives are expected to: 
(a) reduce the costs of business development and transaction preparation by 
spreading them over a larger market; and 
(b) offer international investors more visibility so that they will be eager to win 
a large regional contract to supplement their credentials. 
3.6 Emerging issues 
The argument can be made that many of the issues identified as drawbacks of smallness 
such as limited institutional capacity, limited access to commercial borrowing and 
increased political (stakeholder) interference are not unique to small states. In fact, the 
review conducted in chapter 2 (informed predominantly by private investment 
experiences in large urban centres), highlighted similar issues as constraints to creating 
an environment conducive to private investment in the sector. Where small states differ 
and size becomes important is in small states' inherent and natural capacity to effectively 
address these issues to their advantage. Small size also impacts investors' perceptions. 
Creating an environment conducive to private investment in water and sanitation can 
overwhelm the resources of small economies due to the institutional, financial and social 
costs involved. With this in mind, should small states subscribe to the international best 
practice recommendations on how to attract private investment to their water and 
sanitation sectors? What modifications if any are necessary to the enabling environment 
paradigm when dealing with small states? These issues are not adequately addressed in 
the literature apart from general statements affirming that determinants for attracting 
private investment to the sector are applicable to all countries regardless of size. The 
extent to which these determinants apply to small states and the extent to which they can 
be directly translated into best practice for small states are unclear. 
Strategies to overcome size constraints and help create an environment conducive to 
private investment in the sector are generally concerned with achieving economies of 
scale and scope. Aggregation and multi-utilities are relatively established means by 
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which the disadvantages of small size can be alleviated by reducing costs, combining 
services, increasing market share and diversifying risks. Regional cooperation on the 
other hand is less frequently used as a size response mechanism in the sector due to its 
limited scope and application to water and sanitation issues. Besides recent use in the 
Asian and Pacific region, the literature fails to adequately address the potential for 
regional cooperation to improve a country's or region's environment for private 
investment in its water and sanitation sector. This potential is of interest to this research. 
3.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter introduced the concept of small size and its impact on attracting private 
investment to the water and sanitation sector. Approaches to address size-related and 
scale-related issues in water and sanitation were also presented. Building on issues 
highlighted in the previous review chapter regarding the relative nature of determinants to 
attract private investment to water and sanitation, this chapter narrowed the research 
focus to look at the implications of small size on the enabling environment paradigm and 
the potential of responses such as regional cooperation to address possible constraints. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology adopted to answer research 
questions formulated from the theoretical frameworks developed in the previous review 
chapters. Particular attention is given to the development of research instruments, 
sources of data and data collection strategy. The chapter is organised into eight 
sections. Section one presents the research objectives and research questions, followed 
by a discussion of the research design. Data collection instruments and procedures are 
then presented in sections three, four and five. Sections six and seven consider ethical 
issues and research limitations respectively. The chapter concludes with some 
preliminary data analysis. 
4.2 Research objective and research questions 
Despite the fall-off of private investment in water and sanitation, significant investment 
needs and budgetary constraints still render it a viable financing option for the sector. To 
regain investor confidence and stimulate interest in the sector, it is therefore necessary to 
understand the drivers for this type of investment and create conditions conducive to its 
use. What are the drivers and deterrents to private investment in the Caribbean water 
and sanitation sector? Are the necessary systems in place to attract private investment 
to the sector? Does the Caribbean's small size affect the effectiveness of these systems 
to attract private investment? These are just some of the questions fundamental to 
understanding the potential for private investment in the Caribbean water and sanitation 
sector and the framework necessary to facilitate this investment. 
Guided by issues arising from the review of literature, a research hypothesis, a primary 
research question and four secondary research questions were formulated to investigate 
the phenomenon of private investment in the Caribbean water and sanitation sector as 
discussed below and presented schematically in Figure 4.1. 
4.2.1 Primary research question 
How can private investment be attracted to the Caribbean water and sanitation 
sector? 
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The objective of this question is to develop a framework to attract private investment to 
the Caribbean water and sanitation sector. 
4.2.2 Secondary research questions 
What is the current state of the operating environment and how conducive is it to 
private investment? 
The objective of this question is to examine the macroeconomic, policy, legal and 
regulatory frameworks within which the water and sanitation sector operates and 
determine the extent to which these encourage (discourage) or have the potential to 
encourage (discourage) private investment. 
What are the main determinants or criteria for private investment in the water and 
sanitation sector? 
The objective of this question is to identify factors that influence the private investment 
decision in the sector. The question intends to assess investors' criteria for investment 
and examine water sector officials' level of awareness of factors important to private 
investors. 
What is the scope for and strategy to attract private investment to the water and 
sanitation sector? 
The objective of this question is to identify appropriate forms of private investment and 
ways to encourage this investment given the local context and conditions. 
To what extent is size an issue and what is the scope for addressing small size as 
a constraint to attracting private investment? 
The objective of this question is to examine the impact of small size on the investment 
potential of the Caribbean water and sanitation sector and to determine what can be 
done to mitigate against likely disadvantages of small size. 
4.2.3 Research hypothesis 
The guiding hypothesis for the research is: 
Factors that determine private investment in water and sanitation vary in 
importance and relevance from location to location; hence a context-specific 
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approach is needed to attract private investment to the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector. 
The basis for the research hypothesis stems from the fact that investors' criteria for 
investment vary and there is no single blueprint for investment promotion as strategies to 
attract private investment need to adapt to the prevailing investment climate. 
Figure 4.1 Schematic of research hypothesis and questions 
Research hypothesis 
Factors that determine private investment in water and sanitation vary in importance and 
relevance; hence a context-specific approach is needed to attract private investment to the 
Caribbean water and sanitation sector. 
Primary research question 
How can private investment be attracted to the Caribbean water and sanitation sector? 
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 
Conducive Investment Investment Small size 
environment decision- promotion 
makinq 
Secondary Secondary Secondary Secondary 
question 1 question 2 question 3 question 4 
What is the What are the What is the To what extent 
current state of main scope for and is size an issue 
the operating determinants or strategy to and what is the 
environment criteria for attract private scope for 
and how private investment to addressing 
conducive is it investment in the water and small size as a 
to private the water and sanitation constraint to 
investment? sanitation sector? attracting 
sector? private 
investment? 
Variables Variables Variables Variables 
• Institutional .Orivers • Model for • Constraints 
• Economic • Constraints private • Response 
and financial investment strategies 
• Socia-political • Type of 
investor 
• Promotion 
strategy 
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4.3 Research design 
The research design is a blueprint of research that links the data to be collected to a 
study's initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusions. Several factors 
govern the choice of research strategy. Yin (2003) offers a framework for deciding on an 
appropriate research strategy which considers the type of research questions, the extent 
of control over behavioural events and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed 
to historical events (Table 4.1). Resources such as the budget available to the 
researcher, time available for data collection and the skills of the researcher also affect 
the research strategy (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
Table 4.1 Research design selection criteria 
no yes 
Archival analysis no yes/no 
Source: Yin (2003) 
Most important is the type of research question. The research questions presented in 
Section 4.2 are 'how' and 'what' questions intended to be both descriptive and 
exploratory in nature. Private investment in water and sanitation is a contemporary 
phenomenon that cannot be manipulated by the researcher. Using Yin's research design 
selection criteria, these conditions favour a case study or survey strategy. Both 
strategies are supported by the extant literature (see Section 2.3.2). Um (2001) speaks 
of investor surveys and in-depth case studies as common sources for empirical work on 
investment determinants. Privatisation studies generally adopt a case study approach 
which allows researchers to observe the phenomenon within its real-life context (Larimo, 
1995). According to Braadbaart (2005), limitations inherent in water privatisation 
research such as restricted access to information on privatisation experiences are best 
resolved by focusing on single cases. Case studies are generally used where no single 
perspective can provide a full account or explanation of the research issue, and where 
understanding needs to be holistic, comprehensive and contextualised (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003). The case study as a research strategy is an all encompaSSing method 
using a variety of qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques to focus an 
enquiry around a specific instance or event (Yin, 2003). The use of multiple sources of 
evidence (including surveys) is one of the strengths of the case study strategy as it 
allows the investigator to address a broader range of issues. This multidimensional 
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approach is well-suited for the research to adequately address the research questions 
and issues. 
4.3.1 Case study research strategy 
Yin (2003) identifies five components of a case study research strategy - a study's 
questions, its propositions, its unit(s) of analysis, the logic linking the data to the 
propOSitions and the criteria for interpreting the findings. Research questions and 
propositions have already been addressed (Section 4.2). The key issue in selecting and 
making decisions about the appropriate unit(s) of analysiS is to decide what it is you want 
to be able to say something about at the end of the study (Patton, 2002). The focus for 
data collection was: 
(a) the operating environment for private investment in the water and 
sanitation sector; 
(b) investors' criteria for investment in the sector; 
(c) water sector officials' awareness of investors' criteria for investment; 
(d) investors' and water sector officials' perceptions of the scope and strategy 
for private investment in the sector; and 
(e) investors' and water sector officials' perceptions of the impact of small 
size on attracting private investment and likely response strategies. 
The 'case' was therefore the primary unit of analysis while private investors, water sector 
officials and documents were sub-units of analysis or more simply put, data sources for 
the research. More specifically, given the strategic nature of the research questions and 
the fact that investment decision-making is invariably a top management exercise (see 
Section 2.3.3.1), the research focused on middle to top-level managers as informants for 
the research. Linking data to propOSitions and the criteria for interpreting the findings 
represent the data analysis steps in case study research (Yin, 2003). Salient 
observations, themes and patterns emerging from the data were then examined within 
the context of the theoretical framework developed during the review of literature. 
The particular focus of the research on the phenomenon of private investment in the 
water and sanitation sectors in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobag045 favoured a 
multiple-case design. The logic underlying the use of multiple-case studies is to choose 
cases that either predict similar results (literal replication) or produce contrasting results 
45 Further references to Trinidad and Tobago will be shortened to Trinidad. 
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but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin, 2003). The three case locations 
were selected for various reasons. Most important was the diversity of private 
investment operational models across locations - private utilities in Jamaica, BOTs in 
Barbados and Trinidad and a management contract in Trinidad. The case locations were 
also known to be at different stages of sectoral development. Examining different forms 
of the phenomenon in different environments was therefore expected to enrich the 
research and allow for better generalisation of the findings. Accessibility, familiarity and 
data availability were also important considerations during case selection. As pointed out 
by Braadbaart (2005), access to information on water privatisation experiences in 
developing countries is generally restricted as details of contract preparation and 
negotiation are often shrouded in secrecy and persons involved are usually close-lipped. 
Aware of these challenges, the cases were chosen on the basis that the researcher had 
established a rapport with likely informants and document gatekeepers through previous 
work experience and professional association, who would be more likely to open-up and 
be more forthcoming with information than persons in an unfamiliar environment. The 
researcher was also aware of problems of inadequate data and limited human resources 
in some Caribbean islands. These problems were not expected to be significant in the 
case locations as they represented the largest countries in the Caribbean with 
longstanding structured institutions and procedures. 
The use of more than one unit of analysis resulted in embedded or nested case studies 
within the overall primary case approach. Using Yin's classification, the emerging case 
study strategy design was a multiple-case (embedded) design (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 Embedded multiple-case study strategy 
Case Study 
Private investment in the Caribbean water and sanitation sector 
/ ~ 
Case Study Case Study Case Study 
Jamaica 
.--------. 
Barbados 
.-------. 
Trinidad and Tobago 
1/ ··· ... ·• ... stt,;,~s ..... "co ~','''>';s"',.,,'y' , ~···'·:;-·.V'0,,'¥'~!'C**¥.yJ",)f.· ,; ~ Surveys Surveys 
Interviews Interviews Interviews 
•. ;';;~'.~;/_c 12g<?':~~':!~tS: Documents &'''·'':'.i~·l~~~~Jl,,~ , v .. "" . ~ ~ .. 
• ... , , L _______________________________________________ ~ _____ ______ J 
Three main sources of evidence were used within the case study framework to answer 
the research questions - surveys, interviews and documents (Table 4.2). These will be 
discussed in turn in Section 4.4. 
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Table 4.2 Data collection techniques used in the research 
What is the current state of the operating 
environment and how conducive is it to 
What are the main determinants or 
investment in the water 
What is the scope for and strategy to 
attract private investment to the water 
To what extent is size an issue and what 
is the scope for addressing small size as 
a constraint to attracting private 
4.3.2 Survey research strategy 
Document review 
Semi-structured interview 
Questionnaire survey 
Semi-structured interview 
Questionnaire survey 
Semi-structured interview 
Questionnaire survey 
Semi-structured interview 
A survey research strategy was adopted outside of the case study framework to access 
data sources beyond the case locations. Using a questionnaire survey technique, this 
research design focused on the investment criteria of international private investors in the 
utilities sector and Caribbean water utility managers' awareness of these investment 
criteria, perceptions of the impact of small size on attracting private investment and the 
scope for regional cooperation to address size constraints. 
4.3.3 Validity and reliability 
The quality of a research design can be judged according to four logical tests (Yin, 2003): 
(a) construct validity - the extent to which correct operational measures are 
established for the concepts being studied; 
(b) internal validity - the extent to which a causal relationship can be 
established whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other 
conditions; 
(c) external validity - the extent to which a study's findings can be 
generalised; and 
(d) reliability - the extent to which the operations of a study can be repeated 
with the same results. 
The use of multiple sources of evidence is one of the strengths of the case study 
research strategy, the most important advantage being the development of converging 
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lines of enquiry (Yin, 2003). This process of 'triangulation' is based on the premise that 
no single method, data source, evaluator or theoretical interpretation of data can 
adequately address a phenomenon. The approach to and consideration of research 
design, instrument development and administration and subsequent data analysis was 
undertaken with a view to maximising validity and reliability throughout the research 
process. Validity within the case study framework for example, was obtained by 
interviewing where possible more than one expert informant to ascertain the same 
information and supplementing this data with documentary evidence. Attention to 
question wording and context during instrument development and pilot testing of the 
instrument(s) by a panel of experts ensured that the instrument(s) addressed the 
appropriate concepts: Interviews were administered using an interview guide and 
transcribed verbatim by the researcher to ensure reliability and consistency. Systematic 
sampling for survey participation from up-to-date sample frames was undertaken to 
facilitate representational generalisation. A case study database was maintained and 
case reports presented with frequent referencing of data sources. These and other 
tactics employed in the research to maximise validity and reliability are detailed in 
subsequent sections. 
4.4 Data collection techniques 
4.4.1 Questionnaire surveys 
A survey is a system for collecting information from or about people to describe, compare 
or explain their knowledge, attitudes and behaviour (Fink, 2003). The survey 
questionnaire or instrument is the tool used to obtain this information in a structured 
format through the use of careful question construction and measurement of key 
variables central to the research. Survey questions are either factual, designed to elicit 
background information on the respondent for classification purposes or subjective, 
designed to measure respondents' beliefs, attitudes, preferences or opinions on the topic 
under investigation. The range and intensity of these subjective experiences are 
measured using rating scales which place each respondent on an attitudinal dimension 
or continuum. 
The main types of survey instruments include self-administered questionnaires, 
interviews, content analysiS of records and structured observation (Oppenheim, 1992; 
Fink, 2003). The following sections concentrate on self-administered questionnaires, the 
development and administration of which was guided by the methods literature (Moser 
and Kalton, 1971; Oppenheim, 1992; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1997; Fink, 
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2003). This survey method was chosen primarily because of its ability to reach a large 
number of respondents in a timely and cost-effective manner. 
4.4.1.1 Survey instrument development 
Three sets of self-administered questionnaires were used to obtain an overview of the 
attitudes, perceptions and expectations of three sets of respondents to private investment 
decision-making in the water and sanitation sector (Appendix 1). These were: 
(a) Survey A - Survey of local financial institutions on investment decision-
making in the water and sanitation sector administered to local financial 
institutions in each case location; 
(b) Survey B - Survey of locational determinants and investment decision-
making in the utilities sector administered to international private investors 
in the utilities sector; and 
(c) Survey C - Survey of locational determinants and the potential for 
regional cooperation in the water and sanitation sector administered to 
Caribbean water utility managers. 
Survey A was undertaken within the case study framework to gauge the interest of local 
financial institutions to investing in the water and sanitation sector. Attitudinal questions 
probed respondents' perception of the local water and sanitation utility with the intention 
of developing a measurable index of investors' perception as a determinant of investment 
in the sector. The survey also identified the key priorities for investors by focusing on 
incentives for investing in the sector. Questions about background characteristics sought 
to classify respondents in terms of organisation type, size and investment activity. 
Survey B was designed to gauge the interest of international institutional investors in the 
utilities sectors and to identify the conditions that this category of investor perceived as 
important when making decisions on new investments or judging the performance of 
existing ones. Attitudinal questions probed respondents' motivation for investing abroad 
and their perception of investment locational determinants. The survey also identified the 
key priorities of investors by focusing on factors determining the success or failure of 
their best, worst and smallest investments to provide greater insight into factors that 
influenced investors' choices. Survey C was designed to determine the level of 
awareness of Caribbean water utility managers to conditions perceived as important to 
investors when making the investment decision in the water and sanitation sector. 
Attitudinal questions probed respondents' perception of investors' priorities, focusing on 
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loeational determinants and factors determining investors' success or failure of specific 
investments. Respondents' attitudes towards regional cooperation in the sector were 
also assessed. Both surveys were conducted outside the ease study framework. 
The survey instruments were developed using constructs identified in the literature, used 
in similar instruments'6 and highlighted during exploratory telephone interviews with a 
small focus group of prospective respondents. For Survey A for example, attitudinal 
statements on investors' perception of the utility were generated from the collective 
opinion of the investor focus group on important attributes of the utility for consideration 
from an investment perspective. The survey instruments were then pilot tested by a five-
member panel of experts who were asked to assess the relevance of each item to the 
intended measurement, evaluate the clarity and conciseness of the items, suggest 
additional items that may have been omitted, comment on the terminology used, 
comment on the time taken to complete the survey and comment on the general layout of 
the survey instrument(s). Survey instruments were modified incorporating feedback from 
the expert panel which included the removal of redundant items, rewording of 
statements, removal of the middle response category (for Surveys B and C) and 
reordering of the scale direction. Aesthetic changes were also made to improve the 
layout. 
The Likert seale was used as the rating scale for all three survey instruments due to the 
following advantages'7 (Oppenheim, 1992; Spector, 1992): 
a) use of multiple items allowing more detailed exploration of an attitude; 
b) items presented as statements to be rated; 
c) response choices indicating varying degrees of agreement with or 
endorsement of the statement; 
d) easy construction and use of simple scoring methods; and 
e) good performance when it comes to a reliable, rough ordering of 
respondents with regard to a particular attitude. 
A five-point unipolar Likert scale was used for Survey A whereby response choices were 
numbered consecutively from high to Iow'S (from 5 to 1). A four-point scale was used for 
4EI For example, NWhat international investors look for when investing in developing countries: Results from a survey 
of international investors in the power sector" (Lamech and Saeed. 2003); ·Obstacles and constraints for increasing 
investment in the water and sanitation sector in Latin America and the Caribbean· (lOB. 2003a); and "Water UK 
investor survey: Key findings" (Whelan. 2004). 
47 Other rating scales were also examined. The Bogardus scale which is a social-distance scale was not applicable 
to the research. Thurstone and Guttman scales were considered laborious and beyond the resources of the research 
due to the number of judges required to assess the items and complex scale development procedures respectively. 
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Surveys Band C whereby response choices were numbered consecutively from 4 to 1. 
The traditional Likert scale employs five categories for each item although three and 
seven have sometimes been used (Moser and Kalton, 1971). The rationale behind using 
a four-point scale in Surveys Band C was to force respondents to take a position with the 
absence of a neutral response choice. This recommendation was made following the 
comments of the expert panel reviewing those instruments. The choice of scale order 
from high to low versus the commonly used low to high range was also made following 
comments from the expert panel about the natural tendency of persons to associate 
higher scores with more positive responses. Attitude scores for the multi-item question 
on investors' perception of the local water and sanitation utility were summed to give a 
utility perception scale (UPS) which was taken as the measure of investors' attitude 
towards the local utility. In so doing, a subjective indicator such as investor perception 
was transformed into a measurable index for rating and assessment purposes. 
Two types of response choices were used in the rating scale - agreement and evaluation 
to correspond with the phrasing of attitude statements. Agreement response choices 
asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed with items, using response 
choices such as strongly agree, most likely and highly supportive. Evaluation response 
choices asked respondents to rate statements along a good-bad dimension, using 
response choices such as critical factor, most important, most adequate and excellent. 
4.4.1.2 Sample design 
For Survey A, a list of 130,116 and 110 financial institutions in Jamaica, Barbados and 
Trinidad respectively was compiled using telephone listings for financial institutions. The 
population of interest included financial institutions that fell in the category of potential 
sources of water and sanitation infrastructure financing - commercial banks, leasing 
companies, insurance companies, pension funds and finance companies. The sampling 
frame was eventually modified to 104, 49 and 82 financial institutions after a clean-up of 
the initial lists (Table 4.3). Firms excluded from the final sampling frame included those 
that were not registered with the central bank and financial regulator in each case 
location, were no longer in business or had merged with other firms already in the 
sampling frame. Firms that were registered as different legal entities for regulation 
purposes were removed from the list and represented by their holding or parent 
organisations. Duplicate listings and firms that did not participate in the local economy 
were also excluded. The latter condition was most relevant to Barbados where for 
48 Scale ranged from highly favourable attitude or strong agreement to unfavourable attitude or strong disagreement 
with the premise that the strength of agreement is directly proportional to a person's attitude. 
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example 52 financial institutions were excluded from the list as they were offshore banks 
that did not participate in local financing arrangements. 
Table 4.3 Sample design data for Survey A 
S-:.Jamaica::';:<t Y;~Barbados- '--. 'i:C- Trinidad~'::·;-
Study population (N) 104 49 82 
Estimated sample size (n') 59 36 51 
Actual sample size (n) 62 27 40 
Number completed 28 15 25 
Response rate 45.2% 55.6% 62.5% 
Sample as % of N 59.6% 55.1% 48.8% 
Sampling error ±4.8% ±7.1% ±5.5% 
The sampling procedures used for Survey A conformed to the methods literature 
(Conway, 1967; Kalton, 1983; Barnett, 1991). Sample size estimates were calculated for 
precision at the 95% confidence interval49 (Table 4.3). Financial institutions were then 
arranged in alphabetical order in each list and subject to systematic sampling using a 
sampling interval of 1 in 2. In all three cases, the sampling fraction (sample size divided 
by the population size) was above 30% (59.6% for Jamaica, 55.1% for Barbados and 
48.8% for Trinidad), indicating that enough of the population had been sampled for 
generalisation of the survey findings (Weisberg et al., 1989). Sampling errors in the 
region of the desired ±5% margin of error also indicated that the samples were good 
approximations of the populations. Response rates of 45.2%, 55.6% and 62.5% were 
achieved for surveys administered in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad respectively. 
For Survey B, a list of 105 international firms involved in the utilities sector was compiled 
using the World Bank's private participation in infrastructure projects database for LAC50, 
the Directory of Development Organisations 2003 for Central America and the 
Caribbean51 and industry-specific business magazines52 • The population of interest 
which was not intended to be statistically representative, included companies that had 
put their own or a sponsor's capital at risk and had played a role in identifying investment 
opportunities in the utilities sector and putting together the initial capital for an 
investment. Companies located in the UK or with representative offices andlor affiliates 
in the UK were selected from the list of 105 firms to form a final sample size of 44 
companies. Contact details for these companies were then obtained using resources 
such as the Hemscott Company Guru and Financial Analysis Made Simple (FAME) 
,(9 95% probability that the interval will contain the true parameter value. 
50 The PPI project database tracks contract and investment information for private infrastructure projects in low and 
middle-income countries from 1990. Database sources indude commercial news databases, specialised and 
industry publications and internet sources (World Bank, 2005). 
51 The Directory is a compilation of contact data of the main sources of assistance available for private sector 
development and poverty reduction. 
52 For example, Global Water Intelligence and Project Finance International. 
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company databases53 and company websites. Of the 44 companies included in the 
survey, 12 completed the questionnaire representing a response rate of 27.3%. 
For Survey C, a list of 45 respondents was compiled using the membership database of 
the CWWA54. The population of interest which was not intended to be statistically 
representative included senior managers and decision-makers in the water and 
sewerage utilities in several Caribbean countries. Twenty-one managers completed the 
survey questionnaire, representing a response rate of 46.7%. 
4.4.1.3 Survey administration 
The extensive use of self-administered surveys as data collection tools has resulted in 
considerable experimental research on response inducement techniques. 
Prenotification, follow-ups, university sponsorship, personalisation and incentives are 
considered to positively influence response rates to mail surveys (Jobber, 1986; Harvey, 
1987; Fox et al., 1988; Diamantopoulos et al., 1991; Church, 1993). These measures 
were incorporated as much as possible during the administration of the survey. 
Prenotification by telephone was conducted to confirm the suitability of the organisation 
for inclusion in the survey, identify the appropriate person(s) to receive the survey 
instrument and in the case of Survey B, obtain some commitment to participate. During 
this exchange which occurred either with the intended respondent or his/her personal 
assistant/secretary, it became clear that the preferred means of receiving Survey B was 
via electronic mail. This mode of delivery was considered to prescribe to much of the 
response inducement techniques developed for the more traditional mail survey. In 
addition, lower costs and increased response speed of electronic mail surveys justified its 
use (Mehta and Sivadas, 1995; Tse et al., 1995; Tse, 1998). Electronic mail was also the 
choice of delivery for Survey C due to the geographical spread of the sample population. 
Prenotification by way of an introduction to the Survey C sample was done bye-mail on 
behalf of the researcher by the president and secretariat of the CWWA. The researcher's 
prior involvement in the association was stressed in this introduction to encourage 
participation. The mode of delivery for Survey A was largely determined by time 
constraints and the researcher's familiarity with each case location. Survey instruments 
were hand-delivered by the researcher in Jamaica and by private courier in Barbados 
and Trinidad. Prenotification by telephone was also done to alert respondents to look out 
for the questionnaire. 
53 Provides business and financial information for up to 500,000 companies in the UK. 
50( Membership open to individuals operating in the water, wastewater and solid waste sectors in the Caribbean. 
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Personalised cover letters were developed addressed to the intended respondent(s) 
(Appendix 2). These included the survey objectives, introduction to the survey 
instrument, the time required to complete the survey, survey return instructions and 
contact details. Assurances of confidentiality and highlights of the benefits of 
participation such as access to the final report were also included. For Survey A, a 
sachet of English tea was included with the cover letter and survey instrument as a 
'break-the-ice' non-monetary incentive for participation. For Surveys Band C, cover 
letters were sent as e-mail messages with the corresponding survey instruments sent as 
e-mail attachments. E-mails were entitled, "Please read - Survey of ... " in keeping with 
information provided during prenotification and to help differentiate the survey 
instruments from possible 'junk' mail. For each survey, academic affiliations were 
highlighted with the use of the university's e-mail account, university's logo on the cover 
letter and survey instrument(s) and the provision of contact details for the research 
supervisor for verification purposes. 
Surveys Band C were distributed in February and March 2004 respectively and were 
timed to coincide with anticipated low peak periods - Tuesday to Thursday mornings. 
Follow-up contact took the form of reminder e-mails in the first instance, and reminder e-
mails and telephone calls in the second and third instances. Completed questionnaires 
were for the most part returned bye-mail. A few were returned by regular mail or by fax 
transmission. Survey A was distributed between January and March 2005 to coincide 
with the researcher's field visit to each case 10cation55• Follow-up contact was by 
telephone. Completed questionnaires were either collected by the researcher while still 
in the case location or mailed to the university's address. 
4.4.2 Key informant interviews 
The purpose of qualitative interviewing is to capture the perceptions and experiences of 
those being interviewed without the constraints of predetermined categories. Interviews 
differ depending on the amount of structure imposed by the researcher which will in turn 
determine the freedom of the respondent in replying to or elaborating on questions 
(Remenyi et al., 1998). The unstructured or informal conversational interview is the most 
open-ended approach to interviewing, relying entirely on the spontaneous generation of 
questions in the natural flow of an interaction between the interviewer and interviewee 
(Patton, 2002). A more formal type of interview is the semi-structured interview which 
"Case study field visits - Jamaica (January 10-27). Barbados (January 28 - February 17) and Trinidad (February 18 
to March 9). 
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follows a sequence of standard question formulations outlined in an interview guide. This 
interviewing approach was adopted for the research to take advantage of the following 
features (Oppenheim, 1992; Kvale, 1996; Patton, 2002): 
4.4.2.1 
(a) the exact instrument used in the evaluation is available for inspection; 
(b) the interview is highly focused so that interviewee time is used efficiently; 
(c) it offers a more systematic and comprehensive way of collecting 
evidence; 
(d) 
(e) 
comparison across cases is possible in multi-case studies; and 
analysis is facilitated by making responses easy to find and compare. 
Interview design and protocol 
Constructs addressed in the survey questionnaires were further developed to allow 
respondents to freely express their perceptions, opinions and experiences in an interview 
situation. A series of open-ended questions developed from the literature were fashioned 
into 4 interview guides to correspond to different data sources (Table 4.4; Appendix 3). 
Table 4.4 General content of interview guides 
Interview guide for ... Questionnaire content 
Water sector officials" • Environment for private investment 
• Private investment experience 
• Scope and strategy for private investment 
... • Impact of small size 
... • Scope for regional cooperation 
·UI;I;ty'regUlators • Regulatory framework for private investment 
• Private investment experience 
• Impact of small size 
.. 
• Scope for regional cooperation 
. . 
Private service • Environment for private investment providers • Investment experience in the sector 
• Motivation to invest 
. 
Local financial • Perception of the sector 
institutions • Investment experience in the sector 
• Incentives to invest in the sector 
In keeping with the methods literature (Remenyi et al., 1998; Yin, 2003), a case study 
protocol was developed detailing the procedures and general rules to be followed during 
the collection of interview evidence. Field interview procedures were replicated as much 
as possible at each case location and included: 
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(a) establishing initial contact with the organisation's management at the 
highest level possible to achieve legitimacy and gain access to 
informants; 
(b) having at least three water utility informants in each location for the 
purposes of data validation; 
(c) having at least two water sector informants external to the water utility in 
each location; 
(d) having at least one water ministry/government informant in each location; 
(e) having at least one water utility regulation informant in each location; 
(f) having at least two water sector private service provider/investor 
informants in each location; 
(g) having at least one financial institution informant in each location; 
(h) e-mailing interview guides to the respective informants before the 
interview session to familiarise them with the research and assist in their 
preparations; 
(i) securing multiple interviews per site so as to reduce travelling time; 
U) interviewing informants in a familiar and convenient environment of their 
choice; 
(k) tape-recording all interviews; 
(I) identifying documentary evidence to support verbal information; and 
(m) developing a rapport with at least one friendly gatekeeper or informant in 
each location to assist with follow-up off-site requests. 
4.4.2.2 Sample design 
Sampling for semi-structured interviews within the case study framework was very 
specific to fulfil a requirement to interview persons with the likelihood of representing the 
best practice in support of the research constructs. The composition of this judgement 
sample was not intended to be statistically representative of the population but to 
comprise individuals considered to have the knowledge and information to provide useful 
ideas and insights. The interview sample frame included (Appendix 4): 
(a) senior water sector officials (from both the utility and government); 
(b) senior water utility regulators; 
(c) private service providers/investors in the sector; and 
(d) senior executives of financial institutions. 
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Respondents were identified from the sample frame created for the survey 
questionnaires, recommendations and/or referrals by other informants and through the 
researcher's interactionsS6 to satisfy the requirements of the field interview protocol in 
each case location. In total, 52 interviews were conducted (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Classification of interview respondents 
Jamaica Barbados Trinidad 
Water util,ity 12 5 7 
Utili,iy regulator 1 1 2 
Priv,ate, service,provider 3 2 3 
Financial'institution' 2 4 3 
General·· , 2 2 3 
4.4.2.3 Interview administration 
In addition to the general methods literature on interview techniques (Oppenheim, 1992; 
Kvale, 1996; Patton, 2002), interview administration was guided by specific methods 
literature on interviewing corporate 'elites,S7 in business research (Healey and Rawlinson, 
1993; Hertz and Imber, 1993; Yeung, 1995; Cochrane, 1998; McDowell, 1998; Welch et 
al., 2002). Case study informants were contacted bye-mail and a provisional interview 
schedule prepared to coincide with the fieldwork schedules8 Upon arrival at the case 
location, informants were contacted by telephone during which interview dates, times and 
location were confirmed. Interview guides were delivered beforehand to assist 
respondents in their preparations. 
Prior to the start of each interview, respondents were given an overview of the research 
and their consent obtained to record the interview. To ensure consistency and reduce 
interviewer bias, questions were presented in their pre-determined order with minimum 
deviation from the original wording. Standard pre-prepared explanations were provided 
when necessary. Interviewer interference was minimised to requests by respondents to 
clarify and/or elaborate on certain issues. Interviews outside the fieldwork schedule were 
conducted by telephone using the established face-to-face interview protocol. 
5& For example. potential respondents were identified at the following seminars: 'Financing of asset rich utility 
businesses' hosted by the Utilities Special Interest Group of the StrategiC Planning Society in London, UK on 
November 4, 2003; 'Global change and water in the Caribbean' hosted by UNESCO's Intemational Hydrological 
Programme in Kingston, Jamaica on March 17-19. 2004; and 'Financing of water and sanitation services in the 
Caribbean' hosted by Ihe IDB in St. Peter, Barbados on April 26, 2004. 
57 Elite interviewee defined as an informant who occupies a senior or middle management position; has functional 
responsibility in an area which enjoys high status in accordance with corporate values; and has considerable industry 
experience. 
"Case study field visils - Jamaica (March 1 - April 12, 2004 and January 10-17, 2005), Barbados (April 13-27, 2004 
and January 28 - February 17, 2005) and Trinidad (April 27 - May 10, 2004 and February 18 - March 9, 2005), 
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Interviews lasted 45 minutes on average. At the end of each session, comments and 
impressions of the interview were noted. Interviews were then transcribed verbatim in 
preparation for analysis (Appendix 5). Interview transcripts were sent bye-mail to 
respondents who had specified a desire to review the written account of the interview 
before inclusion in the research. Respondents were given one week to make 
amendments. 
4.4.3 Documents 
Records, documents and archives constitute a rich source of information about many 
organisations and programmes. Within the case study framework, the most important 
use of documents was to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources (Yin, 
2003). Documents were used to: 
(a) set the context for interviews or discussions with the organisation being 
studied; 
(b) provide specific details to corroborate information from other sources; and 
(c) make inferences. 
A systematic approach was adopted for the collection of documentary evidence (Table 
4.6). At each case study location, a request was made for documents pertinent to the 
constructs of the research. Visits to libraries and government statistical archives also 
provided access to other documents relevant to the research. Notes taken during and 
after interviews and documents collected throughout the fieldwork period formed part of 
the case study database. 
Table 4.6 Case study documentary evidence 
!$ts;~soirrCe·:~fr;;:;?,::;;:~ t'~' '!(!:'-'!I:':.'4'TVt)'S"of docurrient~:iif;ic':;'j i: 
Water utility • Annual reports 
Water ministry • Strategic business plans 
Water utility regulator • Contract documents 
• Internal memos/reports 
• Acts of parliament 
• Policy papers 
• Tariff structure reports 
• Capital expenditure budgets 
Private investor • Annual reports 
• Promotional brochures 
Ubrary • Housing and population census 
Government statistical • Uving conditions reports 
archive • Country economic reports 
• Academic journals/reports 
• Newspaper clippings 
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4.4.4 Database summary 
Besides the review of literature, the research generated a sizeable amount of qualitative 
and quantitative data from survey questionnaires, interviews, documents and notes. 
Collectively, this information formed the research database which was organised where 
applicable by case location and stored in a variety of formats - electronic, hard copy and 
audiotape for easy retrieval. Reference to the research database was done as much as 
possible during data presentation and analysis to provide a chain of evidence from the 
research questions to research conclusions and to facilitate independent secondary 
analysis. A summary of the research database is presented in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Research database summary 
Data Quantitv 
Survey A 68 
Survey B 12 
SurveyC 21 
Semi-structured interviews 52 
Documentary records 250+ 
4.5 Ethical considerations 
The basic ethical principle governing data collection is that no harm should come to the 
respondents as a result of their participation in the research (Oppenheim, 1992). Prior to 
data collection, an ethical clearance checklist was completed as required by the 
university's Ethical Advisory Committee. The research was found to conform to the 
university's ethical checkpoints without need for formal approval by the committee. 
Ethical issues considered and adhered to throughout the entire research process 
included: 
(a) obtaining respondents' informed consent to be interviewed; 
(b) providing a purpose statement at the beginning of the interview which 
outlined the research background and objectives; 
(c) keeping promise of confidentiality and/or anonymity; 
(d) respecting the boundaries set by respondents regarding access to 
company documents and information; 
(e) obtaining respondents' consent for interviews to be recorded; 
(f) providing respondents with the option to review interview transcripts; 
(g) safeguarding the storage of interview transcripts and survey instruments; 
(h) honest presentation of the research findings; and 
(i) use of the research findings for academic purposes only. 
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4.6 Limitations of the research methodology 
Access to the various data sources was the most significant constraint to the research 
methodology. A lot of time was spent networking, making introductions and getting past 
the personal assistants and secretaries of the intended corporate executive respondents. 
As a mere student, the researcher had limited leverage with which to get the attention of 
the survey respondents, many of whom appeared to suffer from 'questionnaire fatigue'. 
To quote one prospective respondent, "If I answered every questionnaire sent by PhD 
students I would not have any time to do my job." Some organisations blatantly indicated 
non-interest while others declined participation indicating that they had a corporate policy 
not to participate in surveys. In some cases, interviews had to be rescheduled up to 
three times due to respondents' busy schedules. This often had a domino effect on the 
entire fieldwork timetable in that each cancellation resulted in a reshuffling of previous 
arrangements. Even when granted access, some respondents were tight-lipped about 
their experiences and were non-committal in their responses. Access to organisational 
documentary evidence was restricted to 'closed' files which limited the potential scope of 
the investigation. Other limitations to the research methodology included budgetary and 
time constraints (fieldwork conducted abroad) and respondents' occasional memory 
failure since their experiences were several years old. 
4.7 Preliminary data analysis 
Data analysis consists of examining, categorising, tabulating or otherwise recombining 
the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study (Yin, 2003). Quantitative data 
generated by the survey questionnaires (particularly Survey A) and qualitative data 
generated from interviews and documents were subject to different analytical processes 
which are discussed in the following sections. The choice, application and interpretation 
of statistical tests used during analysis were discussed and verified by a statistician from 
the university's Mathematics Support Centre. 
4.7.1 Quantitative data: Survey questionnaire 
4.7.1.1 Data preparation, screening and transformation 
The preparation and treatment of data obtained from the survey questionnaires 
conformed to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)59 statistics methods 
59 SPSS 12.0 for Windows. 
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literature (Norusis, 1993; Field, 2000; Coakes and Steed, 2003; Bryman and Cramer, 
2005). This included defining variables and missing values60 and coding and recoding61 
data. For Survey A, missing values for the UPS were replaced with the mean score of 
the non-missing values for the respective participant to prevent distortion of the final 
scale. Using the criterion suggested by Bryman and Cramer (2005), the scale was 
defined as missing for a participant if more than 10% of the scale data were missing. For 
the 22-item UPS, this 10% limit meant that respondents with more than 2 items missing 
were defined as missing for the scale62. In keeping with a between-subjects design, 
three sets of grouping variables were used to classify participants into independent 
groups - by country; by organisation category (banking vs. non-banking)63; and by 
infrastructure investment activity (investor vs. non-investor). 
The internal-consistency reliability of the 22-item UPS was examined prior to data 
analysis to determine how well the individual scale items reflected issues that contributed 
to how the local utility was perceived. Both the spilt-half reliability and Cronbach's alpha 
methods indicated an internally reliable scale with correlation coefficients over 0.864• 
Univariate procedures such as frequency distributions and measures of central tendency 
and dispersion were used to summarise the survey data. A series of bivariate non-
parametric tests were used to determine differences and relationships between and 
among variables (Table 4.8). The premise for using non-parametric tests was three-fold. 
Firstly, in all three surveys, the data were not normally distributed for variables according 
to the Shapiro-Wilk statistic65. Secondly, non-parametric tests were considered desirable 
due to the small size of the sample(s), which according to Bryman and Cramer (2005) 
makes it more difficult to determine the extent to which conditions of normality and equal 
variance have been met. Finally, non-parametric tests are preferable when analysing 
ordinal variables. A summary of these tests is provided in Box 4.1. 
60 Missing data for all variables defined as '99'. 
61 Refers to the modification of original data values. This induded recoding negatively worded scale items, replacing 
missing scale values and combining scale item variables into a single perception index (UPS). 
62 Applied to only 2 participants with 7% and 100% missing data. 
63 Banking institutions defined as regular deposit-taking financial institutions such as commercial, merchant and 
development banks, while non-banking institutions refer to all other financial institutions such as unit trusts, pensions 
fund managers, insurance companies, securities and building societies. 
64 Correlation coefficient of 0.89 (alpha for part 1) and 0.86 (alpha for part 2) using the spilt-half reliability method and 
0.93 using Cronbach's alpha. There was marginal improvement of the correlation coefficient for the 18-item scale. 
65 Considered to be more accurate than the Kolmogorov-Smimov statistic and more appropriate for sample sizes less 
than 100 (Field, 2000; Coakes and Steed, 2003). Numeric transformation of variables, for example to natural logs, 
still resulted in non-normal data. 
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Table 4.8 Non-parametric tests used during data analysis 
Name of test Nature of Number of dependent variable comparison aroups 
Chi-square Nominal 2+ 
Mann-Whitney Ordinal 2 
Kruskal-Wallis Ordinal 3+ 
Soearman's rho Ordinal 2+ 
Source: Bryman and Cramer (2005) 
Box 4.1 Summary of statistical tests and procedures used in data analysis 
Frequency distributions, measures of central tendency, measures of dispersion 
The frequency distribution is usually a first step in summarising data and is a measure of the number of cases in 
each category. One of the most important ways of summarising a distribution of values for a variable is to establish 
its central tendency which is the typical value in a distribution. Different methods of expressing central tendency 
include the arithmetic mean, the median and the mode. The mean is the most familiar average which works well with 
many statistical methods. Measures of dispersion determine how widely spread a distribution is and include the 
range and the standard deviation. 
Non-parametric tests 
Chi-square - used to compare the obselVed with the expected frequencies of cases found in one variable in two or 
more unrelated samples or categories of another variable. 
Mann·Whitney test - compares the number of times a score from one sample is ranked higher than a score from the 
other sample. Equivalent to the independent groups t-test for normal data. 
Kruskal·WalUs test - similar to the Mann-Whitney test but used to compare scores in more than two groups. 
Equivalent to the one-way analysis of variance ANOVA test for normal data: 
Spearman's rho - used to examine the relationship (rank correlation) between pairs ,of ordinal variables. The 
direction and strength' of the 'relationship are indicated by the sign and size of the correlation coefficient respectively. 
Equivalent to Pearson's coefficient for normal data. 
Source: Field (2000); Bryman and Cramer (2005) 
The significance of test results was reported in the three ways suggested by (Coolican, 
1999) based on p the probability level: 
(a) significant: 0.05 > P < 0.01; 
(b) highly significant: 0.01 > P < 0.001; and 
(c) very highly significant: 0.001 > P 
A significant result was interpreted to mean that the difference (or relationship) observed 
was genuine and unlikely to have occurred by chance. All probabilities reported were 
based on two-tailed tests as each comparison had two possible directions. 
4.7.1.2 UPS validation 
The typical scale validation strategy involves investigating the extent to which the scale 
items correlate with each other and seem to be measuring the same concept(s). Factor 
analysis is often used to determine whether these item correlations can be 'explained' in 
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terms of their common underlying dimensions or factors. Exploratory factor analysis66 
was conducted on the 22-item UPS to assess the extent to which the items measured 
how financial institutions perceive their local water and sewerage utility. Five factors 
were extracted using the principal component method67 with the first factor accounting for 
43.1 % of total variance and the fifth or smallest factor accounting for 4.7% of total 
variance (Table 4.9). Orthogonal rotation using the varimax method indicated that 12 
items correlated highly with the first factor, 3 items each correlated with the second and 
third factors and 2 items each correlated with the remaining 2 factors (Appendix 6: Table 
A 1). The basis for determining item-factor correlation was guided by two conventions 
proposed by Bryman and Cramer (2005). Items that correlated less than 0.3 with a factor 
were omitted from consideration on the basis that they accounted for less than 9% of the 
variance. Additionally, factors were interpreted in terms of items unique to them by 
choosing the correlation above which no item correlated highly with more than one factor. 
Table 4.9 Variance of extracted and rotated factors 
, Extraction loadinas / ' ; Rotation loadinas 
Factor 1,'%'01: . I," Cumulative • ,%01."",: Cumulative 
.", . ". I ~-variance 1:·':% "variance '," 1,·;'%··; .' 
1 43.1 43.1 28.1 28.1 
2 7.9 51.0 15.3 43.4 
3 7.0 58.0 11.1 54.5 
4 5.8 63.8 7.3 61.8 
5 4.7 68.5' 6.6 68.48 
• Difference In cumulatrve percent due to rounding 
Criteria for deciding how many factors to keep are heavily dependent on sample size. 
The graphical scree test6S is considered to provide fairly reliable criterion for factor 
selection with a sample size greater than 200. Kaiser's criterion of retaining all factors 
with eigenvalues greater than 1 is considered accurate when the sample size exceeds 
250 and the average variance is greater than or equal to 0.6 (Bryman and Cramer, 
2005). Given that the survey sample size did not satisfy conventional sample size 
requirements for factor analysis, the correlation between paired items was also used to 
assist in determining the number of factors to retain for the UPS. The scree plot 
(Appendix 6: Figure A 1) and Kaiser's criterion suggested that factors 1 through 4 should 
be retained. Spearman's rho however indicated no correlation for items 17, 18 and 22 
relative to the other items. On this basis, it was decided to retain factors 1 through 3 
which accounted for 18 of the original 22 scale items. 
66 The small size and uniqueness of the target population restricted this examination of factorial validity to the actual 
survey (usually done following a pilot survey). 
67 Extraction using the principal axis factoring method was unsuccessful up to 500 iterations as the communality of a 
variable exceeded 1. The principle component method assumes that the communality or common variance of every 
variable is 1. thereby allowing the original data to be transposed into constituent linear components (Field. 2000). 
68 Graph of descending variance (eigenvalue) accounted for by the factors initially extracted. The plot typically shows 
a break between the steep slope of the initial factors and the gentle one of the later factors. Factors to be retained 
are those which lie before the point at which the eigenvalues seem to level off. 
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The reliability of factor analysis is reputed to be dependent on sample size as correlation 
coefficients fluctuate much more in small samples than in large ones. The factor analysis 
literature includes a range of recommendations regarding the minimum sample size 
necessary to obtain stable factor solutions that correspond closely to population factors69. 
Empirical research has shown however that changes in the subject to variable ratio make 
little difference to the stability of factor solutions. Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) for 
example find that contrary to popular opinion, the most important factors in determining 
reliable factor solutions are the absolute sample size and magnitude of factor loadings7o. 
MacCullum et al. (1999) propose that the necessary sample size is dependent on the 
research design including the level of communality of the variables. Communalities 
above 0.6 are found to be perfectly adequate for small samples (less than 100). 
Normally distributed data are preferable but not prerequisites for using factor analysis 
(Field, 2000). When considered individually, data for several of the scale items were 
non-normal. As a single UPS however, the data followed a normal distribution thereby 
justifying the use of factor analysis to assess the factorial validity of the scale and to 
reduce the number of scale items to a more precise set of factors. 
4.7.1.3 UPS interpretation 
For the 18-item UPS, the possible range of total scores for each participant was 18 to 90. 
This represented the full spectrum of the scale with the lowest end of the scale (18) 
defined as 'negative utility perception' and the upper end (90) defined as 'positive utility 
perception'. A 'neutral utility perception' was interpreted as being in the region of 54 on 
the scale71 . A unique UPS was then calculated for each participant by summing the 
values of the 18 scale items. The resulting scale range was 21 to 70. A unique UPS 
range was calculated for different grouping variables to determine how perception of the 
local utility varied across these groupings (Appendix 6: Table A2). For certain analyses 
(frequency distribution, crosstabulation and correlation), the UPS was collapsed into five 
ordinal groups72 for simplification purposes and to facilitate analysis with other ordinal 
variables. 
Interpretation of an attitude score on a summated rating scale cannot be made 
independently of the distribution of scores of some defined group (Edwards, 1957). This 
69 For example, a minimum of five to ten partiCipants per variable up to about 300 subjects is recommended. 
70 If a factor has four or more loadings greater than 0.6 it is considered reliable regardless of sample size. 
11 The 'neutral' point on a summated rating scale does not necessarily correspond to the midpoint of the possible 
range of scores. Scores in the middle region could be due to lukewarm response, lack of knowledge, lack of attitude 
in the respondent or to the presence of both strongly positive and strongly negative responses which would balance 
oul each other (Edwards, 1957; Oppenheim, 1992). 
12 UPS groupings _ 20-30; 3140; 41·50; 51-60; and 61·70. 
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highlights a major criticism of the Likert scale - poor reproducibility. Since the same total 
score can be obtained in different ways, two or more identical scores can have different 
meanings. For this reason, the pattern of response is more interesting than the total 
score. In addition, because the scale is not an interval scale, no conclusions can be 
drawn about the meaning of distances between scale positions. Guided by these 
constraints, interpretation of the UPS for a participant or group of participants was done 
relative to other participants or other groups of participants. 
4.7.1.4 Introduction to the survey respondents 
Survey A 
Sixty-eight respondents representing 68 different financial institutions across the case 
locations completed the survey questionnaire. There was no significant difference 
(p>0.05) in the classification of survey respondents across case locations (Table 4.10; 
Appendix 6: Table A3). In all 3 cases, the majority of respondents were from non-
banking institutions, banking institutions were more active in infrastructure financing than 
their non-banking counterparts and investors had larger investment portfolios than non-
investors. Respondents' profiles were therefore consistent with that of typical 
infrastructure financiers in developing countries whereby banking institutions (e.g. 
commercial banks) are more active in infrastructure financing than non-banking 
institutions (e.g. pension funds) and infrastructure investors have investment portfolios 
large enough to provide project financing for infrastructure projects (>US$50 million). In 
Jamaica, loans were the most common form of infrastructure financing while bond issues 
were the primary means of infrastructure investment in Barbados and Trinidad. More 
detailed profiles are presented in Appendix 6: Table A4; Table A5; Table A6. 
Table 4.10 Survey A: Respondents' characteristics 
42.6 39.3 40.0 48.0 
<US$10 m 20.3 21.4 25.0 16.7 
US$11-SO m 21.9 28.6 8.3 20.8 
US$51-100 m 10.9 7.1 25.0 8.3 
m 21.9 21.4 16.7 25.0 
0% 33.8 39.3 33.3 28.0 
1-5% 24.6 21.4 25.0 28.0 
6-10% 15.4 17.9 16.7 12.0 
11-15% 9.2 7.1 8.3 12.0 
16-20% 4.6 3.6 8.3 4.0 
Loans 53.5 64.7 37.5 50.0 
Bonds 55.8 29.4 75.0 72.2 
17.6 
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Survey B 
Most of the respondents were private operators/contractors (58.3%) while the remaining 
41.7% represented financial institutions. The majority of respondents (91.7%) had 
investments in water and sanitation. Other utility investments included electricity 
(58.3%), gas (41.7%) and telecommunications (33.3%). Water and sanitation was 
however considered to have the lowest investment potential of the utility sectors. 
SurveyC 
For Survey C, 33.3% of the respondents were water utility managers from Jamaica, 19% 
from Barbados, 14.3% from Trinidad and Tobago and the remaining 33.3% from other 
Caribbean islands (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat and St. Lucia). In terms of 
the status of their respective water and sanitation sectors, respondents were most 
satisfied with the level of service coverage, water resource development, water quality 
and service reliability (Appendix 6: Table Al). Respondents were least satisfied with the 
level of revenue recovery, government's budget allocation to the sector, the level of 
unaccounted-for-water, the level of investment besides government and tariff rates. All of 
the respondents were in agreement that additional investment was needed in the sector, 
particularly to assist in strengthening institutional capacity, for the construction of new 
infrastructure and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure. The majority of respondents 
(85.7%) had some experience with private investment with only 5.6% very satisfied with 
this investment. Where there was no private investment, respondents felt that investors 
were not interested in the sector (100%), the utility had not been successful in sourcing 
private investment (33.3%) or there was strong opposition to private investment (33.3%). 
4.7.2 Qualitative data: Interviews and documents 
The challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making sense of massive amounts of data. 
This involves reducing the volume of raw information, sifting trivia from significance, 
identifying significant patterns and constructing a framework for communicating the 
essence of what the data reveal. Patton (2002) identifies two approaches of relevance to 
the research - the case study approach and an analytical framework approach (Table 
4.11). The case study approach is a specific way of collecting, organising and analysing 
qualitative data and in that sense represents an analysis process which results in a 
product - the case study. The analytical framework approach involves organising and 
analysing data using theoretical propositions developed during the review of literature 
and reflected in the research questions and research hypothesis. A mixed approach was 
adopted for the research with case studies thematically presented as descriptive and 
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explanatory reports of the operating environment for private investment in the water and 
sanitation sector and the attitudes and perceptions of water sector officials and private 
investors to private investment in the sector. 
Table 4.11 Options for organising and reporting qualitative data 
A pproach Description 
., 
If individuals or groups are the primary unit of analysis, then People 
case studies of people or groups may be the focus for case 
studies. 
Case study Critical incidents Critical incidents or major events can constitute self-contained 
. 
descriptive units of analysis, often presented in order of 
importance . 
..•.. 
Various settings Describe various places, sites, settings or locations before doing 
.. 
cross-setting pattem analysis. 
Processes Organise data to describe important processes 
.,. 
Analytical ...•.. 
Issues Organise analysis to illuminate key issues, often the equivalent 
of the Drimarv evaluation auestions 
Framework 
. Questions Responses to interviews can be organised by question 
especially where a standardised interviewing format was used . 
• f Sensitising concepts OrQanise and describe data throuQh sensitisinQ concepts 
Source. Patton (2002) 
The process of moving from raw qualitative data to the case study was an iterative one 
guided by the methods literature (Kvale, 1996; Silverman, 2001; Patton, 2002; Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003; Vin, 2003). A code and retrieve method was used to organise and 
analyse the data. Codes were developed for interview data relying on the content of 
standardised questions used during interviews and concepts highlighted during the 
review of literature and reflected in the research questions. Each interview was read at 
least three times during which notes and comments were made in the margins alongside 
the relevant data passages. Illuminating and collaborating quotes were highlighted for 
easy identification. Using the thematic framework developed for data analysis, quotes 
with their corresponding notations and comments were transferred into their appropriate 
categories using a cut and paste technique. Care was taken to ensure that enough 
information was transferred during the retrieval process so that the substantive content 
and context of the information was not lost. 
Documentary evidence was also subject to similar analytical treatment. Data were sorted 
and arranged to describe the operating environment for private investment in each case 
location, focusing on the policy, legal and regulatory frameworks for the water and 
sanitation sector. Descriptive accounts were also given of actual private investment 
experiences to showcase the range and diversity of private investment in each case 
location. 
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4.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter introduced the research objectives, research questions and guiding 
research hypothesis. A primary research question and four secondary research 
questions were formulated to investigate the phenomenon of private investment in the 
Caribbean water and sanitation sector as follows: 
Primary research question 
How can private investment be attracted to the Caribbean water and sanitation sector? 
Secondary research questions 
(a) What is the current state of the operating environment and how conducive 
is it to private investment? 
(b) What are the main determinants or criteria for private investment in the 
water and sanitation sector? 
(c) What is the scope for and strategy to attract private investment to the 
water and sanitation sector? 
(d) To what extent is size an issue and what is the scope for addressing 
small size as a constraint to attracting private investment? 
The research hypothesised that factors that determine private investment in water 
and sanitation vary in importance and relevance; hence a context-specific 
approach is needed to attract private investment to the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector. 
A case study research strategy utilising surveys, interviews and documents as the main 
sources of evidence was adopted for the research. Case studies from Jamaica, 
Barbados and Trinidad were selected to examine different forms of private investment in 
the water and sanitation sector in different environments. Quantitative data were 
analysed using a variety of statistical tests while qualitative data were categorised into 
themes derived from the literature and reflected in the research questions and hypothesis 
for further discussion and interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE RESEARCH STUDY AREA 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter contains background information on the research study area to 
contextualise and introduce basic physical. geographic, historical, social and 
contemporary factors that may impinge on the research problem and issues. 
5.2 The research setting 
The general research setting is the Caribbean73 which from a strict geographical 
standpoint is an archipelagic group of islands stretching from the Yucatan and Florida 
peninsulas in a south-easterly direction towards the north-eastern coast of the Latin 
American mainland (Figure 5.1). For classification purposes, the Caribbean is included 
in the larger LAC geographical region which includes Central and South America. In 
terms of the level of development, the region qualifies as a less developed region with 
countries assigned to lower-middle and upper-middle income categories. 
Figure 5.1 Map of the Caribbean highlighting the case study locations 
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73 For the purposes of this research, the term 'Caribbean' refers to the English-speaking independent states of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean - Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica. Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & 
Nevis, 8t. Lucia, 8t. Vincent & the Grenadines and Trinidad & Tobago and the mainland nations of Belize and 
Guyana. 
101 
Chapter 5 - The research study area 
5.2.1 General features of the Caribbean 
The Caribbean is home to about 5.7 million inhabitants, a mere 1.1% of the LAC 
population (United Nations, 2004). With 64.2% of the population living in urban 
settlements in 2003 and an urban growth rate of 1.58% per annum between 1995 and 
2000, the Caribbean is considered the most urbanised island region (pelling and Uitto, 
2001). The Caribbean environment is also characterised by widespread market 
distortions, economic dependence on one or a few productive activities (e.g. tourism, 
sugar and culture), supply-side bottlenecks, high levels of domestic and international 
indebtedness, a shortage of foreign exchange, high levels of unemployment and 
monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures in which transnational enterprises are the 
major market participants (Nicholls et al., 2000). Many of these characteristics are a 
result of the small size of the islands, all of which except Jamaica74, fall within the 'small 
states' population threshold limit of 1.5 million (ComSec and World Bank, 2000). 
The development literature considers small countries to be at a disadvantage in attracting 
foreign investment, some authors claiming that even with good policies and other positive 
characteristics for attracting foreign investment, small countries are generally rated to be 
significantly more risky (Collier and Dollar, 1999). While data on international private 
flows into Caribbean countries are fragmentary, the indications are that these countries 
have been able to attract relatively large amounts of FDI in relation to both GDP and per 
capita measurements (Fairbairn and Worrell, 1996; Carrington, 1999). In 1996 for 
example, six Caribbean countries were ranked among the first thirty largest recipients of 
FDI inflows per US$1000 GDP (Table 5.1). Most of this FDI is services-oriented 
however, bound for the tourism sector. Light manufacturing, agri-business, 
entertainment and the energy sector in the case of Trinidad, account for the balance of 
FDI flows. More recently, business services has also emerged as an important FDI 
destination due to the Caribbean's good techno-intellectual skills, good 
telecommunications infrastructure and time zone advantages. The region's favourable 
business climate, investor-friendly environment, macroeconomic policy instruments, 
generous fiscal incentives, stable political climate and transparency in the conduct of 
public business are credited as important determinants of this FDI (Carrington, 1999; 
Pro€lnvest, 2004). 
7. Although above the 'small state' population threshold, Jamaica is included in the small state category as it shares 
many of the physical and eoonomic characteristics of small states (ComSec and Wortd Bank, 2000). 
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Table 5.1 Caribbean ranking in sourcing FDI flows (1996)75 
5 Guyana 1.50 
14 st. Kitts & Nevis 0.82 
15 Dominica 0.81 
17 St. Vincent 0.70 
18 Grenada 0.69 
19 st. Kitts & Nevis 404.80 
21 Trtnidad & Tobago 0.62 
22 
26 Antigua & Barbuda 284.80 
28 Dominica 253.50 
Source: UNCTAD (1998) 
The size of the public sector in the Caribbean is large with up to 25% of GDP consumed 
by the central government (Swaroop, 1996). This figure has the potential to double if 
public sector expenditure for public utilities, state-owned corporations and statutory 
bodies is also taken into account. In most cases, having a large public sector is by 
choice (deliberate socio-economic policy of government) rather than due to any 
economic constraint, except in countries like Jamaica and Guyana where a large portion 
of public expenditure goes towards debt service. With respect to infrastructure, the bulk 
of service provision is in the public domain in most Caribbean countries due to high unit 
costs of producing goods and services (except for areas such as electricity generation, 
telecommunications and urban transportation where technological advancements have 
created conditions for competition and increased the role of the private sector). 
By virtue of their small size, many of the countries in the Caribbean have limited skilled 
human resources at their disposal (Barrett, 1986). The role of government is sometimes 
multi-faceted requiring senior officials to act in multifunctional roles. In some of the 
smaller islands there is little job specialisation. A civil engineer in a water utility for 
example (who in some cases may be the only engineer), must also be proficient as an 
electrical and mechanical engineer and may even have to function in a top administrative 
position as well. 
Social cohesion in the Caribbean is strong due to a common history and cultural identity. 
As such there is a tendency for islands to develop closely integrated societies which can 
negatively impact on policy-making and decision-implementing processes due to the 
'accessibility' of public sector managers and government officials (Farrugia, 1993). This 
solidarity can also affect communal interactions with 'outsiders' who are viewed 
15 More recent FDJ data for the Caribbean difficult to obtain as data for the Caribbean are usually undifferentiated 
from that used for the larger regional grouping of LAC. 
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suspiciously as exploiters. The Caribbean's colonial past also contributes to a general 
distrust of foreign interventions. 
The Caribbean is particularly susceptible to adverse climatic and other natural events 
such as hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. Of the 25 countries that suffered the 
greatest number of natural disasters during the 1970s and 1980s, the most disaster 
prone island group was the Greater Antilles76 in the Caribbean (Pelling and Uitto, 2001). 
The economic and social impact of these natural disasters is often staggering due to 
considerable infrastructure damage, export losses and loss of life. Hurricane George in 
1998 for example, caused US$2.5 billion in insured losses with 70% of these in the 
Caribbean (Ibid.). Like other small islands groups, the Caribbean is characterised by 
limited and fragile freshwater resources with some countries like Barbados classified as 
water-scarce. Finally, the islands which are predominantly of limestone and volcanic 
origin are particularly vulnerable to pollution from sewage, industrial effluents, saline 
intrusion and poor land use practices. 
5.3 Water and sanitation in the Caribbean 
5.3.1 Status of the sector 
Although the Caribbean is perceived to be well advanced compared to other regions in 
meeting target 10 of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals77 (UNDP, 2004), 
underinvestment in water and sanitation infrastructure (less than 2% of GDP) has 
resulted in deteriorating levels of service and constrained economic growth due to 
unexploited development opportunities. Investment needs are still Significant, estimated 
at US$193 million for water and US$254 million for sanitation (Clayton, 2004). 
Much of the water and sanitation infrastructure in the Caribbean predates independence 
from Britain in the 1960s and 1970s. This has resulted in a myriad of problems 
associated with ageing infrastructure such as high unaccounted-for-water and 
inadequate and unreliable levels of service. Figure 5.2 highlights the predicament of 
several Caribbean countries with respect to their water supply coverage status. As the 
graph suggests, the status of the water sector in several Caribbean countries (except 
Barbados, SI. Lucia and Montserrat) is similar to that of the USA in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The situation is even worse for rural water supply and for sanitation in terms of coverage 
and technology type. Only a small percentage of the population is connected to 
18 The Greater Antilles are the four largest islands in the north-western part of the Caribbean Sea and include Cuba, 
Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Jamaica and Puerto Rico. 
77 To halve by 2015, the proportion of persons without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. 
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conventional sewerage systems, the majority relying on in situ sanitation systems such 
as latrines and septic tanks. The lack of wastewater treatment is considered to be one of 
the most serious sanitary problems in the Caribbean with data for 2000 indicating that 
only 13.7% of the wastewater collected by the few existing sewerage systems is treated 
(PAHO, 2001). The situation is even more troubling as the efficiency of these treatment 
systems is known to be very low. Microbiological contamination of drinking water 
remains the principal water quality problem with only 59% of the population in 1994 
receiving disinfected water on a regular basis (PAHO, 1997). While there is a low 
prevalence of water-borne diseases and illnesses related to poor hygiene and sanitation, 
there are concerns about the potential of a high risk disease outbreak due to 
contaminated drinking water and inadequate sewage disposal. The rapid and unplanned 
nature of urban expansion in the Caribbean, increasing standards of living and changing 
lifestyles place additional pressure on the sector in terms of supply demands and 
preservation of environmental quality (Biswas, 1998). 
Figure 5.2 Water supply coverage in select LAC countries compared to the USA 
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Source: PAHO (2001) 
Common problems and challenges faced by the Caribbean water and sanitation sector 
include (CEHI, 2001; San Martin, 2002): 
(a) poor coordination among institutions due to the fragmented and sectoral 
approach to water resource management; 
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(b) inadequate water legislation, regulatory and monitoring frameworks and 
institutions - each institution has its 'own' piece of legislation and 
mandate which limits the scope for action and coordinated efforts; 
(c) inappropriate pricing policies due to inadequate tariffs, low user charges 
and infrequent adjustment for inflation; 
(d) low cost recovery for operation and maintenance due to poor 
enforcement and a 'free water' culture; 
(e) high cost of provision due to overstaffing and poor maintenance of 
facilities; 
(f) low coverage rates due to low investment capacity and the difficult 
financial situation of most water utilities; 
(g) weak technical capacities among water sector personnel; 
(h) poor stakeholder participation and low awareness among public and 
decision-makers due to existing institutions and policies; 
(i) lack of consistency on policies to promote contribution of water resources 
to national economies; 
U) pollution from untreated municipal and industrial discharges due to 
deficient legislation and/or monitoring and a lack of incentives for 
improved technologies; 
(k) insufficient information to support decision-making due to inadequate data 
collection and information management; 
(I) poor feasibility assessment of projects due to inadequate economic 
valuation of water resources; 
(m) over-exploitation of groundwater resources due to distorting incentives, 
deficient legislation and/or weak enforcement; and 
(n) inadequate urban and rural land use planning resulting in deforestation, 
soil erosion and water resource degradation. 
Policy-makers, regulators, practitioners and water users are generally well aware of the 
main problems facing the sector and have adopted diverse approaches and responses to 
address these challenges. Some of these include reform of institutional arrangements, 
growing interest in increasing the role of the private sector especially in providing water 
supply and sanitation services and adopting integrated water resources management 
(IWRM)'8 policies for planning and management purposes (San Martin, 2002). Countries 
have experienced different levels of success in responding to challenges in the sector. In 
some countries, the reform process has been very slow and haphazard with proposals 
78 IWRM as defined by Mudege and Taylor (2001) is a process which promotes the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in 
an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. 
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for new legislation in draft form for years without receiving parliamentary approval. 
IWRM is still in an early conceptual phase in many countries. There is therefore some 
disparity in the developmental status of the sector throughout the Caribbean. 
5.3.2 Sources of financing 
Caribbean utilities have traditionally accessed funds to finance capital expenditure from 
internally generated funds, government financing, bilateral funding grants and 
concessionary loans and multilateral financial institutions. Because of their risk profile, 
many Caribbean utilities are generally unable to borrow money directly from international 
capital markets or can only do so at very high interest rates (Pemberton, 2003). As a 
result, the majority of external funding for water and sanitation projects has been through 
bilateral and multilateral funding agencies. Other sources of financing such as 
commercial banks, direct equity investment (foreign and/or local) and capital markets 
(bonds and securities) are rarely used if at all. In most cases, government's guarantee 
for the revenue of the project is the only recourse to utilities being able to access these 
sources of capital. 
5.4 Private investment in the Caribbean 
Sources of private sector finance in the Caribbean are very similar. There are branches 
and subsidiaries of foreign banks, indigenous banks (private and public), trust companies 
(usually subsidiaries of commercial banks), finance companies, credit unions, public and 
private development finance institutions, building societies and insurance companies. 
Some countries such as Barbados also allow offshore banking which is a major source of 
revenue but is largely irrelevant to the domestic banking requirements of the region 
(World Bank, 1994). Local capital markets while successful in terms of achieving 
significant savings mobilisation and attracting foreign financing (with a strong 
manufacturing and financial services bias), are limited in terms of the choice and depth of 
instruments offered. In Trinidad for example, financial firms and utilities dominate listed 
equities accounting for 60% of total market capitalisation, thereby limiting the frequency 
of trading activity (CBB, 2004b). 
Most of the financing activity in the Caribbean is confined to short and medium-term 
commercial bank lending partly due to a traditional firm-bank relationship. There is also a 
fair deal of activity in the primary market for short-term government paper, particularly 91-
day treasury bills and the issue of developrnent bank bonds. Secondary trading in the 
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shares of listed public companies is done through stock exchanges in Barbados, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean79, but generally only in small volumes due 
to the small number of domestic investors and listed public companies. 
Competitive pressures, technological change and the desire for financial institutions to 
increase revenues have however resulted in significant growth in financial services since 
the 1990s. Republic Bank Ltd. in Trinidad for example, through a strategic expansion 
policy throughout the Caribbean has increased its asset base by 16% over 1993-2002 
and increased its annual net profit by 23% over the same period (Thurston, 2003). Its 
Republic Finance and Merchant Bank Ltd. (FINCOR) subsidiary has gained a reputation 
for being able to structure innovative capital market instruments and finance development 
and infrastructural projects in Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean. Similarly, Jamaica 
Money Market Brokers Ltd. has expanded money market brokerage operations beyond 
Jamaica to Barbados, Trinidad and SI. Lucia (through its Caribbean Money Market 
Brokers subsidiary) to allow clients to trade in the Jamaican and regional equities 
markets (JMMB, 2006). 
5.4.1 Private investment in the water and sanitation sector 
Private investment in the water and sanitation sector is slowly gaining acceptance and 
prominence on the financing agenda of several Caribbean countries. The corporatised 
water utilities in Dominica and SI. Lucia for example, have successfully raised capital 
through the divestment of shares. Trinidad's water utility regularly uses bond issues to 
finance capital investment projects. Management contracts have been used in Trinidad 
and Guyana while the utility in Belize has been privatised through the sale of shares to a 
British-Dutch consortium. BOT-type contracts have been used in several countries to 
construct new desalination facilities, water and wastewater treatment plants. Local 
private water and sewerage utilities operate in Jamaica. 
The influence of multilateral and bilateral institutions is credited for catalysing much of the 
private investment activity in the Caribbean water and sanitation sector (McDavid, 2003). 
Private investment is typically promoted by these organisations by direct lending and 
guarantees to the private sector for specific projects, equity participation and/or through 
sector reform efforts to create 'enabling environments' conditional to the terms of 
concessional grants/loans and/or technical assistance. In 1994 for example, the IDB 
79 The Eastern Caribbean Securities Market is a regional securities market serving Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, 
Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & the Grenadines. 
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through its Multilateral Investment Fund facility provided a grant of US$1.5 million to the 
Jamaican government to support an 18-month programme to develop legislation and 
regulatory instruments to enable private investment and establish an independent multi-
utility regulator (lOB. 2003b). Despite these efforts. organisations like the lOB admit that 
the small size of the Caribbean islands poses a challenge to attracting adequate levels of 
private investment to the sector and that coordinated and tailored initiatives through 
country strategies. action plans and sector studies are necessary to remedy this size 
constraint (Ibid.). 
Besides the constraints of small size. general obstacles to the private financing of water 
and sanitation infrastructure in the Caribbean are reported as (lOB and COB. 1996): 
(a) a lack of a tradition of privately-owned firms as service providers; 
(b) the absence in most countries of an appropriate legislative environment 
and an independent. effective regulatory body to oversee the functioning 
of privately-owned (or operated) public utilities; 
(c) a past history in many countries of political interference in matters such 
as price-setting and staffing; 
(d) a legacy in many countries of under-priced public sector services; 
(e) the absence in most countries of an adequate pool of skilled labour to 
manage public utilities; 
(f) the accumulated debt burdens of most publicly-owned water utilities plus 
poorly maintained assets; 
(g) the public debt overhang of some national governments. reducing 
possibilities for public sector financial guarantees and risk-sharing using 
sovereign debt; and 
(h) the existence of shallow local capital markets plus a lack of strong local 
banking sectors in many countries. thereby reducing the possibilities for 
local private sector equity and debt financing. 
Researchers generally credit the status of Caribbean utilities as one of the most 
important determinants of private investment. claiming that if private investors are to 
become interested in financing the sector. Caribbean utilities must be managed so that 
they demonstrate strong financial performance. efficient and effective operations. stable 
corporate structures and effective regulatory environments (Pemberton. 2003). 
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5.5 Regional cooperation in the Caribbean 
The Caribbean has a long tradition of regional cooperation dating back to the late 1950s 
when the focus was on political integration through a West Indies Federation. Since 
then, the fundamental premise for regional integration has been the promotion of 
economic development primarily as a means of accelerating industrialisation and 
expanding competitiveness. The Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM) established in 1973 represents the most recent expression of formal 
Caribbean integration. The objectives of CARICOM are (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001): 
(a) to facilitate regional economic integration through the Caribbean Common 
Market; 
(b) to provide a mechanism for the coordination of the foreign policies of 
member states; and 
(c) to promote non-economic (functional) cooperation in as many areas as 
possible especially in relation to various areas of social and human 
endeavour. 
While progress towards economic integration has been slow due to ongoing national 
rivalries, waning political will and regional economic difficulties that have threatened the 
viability of the regional economic movement, CARICOM is renowned for its success in 
relation to foreign policy and functional cooperation (Samuel, 1990; Bryan and Bryan, 
1999). Functional collaborative efforts in the areas of health, education, labour, and 
environmental issues have resulted in a number of successful regional ventures such as 
the University of the West Indies, the Caribbean Hotel Association and the Caribbean 
Meteorological Organisation. The Caribbean is also home to the world's first example of 
a multinational regulatory agency - the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority 
which provides regulatory services to the telecornrnunications sector in the Eastern 
Caribbean80 (Samuel and Welsh-Haynes, 2000; DeFreitas et al., 2001). Such regional 
initiatives have broadened the scope of involvement of people other than government 
and business groups to address issues pertinent to the region that are likely to benefit 
from the coordination of joint action and cooperation. 
eo Established in 2000 to introduce pro-competition reforms in the telecommunications sector and increase the supply 
of informatics-related skills in Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & the Grenadines. 
Benefits indude the provision of high quality technical expertise common to all member territories and the 
development of a regulatory approach that can address cross-cutting technical issues. Greater investor confidence 
in the objectivity and stability of the regulatory authority combined with more competitive rates are expected to lead to 
greater foreign and domestic investment (World Bank, 2002a). 
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5.5.1 Regional cooperation in the water and sanitation sector 
A number of regional initiatives and institutions have evolved in the Caribbean, some 
under the auspices of CARICOM to address various issues related to the water and 
sanitation sector. The better known organisations are the Caribbean Water and 
Wastewater Association (CWWA) , the Caribbean Environmental Health Institute (CEHI), 
the Caribbean Basin Water Management Programme (CBWMP), Global Water 
Partnership Caribbean (GWPC) and the Organisation of Caribbean Utility Regulators 
(OOCUR). A brief introduction to each organisation is provided in Box 5.1. 
Box 5.1 Regional institutions involved in the Caribbean water and sanitation sector 
CWWA 
CVVWA is a non-govemmental organisation committed to the advancement of the science, practice and management 
of water supply and waste disposal in the Caribbean. Since its inception in 1992. CVVWA's major activity has been its 
annual conference and exhibition where industry practitioners explore important themes of relevance to the sector 
and share experiences. Over the years, the conference has evolved into the single largest assembly of professionals 
and executives in the Caribbean industry, and in some cases, provides the only opportunity for networking among 
industry professionals. Besides the main CWWA body, national sections of the association also exist in three 
countries, namely the Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. CWWA membership is open to individuals, 
companies and utilities operating in the water,' wastewater and solid waste sectors. Twenty-five regional (including 
15 utility members) and seven international countries are represented. 
CEHI 
CEHI was Initially established as a project in 1979 under the aegis of CARICOM as part of an environmental health 
strategy for the English-speaking Caribbean. CEHI provides technical and advisory services on environmental 
management; selVes as a regional reference centre for environr'Qental data; coordinates research relevant to the 
environmental problems of the region; provides environmental services; and promotes uniformity in professional 
practice, design. standards and technical methods in environmental health/management. 
CBWMP 
CBWMP is a non-profit organisation established in 1975 to provide training on a regional basis to employees of 
member water utility companies and to develop local in-house training capabilities within the utilities themselves. Its 
strategic plan is predicated on the following beliefs: water must have priority on the national agendas of Caribbean 
countries: each utility can achieve more by working in partnership with others; networking among utilities is essential 
for the sustainable development of each utility; collective experiences can provide solutions to the challenges faced 
by various utilities; and water supply problems facing the region can be solved by the utilities themselves. As part of 
CBWMP's focus on organisational development and training, CBWMP is currently in the process of developing 
benchmarks and indicators for its 13 member utilities. It also operates as a certifying authority for water and 
wastewater operators with the aim of promoting certification as a means of ensuring effective utility operation. 
GWPC 
GWPC is a working partnership among various stakeholders in water resources management in the Caribbean 
region established in 2004 as the regional arm of the Global Water Partnership. GWPC's objectives include: 
establishing proactive alliances in water resources management; promoting public participation in the management of 
water resources through capacity building and infonnation sharing; promoting integrated water resources 
management (IWRM); aligning the Caribbean region with other global water initiatives in order to capitalise on 
intemational experiences and opportunities for regional capacity building in IWRM; improving water governance 
through the promotion, enhancement and effective implementation of legislation, poHcy, programmes and institutional 
regulatory and administrative frameworks; and collaborating with other organisations and institutions working in other 
areas of sustainable development. 
OOCUR 
OOCUR is a non-profit organisation established in 2002 to assist in the improvement of utility regulation in member 
countries, foster development of transparent and stable utility regulation and foster cooperation among utility 
regulators. To facilitate the sharing of infonnation and experiences among members, OOCUR hosts an annual 
conference, regular workshops and produces a newsletter. Full membership is open to regulatory bodies with 
responsibilities in the telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, water and transportation sectors in the Caribbean. 
Source:; CWWA (2003; 2005); OOCUR (2003); Sweeney (2003); GWPC (2004); CEHI (2005) 
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The main opportunities for regional cooperation facilitated by these institutions include 
sharing knowledge and experiences, overcoming capacity/capability constraints, 
providing centralised services and harmonising regional standards (Martin and Sohail, 
2005). Annual conference and regular workshops hosted by CWWA and OOCUR for 
example, provide opportunities for networking among industry professionals. Training 
and professional development are possible through CBWMP. Regional initiatives like the 
CWWA typically have a 'loose' association with Caribbean governments and very limited 
influence on government policy for the sector. This exclusion from the formal sector 
policy framework is seen as one of the main weaknesses of such organisations as in the 
absence of formal regional agreements, their position and mandate can appear 'weak' 
(Bryan and Bryan, 1999). 
More recently, there have been attempts to develop greater ministerial commitment to 
regional water and sanitation issues through increased government participation in 
regional organisations. In 2005 for example, government ministers for the first time held 
a ministerial meeting during the CWWA conference to discuss the way forward for a 
unified approach to water and wastewater management in the Caribbean (JIS, 2005). 
Plans are now afoot to convene this level meeting annually to coincide with the CWWA 
conference and '10 keep the lines of communication open" through the creation of a 
"loose coordinating secretariat" over the 12-month waiting period between conferences 
(Ibid.). 
Another new regional initiative in the sector is a professional exchange programme 
between the water utilities in Jamaica and Trinidad (WASA, 2004c; WASA and NWC, 
2006). Signed in April 2006, the memorandum of understanding between the two utilities 
is a 2-year non-binding agreement to facilitate the sharing of knowledge, experience and 
skills towards the mutual improvement in the delivery of water and sanitation services. 
Areas for cooperation include water and wastewater treatment, desalination, project 
management, early contractor involvement, PSP, financial modelling and strategic 
planning. Proposed modes of cooperation include site visits and participation in project 
planning and implementation activities. At the end of this 'trial' 2-year period, the 
intention is to extend similar professional exchange programmes to other Caribbean 
water utilities. 
With regards to regional financing initiatives in the sector, the Caribbean Development 
Bank (COB) assists member countries81 (particularly the smaller and/or less developed 
81 Regional members are Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, 
Columbia, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Montserrat, 8t. Kitts & Nevis, 8t. Lucia, 
8t. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks & Caicos Islands and Venezuela. 
112 
Chapter 5 - The research study area 
members of the region) in the coordination and financing of development programmes. 
This may involve mobilising financial resources from within and outside the region, co-
financing projects and providing technical assistance by undertaking pre-investment 
surveys or identifying and preparing project proposals. COB's involvement in water and 
sanitation financing is indirect and complex however as financing is rooted in its sector 
strategies of economic and social infrastructure, the environment, poverty reduction and 
health. Financing of projects in the sector has been addressed for example through its 
Basic Needs Trust Fund programmes which target small projects in poor rural 
communities. As such, financing of the sector constitutes a very small portion of COB 
activity. In 2003 for example, total net approvals inclusive of loans, contingent loans, 
equity and grants to the sector amounted to only 6.4% of total COB financing (Brunton, 
2004). 
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented background information on the research study area to provide 
context for research issues to be explored in the case studies. 
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY: JAMAICA 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of private investment in the Jamaican water and 
sanitation sector using survey, interview and document data to determine the operating 
environment for private investment, criteria for investment decision-making and scope 
and strategy for private investment in the sector. The potential for various size-related 
response strategies such as regional cooperation to improve investment prospects in the 
sector is also examined. 
6.2 General information 
Jamaica is the most westerly and largest English-speaking island in the Caribbean with a 
total area of 10,991 sq. km (Figure 5.1) and population of 2.61 million, of which 52% 
reside in urban centres. Of 232 countries surveyed in the CIA World Factbook, Jamaica 
is ranked 171 sI in terms of area, 139'h in terms of population, 136'h in terms of total GDP 
and 144'h in terms of GDP per capita (CIA, 2005). Although Jamaica's population is 
above the 1.5 million small states threshold, it is still considered a small state as it shares 
many of the characteristics of smaller countries. 
6.3 Status of the water and sanitation sector 
The development of piped water supplies in Jamaica can be traced back to 1799 when 
the privately owned Falmouth Water Works Company was established to supply the town 
of Falmouth, Trelawny. Since then, different approaches have been used to extend 
water and sewerage services to various sections of the country. Public ownership under 
a series of government-appointed boards and commissions has however dominated the 
sector since the 1870S82. Up to 1980, responsibility for water supply and sewerage 
services was essentially split between the 'capital city focused' Water Commission and 
the 'rest of Jamaica focused' National Water Authority. Government's intention to 
rationalise water use and management under a single service provider was realised in 
1980 with the amalgamation of both entities into the incumbent National Water 
Commission (NWC). 
82 After the transfer of the island's capital from Spanish Town to Kingston in 1870, the private development of water 
supplies was no longer encouraged and government proceeded to purchase the assets of various private water 
works companies. 
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Since inception, NWC's primary focus has been the provision of urban water supply and 
sewerage services, a fact supported by dissimilar levels of coverage to urban and rural 
communities (Table 6.1). Minor rural water supply systems83 have been and are still the 
responsibility of local government councils (parish councils). Approximately 74% of 
Jamaican households receive water from NWC, of which 83% have piped water. 
Coverage for urban and rural households is 91% and 56% respectively, with 5% of urban 
households receiving non-piped sources compared to 38% of rural households. To 
compensate for the shortfall in public water supply, 28% of rural households rely on 
private sources of wate~ compared to 7% of urban households. Centralised sewerage 
services are available to only 22% of households, with 75% of households relying on on-
site disposal systems such as flush toilets (37%) and pit toilets (38%). The most 
common sanitary convenience in rural areas is the pit latrine used by 60% of rural 
households. 
Table 6.1 Water and sanitation coverage in Jamaica (2001) 
Public source 74.2 90.5 56.0 Not shared 76.8 74.1 79.8 
Piped into dwelling 44.8 65.7 21.6 WC linked to sewer 18.2 } 62.7 4.0 
Piped into yard 16.7 19.9 13.1 WC not linked to sewer 30.8 } 29.5 
Standpipe 10.7 4.3 17.9 Pit 27.8 11.4 46.3 
Catchment 2.0 0.6 3.4 
Private source 16.5 6.6 27.7 Shared 20.6 24.0 16.8 
Piped into dwelling 6.4 4.5 8.6 WC linked to sewer 3.8 } 16.6 } 3.4 
Catchment 10.1 2.1 19.1 WC not linked to sewer 6.6 } } 
Pit 10.2 7.4 13.4 
Spring/river 4.7 0.2 9.5 
Other 4.6 2.7 6.8 No toilet facilities 2.6 1.9 3.4 
Source: STATIN (2003; 2004) 
In the context of 'improved drinking water sources' and 'improved sanitation,8S, the 
majority of Jamaican households have good water and sanitation coverage. While 
coverage is good however, reliability of water supply is erratic in some areas and sewage 
disposal practices are not considered environmentally friendly. The level of unmet 
demand has shown an upward trend primarily due to high levels of UFW, a slow rate of 
new supply development, little or no system rehabilitation and poor demand 
management. Water quality is generally good but is compromised by saline intrusion, 
nitrate contamination from fertilizers and sewage, improper disposal of industrial effluents 
and the use of pesticides in catchment areas. Sewage effluent quality from standalone 
83 Defined as systems with distribution networks less than 100 mm in diameter. 
84 Private sources in this context does not necessarily refer to water obtained from a privately operated water utility 
but can apply to discrete sources for individual use such as boreholes or rainwater catchment tanks. 
85 'Improved drinking water sources' include household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug 
wells and protected rainwater collection. 'Improved sanitation' indudes connection to public sewers, connection to 
septic systems, pour-flush latrines, simple pit latrines and ventilated improved pit latrines (WHO and UNICEF, 2000). 
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'package' plants is often inconsistent, with more than 85% of these plants failing to meet 
sewage effluent standards. The situation is aggravated by the demands of increasing 
urbanisation, the existence of dispersed and remote rural communities, challenging 
terrain especially in rural areas, annual drought conditions and the need to comply with 
more stringent sewage effluent standards. Investment needs for the sector to remedy 
these deficiencies and provide universal access are estimated at US$2-3 billion. 
6.3.1 Status of the public water utility 
NWC's performance has been mixed. 1999/2000 for example, saw the largest growth in 
sales revenue at 17% and increase in operating margin by 15% following an interim tariff 
adjustment. Financial and operational data for 2003 however, indicate a slowdown in 
revenue growth and operating losses of J$618 million reflecting an operating profit 
margin of -12% (Table 6.2). Declining performance has been attributed to unexpected 
pension liabilities, increases in debt, implementation of projects with wider economic 
benefits but limited financial returns, a tariff insufficient to cover capital costs, high UFW 
(65%), lower than expected collection efficiency and incurred interest costs due to cash 
flow deficits and reliance on overdraft facilities. NWC's financial situation is also a by-
product of government's systematic weaning of budgetary support, concurrent with NWC 
having to go into 'expansion mode' to fulfil government's mandate for universal access by 
2010. In keeping with government's Public Sector Modernisation Programme, NWC has 
been receiving progressively smaller disbursements and subsidies from government and 
has had to assume more of the capital costs of the sector. 
Table 6.2 Financial and operational data for NWC (2003) 
~Paramete'ri'';;0;'tiJ0;i]j{f17P !iJJ~Value\~0.;~¥-;;: 
Working ratio 1.0 
Operating ratio 1.4 
Debt service ratio 35% 
Gross operating margin -1% 
Operating profit margin -12% 
Sales growth 7% 
Collection efficiency 89% 
Staff per 1000 connections 6 
Employee cosUtotal cost 46% 
Production (Mm') 281.3 
Consumption (Mm3) 98.9 
Unaccounted for water (UFW) 65% 
Source: NWC (2003; 2004a) and author's calculations 
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6.3.2 Sources of financing 
The financing of major capital works has predominantly been the responsibility of the 
public sector either from revenues generated by NWC, specially designated funds such 
as the K-factor fund provided as a tariff surcharge (see Section 6.4.5.2), budgetary 
allocations from government or funds facilitated by government on behalf of NWC from 
various commercial, multilateral and bilateral sources. Bank loans and overdrafts 
guaranteed by government are normally sourced from local commercial banks and 
financial institutions to provide working capital and fund NWC's systems rehabilitation 
programme. Multilateral and bilateral sources such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank, European Union, European Investment Bank, Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation, Overseas Economic Corporation Fund, Caribbean Development Bank and 
United States Trade and Development Agency provide concessional loans and grants 
which are normally matched in part by government to fund NWC's major capital works 
programme. More recently, there has been some private sector investment through 
developer contributions/exactions, PPPs and private service providers. The extent of this 
investment is unknown however as it is not differentiated from other non-NWC and non-
government financing sources. The typical financing mix for major capital works is NWC 
(2%), government (41%) and other sources (57%). 
Government's systematic weaning of NWC from public funds has resulted in NWC 
having to assume more local and foreign debt to finance capital expenditure, NWC trying 
to improve its financial performance to facilitate self-funding and increased emphasis on 
obtaining additional multilateral and bilateral funding. Capital work estimates for 2004/05 
however indicate that there is a significant shortfall in terms of traditional sources of 
financing. Budgetary allocations for example, are just 54% of requested government 
funding and contributions from multilateral and bilateral sources fall below expectations. 
Aware of this shortfall and the significant investment needs of the sector, government's 
strategy is to mobilise additional sources of financing including private investment. 
6.3.3 Projects for financing 
Several capital projects have been planned for the 2004/05 fiscal year to improve water 
and wastewater treatment facilities, improve operational efficiencies and develop water 
supply systems for service expansion. A list of these projects is presented in Appendix 7. 
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As shown in Table 6.3, the majority of projects are less than US$1 million with only one 
project valued more than US$50 million. 
Table 6.3 Capital expenditure for 2004/05 (NWC) 
. ··'Project ~ost Number of projects 
Less than US$1 million 47 
US$l.l to US$10 million 11 
US$10.1 to US$50 million 6 
Greater than US$SO.1 million 1 
Source: NWC (2004b) 
6.4 Overview of the operating environment 
6.4.1 Macroeconomic environment 
Jamaica's monetary and exchange rate policies have been strongly determined by the 
economic effects that resulted from the major financial crisis in 1995/9686 . Since then, 
government's primary macroeconomic objective has been the control of inflation by 
adopting a very restrictive monetary policy combined with an attempt to stabilise the 
foreign exchange rate. While these policies have been successful in reducing inflation, 
they have contributed to a high interest rate environment which has been detrimental to 
private sector investment, growth and external competitiveness. Since 2004, there has 
been a general stabling and predictability of the macroeconomic environment allowing 
the central bank to relax its monetary policy stance while maintaining focus on preserving 
low inflation. Government's outlook based on market conditions includes restoration of 
strong foreign and local investor confidence fuelled by foreign exchange market 
stability87. On the international scene, positive policy trends are considered to 
counterbalance the significant risk stemming from the government's debt size (135% of 
GDP at year-end 2004) and have led to the revision of Jamaica's sovereign credit rating 
from B negative to B stable. 
The Jamaican economy is heavily dependent on services which account for 
approximately 61% of GDP (Table 6.4). Targeted sectors for FDI include tourism, 
information and communication teChnology, telecommunications, specialised minerals 
such as bauxite, agribusiness and culture (music and film). Government's economic 
programme is aimed at strengthening the framework for private investment with 
B6 Financial sector crisis when several domestic financial institutions and insurance companies ran into severe 
liquidity and solvency problems. Government intervention succeeded in averting the collapse of the finandal system 
but led to rapid accumUlation of high-cost domestic debt. 
87 For example. the Jamaican stock market in 2004 recorded one of its strongest year perfonnances reflecting growth 
of 66.7% in its main index. Macroeconomic stability was also reflected in a mere 1.63% depreciation in the foreign 
exchange rate, the lowest since 1998 (BOJ, 2005). 
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numerous initiatives implemented in this regard including measures to reduce 
deficiencies in infrastructure services. Problems such as water shortages, inadequate 
sewage facilities and the underdeveloped transport network have been prioritised and 
there is active encouragement of PSP by govemment to address these issues. 
Table 6.4 Economic indicators for Jamaica (2004) 
GDP per capita 
GDP - real growth rate 
GDP - services 
GDP - industry 
GDP - agriculture 
Inflation rate 
Public debt (of GDP) 
Exchange rate - J$ per US$ 
Average lending rate 
Sovereian credit ratina 
-As at December 10,2004 (/oca/and foreign) 
Source: BOJ (2005); Standard & Poor's (2005) 
6.4.2 Institutional arrangements 
US$3,100 
1.2% 
61.3% 
32.7% 
6.0% 
13.7% 
135% 
61.39 
24.89% 
BlslablelB' 
The Ministry of Water and Housing (MOWH) is the premier agency charged with 
developing and implementing government's policy objectives for the sector. Prior to 
1998, policy formulation was carried out by the Ministry of Public Utilities which in 
addition to water and sanitation also had responsibility for electricity, telecommunications 
and transport. Widespread dissatisfaction with service provision however, exacerbated 
by an unprecedented drought in 1997, prompted government to establish a Ministry of 
Water88 devoted exclusively to developing the sector. Implementation of government's 
policy for the sector is vested in NWC, a statutory organisation responsible for providing 
potable water and sewerage services to over 74% and 18% of the Jamaican population 
respectively. Long-term strategic planning within NWC is conducted by its Corporate and 
Strategic Planning Division89 responsible for: 
(a) coordinating planning activities within NWC to facilitate orderly 
development and expansion of water and sewerage systems; 
(b) analysing and monitoring regulatory compliance to utility benchmarks and 
targets; 
(c) designing and maintaining tariffs to reflect NWC's revenue targets and 
socio-economic objectives; 
88 Housing portfolio added in 2000. 
89 Also established in 1998. The division is headed by a Vice President who is supported by a General Manager 
Corporate Planning, General Manager Special Projects and Public-Private Sector Partnerships, Financial Analyst, 
Corporate Economist, Tariff Analyst, Strategic Planner, Policy Analyst and Industrial Engineer. 
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(d) identifying and negotiating sources of funding to finance projects; and 
(e) structuring PPPs to improve NWC's service delivery. 
The work of NWC is supplemented by 12 parish councils who under the direction of the 
Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Sports operate small 
distribution systems, community catchment tanks, standpipes and truck-borne water 
operations to rural communities. Community-based organisations are also involved in 
the operation and management of community water supply systems, largely due to local 
government encouragement for community self-help programmes. With respect to 
sanitation, NWC operates centralised and standalone sewerage systems in designated 
urban areas. Additional sewerage services are provided by the Urban Development 
Corporation (UDC)9o, hotels, public and private housing developments91 and educational 
institutions. Sewage treatment plants serving hospitals and health care facilities across 
the country are operated by the Ministry of Health (MOH). 
Economic and quality standards regulation is provided by the Office of Utilities Regulation 
(OUR), an independent body attached to the Ministry of Development in the Office of the 
Prime Minister92 . OUR's responsibilities include licensing utility service providers, tariff 
adjustment and the setting, monitoring and enforcement of service quality standards. 
Water quality and sewage effluent monitoring is conducted at the parish level by the 
Environmental Health Unit of the MOH. The National Environment and Planning Agency 
(NEPA) is the semi-autonomous government agency charged with the implementation of 
environmental protection laws and regulations. In so doing, NEPA monitors and enforces 
water quality and sewage effluent standards. The sector is also subject to the regulation 
of the Water Resources Authority (WRA), the agency responsible for the control and 
management of the country's water resources93. 
The Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) monitors the financial performance of 
NWC and through the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)94, coordinates external 
financing for NWC's investment programmes. This may include MOFP underwriting or 
offering government's guarantee to secure commercial or donor financing on NWC's 
behalf. Government and donor financial resources for small-scale, community-based 
90 UDC is government's urban developer. Its role is to plan and design urban environments in deSignated areas and 
to undertake large-scale projects as a catalyst for development or to facilitate urban renewal and revitalisation. 
91 Public housing developments provided by the National Housing Trust. 
92 The Ministry of Development is responsible for development projects. investment promotion and social, economic 
and support programmes. OUR is headed by a Director General who is supported by two Deputy Director Generals 
~ne specific to electricity and water) and a team of economists, financial analysts, engineers and legal personnel. 
WRA's duties include allocating water resources, issuing and monitoring water abstraction licences and monitoring 
water quality. 
94 PIOJ is the central planning agency responsible for initiating and coordinating plans. programmes and policies for 
the economic. financial, social, cultural and physical development of Jamaica. Funding assistance from international 
development partners is managed by its External Cooperation Management Division. 
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water infrastructure projects are mobilised by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund 
(JSIF)95. Loans to JSIF from external partners including multilateral and bilateral 
organisations96 are administered by government. The National Housing Trust (NHT)97 
operates both as a financier and developer of public housing projects and in so doing, is 
often actively involved either by itself or as part of a joint venture in the financing of new 
water and sewerage infrastructure. The same is true for UDC as it carries out its urban 
renewal mandate. Private housing developers are also involved in financing the sector 
as they are required to meet all on-site infra structural costs in discrete new 
developments. In addition, where off-site infrastructure is undertaken to benefit a new 
housing development, industrial park or private residence exclusively, the capital cost 
has to be met by the developer. 
A summary of the institutions involved in the sector is shown in Table 6.5. Additional 
information on the function, responsibilities and framework within which these 
organisations operate is included in Sections 6.4.3 to 6.4.5. 
Table 6.5 Institutions involved in the Jamaican water and sanitation sector 
~.'f4fi£o'c'(js~)1;i ~;D II-.JRlifstitutiorfgjl G\ttt@1I:et~ 
Policy • Ministry of Water and Housing 
• Ministry of Local Government, Community 
Development and Sports 
Regulation • Office of Utilities Regulation 
• Ministry of Health 
• National Environment and Planning Agency 
• Water Resources Authority 
• National Water Commission 
Service provision • National Water Commission 
• Parish Councils 
• Urban Development Corporation 
• National Housing Trust 
• Ministry of Health 
• Private housing developers 
• Private operators 
Finance/planning • Ministry of Finance and Planning 
• Planning Institute of Jamaica 
• Jamaica Social Investment Fund 
• National Housing Trust 
• Urban Develocment Corcoration 
95 JSIF is a temporary, autonomous government-sponsored institution designed to address the most pressing socio-
economic needs of the poor. This is usually achieved through a national partnership between central and local 
government and private and public organisations working at the local level to address the immediate demands of 
communities. 
98 Includes the World Bank (40%), Inter-American Development Bank (20%), Caribbean Development Bank, 
Government of the Netherlands (6%), European Union, Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (4%) and 
Department for International Development (JSIF, 2005). 
91 NHT is a public sector enterprise responsible for mobilising additional funds for housing. 
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6.4.3 Policy framework 
Government's broad objectives for the sector were initially outlined in the National 
Industrial Policy of 1996 in keeping with a national strategic plan for economic growth 
and development. General water and sanitation targets of the policy included upgrading 
and expanding water and sanitation infrastructure, improving the quality and scope of 
water and sanitation services and reducing the cost of service provision in line with world 
standards. Complementary to sector reform which resulted in the formation of the 
Ministry of Water in 1998, industry-specific policy was approved in March 1999 followed 
by the development of strategies and action plans to enable policy implementation. The 
resulting policy document - Jamaica Water Sector Policy: Strategies and Action Plans98 
(MOWH, 2004), was presented island-wide during a series of public consultations at the 
parish level. The document was also widely circulated among the business community, 
non-government organisations, parish councils and other interest groups and posted on 
WRA's website. The original document of November 2000 has since been revised and 
updated to its current June 2004 version. 
The main objectives of the policy are universal access to water by 201099 , expansion of 
central sewerage services to major towns by 2020 and improvement in NWC's efficiency. 
The main elements of the policy are to reorganise institutions involved in the sector, 
ensure minimum standards of service, mobilise additional sources of funding, introduce 
cost recovery mechanisms and develop a regulatory framework to protect customers, 
investors and the environment. To this end, government pledges to "update the 
legislative framework by amending existing laws, and where necessary, passing new 
laws to reflect the policy and facilitate its implementation". 
In recognition of the different challenges of urban and rural service provision, the Water 
Sector Policy outlines separate objectives and implementation strategies for urban and 
rural water and sanitation. The focus for urban water and sanitation which is the 
mainstay of NWC's operations is the development of an "enabling environment" to 
encourage the implementation of conservation measures, increase the efficiency of 
NWC's operations and encourage optimal utilisation of water through multi-purpose uses 
such as hydropower generation, recreation and recycling. Institutional responsibilities for 
operation, economic regulation and water quality/sewage standards monitoring are 
98 Commonly referred to as the Water Sector Policy. 
99 Universal access in this context does not necessarily mean piped water to every household. Access to be 
achieved through a combination of service supply options including water shops, wayside tanks and loading bays, 
community catchment tanks, standpipes, trucking and self-provision through individual household rainwater tanks 
and wells. 
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clearly defined. OUR is mandated to set tariffs which allow service providers to fully 
recover efficient cost levels including both capital and operating costs. Where necessary 
to achieve social objectives, government intends to provide subsidies equal to the tariffs, 
fees and charges otherwise payable by the consumer. With respect to financing capital 
costs, government makes clear its intention to access financing from a "wider range of 
sources" to include millage 100 and private investment in new infrastructure and private 
operation of water and sewerage services. PSPs are expected to meet the following 
criteria: 
(a) terms for privatisation that are in the country's best interest; 
(b) improved economic efficiency in both operating performance and the use 
of capital investment; 
(c) technical and managerial expertise and the introduction of new 
technology to achieve productivity improvements; 
(d) injection of large-scale investment capital and/or access to private capital 
markets; 
(e) insulation from short-term political intervention in utility operations and 
limited opportunity for intervention by powerful interest groups; 
(f) transfer of risk and responsibilities of ownership from government to the 
private sector over the long-term; 
(g) delivery of a reliable and efficient service to communities throughout the 
island; and 
(h) a sector more responsive to consumers' needs and preferences. 
PSP is recognised as "part of the government's strategy to secure economic benefits for 
Jamaica, and not an end in itself'. The policy clearly delimits PSP options under 
consideration. Service and management contracts, leases, concessions and BOT-type 
arrangements are identified for investigation pending government's objective(s) for this 
investment. Divestiture is not considered a financing option since "the Government of 
Jamaica wil/ continue to own and/or control (directly or through designated entities such 
as the NWC), the natural resources and existing infrastructural assets". 
Responsibility for the provision of water services in rural areas has historically been 
transferred back and forth between NWC and parish councils resulting in an "iI/-defined 
and unsatisfactory" relationship between both entities 101. The Water Sector Policy 
100 Charges such as the K-factor levied on customers in addition to the tariff to fund new projects from which they will 
benefit. 
101 Between 1988 and 1993 for example, water provision throughout the island was NWC's responsibility. In 1993, 
NWC transferred 'simple' systems to parish councils and retained systems that were more complex and expensive to 
operate and maintain. 
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proposes to formally determine the responsibilities of NWC, parish councils and other 
water operators. With regard to financing and cost recovery, the policy makes 
allowances for higher than normal subsidies to offset higher delivery costs and lower 
incomes in rural areas compared to urban areas. These 'features of rural water supply 
are recognised as likely deterrents to attracting private investment. Regardless, 
recommendations for private investment include deliberate inclusion of rural areas in 
private urban systems and provision of incentives by government. Where appropriate, 
government intends to promote the involvement of cooperatives and small entrepreneurs 
through community participation in the operation and management of community water 
supply systems. To support this emphasis on rural service provision, government has 
approved the establishment of a Rural Water Supply Ltd.102 to facilitate the development 
of small water supply projects for small rural communities. 
6.4.4 Legislative framework 
The NWC Act (GOJ, 1980) is the primary legislation governing water and sanitation 
service provision in Jamaica which recognises NWC as the "statutory water undertaker". 
The defined functions of NWC are enumerated in Section 4(1) of the Act and include: 
(a) preparing and submitting proposals to the Minister for the establishment 
of an efficient, coordinated and economical water supply system capable 
of meeting the island's water needs; 
(b) preparing and submitting for Ministerial approval, details of schemes for 
the development of water resources and water supply in particular areas 
and the delivery of such schemes; 
(c) reviewing water supply service quality, reliability and availability and the 
rates charged for such services in addition to advising the Minister on 
these and other water supply-related matters; and 
(d) providing and improving water supply services throughout the island 
within the limits of its resources, 
The Act empowers NWC with the consent of the Minister to borrow money and raise 
money by issuing stocks, debentures and other securities. Authorised loans to NWC 
may be guaranteed by the Minister responsible for finance pending parliamentary 
approval. The NWC is also authorised to purchase and sell water in bulk and acquire 
102 To be formed from a merger of the Project Implementation Unit of the GOJ/IDB Rural Water Programme and 
Carib Engineering Corporation Ltd. The Rural Water Supply Ltd. is expected to have a multi-functional role involving 
project management, water supply system design and construction management. 
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parish council systems subject to Ministerial approval. NWC's regulatory powers extend 
to issuing licences to other service providers and the regulation of all wells 103 to the 
extent that "any person who without a licence from the Commission [NWC}, from any 
source whatever supplies water to any other person in any area in which water is 
supplied by the Commission shall be guilty of an offence". 
Provision for other "statutory water undertakers" is made in the Water Supply Act (GOJ, 
1958) taken to mean parish councils or "any committee authorised by any law or 
regulations to supply water". The Act empowers the Minister on the application of 
statutory water undertakers to provide for joint water supplies and transfer of 
undertakings by agreement, determine supply boundaries in the case of multiple 
applications and resolve disputes between statutory water undertakers. Parochial water 
supply by parish councils is governed by the Parishes Water Supply Act '04 (GOJ, 1889). 
The Act empowers the Minister to define service area limits, order monies to be 
advanced for construction andlor maintenance and determine the repayment of 
advances and interest. Parish councils with Ministerial approval determine water rates 
using either a uniform rating based on property value or a graduated scale of charges 
based on property value or the amount of water supplied. Parish councils are also 
empowered to supply water free of charge 'OS or with the consent of NWC106, connect to 
their mains to supply free water as they see fit. Regulatory powers of the parish councils 
extend to making by-laws for regulating water (mis)use, sale, delivery and supply. 
6.4.4.1 Regulation-specific legislation 
Regulatory provisions for utility services 107 are made in the OUR Act (GOJ, 1995) which 
established OUR as a corporate body. The key functions of OUR are specified in 
Section 4(1) of the Act and include regulating the provision of prescribed utility services 
and receiving and processing utility service licence applications. In the performance of 
its functions, the Act enables OUR to encourage utility service competition, protect 
consumers' interests and promote and encourage the development of modern and 
efficient utilities. The Act also empowers OUR to prescribe service standards, prescribe 
the system of accounts to be kept by a licensee and impose regulatory service fees. 
103 Includes sinking, construction, maintenance and use of all new wells. 
104 Not in force in the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew. 
105 Also provided for in the Parochial Water Works Charges Act (GOJ, 1913). 
106 Section 20(1) of the NWC Act empowers the Minister to modify water rates due to NWC in areas where NWC 
supplies water within the limits of a water supply district as defined in the Parishes Water Supply Act. 
107 Includes water, sewerage, electricity, telecommunications and public transportation by road, rail or ferry. 
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In carrying out its duties, the Act instructs OUR to have regard to protecting the 
environment, ensuring that consumers are afforded an economical and reliable service 
and that persons financing the operation of a utility service are afforded a reasonable 
return on capital invested in providing that service. Unless the "enabling instrument.10a 
specifies the manner in which rates may be fixed by a licensee or specified organisation, 
OUR may either on its own motion or upon application, prescribe the rates to be charged 
by a licensee or specified organisation in respect of its prescribed utility services. In 
cases where the enabling instrument of a specified organisation contains provisions 
regarding returns or profits to be received, the Act mandates OUR to limit rates to ensure 
compliance with such provisions. Where a project is assisted by a loan provided by a 
financial institution on terms approved by the Minister, rates approved by OUR should be 
such as to ensure that while the legal obligation to the financial institution remains 
outstanding, the licensee or specified organisation receives a minimum return on its rate 
base 109 as prescribed by the Minister. Finally, in the event of an enquiry, interested 
parties may be represented before OUR by an attorney-at-Iaw and may call witnesses as 
necessary. 
As mentioned in Section 6.4.2, three other agencies besides OUR are involved in 
regulating the water and sanitation sector. The WRA by way of the Water Resources Act 
(GOJ, 1996), regulates and manages the abstraction, allocation and conservation of 
Jamaica's water resources. Licences issued by WRA are necessary to abstract water 
and to drill or modify wells. Persons are exempt from abstraction licences only if they 
have a right of access to a water source or require water for household domestic use. 
The Public Health Act (GOJ, 1985) does not speCifically address the water and sanitation 
sector but in the interest of public health, empowers MOH to "carry on all activities which 
appear to be requisite, advantageous or convenient in the interest of public health". 
NEPA is empowered by the Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA) Act 
(GOJ, 1991) to formulate standards and codes of practice for maintaining the quality of 
the environment. Permits and licences are required from NEPA to construct or modify 
wastewater treatment works and discharge sewage effluent. 
Pursuant to the NRCA Act, drafting instructions have been issued for the National 
Wastewater and Sludge Regulations (GOJ, 2004b) to complement existing sewage and 
trade effluent standards. These regulations will make provision for the operation of 
wastewater treatment plants, certification of wastewater treatment operators, monitoring 
108 Defined as any permit or statutory instrument by which the licensee or specified organisation is authorised to 
~rovide a prescribed utility service. 
09 'Rate base' in relation to a licensee or specified organisation means its rate base as determined by OUR in 
accordance with the principles set out in the enabling instrument. 
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and reporting requirements for licensed treatment plants, requirements for sewage 
effluent disposal and fees and penalties for sewage effluent discharges. In an effort to 
streamline monitoring and reporting requirements for sewage disposal, the regulations 
will assign MOH, WRA and NEPA joint monitoring responsibility of sewage effluent 
standards. NEPA will however administer the standards. 
6.4.4.2 Sector-specific legislation 
Cabinet has also approved the issuing of drafting instructions for a new bill, the Water 
Supply and Sewerage Services Act (WSSS Act) (GOJ, 2004a) to serve as industry-
specific legislation for the water and sanitation sectorll0. Provisions under the new Act 
will include: 
(a) Ministerial designation of a Director of Water to coordinate the macro-
planning of the sector and assume planning and approval functions 
previously executed by NWC; 
(b) defined functions of OUR with respect to regulating service providers, 
receiving and processing licence applications for service provision, 
promoting competition among service providers and making information 
available to the public; 
(c) removing the regulatory powers of NWC and parish councils by repealing 
the NWC and Parishes Water Supply Acts; and 
(d) establishing a fund from the mandatory contributions of water supply 
licensees to assist in the financing of water supply expansion. 
Most of the WSSS Act focuses on the empowered regulatory duties of OUR with respect 
to the licensing of water supply and sewerage services. In deciding whether to grant a 
licence, OUR is expected to consider water resource plans and planning approvals in the 
case of water supply and sewerage services respectively. The Act will empower OUR to 
"determine whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to be granted a licence", such 
person agreeing to comply with the provisions of the Act, is not disqualified by reason of 
any legal impediment, possesses the technical qualifications to perform the obligations 
imposed by the licence and satisfies the financial requirements for service provision. 
Persons aggrieved by a decision made by OUR will be able to appeal against the 
110 A legal consultant was hired in March 2002 to draft instructions for the WSSS Act. The MOWH has hosted three 
industry-specific legislation workshops to involve stakeholders and incorporate their views in the legislative 
framework, the final draft of which was submitted to the Ministry in November 2002. Work continues at the ministerial 
level to finalise Cabinet submission in relation to the drafting instructions. It is anticipated that the WSSS Act will be 
enacted in 2005/06. 
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decision to the Appeal Tribunal"1• Finally, the Act will empower OUR to make an 
application to the courts in the event that a licensee has failed to comply with the 
conditions of the licence or has contravened provisions of the Act. In such cases, OUR 
will consider the resources available to the licensee, the continued economic viability of 
the licensee and the conduct of the licensee's competitors. 
6.4.5 Regulatory framework 
6.4.5.1 Regulatory framework for the NWC 
Although Section 11 of the OUR Act empowered OUR to prescribe rates for utility 
services, up to 1999, rates were set and charged by NWC subject to Ministerial approval 
in accordance with the NWC Act. However, in anticipation of an amendment to the NWC 
Act by way of the pending WSSS Act112, the task of reviewing rates charged by NWC has 
been delegated to OUR. Complementary to tariff review, OUR also developed a 
regulatory framework which outlined several performance targets and benchmarks to be 
achieved by NWC. The first consultative document for the water sector was issued in 
February 1999 as a public discussion paper to provide an overview of the principles on 
which service quality standards for the sector were being set and to propose appropriate 
standards for NWC113. Standards 114 were developed based on NWC's performance, 
policy, data availability, existing regulations, corresponding relevant standards as 
specified for the electricity utility and standards from other countries, particularly the 
UK115. Following conSUltation, NWC began reporting on overall and guaranteed 
standards 116 in April 2000 with compensatory payment for failure to meet the agreed on 
guaranteed standards commencing in April 2001 117• 
Since then, NWC's performance in terms of overall standards has featured highly at tariff 
reviews to the extent that targets and reporting requirements have been revised to 
111 Appeal Tribunal to consist of 3 members appointed by the Minister - former Judge of the Supreme Court or Court 
of Appeal as chairman, one member appointed on the recommendation of the Advisory Council and one member 
aRPointed on the recommendation of the Consumer Affairs Commission. 
1 Amended NWC Act to make rate-setting the sole purview of OUR. 
113 Consultation lasted four months during which time the document was circulated and written comments to the 
proposals and specific questions invited from the general public and other interested parties such as service 
providers, businesses, professionals and academics. 
m Standards can be divided into three major areas covering the entire spectrum of NWC's operations, namely the 
production process, service supplied and customer interiace. Standards relating to customer service and intrinsic 
quality are determined by OUR while health and safety standards and environmental impact are monitored by MOH 
and NEPA. OUR however monitors NWC's compliance to all set standards. 
115 The UK was chosen as a model because it was considered to have a wel1-developed quality of service and 
~uaranteed standards scheme for the water sector. 
16 Overall standards are intended as general performance measures to ensure that consistently good quality service 
is provided to customers while guaranteed standards address specific aspects of service provision for which NWC 
has to make compensatory payments to affected customers if in breach. 
117 One year 'grace period' given between introducing the standards and implementation of guaranteed standards to 
allow NWC time to put the necessary systems in place, e.g. automatic compensation to customers. 
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correspond with rate determination. Tariff review applications have to be accompanied 
by detailed supporting documentation to justify the request for a tariff increase, outline 
financial projections and present the proposed capital investment programme 118. Rate 
determination notices are then issued by OUR detailing the results of the tariff review, 
revised performance targets for NWC and expectations for efficiency improvements and 
customer service. In order to satisfy the provisions of the OUR Act and to benefit from 
the widest possible cross-section of views, OUR has adopted the practice of public 
consultations, the results of which are also considered in rate reviews 119. At the end of 
the tariff review and concurrent with the final determination, a new regulatory framework 
is drafted by OUR outlining standards and reporting requirements to be fulfilled by NWC, 
the effective date of the decision and the effective time period of the tariff regime. 
The prevailing regulatory framework for NWC became effective on April 1, 2004 and is 
intended to remain in effect until March 2006. Financial and operational performance 
targets have been established with the intention of securing continued improvements in 
NWC's efficiency and overall performance. Regulatory oversight is achieved through the 
quarterly and/or annual submission of various reports 120 by NWC to OUR. 
6.4.5.2 Tariff structure 
The present tariff structure is a uniform, two-tiered system comprising a fixed component 
represented by a customer service charge 121, and a variable component represented by 
a volumetric charge. Domestic tariffs have an increasing block structure comprising six 
blocks, tiered in such a way so that the first 14 cubic metres is heavily subsidised (Table 
6.6). Wastewater tariffs are set at 100% of the water consumption charge and are 
charged to residents located within a 0.1 km radius of a NWC sewerage treatment facility 
regardless of connection to the system. In addition, there is a surcharge - the price 
adjustment mechanism (PAM), added to all billed water, sewerage and service charges 
to protect the real revenues of NWC. PAM is calculated as the weighted average of 
changes in foreign exchange rates (0.175), inflation (0.605) and electricity costs (0.220), 
with the electricity and foreign exchange components of PAM applied as a monthly 
adjustment to customers' bills. The inflation component of PAM is applied as a lump sum 
118 NWC's September 2003 tariff review application for example, was supported by the findings of a tariff review study 
which among other things outlined NWC's proposals to meet performance targets set by OUR, developed a cost of 
service model, reviewed existing tariffs and suggested new tariff structures. 
119 For the 2003 tariff review for example, a supplement summarising NWC's tariff proposal was published in the local 
newspaper and the public invited to submit written comments. In addition, public consultations were held in major 
urban centres to give stakeholders an opportunity to be heard and make presentations to OUR. During these public 
meetings, NWC had to elaborate on their tariff proposal and respond to questions and comments. 
120 Includes financial reports; statistical information on operations and customer service; quality of service standards 
reforts; reports relating to pertormance on capital projects; and status reports on restructuring programmes. 
12 Designed to recover fixed costs related to metering, billing, collection, customer services and depreciation. 
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on an annual basis minus a 3.5% efficiency gain calculation 122. This becomes effective 
on January 1 each year at which time a new base rate is set to reflect the change in 
PAM123. 
Table 6.6 OUR determined water rates as at January 1, 2004 
~." Category >:c·; '" ; Rates (J$)' •..... 
Domestic 
0-14 m3 23.83 
14 - 27 rn' 42.02 
27-41 rn' 45.37 
41-55m3 57.91 
55-91 rn' 72.12 
>91 m3 92.83 
Commercial 89.37 
Condominium 44.33 
Primary school 35.75 
'Rates per cubIC metre calculated usmg PAM of 48% as at August 2003 
Source: OUR (2003b) 
Under the previous regulatory framework, a 4% K_factor '24 was also added to PAM to 
provide revenue to cover additional capital costs associated with additional capital works 
necessary to comply with OUR performance target requirements and/or achieving 
government's water sector policy. A K-factor was not included in the rates for the 2003 
review as NWC's anticipated J$600 million profit as a result of a 26.36% tariff increase 
was allowed as sufficient to cover operating expenses, undertake essential rehabilitation 
programmes and contribute to capital expansion. 
In determining the tariff increase to be granted to NWC, OUR calculates the percentage 
change in revenue required to offset the shortfall between what is termed the 'revenue 
requirement' and projected revenue 125. The revenue requirement is the sum of NWC's 
total operating costs 126 and return on equity. In calculating the appropriate return on 
equity for NWC, the returns of international utilities 127 are used as proxies to estimate 
elements of the capital asset pricing mechanism 128. The basis for this methodology is 
two-fold. Firstly, OUR believes that the return on investment should be calculated on a 
122 With the expected expenditure on mains replacement as well as the installation of source meters, OUR anticipates 
an improvement in UFW of at least 2% each year assumed to result in at least 2% improvement in efficiencies. 
Additional efficiency gains of 1 % on production and distribution costs and 0.5% on indirect costs yields an overall 
efficiency gain of 3.5% (OUR, 2003a). 
123 New base rate is set annually equal to old base rate *(1 + PAM - 3.5%). 
124 K-factor managed in a separate account in accordance with OUR regulation. 
125 Projected revenue determined by examining trends in water production and consumption and customer account 
information. 
126 Includes salaries, pension costs, administration, repairs and maintenance, electricity costs. purchase of water, 
loan interest, depreciation, bad debt and regulatory fees. Assumptions of expected cost savings and changes in cost 
items are incorporated in OUR's determination of total operating cost. 
121 Countries used are France, Brazil, China, Chile, Greece, Spain, Hong Kong, Italy, USA and the UK. 
128 Model used to provide framework relating the required return on an investment to the risk of that investment. 
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real basis and in US dollar terms since the new policy of regular revaluation of assets 129 
and PAM account for any inflationary and foreign exchange movements. Secondly, it 
facilitates bench marking against international utilities. The resulting return on equity 
therefore represents what OUR considers a reasonable profit that will allow NWC to do 
critical rehabilitation projects as well as contribute to the financing of capital expansion. 
The current regulatory framework for NWC represents a departure from its 1999 
predecessor with respect to OUR's approach to expectations of efficiency gains, the use 
of PAM and the setting of performance benchmarks. The OUR attributes this change to 
reflect government's expectation for NWC to operate in a commercially-focused manner 
and from a regulatory perspective, be treated similarly to any private sector operator. 
6.4.5.3 Regulatory framework for private service providers 
Until recently, OUR's regulatory framework for the sector especially as it relates to quality 
of service standards, has been developed specifically for NWC. This is largely due to the 
fact that NWC is the dominant actor in the sector and in the opinion of OUR "should be 
held at a higher level of accountability when compared to other small water providers . .. 
and to impose similar standards on them [small water providers] would be burdensome 
and unnecessarily costly". As a result, a 'simplified' regulatory framework has been 
developed for small private operators, the terms of which form part of their licence 
conditions (Appendix 7). 
With respect to rate charges, the licence stipulates that rates are set to allow the licensee 
to make a reasonable return on capital taking into account costs incurred during service 
provision. The formula used by OUR to calculate the revenue requirement is the sum of 
operating costs 130, depreciation 131, taxes 132 and return on investment '33 . The weighted 
average cost of capital is used to calculate the licensee's rate of return. Audited 
schedules supporting specific operating costs, depreciation expenses and taxes have to 
be submitted to OUR at the end of each financial year. Licensees are invited to submit 
proposals for initial tariffs after their operating licences have been granted. Applications 
129 Asset revaluation has resulted in over 100% increase in depreciation charges. The majority of assets utilised by 
NWC are acquired from overseas and as such, are impacted by foreign exchange movements. 
130 Includes incurred costs not directly associated with investment in capital plant but incurred in connection with the 
licensed business such as salaries and property rental. . 
131 Calculated by applying annual depreciation rates as agreed with OUR to the gross value of the individual plant 
asset accounts. 
132 Calculated based on the net income of the licensee payable to GOJ (incentives to encourage capital investments 
are not included in the calculation of income taxes). 
133 Calculated based on the approved value of the net investment (rate base) of the licensee and the required rate of 
retum sufficient to provide for the requirements of consumers and acquire new investments at competitive costs. 
Working capital component of rate base to be determined by OUR. 
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for a tariff review can be made no sooner than once in every two years and must be 
supported with data and information determined by OUR. Proposed rate schedules have 
to demonstrate that rates will generate the revenue requirement for the test year'34. A 
rate review proceeding is then initiated upon acceptance of the rate filing, the format and 
procedure of such proceedings at the discretion of OUR. In the absence of an order from 
OUR, licensees are informed upon the expiry of 90 days whether their tariff review 
application has been rejected, approved or modified. If an order rejecting or modifying 
any portion of the proposed rates has been issued, licensees may refer the matter to the 
Appeal Tribunal. 
6.5 Private investment in the water and sanitation sector: An overview 
6.5.1 Private utilities 
There are three recognised private water service providers in Jamaica, namely Runaway 
Bay Water Company (RBWC), Four Rivers Development Company (FRDC) and Dairy 
Spring Ltd. (DSL), all of which serve the SI. Ann '35 area. The oldest and largest of these 
is RBWC which first began operations in 1958 to provide water primarily to the Jamaica-
Jamaica Hotel and golf course in Cardiff Hall. Economic and political instability in the 
1970s however, witnessed the flight of several private entrepreneurs including those at 
the Jamaica-Jamaica Hotel. As a result, the hotel and associated developments in 
Cardiff Hall were taken over by government through its National Hotels and Properties 
initiative and given to UDC to operate. Since 1977, RBWC has existed has a fully-owned 
subsidiary of UDC and has operated as a de facto water utility outside the regulatory 
provisions of the NWC Act'36. 
RBWC operates two deep wells which supply water to 234 domestic and 46 commercial 
customers in the Cardiff Hall subdivision, Runaway Bay. The majority of RBWC's 
revenue however, is generated from bulk water sales to NWC for redistribution to the 
Runaway Bay area. Production figures for 2004 indicated that about 74% of RBWC's 
water sales were to NWC. Financial data for the same period indicated an operating 
profit margin of 39% (Table 6.7). 
134 The latest 12 months of operation for which there are audited accounts. 
135 st. Ann is a major tourist destination located in the northern part of Jamaica. 
138 RBWC basically has a bUsiness relationship with NWC. As RBWC's largest customer, NWC is allowed to 
independently take water quality samples and verify meter readings. Water quality samples are sent to NWC's 
laboratory for analysis. 
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Table 6.7 Financial and operational data for RBWC and DSL (2004) 
I. 'C:-::i.:Para-mete-r.~;';;/:j,~~T ;',' ·i,RBWC v _ ~ --" DSL -!rJ%?-;:i-~ 
Working ratio 0.6 0.01 
Operating profit margin 39% 99% 
Collection efficiency 97% 95% 
Water rates Same as NWC $33.00 per rn' 
Employee cosUtotal cost 37% 1% 
Production (Mm3) 2.2 0.8 
Consumption (Mm3) 1.9 0.6 
UFW 13% 66% 
, Source: HCL (2004); White (2005); author s calculations 
In 2002, RBWC's licence application to OUR was suspended as OUR awaited 
amendments to the NWC Act which would remove certain conflicts in the regulatory and 
service provider functions of NWC. Prolonged delays in these amendments taking effect 
and strong lobbying by RBWC and OUR for government to commit to its PSP policy 
resulted in RBWC being granted a 20-year utility service provider licence by OUR in 
February 2005 upon the instructions of MOWH. Up to December 2004, water rates 
levied by RBWC were identical to those charged by NWC. The rates have however 
remained fixed at NWC's December 2004 prices as RBWC could not justify an increase 
as afforded NWC effective January 2005. Effective April 1, 2004, the bulk water tariff 
applied to water bought by NWC was negotiated to J$15.40 per cubic metre. With 
RBWC now under the regulatory purview of OUR, this bulk water rate in addition to 
RBWC's domestic and commercial rates will in future be determined by OUR. RBWC is 
headed by an Operations Manager supported by 16 full-time and 6 part-time employees. 
TeChnical audits are produced on a quarterly basis by an independent water resources 
consultant and the relevant sections submitted to OUR, WRA and MOH. 
FRDC began operations in August 1969 following planning approval by the SI. Ann 
Parish Council for the subdivision of the Shaw Park Estate137 . In the 1980s, water supply 
contracts were also established between some landowners within the original subdivision 
and NWC, albeit for a minor portion of their water supply requirements. For all intents 
and purposes however, FRDC remained the main water provider for the subdivision. The 
commercial potential of the subdivision however, peaked NWC's interest in becoming the 
main water provider to the subdivision. FRDC was subsequently warned by NWC that it 
was in breach of Section 27 of the NWC Act and was advised to immediately discontinue 
supply. The matter was brought to the attention of OUR in July 1999 by way of a licence 
application and supporting evidence justifying FRDC's legal right and obligation to 
operate as a water utility. 
137 Sales agreements for the lots required FRDC to provide a reliable water supply. 
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Several issues were highlighted by FROC to support its case. Firstly, planning approval 
by the parish council had not made any requirements for subsequent transfer of the 
water supply, and in so doing had intended FROC to indefinitely supply the subdivision. 
Secondly, there were no provisions in the NWC Act for the rationalisation of existing 
private water supply systems thereby negating NWC's claim of rights to supply water to 
the subdivision. It was pOinted out that NWC had not previously pursued a policy of 
licensing privately owned water supply systems and to enforce the NWC Act against 
FROC alone could be construed as discriminatory. In addition, FROC's termination of 
supply to the subdivision would cause them to be in breach of sales agreements with the 
subdivision landowners. Lastly, efforts by NWC to have FROC surrender its historic 
water supply area was argued to be in direct conflict with the Water Sector Policy which 
sought to encourage PSP in the water sector. Consequent to FROC's submission and 
discussions between FROC, OUR, WRA and NWC, FROC was granted a 10-year non-
exclusive water service provider licence by NWC. 
OSL began operations in November 2001 as a limited liability water only utility company. 
Its founders are the only two shareholders in the company with a share capital of J$1,OOO 
divided into 1,000 shares using a 600:400 ratio. OSL operates a gravity-based system 
which harnesses water from the Shaw Park Oairy Spring to serve sections of Shaw Park 
and Ocho Rios. The service area and in fact the source are not new to private water 
provision. Previous to OSL, a 25-year agreement dated November 1976 between UOC 
and the spring landowners (FROC), allowed UOC to divert 909 cubic metres daily from 
the spring. The water was used initially to facilitate UOC's construction of the Ocho Rios 
commercial area and subsequently to provide domestic water to the new waterfront 
development. In March 2001, UOC advised FROC that it did not intend on renewing the 
lease agreement and that arrangements should be made to service existing customers 
on or before November 2001. The owners of OSL became aware of this business 
opportunity through their business relationship with FROC and entered into a 25-year 
agreement with FROC for sole access to the spring discharge. 
OSL currently supplies six commercial customers (all hotels) with approximately 0.55 
million cubic metres of water annually (Table 6.7). There are plans however to expand 
the customer base to a maximum of 10 when the system is fully operational. Operational 
costs are very low compared to revenue. Electricity costs are low as the system is 
gravity-driven. Although the company is registered as having four employees - a 
managing director, systems supervisor, systems operator and customer 
service/accounting officer, there is essentially only one member of staff. Professional 
services such as management, engineering and design are provided by the owners 
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through their water resources consultancy business. As the business is seen as a 
'pension plan' for the owners, professional services are not facto red in the operating 
expenses. System expansion is planned on a phased basis using cash flow generated 
from the business. so there are no bank charges or loan interests to maintain. These 
technical, operational and professional simplicities and/or efficiencies have therefore 
realised a handsome operating profit margin of 99% for 2004. 
Prior to start-up, DSL made applications and received approvals from WRA. NEPA and 
MOH. WRA has issued DSL a 5-year licence to abstract 3.409 cubic metres per day 
from the spring while an environmental permit and water quality certification have been 
issued by NEPA and MOH respectively. DSL operates under a 10-year non-exclusive 
water service provider licence issued by NWC. 
6.5.2 BOT arrangements 
The Rural Water Programme 138 initiated in 2002 has also realised PSP in rural 
community-based water development projects. Specific aims of the programme are to 
encourage private initiative'39 in providing small-scale water and sanitation services 140 
using the build-operate (BO) model and to support autonomous. legally-constituted 
community water organisations (CWO) to provide these services. Beneficiary 
communities through CWOs may choose to select a private firm to build the system and 
maintain responsibility for its operation and maintenance for at least five years. A 
schematic of the build-operate model used is shown in Figure 6.1. 
The project provides 90% of the capital cost with 10% required from the community in 
cash, kind or labour. As a condition for first disbursement for the initiation of works. 
contractors must either provide a bank guarantee equal to 30% of total construction costs 
or complete 40% of construction with non-programme resources. Communities must be 
138 Programme is a 4-year joint venture between GOJ and lOB aimed at improving sanitary and health conditions in 
Jamaica by increasing coverage of potable water and sanitation services in poor rural communities. The total cost of 
the programme is US$12.5 million with US$10.0 million in lOB financing and US$2.5 million in government 
counterpart financing. Eligible communities must be within the lowest poverty quartile as defined in the Jamaica 
Poverty Map, located in a rural area, form a ewo and have a total population less than 6,000. In addition, projects 
must have an economic internal rate of return of 12% or more, Le. average cost per connection is lower than 
US$1,600 (GOJ and lOB. 2001). 
139 Activities for PSP divided as follows: (a) promoting the initiative among the Jamaican private sector: (b) providing 
technical, legal and financial analyses to demonstrate PSP feasibility: (c) preparing terms of reference for contractors' 
selection and the design of BD contracts: and designing and implementing supervision schemes for BD contracts 
\GOJ and lOB. 2001). 
40 Eligible project activities for water systems include (a) well prospecting, drilling and development; (b) catchment 
tanks and reservoirs: (c) distribution lines and connections; (d) standpipes and valves for public access (e) pumps (f) 
individual treated·water solutions such as absorbent wells: and treatment facilities. Eligible project activities for 
individual sanitation facilities include soak-aways, absorption pits, septic tanks. cesspools and tile fields (GOJ and 
lOB. 2001). 
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willing and able to pay tariffs 141 calculated as the sum of operating expenses, 
maintenance costs, depreciation of short-term capital assets, cost of new investments 
related to system expansion and administration fee in the event that operation and 
maintenance of the system is contracted out. Tariff rate proposals will be submitted to 
OUR for review and approval. Upon completion, a project handover certificate has to be 
signed by WRA with regulation and monitoring to be conducted by OUR and MOH 
respectively. 
Figure 6.1 Basic business model of the RWP's build-operate contract 
(Works Contract) (Management Contract) 
Information, training, technical 
SERVICES REVENUE 
Source: GOJ and IDB (2001) 
During the early stages of the project, private sector response was very poor with only 
one contractor responding to the calls for tender142. To counteract this, a 2-day BO 
workshop 143 was sponsored by MOWH in September 2003 to familiarise local private 
interests with the 'new' modus operandi in the sector before the projects were re-
tendered. In September 2004, Cabinet approved two BOT contracts valued at US$2.4 
million and US$3.4 million, both of which were awarded to the same contractor. The 
contracts provided for the operation and maintenance of both systems for five years or 
more, pending the readiness of the respective benevolent societies to take over the 
schemes. The approval of two other projects is pending. Similarly structured projects 
are also financed by JSIF where community contribution is 25% of the project cost. 
141 A step or sliding tariff rate will be charged wherein basic consumption is charged a base rate and incremental 
usage above this base consumption level is charged an incrementally higher level. The base water requirement 
assumes one shower per family member per day, laundry washing by hand, a flush toifet, house cleaning, cooking 
and watering of a small number of ornamental flowers or trees, i.e. about 0.08 m3/personlday. Willingness-to-pay to 
be reflected and embodied in the Memorandum of Understanding that will be signed with the communities during 
eroject preparation (GOJ and lOB, 2001). . 
42 Invitation to tender was open to tax compliant contractors from lOB's member countries who were registered with 
Jamaica's National Contracts Committee in Grade 2 and above in the pipe laying category and Grade 4 and above in 
the electrical works, mechanical works and civil engineering categories. Government agencies such as NWC could 
only be invited to submit bids in the event that a private sector tendering process for build-operators failed to produce 
a satisfactory BO bid (GOJ and lOB. 2001). 
143 The focus of the seminar was to highlight global trends and experiences in community and PSP in small-scale 
water and sanitation services delivery and using case studies, highlight the challenges, benefits and application of 
the build-operate model to rural systems. 
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Inadequacies in centralised sanitation coverage and the introduction of stringent 
environmental standards for planned development have realised more instances of 
private investment in sanitation than in water. In several instances, the model used for 
PSP is a build-transfer one in which private developers finance the construction of a 
sewage treatment plant in order to obtain planning permission for subdivision 
development. Once commissioned, private developers are obliged to operate the 
treatment plant over a 6 to 18-month maintenance period, after which the plant and 
customers are transferred to NWC. 
The BO model has also resulted in the formation of two sewage utility companies - Can-
Cara Environments Ltd. (CCEL) and Rose Hall Utility Company (RHUC). Both utilities 
were granted 20-year sewerage services licences by OUR in 2004. In the case of CCEL, 
the proposal is to provide tertiary level treatment using a 3.2 million cubic metres per day 
pond system in support of housing developments being undertaken in western Spanish 
Town (St. Catherine) by Can-Cara Developments Ltd144. The proposal by RHUC is to 
provide sewerage services to the Rose Hall Estate development in addition to existing 
hotels, resorts and commercial establishments in the tourist city of Montego Bay (St. 
James) using a 1,590 cubic metres per day extended aeration system. 
6.6 Criteria for private investment in water and sanitation 
6.6.1 Perception of private service providers 
Several factors emerged as important reasons for respondents' interest in the sector. 
Most important and common to all was the 'promise' of reasonable returns on their 
investment which was strongly linked to their confidence in the 'guaranteed' success of 
their business ventures (Box 6.1). CCEL for example, capitalised on NWC's inability to 
extend sewerage services to new housing developments in western Spanish Town. 
DSL's commercial customer base and low operating costs realised handsome profits 
(operating profit margin of 99% reported in 2004). In the case of Company X145, the 
option of short-term equity participation (expected turnaround within 2/3 years) and 
payment in US dollars were major incentives. 
144 Project known as the Westem Spanish Town Regional Wastewater Project. CCEL's plan is to provide sewerage 
services to only new housing developments in the first phase (including 8 to 10 developers who have committed to 
become clients of CCEL) and then to extend this service to 'old' Spanish Town. CCEL also proposes to incorporate 
NWC's malfunctioning treatment plants into its treatment system and charge NWC a volumetric rate for sewage 
treatment. 
145 Intemational service operator. 
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Box 6.1 Importance of having a 'guaranteed to succeed' project (Jamaica) 
ForDSL 
• The system was already operable with a dedicated commercial customer base. 
• Management was able to replicate RBWC's commercial success which it had observed while providing engineering 
management services. 
• The timing of the venture was opportune in that it had the full backing of govemment's pro-PSP policy as one of the 
first private proposals since the establishment of the Water Sector Policy. 
• The simplicity of the system resulted in very low operating costs and high operating profit margins. 
ForCCEL 
• Was established to support new housing developments by its parent company. 
• Several developments were on hold due to a lack of adequate sewerage services - was guaranteed the business 
of these pending developments. 
For Company x 
• Potential for the project to realise a quick return on investment within 2/3 years 
• Paid in US dollars 
• Govemment's reputation of honouring financial commitments 
The policy and regulatory frameworks were also instrumental in encouraging and 
enabling investment. Frequent mention was made of the Water Sector Policy's 
promotion of PSP and the support of institutions like MOWH and OUR in championing 
the existence and legitimacy of private investors/operators. DSL for example, described 
OUR as "very cooperative" and MOWH as "instrumental in getting the NWC and OUR 
together" to sort out licensing issues. The commitment of these institutions was 
especially lauded when they in the 'spirit' of the Water Sector Policy, overruled NWC's 
regulatory powers which at times tried to hinder the entry of new service providers. 
Besides the obvious drivers, personal aspiration also emerged as an important reason for 
investment. As explained by Company x's Project Manager, "If we succeed in this 
project, my company can say a big thank you to me. I want to stay here, I like this 
country. If they send me to Afghanistan, etc. I will just do my project and say bye-bye. n 
This desire to stay and enjoy the 'comforts' of Jamaica had resulted in Company x 
actively generating new investment opportunities in the sector. Company x's Project 
Manager was also keen for recognition in the company which he felt was possible if he 
was able to continuously generate successful projects. 
Other factors that impacted on investors' experiences included: 
• Jamaica's high interest rate regime. CCEL for example could not afford to 
borrow from local commercial banks at rates of 20-25%. 
• Jamaica's unstable economy. According to Company x, "You would think that 
getting paid in US dollars means I have more money in my pocket. It's not true. 
Labour prices have increased by 48% in the last 4 years, so already I am paying 
more." 
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• Government's reputation of honouring financial commitments. "To date the 
Jamaican govemment has been putting a lot of money towards extemal debt 
repayment. This has saved Jamaica because as soon as you stop paying one of 
the banks, in 5 minutes all the world knows and the door closes vel}' quickly." 
• Regulatory bureaucracy. For example no licence template existed prior to 
CC EL's application to OUR which resulted in lengthy delays and increased costs. 
• The quality of NWC's management. According to Company x, "We feel that 
there is a new spirit in the NWC and we like it. n 
• Establishing good working relations with NWC. 
• Poor coordination and inadequate long-term investment planning. 
6.6.2 Perception of local financial institutions 
Local financial institutions were asked to rate various factors that influenced their 
perception of investment prospects in the water and sanitation sector to identify their 
investment criteria and priorities. Investors' assessment of the utility was obtained from 
the UPS. Most financial institutions had a relatively neutral to slightly positive attitude 
towards NWC with 70.3% tallying over 50 out of a possible 90 on the UPS (Figure 6.2; 
Appendix 6: Table A8). When assessed within grouping categories, there was a 
significant difference (p=0.019) in the mean ranking of the UPS between banking and 
non-banking institutions according to the Mann-Whitney test (Appendix 6: Table A9). 
Non-banking financial institutions (43.8%) were found to have a relatively lower 
perception of the NWC (UPS<50) compared to banking financial institutions (9.1%) 
(Appendix 6: Table A8). This marked difference in perception was possibly a result of 
banking institutions being heavily involved in infrastructure financing (91%) and by 
extension possibly having more 'business contact' with the NWC (recall that loans were 
the most common means of infrastructure financing in Jamaica). No significant 
difference in UPS (p=0.204) was observed based on investment activity (Appendix 6: 
Table A10). It should be noted however that non-investors (40%) had a relatively lower 
perception of the NWC (UPS<50) compared to investors (23.6%). 
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Figure 6.2 Utility perception scale range for Jamaican financial institutions 
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Grouping variable 
In rating factors that would influence the investment decision in the sector, respondents 
had a slightly higher regard for institutional factors than for economic and financial factors 
(Appendix 6: Figure A2). Good capital investment planning, supportive legislation for 
private investment and institutional reform featured highly among institutional factors 
while credit enhancement mechanisms, bonds issues and infrastructure investment funds 
featured highly among economic and financial factors (Appendix 6: Table A 16). 
Respondents' perceptions of investment prospects in the sector were mixed with 32.2% 
considering them poor (doubtful + poor), 25% considering them acceptable and 42.8% 
considering them good (good + excellent) (Appendix 6: Table A 11). There was no 
significant difference (p>0.05) in respondents' perceptions of investment prospects in the 
sector by organisation category or investment activity (Appendix 6: Table A 12; Table 
A 13). A significant positive relationship (p=0.018) was observed between how the NWC 
was perceived and respondents' perception of investment prospects in the sector 
(Appendix 6: Table A14). Approximately 90% of respondents with a UPS in the 51-70 
range considered investment prospects in the sector to be acceptable, good or excellent 
(Appendix 6: Table A15). Conversely, respondents who scored between 20 and 40 on 
the UPS were doubtful about investment prospects in the sector. These findings indicate 
that there is a tendency for respondents' perception of investment prospects in the sector 
to improve as their perception of the NWC also improves. 
Finally, respondents were asked to indicate what it would take for their organisation to 
become involved (invest) in the local water and sanitation sector. The most frequently 
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mentioned requirements were the provision of government guarantees (25%) and the 
availability of well-structured viable projects (21.4%) (Figure 6.3). Other important 
requirements included tariff adjustments to realise attractive returns (10.7%), the 
participation of international financiers (10.7%) and building better relationships with 
government and NWC (10.7%). 
Figure 6.3 Requirements to become involved in the sector (Jamaica) 
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6.6.3 Perception of water sector officials 
Respondents were very aware of factors that attracted and detracted private investment 
in the sector. Return on investment, a sound regulatory framework, willingness to pay, 
provision of government guarantees, a stable economy, transparency and a good social 
environment were among the most commonly listed determinants for attracting private 
investment. With respect to the local environment, most respondents were of the opinion 
that much had been done to create an environment conducive to private investment. As 
expressed by MOWH's Chief Technical Director, "In terms of legislation and institutional 
development, we have done aI/ that is required of us to have private sector investment a 
reality." Credit was primarily given to the regulatory environment for bringing some 
measure of predictability to the sector. Respondents from the Ministry were however 
disappointed with the level of private sector interest particularly that of foreign investors, 
which they felt was not commensurate with efforts made to establish a pro-private 
environment in the sector. 
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Low willingness-to-pay, inadequate data, poor long-term investment planning, 
bureaucracy and prohibitive macroeconomic conditions were identified as major 
deterrents to private investment in the local water and sanitation sector. Frequent 
mention was made of Jamaica's high interest rate regime and the negative effect this had 
on attracting private investment to the sector. 
6.7 Scope and strategy for private investment in water and sanitation 
6.7.1 Perception of private service providers 
Both DSL and CCEL were in strong favour of local private investment, especially the 
involvement of professionals already active in the sector (recall that both have previous 
experience in the sector, albeit not in an investment capacity). More specifically, 
opportunities for private investment were believed to exist in efficiently-operated small 
water supply systems and sewerage systems in areas unserved and/or underserved by 
NWC. PPPs with NWC were also considered viable options for increased local private 
investment, although in DSL's case, previous 'bad' experiences with NWC did not endear 
management to the prospect of collaborating with the utility. Both DSL and CCEL were 
also supportive of service providers getting involved in simultaneous complementary 
investments when and if the opportunity presented itself. For DSL, bottled water 
appeared to be a viable option given the source's good water quality. Wastewater reuse 
for irrigation and aquifer recharge was being explored by CCEL. The view therefore, was 
that private providers did not have to limit the scope of their operations to mere service 
provision but as true entrepreneurs, could diversify into related business ventures. 
For Company x, internationally sponsored BOTs were not considered viable for the 
sector in general and developing countries like Jamaica in particular as foreign investors 
were seen as having limited control over the local environment with respect to tariffs and 
revenue recovery. "To make BOT in water we think is not feasible. We are not 
Jamaicans - we are not in our country. Many people have lost money because you are 
not allowed to fix the price of water." As a result, Company x like so many other 
international companies had reduced its range of activities in the sector, opting to pursue 
a specialisation strategy specifically linking leak detection with capital investment and 
reaping the efficiency gains from reducing UFW. This approach was considered viable 
as it ensured a relatively fast return on investment and also improved efficiency in the 
local network. A more facilitative role in terms of providing technical expertise to solve 
local problems was seen as the best PSP option for large international companies. 
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Based on their experiences, both DSL and CCEL had some suggestions to encourage 
private investment given the local context. 
• The need to 'sel/' the idea that investing in the sector can be finanCially 
rewarding, even for small rural water supply systems. DSL for example with the 
encouragement of OUR, had developed a concept paper to convince potential 
investors about investment opportunities in efficiently-run discrete rural water 
supply systems. 
• The need to adequately develop the regulatory framework before engaging 
the private sector. Being among the first licensed private utilities in Jamaica, the 
regulatory framework applicable to private service providers essentially evolved in 
tandem with CC EL's licence application as there was "no blueprint to follow." This 
resulted in lengthy and costly delays as "at each step of the way, it had to be 
discussed and argued before we could determine which way to go which meant 
that even more pressure was put on CCEL, diverting us from our original mission." 
• The need to link sewerage treatment to water supply to 'guarantee' bill 
payment. CCEL had applied to OUR to operate as a water and sewage utility but 
was only granted the sewerage part of the licence. The exclusion of water supply 
from its licence was believed to affect its success in sourcing financing due to 
concerns about being able to collect sewerage rates only. 
• For a change in attitude towards private investors who should not be maligned 
or begrudged for their profits as this could be off-putting. According to CCEL's 
Project Manager, "The attitude here [Jamaica] is if we give you $x, the next thing is 
you buy Mercedes Benz. That is none of their business." The focus instead 
should be on service delivery. 
• The need for better long-term, prioritised investment project planning. 
6.7.2 Perception of local financial institutions 
When asked to rate the investment prospects of the sector based on the use of different 
operational modes for private investment, respondents were more in favour of short-term 
management/service contracts than for longer-term arrangements such as concessions 
and BOTs, probably reflecting their lack of experience in long-term financing in the sector 
(Appendix 6: Figure A3). When asked to indicate their possible role in the sector, the 
most frequently mentioned roles were project financing (28.6%) and providing working 
capital in support of the day-to-day operation of the NWC (28.6%) (Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4 Role of financial institutions in the sector (Jamaica) 
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6.7.3 Perception of water sector officials 
Respondents, particularly those from NWC were unanimous in their approval of the 
family of BOT-type projects as "the most convenient way of having private sector 
investment." The general attitude to involving private investors was for them to "come in, 
cooperate with the NWC and make the investments to fix the system" thereby leaving the 
day-to-day management and operation of the sector to NWC. Local investors were 
considered the most practical option for private investment to allay fears of foreign 
ownership, be more responsive to local needs and conditions (especially in rural 
communities) and provide local currency financing. As put by one respondent, "Private 
sector with a big 'P' and'S' won't work. We have to look at private sector in terms of 
small community entrepreneurs." The general opinion was that local financial institutions 
had "tons of money" which could be channelled to the sector if they were offered 
incentives such as government guarantees and presented with viable projects. The 
reality of coaxing local financiers to invest in the sector was however doubtful given the 
availability of 'hassle free' alternative investment opportunities. According to one 
respondent, "Locally if you can get 30% retum on govemment paper at zero risk, why 
invest in the water supply sub-sector with a retum of 10% and lots of hassle to realise 
that retum in the first instance?" 
In terms of the strategy to encourage private investment in the sector, the following points 
were highlighted by the respondents: 
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• The need for a more proactive strategy to attract and engage 'good' private 
investment. Respondents commented that most of the proposals brought to NWC 
were unsolicited, poorly planned and exploitative. Investors were accused of 
"cherry-picking, ' "get the easy money and run," "not bringing new capital to inject 
into the sector" and "a lot of talk but no action when time to put their money where 
their mouth is." This disappointment respondents believed could be minimised if a 
more proactive approach was adopted instead of merely reacting to investors' 
proposals. 
• The need for a clearly defined strategy to assign responsibility, minimise 
ambiguity and encourage transparency. Although there was acceptance of 
collective responsibility for failing to implement a long-term plan to attract private 
investment, there was a tendency for respondents to shift blame between 
governmentiministry and NWC depending on their affiliation. Respondents from 
MOWH for example, were of the opinion that the ministry's commitment to private 
investment was not matched by NWC and in some cases was met with resistance. 
Conversely, respondents affiliated with NWC believed that government should do 
more to promote private investment beyond mere policy-setting. Respondents 
therefore believed that there was no apparent 'ownership' of the private investment 
strategy as neither group (governmentiNWC) wanted to be identified and labelled 
as 'the one' that privatised the water sector. With respect to clarity of the strategy, 
respondents felt that there was still some hesitation to explicitly commit to a private 
investment strategy due to "the negative connotations of selling off your water 
supply facilities" and admitted that there was a lot of "misunderstanding about 
having private participation as to privatising the water sector" which had the 
potential to affect public acceptance of private investment in the sector. 
• The need for a progressive strategy whereby institutions like OUR described as 
"on a learning curve with respect to dealing with private investors in the sector" can 
systematically obtain the necessary experience and wherewithal to effectively 
contribute to a private investment strategy. 
• The need for an adaptive strategy whereby elements such as the regulatory 
framework are flexible enough to apply to various types of investors and conditions 
such as the 'simplified' regulatory framework for private service providers. 
• The need for the support of other agencies better equipped to develop and 
effect a private investment strategy for the sector instead of relying too much 
on NWC. Respondents admitted that NWC was probably not the best institution to 
effect the strategy for two main reasons. Firstly, there was a conflict of interest as 
NWC would have to act in its best interest which would rule out encouraging 
competition. According to NWC's Vice President, Corporate and Strategic 
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Planning, "Certain things that would impact the management of NWC or could be a 
potential risk to the management of NWC would not be pursued by the 
management of NWC." Secondly, NWC's busy schedule of dealing with day-to-
day operational matters did not leave it with much time or opportunity to actively 
promote private investment. Instead, the utility was more concerned with focusing 
on "Iow hanging fruits to improve efficiency" rather than putting "much effort on 
promotion aside from packaging projects. ' 
• The need to purposely develop and promote 'win-win' projects which 
respondents felt would result in a more positive response from private investors. 
• The need to educate potential investors (especially first-time investors) about 
their potential role in the sector and investment models applicable to the 
sector. Referring to the poor private sector response to BO community-managed 
projects for rural water supply (see Section 6.5.2), respondents commented on the 
effectiveness of a 2-day workshop on private investment in the sector to potential 
contractors. 
• The need to educate the general public about private investment in the sector 
and sensitise them to issues such as the importance of paying for services. 
6.8 Small size 
6.8.1 Effect of small size 
Water sector officials were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought small size 
affected the Caribbean's ability to attract private investment to the sector. Most 
respondents (78%) felt that size was an important issue, more so in the smaller 
Caribbean islands than in Jamaica. Factors such as limited professional/technical 
capacity, high transaction costs, high borrowing costs and a lack of local financing were 
among those identified as the main effects of small size (Table 6.8). Small size was also 
believed to affect the calibre of investors in the sector. Respondents opined that 
because the Caribbean was unable in a lot of cases to offer the critical mass often sought 
after by investors, the region was at a disadvantage of not being able to "attract the 
serious private investor." According to one respondent, "You don't get the attention of 
the big people in the business. You don't get the kind of interest from the strong 
technical people that you would want." Finally, respondents also believed that small size 
contributed to increased stakeholder interference (lack of institutional independence) and 
conflict due to the 'intimacy' and familiarity of the various actors. 
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Table 6.8 Small size effects (Jamaica) 
-Size an issue1"'{~ ::~::,,:;~~t$N1;'{*~'iR: :,k, Main reaso'ns given" .. 1"d.~ 
YES • Scarcity of trained professionals 
(78%) • Specialist services expensive (e.g. regulation) 
• Cannot attract 'serious' investors 
• Have to look 'outside' for investment dollars 
• Bundling of institutional responsibilities 
• High transaction costs 
• Higher borrowing costs 
• More frequent personality conflicts 
• Difficult to manage O&M costs for small systems 
• Difficult to maintain quality control of small systems 
NO • Macroeconomic performance more important 
(22%) • Does not matter as long as people can make money 
• Just need to target the right type of investor 
• Concessional funds available from development agencies 
Respondents who did not consider small size to affect investment prospects in the sector 
were of the general opinion that at the end of the day, investors were not particularly 
concerned about size as long as the investment opportunity and environment were 
conducive to them making money. Small states they reasoned, because of their special 
circumstances, would always receive special consideration from international 
development organisations in the form of concessional loans/grants and as such private 
investment did not have to feature as an important source of financing. Relative to other 
determinants such as macroeconomic stability, small size was therefore not considered 
to be a significant deterrent to private investment in the sector. What was considered 
more important was the type of investor being targeted. Local investors for example 
were believed to be best suited to small-scale investments in the sector. 
The 'suitability' of local investors to small-scale investments was also borne out by the 
private service providers interviewed. Neither DSL nor CCEL were averse to small-scale 
investment opportunities in the sector. In fact, they were both advocates of local 
entrepreneurs getting involved in small discrete rural water supply systems which they 
believed had the potential to be profitable ventures if operated effiCiently. 
6.8.2 Response strategies to address size constraints 
6.8.2.1 Regional cooperation 
Water sector officials were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought r.egional 
cooperation could improve investment opportunities in the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector. Respondents were not overly enthusiastic about the prospects for 
regional cooperation in the sector, claiming that each island's sector was unique thereby 
requiring discrete approaches. As put by one respondent, "No two utilities are alike and 
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no two utilities' success is determined by the same factors." There was also a belief that 
in the final analysis, what mattered most was a country's macroeconomic environment 
rather than that of the region and as such, countries would only benefit marginally from 
regional cooperation in the sector. The most feasible opportunities for regional 
cooperation were identified as the sharing of professional expertise to address capacity 
constraints (83% of respondents) and the development of regional benchmarks to 
facilitate like-for-like comparison among utilities so that various aspects of utility operation 
could be easily identified and assessed (67% of respondents) (Table 6.9). Institutions 
such as CWWA and OOCUR with their annual conference and networking opportunities 
and CBWMP with its focus on certification were identified as organisations suitably 
placed to carry out a regional mandate in the sector. Regulation and investment sourcing 
were not considered suitable issues for a regional approach as these issues were 
believed to be very site-specific. 
Table 6.9 Scope for regional cooperation in the sector (Jamaica) 
'fuiI"';~~Scop."I}g_ ~=itft~~\~rP~tif,;!!iBbDetails~Iffl#)tJ{Z_~!6M!§t;ml~'k"F0p!kilif' 
Professional expertise • Sharing experiences and expertise (e.g. at CWWA and OOCUR 
(83%) conferences) 
• Transferability of services so that investors have access to a 
pool of professionals 
• Regionalleaming institutions 
Standardisation • Through existing institutions such as CBWMP 
(67%) • Develop benchmarks for the Caribbean so can rank utilities 
• Collaboration for consistency - establish parameters so that 
information Drovided to investors is consistent 
Regulation • Help set up regulatory framework 
(33%) • OOCUR orovides forum for the exchanae of ideas/exoeriences 
Investment sourcing • CARICOM to provide one voice on behalf of the Caribbean 
(25%) • Caribbean Development Bank to serve as an avenue for capital 
flows from other lendina institutions 
Several challenges to a regional approach in the sector were highlighted. These 
included: 
• Concerns that cooperating with smaller 'less developed' islands would retard 
progress (big island, small island mentality). As the largest Caribbean island 
with well established institutions and a cadre of highly skilled industry 
professionals, respondents generally felt that Jamaica had more to offer than to 
gain from a regional approach. 
• Ensuring that institutions are 'accountable' to the region. Although 
respondents recognised the contribution of regional organisations such as CEHI 
and CBWMP, there was a general feeling that some organisations did not have a 
regional mandate but instead operated either as 'private' entities or served only a 
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select group of countries (particularly the more closely-knit islands of the Eastern 
Caribbean). The Asian region was identified as a good working model of regional 
accountability whereby regional organisations were seen to truly represent member 
countries by dealing with issues important to the region and ensuring that the 
region's position/issues were adequately presented to the international community. 
• The need for more formal collaboration (i.e. getting politicians and policy-
makers on board) rather than individual attempts at cooperation. 
• Diversity in politiCS, level of sector development and institutions. 
• Difficulty in getting the support of politicians and policy-makers. 
• Tendency for each island to "feather its own nest, n insularity, jealousy and inter-
island rivalry. 
• The large geographical spread of the Caribbean islands which would make 
cooperation cumbersome. 
• Concerns about encroachment on sovereignty. 
6.8.2.2 Other response strategies 
When asked to suggest strategies to improve small-scale investment opportunities in the 
sector, water sector officials proposed: 
• Pooling small projects into larger more viable projects that would better appeal to 
private investors. This strategy they highlighted was used when approaching 
multilateral organisations such as the IDB who "are interested in packages. n 
• Increased community involvement especially in the operation of small-scale rural 
supplies which might not naturally appeal to private investors. 
• Using limited financial resources to leverage more finanCing. 
Local financial institutions were also highly supportive of 'project bundling' as a means of 
responding to small size issues and improving the investment prospects of the sector 
(Appendix 6: Figure A4). Respondents were least supportive of the formation of multi-
utilities to offset disadvantages from insufficient size. 
6.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the Jamaican case study which examined the operating 
environment for private investment in the water and sanitation sector and the perceptions 
of public and private sector actors to criteria for private investment, scope and strategy 
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for private investment and size-related response strategies to improve conditions -for 
private investment in the sector. Findings from documents. survey questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews were systematically presented for further discussion within the 
context of the literature in the cross-case analysis (Chapter 10). 
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CHAPTER 7 CASE STUDY: BARBADOS 
7.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of private investment in the Barbadian water 
and sanitation sector using survey, interview and document data to determine the 
operating environment for private investment, criteria for investment decision· making and 
scope and strategy for private investment in the sector. The potential for various size-
related response strategies such as regional cooperation to improve investment 
prospects in the sector is also examined. 
7.2 General information 
Barbados is the most easterly of the chain of Lesser Antilles Caribbean islands extending 
over 430 sq. km, mostly over flat terrain (Figure 5.1). Given the country's small size, it is 
difficult to define areas as urban or rural. Approximately 50% of its 271,600 inhabitants 
reside in the southern and western parishes which in addition to the capital Bridgetown 
comprise the major areas for tourism and commercial development. Of 232 countries 
surveyed in the CIA World Factbook, Barbados is ranked 207th in terms of area, 181$' in 
terms of population, 159'h in terms of total GDP and 59'h in terms of GDP per capita (CIA, 
2005). 
7.3 Status of the water and sanitation sector 
The Barbadian government becarne involved in water supply provision in 1895 as the 
Barbados Waterworks Department, having bought the assets of two private companies -
the Bridgetown Waterworks Company and the Barbados Water Supply Company, both of 
which had previously operated as joint stock companies guaranteed an annual 
government subsidy to supply water to Bridgetown and 'rural' Barbados respectively. 
Provisions for the collection and treatment of municipal sewage are a relatively recent 
development (1970s), brought on by increased levels of beach and marine pollution in 
the 1960s and the introduction of statutory requirements for sewage disposal. 
Since 1980, the Barbados Water Authority (BWA) has been responsible for providing 
water supply and sewerage services to the Barbadian population. Approximately 98% of 
Barbadian households receive water from BWA, the majority of which have piped water 
supply (Table 7.1). In addition to domestic customers, BWA also provides water to 
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commercial, hotel and government customers who account for 39% of BWA's metered 
supply. In total, about 72% of the island's annual water abstraction goes towards public 
water supply. Private water supply accounts for approximately 28% of total water 
abstraction and is provided for golf course and agricultural irrigation and industrial use 146 
(Table 7.2). Centralised sewerage services are provided by BWA to 6% of Barbadian 
households from two sewerage treatment plants serving central Bridgetown and the 
south coast. The majority of the population relies on on-site disposal systems such as 
septic systems (81.8%) and pit latrines (16.6%) (Table 7.1). Private package wastewater 
treatment plants traditionally serve tourist-related establishments such as hotels. 
Table 7.1 Water and sanitation coverage in Barbados (2000) 
'.' 
Source of w~ter ,"< TI~~~I Type of t~ilet facilities ", TI~~~I % % 
Piped into dwelling 91.5 WC linked to sewer 0.5w 
Piped into yard 5.6 WC not linked to sewer B1.B 
Standpipe O.B Pit 16.6 
Stream/spring/well 0.0 Other 0.5 
Friend/relative's pipe 1.9 No toilet facilities 0.6 
Other 0.2 
NOTE. Adjusted for non-response 
Source: BSS (2002) 
Table 7.2 Public/private distribution of water supply in Barbados (2000) 
Source: BWA (2000) 
~'yPe ~!, customer" Total 1%1 
Public supply (8WAJ 
Domestic 60.9 
Commercial 1B.3 
Hotel 9.7 
Govemment B.2 
Statutory corporation 1.4 
Ships 1.5 
Private supply 
Golf course irrigation 14.0 
BAD MC· & GOBb irrigation 22.6 
Private irrigation 51.9 
Industry 11.5 
Barbados Agncultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
bGovemment of Barbados 
Although water and sanitation coverage is good, the sector is vulnerable on several 
fronts. Barbados is ranked among the top 15 countries in the world in terms of water 
scarcity with a per capita water availability of about 390 cubic metres per year. Nitrate 
contamination and saline intrusion are major threats to water quality due to the highly 
146 For example, DesatCo (Barbados) Ltd., a member of the Consolidated Water Company, operates a 5,000 m3/d 
seawater desalination plant for the Sandy Lane Hotel and Golf Club in St. James. 
147 Since the 2000 population census, the commissioning of the South Coast Sewerage Treatment Plant in 2003 has 
expanded centralised sewerage services to about 5.5% of Barbadian households. 
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permeable nature of the coral limestone aquifer and low water table elevations. The 
country's high population density (ranked 8th in the world) and significant annual tourist 
population of up to 500,000 place additional stress on limited and fragile resources. With 
up to 90% of freshwater resources already committed, further economic development 
particularly in the tourism sector is constrained by the unavailability of freshwater. 
Wastewater discharge is also an important concern, not only from a public health 
standpoint, but also due to its impact on tourism, the country's number one economic 
generator. Institutional constraints related to fragmented institutional responsibility and 
manpower limitations in terms of adequately trained persons to address issues important 
to the sector are real challenges. Investment needs in the region of BBD$500 million to 
improve both water supply and wastewater management and service provision represent 
an additional constraint to the sector. 
7.3.1 Status of the public water utility 
Up to the early 1990s, BWA's financial position was considered healthy to the extent that 
revenues were sufficient to cover recurrent expenditure. Since 1996-97 to 2003-04 
however, BWA's operating expenses have increased by about 50% with salaries and the 
purchase of desalinated water since February 2000 representing the most significant 
increases over the period. Financial and operational data for 2003 indicate that salaries, 
electricity and desalinated water represented 36%, 20% and 14% of operating expenses 
respectively (Table 7.3). Other contributing factors to BWA's operating profit margin of 
-38% include a high UFW of 60%, a long history of high receivables (collection efficiency 
of 65.3% with about 60% of receivables over 6 months in arrears), unchanged water 
rates since October 1991, introduction of island-wide 24-hour service provision 148 and 
restrictions to charge a 15% value added tax on services. As at 2004, BWA had a debt 
portfolio of BBD$99.5 million with interest rates ranging between 6.9% and 7.15%. Plans 
to refinance this debt in addition to an interim rate adjustment are expected to result in a 
significant turnaround in BWA's financial pOSition. 
148 Includes distribution, revenue collection, transport and information systems. 
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Table 7.3 Financial and operational data for BWA (2003) 
'ii~P'arameterdtr~:-kZ1e;~j:~:' fjjt1~Value;.,;&:;;;;; 
Working ratio 1.2 
Operating ratio 1.5 
Debt service ratio 31% 
Gross operating margin -21% 
Operating profit margin ·38% 
Sales growth 0.5% 
Collection efficiency 65% 
Staff per 1000 connections 9 
Employee cosvtotal cost 36% 
Desalinated water/total cost 14% 
Production (Mm3) 59.8 
Consumption (Mm3) 23.9 
UFW 60% 
, Source: BWA (2000; 2004a) and author s calculations 
7.3.2 Sources offinancing 
The sector is financed mainly through government subventions, revenue generated by 
BWA and loans facilitated by government. Local financing through short- and long-term 
loans to support BWA's in-house project commitments is provided primarily by the 
Barbados National Bank which has a long-standing business relationship with BWA 149. 
Major capital works particularly in sanitation, are co-financed by government and various 
multilateral and bilateral sources such as the Canadian International Development 
Agency, Inter-American Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank and the 
European Investment Bank. Barbados' high GDP per capita has however resulted in 
less opportunity for government to borrow on concessional terms from multilateral and 
bilateral sources. Consequently, financing is increasingly being sourced on the 
international commercial market. More recently, there has been some private sector 
investment in the sector through a BOT arrangement and local currency bond issue (see 
Section 7.5). The level of private investment in the sector is expected to increase due to 
government encouragement for private capital in water augmentation options such as 
seawater desalination and wastewater reuse. 
7.3.3 Projects for financing 
Several capital projects have been planned for the 2004/05 fiscal year to improve the 
overall capability of BWA to provide expanded and improved water supply and 
wastewater infrastructure to meet current and future water and wastewater treatment 
149 Originally the 'government's bank' but has since been divested to the private sector. 
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demands. A list of these projects is presented in Appendix 7. As shown in Table 7.4, the 
majority of projects are valued at less than US$1 million. 
Table 7.4 Capital expenditure for 2004/05 (BWA) 
8 
Source: BWA (2004a) 
7.4 Overview of the operating environment 
7.4.1 Macroeconomic environment 
The Barbadian economy is supported by a long tradition of political and social stability. 
Following economic expansion of the manufacturing and tourism sectors in the mid-
1990s, Barbados now has the demographic profile of a developed country with a per 
capita GDP of about US$9,925. Offshore finance and information services are also 
important foreign exchange earners as the island has become a preferred low tax 
destination for information technology, manufacturing and financial businesses. 
Barbados also boasts a well-developed banking and insurance industry. 
Barbados has a conservative monetary policy. Since July 1975, government has 
adopted a policy of pegging the Barbadian dollar to the US dollar at a rate of BBD$2 per 
US dollar, which is still in effect. This policy has served the country well. Inflation has 
remained in the 2-3% range over several years and was reported as 1.5% for the 2003 
fiscal year. Countercyciical policies introduced in the 2001 downturn 150 have however 
resulted in total public debt rising to 83.8% of GDP in 2003. There are also concerns 
about economic vulnerability from exposure to external shocks especially from major 
North American and European markets and the need for diversification due to high 
dependence on the tourism industry. Nevertheless, government's macroeconomic 
management is highly regarded resulting in a long-term stable sovereign US credit rating 
of BBB+. A summary of these and other economic indicators is shown in Table 7.5. 
The Central Bank of Barbados forecasts continued economic performance based largely 
on increased activity in the tourism sector which is prOjected to increase by 5% if efforts 
continue with the 'Best of Barbados' marketing programme and there is sustained 
150 Reflecting the global slowdown and impact of the September 11 events on the tourism sector. 
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economic recovery in key target markets. In addition, the economy is expected to benefit 
from the pending liberalisation of the telecommunications market. 
Table 7.5 Economic indicators for Barbados (2003) 
, ., .<::..;:< 1(?::WParaineter 'V,"," I'" 'Walue/i . ii',,' 
GDP per capita US$9,925 
GDP - real growth rate 2.2% 
GDP - services 74.2% 
GDP - industry 20.0% 
GDP - agriculture and mining 5.8% 
Inflation rate 1.5% 
Public debt (of GDP)'" 83.8% 
Exchange rate - BBD$ per US$ 2.00 
Average lending rate 8.3% 
Sovereign credit rating - local A·/stable/A-2' 
Sovereign credit rating - foreign BBB+/stable/A-2' 
As at August 5, 2004 
Source: CBB (2004a); IMF (2004); (Standard & Poor's, 2005) 
7.4.2 Institutional arrangements 
The Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities (MOEPU) 152 is the policy ministry in charge of 
water and sanitation services with direct responsibility for BWA, the statutory organisation 
responsible for providing potable water and sewerage services to 98% and 6% of the 
Barbadian population respectively. BWA also has overall responsibility for the 
development, management and assessment of the island's water resources and 
monitoring water quality. The multiple roles of BWA have therefore resulted in it 
functioning as service provider, regulator and manager of the water and sanitation sector. 
BWA is organised into seven divisions, the principal one being the Engineering Division 
responsible for water production and distribution as well as the operation of sewerage 
facilities. Construction of new works, maintenance and replacement of parts of the 
distribution system are carried out by the Capital Works Division. Historically, BWA has 
done most of its work in-house which has contributed to an employee ratio of 9 persons 
per 1,000 customers, considered to be much higher than the industry norm 153. Despite 
relatively high staffing levels, there is a paucity of persons at the senior management 
level resulting in the merging of important job functions. For example, there is no 
151 The main beneficiaries of government's guaranteed debt were the Barbados Tourism Authority, Barbados Tourism 
Investment Inc., BWA, Barbados Agricultural Management Company and the National Housing Corporation. 
152 MOEPU took over policy responsibilities from the Ministry of Public Works in 2003. In addition to water and BWA, 
other sector responsibilities for MOEPU are energy and natural resources, public utilities, quarrying and mining, 
telecommunications. the National Petroleum Corporation, the Barbados National Oil Company and the Transport 
Board. There is however no identifiable division or individual within the Ministry with specific responsibility for the 
sector. This role is assumed by BWA's General Manager, government's policy spokesperson for the sector. 
153 Most literature speak of efficient water utilities having 3 or 4 employees per 1,000 customers. 
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dedicated planning unit. the duties of which have been incorporated within the portfolio of 
the Engineering and Capital Works Divisions. 
Besides BWA. water quality monitoring is also carried out by the Public Health 
Inspectorate of the Ministry of Health (MOH) while monitoring of sewage effluent is 
conducted by the Environmental Protection Department (EPD) 154 of the Ministry of 
Housing. Lands and the Environment. The Town and Country Planning Department 
oversees the enforcement of the Groundwater Zoning Policy (see Section 7.4.3) by 
regulating development. In theory. the Fair Trading Commission (FTC)'55 attached to the 
Ministry of Commerce. Consumer Affairs and Business Development is responsible for 
the economic regulation of BWA. This is not the case however with FTC's role relegated 
to that of 'liaison' between BWA and its customers through enforcement of its Consumer 
Protection Act. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs oversees all government 
projects with foreign funding and liaises with international donors. In addition. it 
influences subsidies directed to the sector through its budgetary responsibilities and 
provides government guarantees for water and sanitation projects. Table 7.6 
summarises the various stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector. 
Table 7.6 Institutions involved in the Barbadian water and sanitation sector 
~AF}1~E~Fo'c'(fs'~~,: ~a~lristitutiiiri'_~:f[f1.Jg#iI§,i8A1iiiilMffi~ 
Policy • Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities 
Regulation • Barbados Water Authority 
• Ministry of Health 
• Ministry of Housing, Lands and the Environment 
• Fair Trading Commission 
• Town and Country PlanninQ Department 
Service provision • Barbados Water Authority 
Finance/planning • Ministrv of Finance and Economic Affairs 
7.4.3 Policy framework 
The most current national strategies and policies for the water and sanitation sector are 
contained in a draft policy document (BWA. 2002). the product of a collaborative effort in 
1997 between BWA and EED of the then Ministry of Health and Environment. The Water 
Resource Management Policy which was updated in 2002. albeit still in draft form, is 
heavily influenced by concerns about water scarcity and adopts an IWRM approach in 
150' Formerly the Environmental Engineering Division (EED). 
155 The Utility Regulation Department headed by the Director of Utility Regulation is one of five operational 
departments within FTC. The department is largely responsible for providing inputs to the regulatory function of FTC 
- providing advice on rate applications, monitoring the quality of services provided by utilities and investigating utility 
customer complaints. 
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developing a framework for water resource development and management in Barbados. 
The main objective of the policy is to ensure that water is recognised as a critical national 
resource with the potential to negatively impact on the economic, social and political 
fabric of Barbados if not properly managed, developed and utilised. In this regard, the 
policy framework intends to: 
(a) facilitate an integrated approach to water resource management; 
(b) identify and recommend a legal framework within which water resource 
management activities need to be pursued; and 
(c) identify and recommend an appropriate institutional framework that will 
allow for efficient management, regulation and enforcement of activities 
and policies. 
Critical aspects of the proposed policy include wastewater reuse for groundwater 
recharge, irrigation and industrial cooling purposes, use of desalinated water to augment 
potable water supply, reduction in UFW and water conservation via structural measures, 
behavioural changes, tariff structures and water reuse. The policy also advocates the 
development of a water allocation and categorisation framework 156 concurrent with other 
supply and demand strategies. Institutional responsibilities and capacities to implement 
the policy are also addressed, calling for the separation of operational and regulatory 
functions of BWA. This would include FTC assuming economic and service regulation 
duties and the formation of a Water Resources Management Agency (WRMA) 157 under 
the Ministry of Housing, Lands and the Environment as custodian of the island's water 
resources. Water quality standards and public health protection and regulation would 
become the sole purview of EPD158• With this separation of responsibilities, BWA would 
interact with WRMA primarily as a water user but still have responsibility for water and 
sewerage services provision for the entire island, demand analysis, forecasting and 
management and water quality monitoring of its water sources and distribution network. 
In keeping with the water-scarcity focus, government has recently decided that subject to 
feasibility, all existing sewerage schemes should be retrofitted and new sewerage 
facilities designed to treat wastewater for reuse for non-drinking purposes. To satisfy 
increasing household and tourist demands and meet the requirements of new 
156 Proposal is to establish six categories of water use, ranked so that only categories I to V would have access to 
renewable water resources, with only categories I and II requiring potable water. 
157 Duties would include (a) water resources assessment and management; (b) prescribing. enforcing and 
implementing water quality monitoring programmes; (c) licensing. monitoring and controlling water abstraction; (d) 
reviewing and updating the water sector policy every 5 years; (e) identifying and assessing alternative water sources; 
and (f) serving as a repository for water-related data. 
158 Duties would include (a) setting water and industrial effluent standards; (b) monitoring and ensuring compliance to 
these standards via surveillance monitoring; (c) enforcing zoning policy; (d) serving as the public water supply and 
treatment watchdog; and (e) developing, implementing and maintaining recharge schemes. 
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investments, government is also advocating increased desalination capacity using BOT-
type arrangements. Government is also actively considering the introduction of a more 
supportive legal framework for the sector including new measures to provide clear 
authority for BWA to enter into private partnerships in order to carry out its investment 
portfolio. Steps to create conditions suitable to attract "novel financing structures" include 
strengthening BWA and developing FTC as a regulator of water and sewerage services 
in the context of a wider regulatory framework for the sector. Technical cooperation 
assistance provided by lOB is ongoing to effect these changes. 
As previously mentioned, the Water Resource Management Policy is still in draft form. 
Until effective, development of the sector particularly sewage disposal, is guided by the 
Groundwater Protection Zoning Policy (GOB, 1963) which delineates the island into five 
groundwater protection zones to guard against bacteriological contamination of public 
water supply sources. The most stringent restrictions are in Zone I which is located 
immediately around all existing and potential public water supply sources. Zones 11 to IV 
provide progressively less stringent controls. Although effective, this policy is not 
supported by legislation 159 which has resulted in poor enforcement. 
To date, government has not formally adopted a policy pertaining to public and private 
groundwater rights 160 and recourse has had to be sought from English Common Law 
when these issues have arisen. Neither are there formally adopted standards or 
guidelines for the sector. World Health Organisation drinking water guidelines, British 
water industry standards, American Water Works Association standards and codes of 
practice and US Environmental Protection Agency regulations of standards have been 
utilised as needed. Environmental standards including water and wastewater standards 
specific to Barbados are pending the work of EPD and the Barbados National Standards 
Institute. The pricing policy adopted for water rates using a block tariff structure is 
intended to ensure that the basic needs of the poor are met at minimal cost. Water bills 
for the indigent and aged poor are currently covered by the Welfare Department in the 
Ministry of Social Transformation. 
Since the late 1990s, the process of policy formulation has generally been conducted 
through the work of a committee of experts and stakeholders in an effort to involve all 
major stakeholders in the decision-making process. This has taken the form of public 
consultations, interactions at workshops and town meetings. In addition, BWA as the 
159 The prohibition of new development in Zone I has however been incorporated into the Development Order under 
the Town and Country Planning Act (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs). 
160 The Three Houses and Porey's Spring Acts for example (see Section 7.4.4), are to be repealed to bring ownership 
of all water resources in Barbados under the Crown. This would require a review of the constitutional and property 
rights for legislating ownership of water in the Crown. 
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main stakeholder in the sector actively participates in the work of related programmes 
such as the National Commission on Sustainable Development, providing information on 
water resources and recommendations for conservation activities. 
7.4.4 Legislative framework 
The BWA Act (GOB, 1980) is the guiding legislation for water supply'6' and sewerage 
services in Barbados save for two main spring sources that fall under the Three Houses 
Act (GOB, 1713) and the Porey's Spring Act (GOB, 1864)'62. The all-encompassing 
functions of BWA as service provider and regulator as defined.in Section 5 of the BWA 
Act include: 
(a) managing, allocating and monitoring the water resources of Barbados; 
(b) constructing, maintaining and operating schemes for water resource 
development and the supply of water and sewerage services; 
(c) reviewing the quality, reliability and availability of water supply and 
sewerage services and the rates to be charged for these services; 
(d) controlling and regulating the production, treatment, storage, 
transmission, distribution and use of water for public purposes; and 
(e) controlling and regulating sewage disposal by other operators. 
The scope of BWA's regulatory responsibilities is embodied in subsidiary legislation 
made by BWA's Board and approved by Cabinet under Section 28 of the BWA Act. 
Rates for domestic water supply and the provision of sewerage services are detailed in 
the BWA (Water and Sewerage Rates) Regulations (GOB, 1982b). The BWA (Water 
Services) Regulations (GOB, 1982a) and BWA (Sewerage) Regulations (GOB, 1982c) 
set out specific duties, powers and expectations of BWA regarding the provision of water 
supply and sewerage services. Consideration of private facilities is limited to the 
construction of private sewers which need to comply with requirements of 'general 
systems', particularly if BWA considers the proposed system likely to form part of a 
general sewerage system. 
181 In addition to providing potable water for domestic purposes, BWA is also responsible for supplying water for 
some agricultural, industrial and commercial purposes. 
162 The Three Houses and Porey's Spring Acts empowered the vestry (local government system up to 1969) of St. 
Philip and St. Thomas respectively to construct and maintain systems for collecting and delivering water and if they 
saw fit to charge rates for water delivered from the springs. Riparian landowners are now in charge of both sources. 
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Provisions for the control and use of surface and groundwater sources of water supply 
are addressed in the Underground Water Control Act (GOB, 1953)'63. Initially, the Act 
provided for the establishment of a Barbados Water Control Board '64 with powers to 
control and regulate the development and use of groundwater resources through 
licensing and the provision of necessary regulations. BWA has however assumed 
authority of the Water Control Board through the BWA Act. Monitoring of marine 
bacteriological pollution and guidelines for public and private sewage effluent disposal 
are provided in the Health Services (Disposal of Offensive Matter) Regulations (GOB, 
1969). These are enforced by EPD assisted by the Public Health Inspectorate and the 
Town and Country Planning Department. Significant assistance in the enforcement of 
these regulations is provided through the Groundwater Protection Zoning Policy (GOB, 
1963) administered by BWA. 
Regulatory provisions for utility services are assumed by FTC pursuant to the FTC Act 
(GOB, 2000b) and subsequent enforcement of the provisions of the Utilities Regulation 
Act (GOB, 2000a) and the Consumer Protection Act (GOB, 2003a). FTC's regulatory 
powers however are restricted to electricity and telecommunication services, even though 
the scope of the Utilities Regulation Act also provides for the regulation of water, 
sewerage and natural gas services. In August 1998, Cabinet decided on a number of 
amendments to the BWA Act to give FTC legal authority to regulate BWA. These 
included: 
(a) amendment of Section 2 to include a definition of the FTC; 
(b) amendment of Section 28(1) to reflect FTC's authority to regulate 
BWA; 
(c) amendment of Section 28(2k) to allow BWA to continue to exempt 
certain classes of persons from payment of rates and charges for 
water supply and sewerage services subject to the approval of FTC; 
(d) amendment of Section 28(3) to give FTC power to make regulation 
for BWA; and 
(e) amendment of Section 29 to make reference to FTC instead of the 
"Board". 
Drafting instructions have been submitted to the Attorney General to effect these 
changes to the BWA Act. When effective, FTC under the Utilities Regulation Act will 
163 Provisions of tI'1e Underground Water Control Act have been extended to apply mutatis mutandis to the control of 
surface waters. 
164 Official membership of the Barbados Water Control Board originally represented agricultural, waterworks, health, 
phYSical planning and private sector interests. 
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establish the principles for setting rates, set and review rates, determine and monitor 
standards of services, hear customer complaints concerning billings and standards of 
service supplied by BWA and educate and assist customers in settling complaints with 
BWA. Further instructions regarding rate review applications, information to support 
these applications and procedures for rate determination hearings will also apply 
according to the Utilities Regulation (Procedural) Rules (GOB, 2003b). 
7.4.5 Regulatory framework 
There is no 'established' regulatory framework for the Barbadian water and sanitation 
sector due to a history of self-regulation by BWA. BWA is dependent on MOEPU which 
has the final decision in important issues related to BWA and the sector. BWA proposes 
its own tariff adjustment for final approval by Cabinet and is also responsible for 
monitoring its own water quality with some assistance from MOH. 
As mentioned in Section 7.4.3, part of government's intended policy for the sector will 
include establishing a regulatory framework with clear delegation of institutional 
responsibilities. Priority will be given to: 
(a) the formation of a separate institution in charge of water resources and 
sewage discharge issues; 
(b) defining which institution(s) will regulate quality of service standards; 
(c) the separation of economic regulation from service provision; and 
(d) ensuring that there is no overlap of responsibilities between institutions 
and that there are mechanisms for coordinating policies from different 
government bodies. 
Under the new regime, economic and service quality standards regulation will be taken 
over by FTC through a Ministerial Order designating BWA as a regulated service 
provider. The sector-specific regulatory capabilities of FTC will be developed against a 
background of severe water constraints, the inefficient and unsustainable financial 
position of BWA, the need to finance sewerage coverage and the lack of an appropriate 
regulatory framework to address water and sanitation issues. Besides regulation of 
public service provision, FTC's role will also be examined under different forms of private 
sector contractual arrangements. Tariffs will be determined by FTC to include costs that 
would be incurred if the service was provided in a competitive market - that is operating 
and maintenance costs plus a return on capital. To facilitate this, reporting requirements 
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will include information on physical assets and information on required investments to 
comply with targets for service expansion and quality of service. In September 2000, 
BWA's Board of Directors engaged a consultant to make BWA 'FTG ready'. 
Disappointed with the progress of that approach and subsequent to numerous studies 
under an IDB technical assistance programme, in July 2004, BWA's Board of Directors 
agreed to the creation of a regulatory unit'65 primarily to prepare BWA for a rate hearing 
before FTG. 
Until enacted, BWA continues to dictate the 'regulatory pace' for the sector. Effective 
January 1, 2005, BWA introduced new rates and tariff structures '66 consisting of four 
domestic bands, a commercial band and a ship's band, based on a concept of 
affordability and conservation (Table 7.7). Sewage tariffs charged to domestic and 
commercial customers are calculated at one-third and two-thirds of their water bills 
respectively. Tariffs are not adjusted by inflation. The new rates represent a 0-44.3% 
increase over previous rates which had been in effect since October 1991. The previous 
tariff structure was a two-block system for metered domestic customers - up to 34 cubic 
metres and over 34 cubic metres'S7. Tariffs for unmetered customers (about 15% of 
BWA's supply) were determined based on the annual rent value for the property and the 
number of taps. The basis for a change in the tariff structure was informed by economic 
analyses which indicated that the previous tariff did not constrain demand and hence was 
not suitable for consumption management purposes. 
There is no formal system for water and sewage effluent quality monitoring and reporting. 
Monthly sampling and analysis of BWA's water supply and sewage effluent from the 
Bridgetown and South Goast sewerage treatment plants are conducted by MOH and 
EPD. In addition, water samples independently collected by BWA are sent to MOH for 
laboratory analysis. By this arrangement, MOH unofficially assumes the role of 
'environmental quality watch-dog' over BWA. 
165 Six-member team to include (a) managerlhead expected to lead the regulatory process. address all economic 
regulatory issues such as rate applications and rate hearings. interface with FTC and provide recommendations and 
advice on organisational policies and procedures impacted by the regulatory environment; (b) management 
accountant responsible for ensuring that the necessary accounting systems are in place, that information is being 
propeny kept for submission to FTC and to liaise with extemal consultants engaged in studies as part of the 
regulatory preparations; (c) two regulatory research officers expected to assist the managerlhead in research and 
report on matters relating to regulatory compliance, tariff structure, accounts, economics, engineering, information 
technology and the database aspects of BWA's operations; and (d) legal expert to provide legal support primarily for 
the regulatory function of BWA and to interface with FTC, external consultants, external counsel and BWA's 
customers. Proposal is for the managerlhead and management accountant to be consultants hired on a contract for 
services basis while other posts are permanent positions within BWA. 
166 Interim rate adjustment agreed by Cabinet to satisfy Section 6.06 of the loan agreement between GOB and lOB 
for the South Coast Sewerage Project. This section states inter alia that revenues from rates for water and sewerage 
services should be sufficient to cover all operating cost of the systems. including those related to administration, 
0Beration, maintenance and depreciation on revalued assets. 
1 Also included a minimum charge of BBO$20 for consumption up to 13 cubic metres. 
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Table 7.7 BWA's water rates as at January 1, 2005 
Domestic 
0_8m3 1.55 0 
9-20m3 1.94 0-15.9 
21-40m' 2.91 18.4 - 32.1 
>40 m3 4.86 33.3 -42.7 
Commercial 2.91 37.3 
Source: BWA (2005) 
7.5 Private investment in the water and sanitation sector: An overview 
7.5.1 BOT arrangements 
Since the 1990s, desalination has featured highly as a viable alternative to 
supplementing Barbados' scarce water resources, but with a view of BWA operation and 
management. During 1994 and 1995, Barbados experienced what was described as a 1-
in-150-year drought which saw over 3,000 households regularly without water. The 
drought also posed a threat to the island's economy heavily dependent on tourism. On 
August 1, 1995, the day after supplies failed most of Bridgetown including the town's 
hospital, government acted to review the future of water provision. This culminated in the 
signing of a water supply agreement in November 1998 between BWA and lonics 
Freshwater Ltd. (IFL), a joint venture company between lonics Inc.'68 and its local 
partner, William Industries Inc.'69 
Dubbed the largest of its kind in the Caribbean, the 30,000 cubic metre per day brackish 
water reverse osmosis desalination plant at Spring Garden, St. Michael was built under a 
15-year BOT contract170 with BWA reserving the right to purchase and take possession 
of the plant at any time or to extend the contract for an additional five years. IFL was 
granted an irrevocable licence to use, occupy and have access to the plant site at no 
cost. In addition, BWA pledged to "use its best efforts to assist the contractor to obtain all 
licences, permits and approvals required under the laws of Barbados to construct and 
operate the plant." 
168 International company specialising in the supply of desalinated water to municipal and industrial clients throughout 
the Caribbean and the US under BOO schemes. 
169 Diversified Barbados-based company doing business throughout the Caribbean. Scope includes investments in 
manufacturing, electrical contracting, steel, hardware and lumber supply, equipment rental, farming, tourism and real 
estate development. 
170 The contract comprised detailed design, engineering. manufacture, site preparation, construction, installation, 
start-up and commissioning of the plant, followed by its operation and maintenance for a 15-year period. The project 
also included upgrading and extending the existing supply infrastructure to enable connection to the new plant, the 
construction of a reservoir at Cave Hill and the implementation of various associated water conservation measures. 
In addition. an education centre was established to serve as a resource for students and the island's tourist industry. 
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Commissioned in February 2000, the plant provides potable water to about 20% of the 
Barbadian population. Water is currently sold in bulk to BWA at BBO$1.10 per cubic 
metre171 , which represents a 37.5% increase over starting rates in 2000. All payment is 
made in Barbadian dollars 172. Under the water supply agreement, cost elements of 
capital recovery 173 and interest remain fixed for the contract period. Cost elements of all 
other items are subject to an annual adjustment on each anniversary date of the 
commencement of the desalinated water delivery period. The percentage rate of IFL's 
profits however remains fixed throughout the contract period in relation to costs subject to 
escalation. The contract also makes provision for a minimum guaranteed delivery of 
27,000 cubic metres per day. Failure on BWA's part to accept this guaranteed quantity 
of water results in BWA compensating IFL the cost equivalent to the difference between 
the guaranteed minimum and the actual quantity accepted. Late payments accrue 
interest at the rate of 1.5% per month until paid or offset. 
Since inception, BWA has found the price of desalinated water expensive relative to the 
rate at which it sells water to its customers. Estimates for BWA's 2004/05 budget for 
example, indicate that the purchase of desalinated water will account for 13.7% of 
operating expenses. Two factors are believed to render the contract 'unattractive' to 
BWA. Firstly, BWA only accepts about 55% of the water produced by the plant, resulting 
in stand-by charges 174 for the unused 45%. In addition, an electricity conversion factor175 
of 1.111 is applied to calculate the appropriate electricity cost. 
In light of these factors, BWA began exploring the scenario of exercising the buy-out 
option of the desalination contract and possibly operating the plant under a management 
contract. The proposal for a February 2005 buy-out at a cost of BBD$19.5 million was 
supported by prOjected cash flow savings to BWA of BBO$32.1 million in absolute value 
and BBO$23.6 million in present value over the remaining 11 years of the contract. This 
was predicted to translate into monthly cash flow savings in excess of BBO$240,000176 
171 Basic elements of the price of desalinated water delivered by IFL to BWA per cubic metre include (a) capital costs; 
(b) interest on capital costs: (c) water treatment chemical costs; (d) labour and labour allied costs: (e) consumables 
costs other than water treatment chemical costs and electricity costs: (f) general and administrative costs: (g) 
electricity costs: and (h) IFL's profit on items c through f. 
172 Each payment is made up of two components. The Barbadian component includes items d and g while the US 
dollar component comprises items a, b, c, e, f and h (see footnote 171). An initial exchange rate of 
US$1=BBD$2.03875 is used as the base exchange rate. 
173 Capital costs of US$28 million represent the financing, detailed design, detailed engineering, manufacture, 
delivery, construction, erection, bonding, insurance, commissioning, testing and labour through completion of the 
reliability and performance tests, interest during construction and all other items relevant to the capital cost of the 
complete plant through to its completion. 
174 Calculated as the product of the stand-by rate {total production rate less rates for chemicals and electricity} and 
the quantity of water not taken up to the plant capacity. 
175 Reflective of the operational efficiency of the plant. 
176 Cash flow savings to accrue from the removal of the capital cost factor and its replacement with a lower 
substituted capital repayment for the purchase of the plant, the removal of special operating conditions as a result of 
BWA owning the plant, the removal of the profit element related to chemicals, equipment consumables and labour, 
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(BWA, 2004b). Government has however rejected BWA's petition to buy-out the 
desalination plant. Government's commitment to the contract, fear of prolonged legal 
action and strong lobbying by IFL are suggested as primary reasons for this decision. 
7.5.2 Public-private partnerships 
Construction of a sewerage treatment plant to serve the western coast of Barbados has 
been on the books since the mid 1990s. The West Coast Sewerage Project now at the 
final design phase has been financed thus far by government subventions and foreign 
currency loans from multilateral funding sources. Government has however mandated 
BWA to complete the project under a PPP arrangement177 citing a lack of in-house 
capacity and constrained financial resources as mitigating factors for involving the private 
sector. Conditionalities attached to lOB funding for the project may have also played a 
part in government's motivation to involve the private sector. In June 2002, government 
made a request to lOB to express its interest in financing the cost benefit analysis for the 
review of the outfall location in preparation for the project. In lieu of problems 
encountered during lOB's financing of the South Coast Sewerage Project178, government 
had to agree on taking appropriate steps to address some of the major problems facing 
the sector before lOB would consider financing the project179• 
Private capital is also being sought for water augmentation options such as seawater 
desalination and/or the retrofitting of the Bridgetown and South Coast sewerage 
treatment plants to facilitate wastewater reuse for irrigation 180 and aquifer recharge. The 
approach being adopted is to hire consultancy services to prepare comprehensive 
procurement documentation to facilitate PPP arrangements for these intended projects. 
The changeover from manual to automatic meter reading is also being scheduled for a 
finance-design-supply-install-maintain public/private sector contractual agreement. 
Estimated at BBD$21 million, the project will include the replacement of over 90,000 
application of a reduced electricity conversion factor and the ability of BWA to only produce the required quantity of 
water. 
m PSP options under consideration include traditional design and construction, operation and maintenance, lease-
develop--operate, build--own-maintain and build--own-operate contracts. 
178 The South Coast Sewerage Project faced numerous setbacks which resulted in a 7 -year delay in completion and 
a 90% cost overrun. In addition, there was non-compliance with certain conditions of the loan including the tariff 
clause, requirements of internal cash generation, collection efficiency targets and a revaluation of fixed assets and 
the transfer of project assets and liabilities to BWA. Structural problems that became self-evident during the 
execution of the project included the underperformance of BWA, the lack of a functioning regulator and weaknesses 
in the policy framework (lOB, 2004). 
119 In this regard, government informed lOB of its decision to have FTC regulate BWA, conduct a review of BWA's 
perfonnance and explore the possibility of creating a WRMA responsible for sector policy thereby leaving BWA as the 
operating entity. Since then, government has fonnally requested lOB's financial support through a reimbursable 
technical cooperation for the financing of the following studies (a) institutional strengthening of BWA; (b) institutional 
strengthening of FTC; and (c) preparation of the West Coast Sewerage Project. 
180 Specifically for golf and polo courses. . 
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meters. Finally, a 5-year BOOT agreement is also being sought for the provision of full 
supervisory control and data acquisition systems 181 for BWA's potable water supply and 
sewerage systems. 
7.5.3 Local capital market 
Finally, as mentioned in Section 7.4.1, Barbados boasts a well-developed banking and 
insurance sector. In 2005, BWA went to the local capital market for the first time and 
secured the largest ever bond issue by a state-owned company. BWA's debt portfolio 
was refinanced through a 25-year fixed rate bond issue valued at BBD$150 million. With 
debts in excess of BBD$100 million, the intention is to improve BWA's cash flow and 
streamline operations in preparation for filing a rate application with the FTC. 
7.6 Criteria for private investment in water and sanitation 
7.6.1 Perception of private service providers 
Respondents highlighted several factors that contributed to their investment decision: 
• The expected rate of return. "There is money to be made in the water and 
sanitation sector because of the inefficiencies that have existed for a long time in 
the utility.' Respondents were optimistic about investment prospects in the 
Barbadian/Caribbean water and sanitation sector given the country's/region's 
economic dependence on tourism which besides being a water-demanding 
industry, also required increased focus on adequate wastewater treatment and 
disposal to safeguard coastal environmental quality. 
• The level of government support and commitment. Augmenting the country's 
scarce water resources became a "national priority' following the devastating 
impact of the 1994-95 drought on the country's tourism sector. As such, IFL 
enjoyed widespread support from government, BWA and other major stakeholders. 
• The broadening scope of the Water Resource Management Policy. The recent 
policy stipulation of brackish water as an important resource subject to similar 
treatment as freshwater (thereby preventing its use for desalination purposes), had 
improved investment prospects for wastewater reuse to supplement potable water 
supply. 
181 SCADA applications to control distributed systems from a master location. 
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• The presence of a strong partner. IFL's local partner had been contemplating 
expanding beyond mainstream construction into the water sector since 1995. They 
were however aware of their inexperience in the sector. "We teamed up with lonics 
who has other operations in the Caribbean and probably has the most experience 
of anybody in BOT projects. We within the Williams Group as local partners had 
not had much experience with those." In lonics they found a strong internationally 
recognised partner with whom they felt guaranteed a "winning project." Williams 
Industries was also considered a "legitimate partner" with enough 'roots' in the 
local economy to reassure government of its commitment to the long-term success 
of the project. They were also considered essential in "clearing regulatory and 
political roadblocks. " 
• The availability of local financing. IFL was able to raise the financing for the 
project (non-recourse project financing with a limited recourse component for the 
first two years). The relative 'ease' with which this was done was attributed to 
Williams Industries' reputation in the local economy, government's guarantee of the 
project, BWA's reputation of paying its bills, the national priority given to the project 
and local financiers' knowledge of the necessity and importance of the project. 
• The presence of an adviser to BWA empowered to make decisions and serve as 
the point of contact for the project. In the past, BWA's limited professional capacity 
had resulted in delays and with this being the first large-scale BOT in the sector, 
there was a concern that the project would 'suffer'. Having a consultant on board 
conversant in desalination PPPs was believed to facilitate the timely completion of 
the project. According to IFL's Director, "He was very knowledgeable about 
desalination, he was very practical when it came to problem solving - not to take 
the 4 meetings, 5 directors and 3 chairmen board meetings 'we will get it done '. In 
his absence it would have been very problematic." 
• The size of the project. Dubbed the "largest brackish RO [reverse osmosis] plant 
in the western hemisphere," the scale of the project was believed to match lonics' 
experience in the sector and "be worth the hassle." 
7.6.2 Perception of local financial institutions 
Most respondents had a relatively positive attitude towards the BWA with 66.7% scoring 
greater than 50 on the UPS (Figure 7.1; Appendix 6: Table A8). No significant difference 
in the UPS was observed based on organisation category (p=0.193) or investment 
activity (p=0.733) (Appendix 6: Table A9: Table A10). An overwhelming majority (93.3%) 
considered investment prospects in the sector to be acceptable, good or excellent 
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(Appendix 6: Table A 11). No significant difference in respondents' perception of 
investment prospects in the sector was observed based on organisation category 
(p=0.267) or investment activity (p=0.705) (Appendix 6: Table A12: Table A13). In 
addition, no Significant relationship (p>0.05) between how the BWA was perceived and 
respondents' perception of investment prospects in the sector was apparent (Appendix 6: 
Table A14). The implication of these findings is that Barbadian financial institutions while 
consistent in their perception of investment prospects in the sector and of the BWA, are 
unlikely to make one viewpoint affect the other. At the time of the survey, the BWA was 
in the process of raising BBO$150 million through a bond issue which had generated a 
lot of interest within the financial sector not because of the BWA per say, but mainly 
because the bond issue (which was the first of its kind for the sector) was guaranteed by 
the Barbadian government. As such, it is likely that respondents' perceptions of 
investment prospects in the sector (which were currently positive) may be totally 
unrelated to their perceptions of the BWA which coincidently were also positive. 
I n rating factors that would influence the investment decision in the sector, respondents 
had a much higher regard for institutional factors than for economic and financial factors 
(Appendix 6: Figure A2). Good capital investment planning, institutional reform and the 
separation of roles featured highly among institutional factors while bond issues, credit 
enhancement mechanisms and infrastructure investment funds featured highly among 
economic and financial factors (Appendix 6: Table A 16). 
Figure 7.1 Utility perception scale range for Barbadian financial institutions 
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In terms of personal preferences to get involved in the sector, the most frequently 
mentioned requirements were the provision of government guarantees (33.3%), bond 
issues (20%) and invitations from the government and/or utility (13.3%) (Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2 Requirements to become involved in the sector (Barbados) 
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7.6.3 Perception of water sector officials 
Return on investment, minimal government interference, a stable macroeconomic 
environment, a sound regulatory framework, willingness-to-pay and a good social 
environment were repeatedly identified as factors necessary to attract private investment 
to the sector. Except for a stable economy, respondents felt that many of these 
investment-encouraging factors were missing in the local context. Respondents 
identified the weak regulatory purview of FTC (seen to result in undue government 
intervention in areas such as rate determination), the legislative framework and the 
existence of poorly-defined institutions as the most pressing issues in the sector likely to 
deter private investment. The social climate was also considered 'unfriendly and 
unacceptable" to private investment. Overcoming a 'water should be free mindset" after 
years of being accustomed to "just turning on the tap and seeing water" was seen as a 
massive challenge. Some respondents however took comfort in government's hands-on 
approach in the sector which they believed would overcome the negative impact of a 
culture of low willingness-to-pay and provide certain guarantees to potential investors. 
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7.7 Scope and strategy for private investment in water and sanitation 
7.7.1 Perception of private service providers 
Respondents were in favour of local private investment or at the very least, international 
private investment with a strong local partner. They were also of the opinion that there 
was enough money and expertise in the Caribbean to address the investment needs of 
the local water and sanitation sector. "I don't think we have to go outside the Caribbean 
to finance again. I think the time has past where someone from abroad has all the 
answers - there are guys like me floating around." Even though private investment in the 
sector was seen to ''favour big established companies like lonics and Vivendi," 
opportunities were believed to exist for established local business entities, particularly 
construction companies described as "second tier players." Under the existing operating 
environment, BOT-type arrangements were considered the most viable models for local 
private investment in the sector. 
In terms of a private investment strategy, respondents recommended: 
• The amalgamation of water utilities across the Eastern Caribbean or bundling of 
small projects to create viable entities to achieve economies of scale in project 
financing and delivery. 
• The development of specific policy to encourage small private companies. 
• The promotion of joint ventures between local and foreign partners. 
• The promotion of investment opportunities for local investors in related areas such 
as the bottled water industry. 
• That government be more responsive to investors' needs especially where the 
drive for investment was being spearheaded by the private sector. 
• That public officials be more embracing of private investment and stop frustrating 
investors' efforts and begrudging them their profits. 
7.7.2 Perception of local financial institutions 
When asked to rate the investment prospects of the sector based on the use of different 
operational modes for private investment, respondents showed a slightly greater 
preference for joint ventures and BOTs (Appendix 6: Figure A3). Interviewees confirmed 
these preferences citing the success of the desalination BOT and the likelihood of 
government providing guarantees in PPPs as the basis for investors' interest in similar 
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scenarios. When asked to indicate their possible role in the sector, respondents 
envisaged their role to be limited to mainly project financing (60%), providing working 
capital to BWA (26.7%) and participating in bond issues (20%) (Figure 7.3). 
Figure 7.3 Role of financial institutions in the sector (Barbados) 
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7.7.3 Perception of water sector officials 
Respondents' concerns about the possibility of private investment in the sector alienating 
sections of society from being able to afford basic services resulted in them placing 
greater emphasis on financing options that did not allow private investors to "exploit 
people through rates." As such, there was very little support for privatisation and 
concessions, described as '100 complex" and "inappropriate" for the needs of the local 
sector. According to one respondent, "I have not come across any concessions that 
have been deemed successful. Until we can find some examples that will give some 
confidence, I don't think concessions have any place in our water sector." Alluding to 
Trinidad's experience under an interim operating arrangement (see Section 8.5), 
arrangements (such as concessions) where private investors were expected to operate 
under general civil service rules were not deemed viable. BOT-type arrangements 
similar to that with IFL were considered "attractive" with "greater potential and 
applicability in our situation," mainly because they had the advantage of augmenting 
BWA's supply without impinging on BWA's statutory obligations to the sector. As put by 
one respondent, "The options being pursued do not conflict with the existing situation," 
the existing situation referring to BWA's monopoly position in the sector. 
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With only one major private investment project to its credit, respondents were aware that 
for Barbados, private investment was a "new concept" and an "untested area." Subject to 
government's continued support for private investment, some respondents believed that 
opportunities existed for both small and large investors in the sector. Other respondents 
however considered the scope for private investment to be limited due to the already 
good service coverage available to most of the population. Respondents generally 
defined the scope for private investment according to the type of investor. The scope for 
local private investors was considered limited due to their inexperience in the sector and 
likelihood to "keep away from investments in the sector." Foreign investors were 
expected to be more interested in distribution and management based on previous 
experience of such entities in other countries. Respondents did not see much scope for 
private investment in "small incremental projects" and were of the opinion that unless 
projects were of a scale similar to the desalination plant, private investors would not be 
attracted to the sector. 
Respondents made the following suggestions to encourage private investment in the 
sector: 
• The need to prioritise the private investment strategy. Respondents admitted 
that prior to the drought, they had never given private investment any serious 
thought because of a long tradition of public sector provision, universal water 
supply coverage, preferential treatment by government and government budgetary 
support. Barbados' situation however of diminishing freshwater resources and the 
need to find alternate sources to augment existing supplies necessitated a more 
urgent and focused approach to securing financing options besides government. 
• The need for a better planned and managed strategy. This recommendation 
was a result of respondents' experience with the desalination BOT. With no 
previous BOT experience in the sector, BWA and other government entities 
hurriedly defined the project to secure the required investment in order to avoid 
further damage to the country's tourism sector. According to one respondent, "The 
pace of the project was so swift that we did not have all the things nailed down 
especially the hydrology of the area, so a number of assumptions were made. By 
the time we got to the actual contract signing, we had to negotiate a lot of things . .. 
While BWA was able to renegotiate some aspects of the contract, some items 
which had significant cost implications were non-negotiable and turned out to be 
very costly to BW A. 
• The need to have the requisite in-house skills to effect the strategy. Even 
though an adviser was on hand during the BOT, some respondents felt that the 
173 
Chapter 7 - Case study: Barbados 
consultant was slightly biased in favour of the investor. As a result, the 
procurement of pro-BWA project advisory services (preferably resident within 
BWA) was seen as a prerequisite to future private investment arrangements. 
7.8 Small size 
7.8.1 Effect of small size 
Water sector officials were unanimous in agreeing that small size affected the 
Caribbean's ability to attract private investment to the sector. The most important size-
related issue for most respondents was that of limited professional capacity, more so in 
terms of the number of skilled persons available than their competence. This situation 
they opined often resulted in a few individuals "spreading themselves thin" by 
undertaking multiple roles. As put by one respondent, "If you are an engineer, it does not 
matter if you are electrical or mechanical- you are an engineer, that's what counts." The 
provision of specialist services such as those required for utility regulation were believed 
to be most affected by small size. Small size was also considered to seriously limit 
Caribbean water utilities' bargaining power when sourcing investment, which resulted in 
government having to facilitate and underwrite most of the investment for the sector. 
7.8.2 Response strategies to address size constraints 
7.8.2.1 Regional cooperation 
Water sector officials were very supportive of regional initiatives to improve the 
investment prospects of the sector. The most feasible opportunities for regional 
cooperation were identified as the sharing of professional expertise to address capacity 
constraints and the development of regional benchmarks using best practice guidelines 
from various Caribbean utilities. CWWA, CEHI and CBWMP were identified as existing 
regional institutions through which an expanded regional mandate for the sector could be 
fostered. To ensure cooperation at the policy-making level, respondents suggested the 
creation of a 'water desk' at CARICOM to focus on the investment needs of the sector 
throughout the region. Besides professional cooperation among regulatory agencies 
(e.g. during OOCUR conferences), there was little support for a regional approach to 
utility regulation which was believed to be site-specific. 
When asked about possible challenges to regional cooperation in the sector, 
respondents highlighted the following: 
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• Diversity in the sector such as water-scarce islands (e.g. Barbados) versus water-
rich islands (e.g. Dominica) which would result in different areas of interest and 
level of emphasis. 
• Different levels of sector development which would also result in different interests. 
• Insularity as each country would want to promote its projects/interests over others. 
• Difficulty sharing information especially if this information would "show up" or 
embarrass specific utilities. 
• Difficulty in getting/maintaining political support and commitment due to the 
sensitive nature of the sector. 
• Possibility of cooperation being one-sided due to the dependence of smaller 
countries with fewer resources on larger more resourceful countries. 
7.8.2.2 Other response strategies 
Water sector officials suggested the following strategies to overcome small size 
disadvantages and improve investment prospects in the sector: 
• Aggregating discrete service areas and offering as a single package to investors 
for a concession-type arrangement. 
• Pooling small projects into larger more viable projects that would better appeal to 
private investors. 
Local financial institutions were also highly supportive of 'project bundling' and merging 
small systems to overcome small size constraints and improve the investment prospects 
of the sector (Appendix 6: Figure A4). 
7.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the Barbadian case study which examined the operating 
environment for private investment in the water and sanitation sector and the perceptions 
of public and private sector actors to criteria for private investment, scope and strategy 
for private investment and size-related response strategies to improve conditions for 
private investment in the sector. Findings from documents, survey questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews were systematically presented for further discussion within the 
context of the literature in the cross-case analysis (Chapter 10). 
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CHAPTERS CASE STUDY: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
8.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of private investment in the Trinidadian water 
and sanitation sector using survey, interview and document data to determine the 
operating environment for private investment, criteria for investment decision-making and 
scope and strategy for private investment in the sector. The potential for various size-
related response strategies such as regional cooperation to improve investment 
prospects in the sector is also examined. 
8.2 General information 
The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is situated at the southern end of the Caribbean 
chain of islands, just northeast of Venezuela (Figure 5.1). With a joint land mass of 5,128 
sq. km, the twin-island state is home to approximately 1.26 million inhabitants, 70% of 
which reside in urban centres. Of 232 countries surveyed in the CIA World Factbook, 
Trinidad is ranked 177'h in terms of area, 139th in terms of population, 130th in terms of 
total GDP and 75th in terms of GDP per capita (CIA, 2005). 
8.3 Status of the water and sanitation sector 
At the country's independence in 1962, public water supply was only available to about 
12% of the population. Private water supply provided by major oil and sugar companies 
supplemented the public system, particularly to small housing estates affiliated with these 
organisations. 1962 marked key developments in sanitation with the beginning of major 
sewerage projects in the capital Port-of-Spain, San Fernando and Arima. Up until 1965, 
water and sanitation services were administered by seven autonomous agencies. The 
Port-of-Spain City Council, San Fernando Borough City Council, Arima Borough Council 
and County Councils operated discrete water supply systems in their respective 
administrative areas. Water supply outside municipal areas was the responsibility of the 
Central Water Distribution Authority. The Water Department and Sanitation Division, 
both within the Ministry of Public Utilities, were responsible for the development and 
operation of major water and sewerage systems respectively. The establishment of the 
Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA) in 1965 realised government's vision of 
consolidating the operations of the various entities and expanding service provision to the 
wider community. 
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Data from the 2000 population census indicate that approximately 81.5% of Trinidadian 
households receive water from WASA, the majority of which have piped water supply 
(Table 8.1). About 13% of households rely on private sources for water. Centralised 
sewerage services are provided to about 21.8% of Trinidadian households, two-thirds of 
which are customers of WASA. Most of the population relies on on-site disposal systems 
such as septic systems (50.7%) and pit latrines (27.0%). 
Table 8.1 Water and sanitation coverage in Trinidad and Tobago (2000) 
s,~urce of ~ater Total Type of toilet faciliti~'; T(?!~I (%) % 
Public source 81.5 WC linked to sewer 21.8 
Piped into dwelling 60.9 WC not linked to sewer 50.7 
Piped into yard 8.9 Pit 27.0 
Standpipe 9.6 Other 0.1 
Truck-borne 2.1 No toilet facilities 0.4 
Private source 12.9 
Piped into dwelling 4.5 
Catchment 8.4 
Spring/river 1.5 
Other 4.1 
NOTE. Adjusted for non-response 
Source: CSO (2002) 
Despite reports of good coverage, water supply in Trinidad and Tobago has always 
suffered from an unequal demand/supply relationship which has resulted in a history of 
water scheduling 182 and difference in service levels. WASA uses a measure of service 
called the Full Service Equivalent (FSE) as an indicator of water service continuity. The 
supply of water is segmented into five classes which form the basis for calculating the 
FSE183 (Table 8.2). Water supply data for 2003 indicated that only 18% of the population 
received a continuous supply while 20% received less than 84 hours' service each week. 
Investment programmes undertaken by WASA are specifically geared towards reducing 
the number of customers in classes 4 and 5. This has been achieved to some extent 
through initiatives like the short-term investment plan credited for reducing the number of 
customers receiving water less than 48 hours per week to 3% and providing 57% of the 
population with continuous service. 
In addition to inadequate coverage and service unreliability, a number of problems 
plague the Trinidadian water and sanitation sector. Only 2.9% of WASA's customers are 
metered, the majority of which are commercial and industrial consumers. Water rates 
182 Refers to the planned restriction of flow to specific areas over specific periods of time. 
183 The FSE is calculated by dividing the number of population service hours for the supply period by the total number 
of population hours. The FSE is primarily affected by the dry and wet seasons. For example, when calculated as an 
average between February and June 2003, the FSE was 59%. In the wet season, the average for July to January 
2003 was 71 %. 
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have remained unchanged since 1993 and do not reflect actual consumption. This has 
resulted in what is considered higher than normal water usage and a conservative UFW 
estimate of 45%. Other problems include limited built-in redundancy in the delivery 
network and the absence of a water master plan for investment planning. 
Table 8.2 Water supply service levels in Trinidad and Tobago (2003) 
Class Level of service Poculation %1 Factor FSE 
1 168 hrs/wk (continuous) 18 1.00 0.18 
2 120 to 168 hrslwk 28 0.71 0.20 
3 84 to 120 hrs/wk 33 0.50 0.17 
4 48 to 84 hrslwk 11 0.29 0.03 
5 Less than 48 hrs/wk 9 0.00 0.00 
Full SONICO equNBlont calculation for June 2003 
Source: WASA (2003) 
In the case of wastewater, there is the need to implement policy to rationalise over 200 
non-WASA sewerage treatment package plants to meet industry standards. Privately 
owned sewerage facilities, especially those in housing developments are in a state of 
disrepair due to neglect and WASA's reluctance to incorporate them into the public 
sewerage system. Finally, increasing pollution from sewage and industrial effluents 
combined with soil erosion and unmitigated development, threaten potable water quality 
while increasing treatment costs. Long-term investment to 2020 to address most of 
these problems is estimated at TT$26 billion. Of that amount, it is estimated that 
TT$16.5 billion is needed for water, TT$6.3 billion for wastewater and TT$3.2 billion for 
institutional strengthening. 
8.3.1 Status of the public water utility 
The history of WASA's financial performance has been one of loss-making, high 
operating costs and low revenues. Since the late 1990s, WASA's financial performance 
and position has been characterised by heavy capital spending, continued operating 
shortfalls and a practice of using debt to finance operational deficits, new capital 
expenditure and refinance existing debts. Revenues are especially affected by WASA's 
customer profile, tariff structure and collection policy. Domestic customers account for 
96.6% of WASA's customer base yet provide only 33.8% of annual revenue. Industrial 
and commercial customers on the other hand generate 37.6% of WASA's revenue while 
only accounting for 2.2% of the customer base. In addition, WASA has a poor collection 
policy with an average collection period of 14 months. An overview of WASA's financial 
and operational data is shown in Table 8.3. 
178 

Chapter 8 - Csse study: Trinidad and Tobago 
Table 8.4 Capital expenditure for 2004-06 (WASA) 
Source: WASA (2004b) 
8.4 Overview of the operating environment 
8.4.1 Macroeconomic environment 
Trinidad and Tobago is considered to have the most diversified and industrialised 
economy in the English-speaking Caribbean 184. There are large reserves of petroleum 
and natural gas and well-developed heavy industries in iron, steel, methanol, nitrogenous 
fertilisers and petroleum products. During the 1970s, high world oil prices created a rapid 
expansion of the local economy with real GDP growing by 72.5% between 1970 and 
1977. These were the boom years during which much of the country's infrastructure was 
developed. Depressed oil prices coupled with high levels of public expenditure however, 
led to a prolonged period of economic contraction between 1988 and 1993. 
Trinidad is now facing its third resource-driven economic boom after the one led by oil 
discoveries in 1974-75 and by natural gas in 1979-80. Growth in real GDP strengthened 
to 4.1% in 2003, mainly reflecting the strong output growth in the energy sector of 11.4% 
(Table 8.5). For the same period, the non-energy sector registered modest improvement 
contributing 68.6% to GDP. The environment that supported this performance was 
marked by lower interest rates and subdued inflation (3.8%) facilitated by an 
accommodative monetary and exchange rate policy. As the main recipient of foreign 
exchange through energy-related taxes and royalties, govemment is an important 
supplier of foreign exchange to the local market. This has resulted in an orderly foreign 
exchange market and a stable exchange rate. Govemment's policy since 1997 of 
pegging the Trinidadian dollar at TT$6.30 to the US dollar has also contributed to the 
stable currency value of the Trinidadian dollar. 
Trinidad's external position is expected to remain strong with higher export volumes of 
liquefied natural gas and other petrochemicals and continued buoyant energy prices. 
Improved fiscal and external positions have resulted in a long-term positive sovereign US 
184 Trinidad's economy can be divided into two separate, mostly independent sectors - the gas and oil sector and the 
rest of the economy. The strength of the energy sector is reflected in the fact that Trinidad is the most important 
world provider of ammonia and methanol. and is also the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas to the US. In this 
dual economy. the energy sector is a source of self-financed investment and fiscal revenues. 
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credit rating of BBB+. In 2002, government initiated its 'Vision 2020' programme to 
transform Trinidad to developed country status by 2020. Vision 2020 is expected to bring 
about a period of accelerated economic growth and focused strategic planning by both 
government and the private sector to establish Trinidad and Tobago as the economic 
centre of the Caribbean. 
Table 8.5 Economic indicators for Trinidad and Tobago (2003) 
~£~~'(.~'t"~,paramete'rZJ~~~j;;~' r' '::;:~/j,'::-ffji}:.Value-{,ihl0s.iii,'i:'l!j'" 
GDP per capita US$8,400 
GDP - real growth rate 4.1% 
GDP -energy 31.4% 
GDP - non-energy 68.6% 
Inflation rate 3.8% 
Public debt (of GDP) 54.4% 
Exchange rate - IT$ per US$ 6.26 
Average lending rate 11.3% 
Sovereign credit rating -local AlPositive/A-1 a 
Sovereiqn credit ratinq - foreiqn BBB+/Positive/A-2' 
As at June 16. 2004 
Source: CBn (2004a; 2004b); Standard & Poor's (2005) 
8.4.2 Institutional arrangements 
The Ministry of Public Utilities and the Environment (MOPUE) is the policy ministry in 
charge of water and sanitation services with direct responsibility for WASA. WASA is the 
statutory organisation responsible for the provision of water and sewerage services to 
about 81.5% and 15% of the Trinidadian population respectively. WASA through its 
Water Resources Agency is also responsible for water resources management, although 
since 2001, this function has been 'transferred' to the Water Resources Management 
Unit (WRMU), a part-time team seconded from WASA to the MOPUE. WASA's water 
supply is supplemented by a BOT arrangement with the Desalination Company of 
Trinidad and Tobago while additional sewerage services are provided by the National 
Housing Authority, private housing developments, hotels and industries. 
The MOPUE is also line ministry to the Regulated Industries Commission (RIC) and 
Environmental Management Authority (EMA), two statutory organisations involved in the 
regulation of the sector. RIC is the economic regulator responsible for granting licences 
to service providers, rate-structuring, monitoring and enforcing service quality standards. 
EMA is responsible for environmental protection and conservation, including monitoring 
and enforcing water pollution and trade effluent levels. Water quality monitoring and 
enforcement is conducted by the Ministry of Health (MOH). 
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The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has overall responsibility for all financial matters 
pertaining to WASA. All capital expenditure projects undertaken by WASA have to be 
approved by MOF as it either provides direct funding through the annual budget or 
provides government's guarantee for loans sourced from the commercial banking sector. 
MOF also works in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning and Development and 
MOPUE when it is necessary to secure funding for WASA from international agencies. 
Table 8.6 summarises the various stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector, the 
duties of which are expanded in ensuing sections. 
Table 8.6 Institutions involved in the Trinidadian water and sanitation sector 
)'~4;+:-:tcFocus?:', :,':<~/: :fS:- ;.-;q;:':<:' -;;;::.;!C':;'i:;)s~~~lri-stiti.itiOh?f::'0~::;'~.~~f':~.l 
Policy • Ministry of Public Utilities and the Environment 
Regulation • Water and Sewerage Authority 
• Regulated Industries Commission 
• Environmental Management Authority 
• Water Resources Management Unit 
• Ministry of Health 
Service provision • Water and Sewerage Authority 
• Ministry of Local Government 
• National Housing Authority 
• Private housina develooers 
Finance/planning • Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Planning and Development 
Reform of the water and sanitation sector, particularly the reorganisation of WASA is part 
of government's Vision 2020 programme to address challenges facing the sector. The 
suggestion is to disaggregate WASA into six functional components to which 
'appropriate' management models will be applied (Table 8.7). The proposed model for 
the sector is shown in Figure 8.1. Essentially, WASA is to be transformed from a public 
utility into an industry which consists of: 
(a) a corporatised utility responsible for water supply and wastewater 
services. Primary ownership and control to remain with government, 
however the utility will function like a private commercial company; 
(b) a division or subsidiary of the corporatised utility to carry out wastewater 
services; 
(c) private water producers contracted to the new utility by concessions and 
BOO/BOT/BOOT arrangements; 
(d) contractors who carry out some of the ancillary services of the enterprise 
through lease contracts; 
(e) private wastewater service providers franchised by the corporatised utility 
to treat wastewater in various geographical areas; and 
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(f) a financially autonomous administrative organisation responsible for 
water resources management. 
Table 8.7 Proposed disaggregation of WASA 
S:~~Comp(),il'E"ritf.:~ ~.Resp6nsibilitYT::::'~J""'_O;'?-+'~*~:; * MaiiaQemeritl:~ 
Water resources Ownership, assessment and allocation Public 
Water production Abstraction and treatment Public/private 
Water transmission Bulk movement Public 
Water distribution Supply to customers' property Public/private 
Wastewater collection Collection Public/private 
Wastewater treatment Treatment Public/private 
Source: ViSion 2020 MGSCPU (2003); WASA (2004a) 
Figure 8.1 Proposed model for the Trinidadian water and wastewater sector 
Industry regulators 
Water Resources Regulated Environmental 
Management Authority I Industries Commission I I Management Authority 
Water af/ocation 
+ 
Private water producers Limited private distributorsB 
Corporatised Water Company 
• Owns some water production Customers 
L 
r 
• Owns all water transmission 
• Owns some water distribution 
I 
Wastewater Division/Subsidiary 
Private wastewater companies 
• OWns some wastewater treatment plants 
• Delegates some treatment plants to the private sector • Collects/treats wastewater in 
• Owns all central wastewater collection and transmission some geographic areas 
·Special consideration for permission to interface with consumers. Billing however remains the responsibility of the major utility. 
Source: Vision 2020 MGSCPU (2003); WASA (2004a) 
8.4.3 Policy framework 
By international standards. Trinidad is not considered a water scarce country. Concerns 
however regarding seasonal and spatial variation in water availability. environmental 
threats from increased industrial activity and resource demands of an increasing 
population have resulted in the pursuit of a new policy paradigm. The National Water 
Resources Management Policy (GORTT. 2002). still in draft form since 2002. is expected 
to form the basis for IWRM for the country. The specific objectives of the policy are to: 
183 
ChapterB- Case study: Trinidad and TObago 
(a) provide an overview of the status of the country's water resources; 
(b) unify various initiatives of government to improve the framework for 
water resources management'85 and provide a strong direction and 
vision for the assignment of responsibilities for policy implementation; 
(c) provide direction for various water-related issues such as land-use 
planning, water resources assessment and planning, abstraction 
licensing, public water supply, wastewater, pricing and cost recovery, 
public participation and access to information; 
(d) outline instruments for policy implementation; and 
(e) outline the process for review and revision of policy. 
Specific to public water supply, the policy intends to satisfy quality and reliability 
requirements through conservation and demand reduction and supply development. 
Water service providers will be obliged to establish plans to meet water conservation 
targets and to demonstrate progress on an annual basis '86. Government intends to 
promote the development of new freshwater supplies strictly on the basis of technical, 
environmental and financial feasibility. The development of other supplies such as 
desalination and barging has to be self-financing and financially self-sufficient. National 
quality standards andlor WHO guidelines will be included as service standards in 
licences granted to water service providers, with RIC responsible for monitoring 
compliance. Water service providers will be required to publish and distribute annual 
drinking water quality reports while sewerage service providers will be required to provide 
performance reports. 
For water supply generally and sanitation specifically, the policy speaks of government's 
intention to encourage "significant private sector participation wherever practicable" by 
implementing strategies for economic investment. Economic instruments to effect this 
policy strategy will include full marginal cost pricing of water and sewerage services and 
targeted subsidies when justified on social or other policy grounds. Metering of water 
connections, application of volume-based water rates and the use of rebates, tax 
incentives and grants for demand management measures including water and 
wastewater reuse are also identified. Community responsibility for developing, operating 
and maintaining decentralised water supply and sewerage facilities will also be 
encouraged. 
165 Some of these initiatives included (a) enactment of the Environmental Management Act and establishment of 
EMA; (b) enactment of the RIC Act and establishment of RIC; (c) establishment of an interim operating arrangement 
for WASA (1995); (d) development of a Water Resources Management Strategy (1999); (e) drafting instructions for a 
new Water Industries Act (2001); and (f) establishment of a Water Resources Management Unit. 
186 Conservation and demand management targets to be included in licences for water service providers. 
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Government's Vision 2020 programme has major implications for the sector. Further to 
the National Water Resources Management Policy, specific strategies for water and 
sanitation are identified in the Vision 2020 report (Vision 2020 MGSCPU, 2003). Under 
Vision 2020, a transitional approach to utility reform is envisaged to establish a sound 
legal and regulatory framework for the sector. Government's policy is to ensure that tariff 
levels, risk-sharing arrangements and regulatory provisions are sufficient to attract 
potential investors and provide sustainable benefits to consumers. Regarding tariffs, 
government advocates stepwise increases. The focus for water supply includes system 
expansion to result in improved service levels, renewal of WASA's asset base and 
demand management via universal metering. For wastewater the proposed strategy 
includes establishing a separate wastewater division and applying separate charges for 
sewerage services. Government intends to actively pursue innovative financing schemes 
with the private sector for the rehabilitation, expansion and operation of existing and 
future wastewater facilities. The collective strategy for the sector will involve the 
development of water and wastewater master and investment plans to determine 
implementation priority over the investment period. 
8.4.4 Legislative framework 
The Water and Sewerage Act (GORTT, 1965) provides for the development and control 
of water supply and sewerage facilities and the promotion of conservation and proper use 
of water resources in Trinidad and Tobago. The Act also established WASA to carry out 
government's policy in relation to water and sewerage following the amalgamation of 
seven autonomous agencies previously responsible for water and sanitation services. 
Subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance, the Act empowers WASA to borrow 
funds to meet its obligations in addition to funds appropriated by Parliament or recovered 
from revenue'S? Section 28 makes provisions for government's guarantee of WASA's 
loan payments. Rates and charges for the supply of water and sewerage services are 
fixed under the Act. 
The Act empowers WASA to authorise individuals, local authorities '88 or authorities 
previously engaged in water supply provision to provide water supply services to defined 
areas. Subject to such authorisation, water providers are free to acquire land or water 
rights, impose and collect water rates and maintain and improve their water supply 
187 Revenue should be sufficient to cover operating expenses including taxes, maintenance, depreciation and interest 
payments on borrowings, meet periodic repayments on long-term indebtedness and create reserves for future 
expansion. 
188 Local authorities are identified as agents of WASA to collect annual taxes, rates and charges levied with respect to 
water supply material and equipment and administer and provide water supply services. 
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systems. In addition to abstraction licences for domestic water supply, WASA is also 
authorised to grant licences to abstract water for industrial purposes 189 if no other 
reasonably practical means of obtaining water are available. Licensees and water 
providers are mandated to keep records and provide information to WASA on the 
quantity and quality of water abstracted and other matters relating to the water source as 
prescribed by regulation. In addition, water providers are required to formulate proposals 
to meet existing or future water supply requirements, either individually or jointly with 
WASA or other water providers. 
With respect to sewerage services, WASA is authorised to delineate sewerage areas to 
facilitate development and/or operation of sewerage systems. Subsidiary legislation by 
way of the WASA (Separate Sewerage Areas) Order (GORTT, 1987) defines five 
sewerage areas for Trinidad and Tobago, namely the capital Port-of-Spain, San 
Fernando, Arima, Trincity and the rest of the country. All premises within a 0.05 km 
radius of a collecting sewer must connect to the sewerage system subject to bye-laws 
made by WASA regulating the construction of sewerage works and materials to be used. 
In accordance with these regulations, only sanitary constructors licenced by WASA are 
authorised to do any work in relation to a collecting sewer, house sewer or water closet. 
Regulatory provisions for utility services 190 are assumed by RIG pursuant to the RIG Act 
(GORTT, 1998b). The key functions of RIG are specified in Section 6 of the Act and 
include: 
(a) granting licences to service providers; 
(b) ensuring that service providers operating under prudent and efficient 
management are allowed to earn sufficient return to finance necessary 
investment; 
(c) conducting studies of efficiency and economy of operation and 
performance by service providers; 
(d) monitoring service providers to determine compliance with service 
standards and imposing sanctions for non-compliance; 
(e) establishing the principles and methodologies by which service providers 
determine rates for services and monitoring these rates; 
(f) investigating complaints by customers; and 
(g) facilitating competition between service providers where possible. 
169 Industrial purposes include oil mining, irrigation and inundation for agriculture. 
190 Includes water, sewerage, electricity and telecommunications. 
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Water and sanitation issues are also addressed incidentally in several pieces of 
legislation. The Waterworks and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act (GORTT, 1998a) 
provides for the undertaking of waterworks in industrial or commercial sites and 
strengthens the provisions for the collection of water improvement rates. Under the 
Public Health Ordinance (GORTT, 1915), WASA is jointly and severally responsible with 
local authorities for all matters related to the provision of sewerage facilities including the 
regulation and construction of sanitary conveniences in buildings. Finally, the 
Environmental Management Act (GORTT, 2000) provides for consultation between EMA 
and WASA to establish mechanisms for coordination and implementation of 
environmental management programmes. Subsidiary legislation in the form of the 
Certificate of Environmental Clearance (Designated Areas) Activities Order (GORTT, 
2001) provides for the certification of wastewater treatment plants by EMA. 
8.4.4.1 Sector-specific legislation 
In 2001, government proceeded to develop drafting instructions for a new Water 
Industries Act. At the time of data collection, no further details on the Act were available 
but it is anticipated that this Act will rationalise the responsibilities of institutions involved 
in the sector and will result in a review of the RIC and Water and Sewerage Acts. 
8.4.5 Regulatory framework 
8.4.5.1 Regulatory framework for WASA 
Economic regulation of WASA dates back to 1966 following the establishment of RIC's 
predecessor, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). The duties of the five-member 
Commission included determining rates for utility services, conducting research relevant 
to rate-making and investigating the operations and standards of service of all public 
utilities. Rate-making dominated the activities of PUC however, effected through a 
tribunal procedure where claims for rate increases were presented. Objectors were then 
given an opportunity to challenge this claim in front of the Tribunal. Appeals against a 
decision of the Tribunal could only be made on a point of law. 
Under PUC, WASA was granted two rate increases, one in 1986 (Order No. 54) and 
another in 1993 (Order No. 83) pursuant to requests by the Minister of Public Utilities. 
The basis for the 1993 claim was to provide "urgent relief' from WASA's insolvency which 
was hampering its ability to undertake capital works and cover day-to-day expenses. 
The Tribunal expressed several concerns during the rate review hearings. Limited data 
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for analysis to determine the plausibility of WASA's arguments were identified as the 
"most worrisome feature of the review". Objectors to the rate increase referred to the 
"absence of audited financial reports and discrepancies in financial data" which 
admittedly limited the Tribunal's determination of the prudence and cost effectiveness of 
WASA's claim '9'. Absence of managerial accountability in the context of unkept 
promises of improved levels of service was also a concem. Under the PUC Act, 
accountability and compliance with plans and programmes on which awards were 
decided were not requirements for granting increased rates. In the absence of 
accountability, a rate increase on the basis of a promise of improved service was 
considered "an act of faith. " 
Despite these misgivings, the limitation of legislation goveming PUC denied the Tribunal 
any authority to deny WASA's claim for relief. A rate increase was granted to WASA on 
the condition that it maintained a record of payments for PUC's inspection and 
implemented a rebate system for intermittent supply. To address deficiencies highlighted 
during the rate hearing, the Tribunal also pledged to assign PUC staff to monitor WASA's 
use of revenue to effect promised improvements and to help collect data for more 
accurate financial estimates for future reviews. 
Following the recommendations of a Cabinet-Appointed Task Force, PUC was replaced 
by RIC in 1998 pursuant to the RIC Act' 92. The revised scope of regulatory services 
provided by RIC has already been mentioned in Section 8.4.4. Regulations to effect 
these services however are subject to ministerial approval'93. This includes the 
procedure for licence applications, granting of licences and general terms and conditions 
of licences. Regulations setting out the principles for rate determination, procedure for 
conducting reviews and standards of service for the sector also require endorsement 
from the Minister. 
191 For example, the Tribunal explained that the translation of the revenue requirement into a specific set of rate 
schedules had been hampered by the lack of data on the costs of the various services provided by WASA. Efforts by 
PUC to separate the costs of water and sewerage services revealed that WASA's accounting records were not 
organised in a manner which would permit such costs to be readily separated. As a result, the rates charged 
continue to be based on best judgement of ability to pay rather than costs. 
192 The regulatory mechanism through PUC was attacked on a number of fronts. PUC was criticised for establishing 
rates unrelated to performance and standard of service provided by the utilities and for adopting a rate-making 
formula not conducive to promoting greater efficiency. It was also believed that PUC's decisions were informed by 
political interests rather than the protection of consumers' interests and a 'fair return' for the utilities. Proceedings of 
the Tribunal were thought to have evolved into adversarial confrontations in which utility management appeared to be 
on trial. In light of these shortcomings. the Task Force made a number of suggestions for improving the regulatory 
framework for public utilities. These induded (a) a broader definition of public utilities to cover entities that were not 
statutory authorities but still provided utility services; and (b) redefinition of PUC's role as a regulatory agency with 
respect to rate determination. It was argued that greater power should be given to the utilities to determine their own 
rates based on sound business practices. Performance standard and rate-setting principles would then become the 
major decision areas for PUC instead of rate-making. As such, the regulatory agency would be responsible for 
setting performance standardslindicators and establishing mechanisms for their monitoring. 
193 Recall that both RIC and WASA fall under the same portfolio ministry. 
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As mentioned earlier, the regulatory framework under PUC did not consider 
accountability and compliance with plans and programmes conditional for rate review 
determination. The RIC has however sought to expand the regulatory framework for the 
sector to include service standards for WASA. The first consultative document for the 
water and wastewater sector was issued in March 2003 for public discussion on the 
standards and performance targets to be applied to the sector. Guaranteed and overall 
standards were developed based on WASA's structure, operation, history, data on 
current service quality performance and standards used in the UK and Jamaica. Under 
this new regime, WASA is required to provide quarterly (with monthly breakout) quality of 
service standard reports to RIC. Implementation of these standards initially scheduled 
for January 1, 2005 is still pending as WASA is allowed more time to prepare itself for 
reporting and complying with these standards. Once implemented, standards will be in 
force for a period of three years then reviewed. 
Since 2001, an application to EMA for a Certificate of Environmental Clearance is 
required prior to the construction of new wastewater treatment facilities to certify 
environmental acceptability. Standards for sewage effluent quality developed by the 
Trinidad and Tobago Bureau of Standards are also monitored by EMA. WHO water 
quality guidelines are monitored by both MOH and WASA. 
8.4.5.2 Tariff structure 
The rating structure under which the public is charged for water and sewerage services 
has not in essence changed since it was first developed in 1923 and revised in 1935. 
WASA's current rates have been in effect since June 1993, although RIC has on its own 
accord initiated proceedings to review these rates and rating structure. Residential tariffs 
are based on an annual rateable value (ARV) 194 which reflects the assessed rental value 
of a property as a proxy for income and potential household water consumption. Metered 
residential customers are charged using a two-block tariff, with an initial block of 150 
cubic metres per quarter (Table 8.8). Water rates are also levied to standpipe users. 
Property owners not normally supplied by WASA but located within a 0.4 km radius of a 
public standpipe are charged TT$33.75 per quarter. Sewerage rates and charges are 
generally set at 50% of the water charge and applied to persons located within a 0.05 km 
radius of a WASA sewerage network. As per the Water and Sewerage Act, rates are 
payable in advance in equal quarterly or half-yearly instalments. An additional water 
194 The ARV is determined by market analysis and is based on the assessment of the expected rental which the 
property will attract in the open market in the year of assessment. Once determined, the ARV is recorded in the 
Assessment Rolls (House Rate Book). The valuation cycle according to legislation is 3 years. Assessment Rolls 
however are not current and efforts to increase the ARV and/or change its structure have not been successful. 
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improvement rate in the amount of TT$4.00 was implemented in 1998 for the Point Lisas 
Industrial Estate to supplement the higher cost of desalinated water. As a result, 
customers in the industrial estate are charged TT$7.50 per cubic metre for water supply 
services from WASA. 
Table 8.8 WASA's existing water and sewerage charges 
Class . ~~{ Sewerage (TT$)' 
Domestic 
A 1 Standpipe $33.75 per quarter None 
A2 Externally serviced $67.50 per quarter None 
A3 Internally serviced $108 to $304 per quarter $75.50/qtr for water bills S $202.50/qtr 
(depending on ARV) $93.50/qtr for water bills> $202.50/qtr 
A4 Internally serviced (metered) S150 m'/qtr - $1.75/m' 50% of water bill 
>150 m'/qtr - $3.50/m' 
Minimum of $30/qtr 
A5 Charitable institutions Minimum of $1 08/qtr $75.50 per quarter 
A6 Charitable institution~ (metered) Same asA4 Same asA4 
Non-domestic 
63 Industrial $474.00 per month $237.00 per month 
B4 Industrial (metered) $3.50/m'/mth; minimum of $35/mth Same asA4 
C3 Commercial Same as 63 Same as 63 
C4 Commercial (metered) Same as B4 Same asA4 
D3 Cottage $300.00 per month Same asA4 
D4 Cottage (metered) S150 m'/qtr - $2.50/m' Same as A4 
>150 m'/qtr - $3.50/m' 
Minimum of $25/mth 
E3 Agricultural 15% of ARV; minimum of $105/mth Same asA4 
E4 Agricultural (metered) $2.25/m3; minimum of $20/mth Same asA4 
F Unserviced premises $50.00 per month None 
Swim mina 0001 $160 Der auarter None 
Source: PUC (1993); RIC (2004a) 
8.4.5.3 Regulatory framework for private service providers 
Provisions for the regulatory framework applicable to service providers besides WASA 
are embodied in the RIC Act. Advice on matters relating to the type, level and quality of 
service provided by service providers is provided to RIC by a ministerial-appointed 
Consumer Service Committee 195 (Section 24). The Committee is also responsible for 
aSSisting RIC in ensuring that service providers implement adequate complaint 
procedures and on request, participates in proceedings of RIC where the terms and 
conditions of licences or the bases of tariffs or rates are being considered. Subject to 
ministerial approval, RIC is authorised to impose a cess on rates and charges on service 
providers. The cess payable within one month's notice is based proportionately on the 
gross earnings of the service provider for the preceding calendar year. 
195 Committee consists of a Chairman, one member nominated by the Chief Secretary of the Tobago House of 
Assembly and three members drawn from throughout Trinidad and Tobago who represent consumer interests but are 
not public officers or employees of service providers or the RIC. 
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In formulating regulations to carry out the Act, RIC is mandated to regard the funding and 
ability of service providers, interest of shareholders, ability of customers to pay rates, 
standards of service being offered by service providers, inflation and future prospective 
increases in productivity by service providers. Pursuant to these regulations, RIC must 
consider expended replacement capital cost, least-cost operating expenses, annual 
depreciation and return on the rate base. Finally, the Act makes provisions for entities 
like WASA that were in lawful operation prior to the commencement of the Act in 1998. 
Until licences are granted under the Act, these entities are deemed to be licenced for the 
purposes of the Act and rates charged by these entities are deemed to be authorised by 
the Act. 
8.5 Private investment in the water and sanitation sector: An overview 
Since inception in 1965, WASA has undergone seven major managerial arrangements 
ranging from a fully subsidised utility, private sector management and the incumbent 
post-interim operating arrangement management team (Table 8.9). Between 1992 and 
1994, the utility entered a phase of local private sector management during which time it 
was granted an effective 35% rate increase. Among other reasons, this initiative failed 
mainly due to the continued lack of funds to effect necessary rehabilitation, refurbishment 
and new capital expenditure and lack of experience in the sector. This stint with the 
private sector marked the beginning of government's private initiative which culminated 
with an interim operating arrangement (lOA) between 1996 and 1999. 
Table 8.9 WASA's managerial arrangements (1965-present) 
ilImJf_Timii~ :.~§_if:Ma;nagement;afrari'gemeritnlli&:it0it' 
1965 -1986 Public sector mode 
1986 -1992 Self sufficiency mandate 
1992 -1994 InsUtutional strengthening team 
1994 -1996 Interim management team 
1996 -1999 Interim operating arrangement 
1999 - 2002 Post-interim operating arrangement I 
2002 - Dresent Post-interim ooeratina arranaement 11 
Source: WASA (2004a) 
8.5.1 Management contract 
The lOA represented the first of a two-staged approach to PSP aimed at enhancing 
WASA's business acumen to the point where it presented a viable option for long-term 
private capital interests. The second stage of the plan was a long-term arrangement of 
20 to 30 years to be developed during the lOA period, with the lOA operator given the 
191 
Chapter 8 - Case study: Trinidad and Tobago 
preferential right subject to performance, to negotiate it. The decision to adopt this 
transitional approach to private participation was informed by several factors. Not 
enough information was available to give investors confidence in WASA's commercial 
and operational situation. Government had also decided not to amend legislation 
governing the provision of water and sewerage services. As such, any private sector 
arrangement had to work within the existing legal framework. Finally, the introduction of 
private participation was made conditional to government accessing World Bank funding 
that had been earmarked for major refurbishment and rehabilitation works'96. 
The lOA became effective in April 1996 after review by the new government which had 
come into power at the end of 1995'97. Parties to the agreement included the 
government, WASA and the locally incorporated firm - Trinidad and Tobago Water 
Services Ltd. (TTWS) in which Severn Trent Water International (STWI) and George 
Wimpey International Holdings/Tarmac Construction Caribbean Ltd. were equal 
shareholders. The lOA which in effect was a performance-based management 
contract'98 saw TTWS personnel assume top managerial posts in WASA'99. WASA's 
Board however continued to have overall responsibility, accountability and control of all 
strategies and policies relevant to the sector. A ministerial-appointed Consultative 
Committee consisting of representatives from WASA, TTWS and government monitored 
the implementation of the lOA and provided a forum for arbitration between WASA's 
Board and TTWS. 
A long-term arrangement did not materialise at the end of the lOA in April 1999. Even 
though the lOA realised key achievements in performance200 , several factors contributed 
196 Agreement had been reached in 1993 on an IBRD loan of US$60 million for a 3-year reconstruction and 
development works programme. In 1994, there was also agreement on a further loan of US$8.6 million for the 
implementation of an emergency work plan. These projects were however put on hold as the government sought to 
obtain the World Bank's assistance in financing the process of introducing private sector management as the 
cornerstone of reform in the sector. The outcome of this approach was the execution of a US$25 million loan from 
the World Bank designed to provide inter alia, funding for consultancy services and working capital needed by WASA 
during the transition of its water supply services operation to private sector management. A major portion of the 
project covered lOA support for WASA and the preparation of a comprehensive rehabilitation programme. as well as 
the establishment and operation of a rehabilitation emergency fund. The loan agreement required that a subsidiary 
agreement be made with WASA whereby WASA was obligated to enter into a contract with a private sector operator 
acceptable to the Bank within a specified period. The PSP contract was required to remain in place until the 
completion of the project or the conclusion of the rehabilitation and divestment process and was required to afford the 
private sector operator full technical and financial responsibility for the management of WASA's water supply and 
sewerage services (Rennie. 2003). 
197 The lOA was signed on November 1, 1995, just 5 days before national elections in which the government 
changed. The election of a new government and a new WASA Board delayed the contract start-up date to April 4, 
1996 as both groups sought to acquaint themselves with the terms and conditions of the contract. 
198 Over 60% of the operator's fees would be paid against performance deliverables. Financing arranged by nws to 
cover the operating shortfall during the lOA was funded by local institutions and syndicated by the local Citibank on a 
non-recourse basis. 
199 Managerial positions held by nws included the Chief Executive Officer and Directors for Operations, Logistics, 
Transport. Management Information Systems, Capital Investment Planning and Finance. The only senior 
management positions held by WASA staff were Directors for Human Resources and Water Resources. 
200 These included (a) reduction in average plant downtime from 54 to 4 days; (b) 17% increase in average water 
production; (c) increase in the FSE from 43 to 48%; (d) 49% increase in the number of leaks repaired; (e) 
improvement in WASA's operating ratio; (t) increase in the collection ratio from 81% to 99%; and (g) introduction of 
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to the abandonment of a longer-term arrangement. A key supposition of the lOA had 
been for long-term World Bank funding for refurbishment and rehabilitation works. This 
did not materialise and severely constrained TTWS's ability to achieve the stated 
objectives of the lOA beyond improvements made possible by more efficient operations 
and supply schedule optimisation2o,. With no World Bank loan forthcoming, TTWS 
acquired government guaranteed loans raised on the local market to finance capital 
projects. By the end of the lOA, WASA's debt burden was over TI$1.17 billion. 
By policy decision, the act governing the operations of WASA was not modified. This 
resulted in a strained relationship between TTWS and WASA's Board throughout the life 
of the IOA202 • A new regulatory regime under the RIC did not come into effect until 
October 1998. As such, the lOA was left to contend with no regulatory clarity during 
much of its life, but was constrained by contractual stipulations of no tariff adjustments 
and no non-voluntary separation of permanent WASA staff. Adherence to an anti-
privatisation position by union representatives, disenchantment by WASA and 
government with achievements of the lOA and growing public speculation also 
contributed to collapsed negotiations for a longer-term arrangement. 
8.5.2 BOT arrangement 
In August 1999, WASA entered a 20-year BOT arrangement with the Desalination 
Company of Trinidad and Tobago (DESALCOTI) to purchase 109,090 cubic metres per 
day of desalinated water, most of it for the Point Lisas Industrial Estate. DESALCOTI is 
owned 60% by the local company Hafeez Karamath Engineering Services Ltd. and 40% 
by lonics Inc. Start-up equity of US$20 million was provided by DESALCOTI for the 
US$120 million facility. The local Republic Bank through its Finance and Merchant Bank 
subsidiary FINCOR, provided bridge financing in the amount of US$77 million for the 
critical software, work processes, database and management systems to realise improved efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, higher customer service and increased productivity. 
201 Procurement arrangements under the lOA required the finalisation of a purchasing services agreement between 
WASA and nws establishing a Procurement Unit of nws to act as an external purchasing agent on behalf of 
WASA. This did not happen until April 1998 (two years into the lOA). This delay impacted on the processing and 
negotiation of the new World Bank loan to which the implementation of procurement arrangements was a 
prerequisite. Further to this delay, the World Bank requested a redefinition of the rehabilitation loan to fund among 
other things, technical assistance for the implementation of further PSP enhancements, i.e. a long-tenn arrangement. 
The Bank's new position with respect to the availability of rehabilitation and other capital funds was seen as an 
apparent attempt to ensure that the reform process remained on track towards the objective of longer-term PSP 
through a concession-type arrangement. This strategy however starved the lOA of much needed capital to achieve 
the stated service provision targets. 
202 The new Board adhered to the position that it could only be guided by the provisions of the Water and Sewerage 
Act which in their opinion superseded the lOA. In the Board's view, the Act made no provision for a Consultative 
Committee or any such external imposition on the management arrangements for WASA. More fundamentally, the 
Board held that the Act did not allow for any delegation of its statutory obligations. As such, nws personnel 
seconded to top managerial posts in WASA were viewed as individual employees of WASA subject to the directives 
of the Board and not to nwS. 
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construction of the plant from a syndicate of unnamed lenders. Construction and 
commissioning of the facility was delayed by over a year, partly due to difficulty raising 
long-term finance for the project as initial discussions with Japanese and US financiers 
did not realise a positive outcome. Permanent long-term financing for US$112.20 million 
was eventually secured in August 2003 on the local bond market. 
WASA purchases water from DESAlCOTT at TT$4.46 per cubic metre which it then sells 
to the industrial estate for TT$7.50 per cubic metre. Despite this apparent 'profit' for 
WASA, the purchase of desalinated water is still a major financial burden to the utility. 
Approximately 28,200 cubic metres per day is transmitted to improve service to southern 
Trinidad, attracting WASA's normal domestic rates. UFW at approximately 16% for the 
Point lisas Industrial Estate results in additional lost revenue for WASA. 
Contracting and collaborating with private sector entities is a major factor in the 
restructuring process of WASA (see Section 8.4.2). The proposed model for the sector 
makes provisions for private water producers to be contracted to the new utility by 
concessions and BOT-type arrangements and franchised private wastewater service 
providers. 
8.5.3 Local capital market 
Trinidad has a substantial and effective banking and investment infrastructure. Since 
1998, WASA has been authorised to borrow heavily on the local financial market to fund 
a number of development programmes. These included bond capital to fund the lOA, 
voluntary early separation offer, South Water and North Water Projects, water purchase 
from DESAlCOTT and working capital. The majority of these bond issues have been 
guaranteed by the Trinidadian government. A summary of capital market activity in the 
Trinidadian water and sanitation sector is shown in Table 8.10 with the most recent bond 
issue in June 2006 for TT$360 million included in Appendix 7. 
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Table 8.10 Bond activity in the Trinidadian water and sanitation sector 
Period issued Borrower Face value Period to Interest Placement 
. ($ Mnl maturity rate 
June 2006 WASA TI$360.0 10 years 7.50% 
June 2005 WASA TI$435.0 15 years 6.35% 
February 2005 ·WASA US$60.0 . -
June 2004 WASA TI$145.0 15 years 5.85% 
December 2004 WASA TI$52.6 
-
. 
December 2004 WASA TT$500.0 - -
July 2003 WASA TT$413.0 10 years 6.75% 
Augusl2003 DESALCOTT US$112.2 20 years 8.50% 
August 2003 WASA TI$52.0 
- -
December 2003 WASA TT$271.4 12 years 6.10% 
November 2001 WASA TT$330.0 20 years 11.50% 
April 2000 WASA TI$330.0 20 years 11.40% 
September 1999 WASA TT$343.0 20 years 11.45%-
June 1998 WASA TT$80.0 15 years 14.10%b 
September 1998 WASA TT$300.0 20 years 11.50% 
.. 
-
Fixed rata of 11.45% for the first 10 years then a step up rate of 12% for the following 10 years 
°Prime less 3.4%. fnitial rate of 14.1% with an interest rate CAP of 16.1% and a 13.6% floor. 
Source: CBTT(1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2004a; 2004b; 2005) 
8.6 Criteria for private investment in water and sanitation 
8.6.1 Perception of private service providers 
Iv.e 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Several factors emerged as important reasons for respondents' interest in the sector. 
These included: 
• Potential for high returns matched by 'guaranteed to succeed' projects. In 
bidding for the lOA for example, STWI identified the Point Lisas Industrial Estate as 
a high revenue area and proposed tariff adjustments accordingly. Their funding 
proposal was therefore calculated on the strength of this 'guaranteed' revenue 
against a background of good payment discipline by WASA's commercial 
customers. 
• Multilateral and government commitment and support. The lOA was preceded 
by strong government and World Bank support for private investment in the sector 
(PSP as a major policy issue of government plus conditional World Bank funding to 
the tune of US$100 million). There was also an expectation that the lOA would 
evolve into a longer-term concession arrangement with STWI having the 
preferential right subject to performance to negotiate the longer-term arrangement. 
• Opportunity to diversify operations. STWl's local partner previously involved in 
the local construction industry was interested in 'dominating' the construction of 
water and sewerage infrastructure and in exploring other business interests such 
as water supply service provision. For DESALCOTT's local partner also heavily 
involved in the construction sectors of Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean, the 
desalination BOT was considered "more profitable than straight construction. " 
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• Opportunity for growth in the wider Caribbean. "Our vision when we started 
was to get this thing [lOA] to work in Trinidad. We would then use the T7WS 
model and go to Barbados, then to Grenada, then to Jamaica and basically move 
through the Caribbean islands. Our thinking was that if it worked for one then it 
should work for the others." Similarly, STWI was also eyeing potential investment 
opportunities in St. Lucia, Puerto Rico and Guyana. Getting involved in Trinidad 
was therefore seen as a chance to get a foothold in the Caribbean and acquire 
local experience to better align TTWS/STWI for future regional undertakings. 
• Recognition in the company. At the time of the interview, the key business 
interests of Severn Trent Plc. were its solid waste division (Biffa Waste Services), 
product and services division (Severn Trent Services) and UK regulated water 
services (Severn Trent Water)203. In addition, the company was in the process of 
major management changes204 and the Group's continued strategy as a diversified 
water company was uncertain. STWI's position within the Group was especially 
vulnerable given the misfortunes of other international water companies that had 
lost money in the sector. As such, there was keen competition within the Severn 
Trent Group in general and within STWI in particular for the allocation of company 
finances, project selection and recognition. "They [directors] have looked at a large 
number of organisations that have lost money in other places around the world. 
That does not go down too well in the City [London Stock Exchange]. There is that 
pressure, albeit not directly on me, but it is something I have to be aware of. " 
• Project location. Respondents believed that the Caribbean's sun and sand 
appeal gave it a natural advantage over 'less appealing' areas for investment as 
"people like nice places to do business in." It was also suggested that companies 
were more likely to invest in countries they were familiar with or were located within 
easy reach of headquarters. 
• The size of the project. The desalination BOT was the largest seawater 
desalination plant in the western hemisphere and the largest operating reverse 
osmosis seawater desalination plant in the world. For lonics, this was their biggest 
project venture to date. 
203 The Group's core businesses of regulated water, waste and laboratories accounted for 83% of Group revenues 
and over 90% of Group operating profit for 2003/04 (Severn Trent, 2004). 
204 Senior management changes included that of Group Chainnan, Group Chief Executive, Group Finance Director, 
Managing Director of Severn Trent Water and STWl's Managing Director (Severn Trent, 2004). 
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8.6.2 Perception of local financial institutions 
The majority of survey respondents (BO%) scored less than 50 on the UPS which 
indicated a relatively negative attitude towards the water utility (Figure B.2; Appendix 6: 
Table AB). No significant difference in the UPS was observed based on organisation 
category (p=0.077) or investment activity (p=0.192) (Appendix 6: Table A9; Table A 10). 
It should be noted however that non-investors (100%) had a relatively lower perception of 
WASA (UPS<50) compared to investors (72.2%). 
Figure B.2 Utility perception scale range for Trinidadian financial institutions 
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The majority of respondents (76%) considered investment prospects in the sector to be 
acceptable, good or excellent (Appendix 6: Table A 11). While no significant difference 
(p=0.491) was observed in respondents' perception of investment prospects in the sector 
based on organisation category, a significant difference (p=0.017) based on investment 
activity was observed (Appendix 6: Table A12; Table A13). More investors (BB.9%) 
considered investment prospects in the sector to be acceptable, good or excellent 
compared to 42.9% of non-investors. A Significant positive relationship (p=0.02) between 
respondents' perception of WASA and perception of investment prospects in the sector 
was observed (Appendix 6: Table A14). All respondents with a UPS greater than 50 
considered investment prospects in the sector to be acceptable, good or excellent while 
66.7% of respondents with a UPS between 20 and 30 were doubtful about investment 
prospects in the sector (Appendix 6: Table A 15). These findings indicate that there is a 
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tendency for respondents' perception of investment prospects in the sector to improve as 
their perception of WASA also improves. 
In rating factors that would influence the investment decision in the sector, respondents 
had higher regard for economic and financial factors than for institutional factors 
(Appendix 6: Figure A2). Bond issues, credit enhancement mechanisms and 
infrastructure investment funds featured highly among economic and financial factors 
while good capital investment planning, institutional reform and tariffs to reflect the true 
cost of service provision featured highly among institutional factors (Appendix 6: Table 
A16). 
Figure 8.3 Requirements to become involved in the sector (Trinidad) 
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Finally, in terms of personal preferences to get involved in the sector, the most frequently 
mentioned requirements were the provision of government guarantees (36%), improved 
utility management (28%), the availability of well-structured and viable projects (20%) 
and tariffs that realised attractive returns (20%) (Figure 8.3). 
8.6.3 Perception of water sector officials 
Low tariffs, low willingness-to-pay and the regulatory framework were identified as the 
main deterrents to private investment in the local water and sanitation sector. With the 
last tariff increase in 1993 and a tariff structure described as "archaic," respondents were 
of the opinion that "the tariff was a big humbug to investment." Also considered 
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discouraging was the lack of financial incentives to local private service operators to 
invest in the sector. WASA being the only entity entitled to collect rates for example, was 
seen as a contributing factor to the abandonment of several private sewerage treatment 
plants originally established to serve private housing developments. 
8.7 Scope and strategy for private investment in water and sanitation 
8.7.1 Perception of private service providers 
Respondents believed that the future of private investment in Trinidad was the BOT-type 
arrangement similar to that in effect with DESALCOTT. By 'rejecting' the lOA and longer-
term concession arrangement and supporting the desalination BOT, some respondents 
felt that government had inadvertently narrowed the scope for private investment in that a 
model similar to the lOA would be less appealing to private investors compared to a 
BOT. DESALCOTT's water sales agreement to supply the Point Usas Industrial Estate 
was also believed to highlight investment prospects for disaggregating the sector into 
discrete water supply areas. Respondents were therefore in favour of WASA's proposed 
industry restructure wherein some water production/distribution and wastewater 
operations would be contracted to the private sector under BOT-type arrangements. 
In terms of a private investment strategy, respondents recommended: 
• The need for a context-specific strategy. Respondents felt that Trinidad's 
experience with the lOA was probably a result of donors and transaction advisers 
imposing a 'one size fits all' approach instead of addressing the specific needs and 
nuances of the local sector. Issues such as TTWS assuming most of the top 
management positions in WASA, underestimating local potential and adopting a 
"colonial approach" to managing WASA were considered important oversights in 
the lOA strategy. According to one respondent, "I don't think they understood 
Trinidad and Trinidadians. When you are coming in to do something like that in 
Trinidad, you have to come in understanding the people, the culture and the way 
things work. ' 
• The need for a gradual strategy so that 'simpler' forms of PSP would set the 
stage in terms of developing the operating environment for private investment in 
preparation for more 'complex' forms of PSP. 
• The need for a realistic strategy. Respondents opined that government needed 
to appreciate that private investment was not an instant panacea for the failings of 
the sector (especially since private investment was often sought after years of 
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neglect) and as such should not have unrealistic expectations for "overnight 
results." From the viewpoint of an international investor, STWI opined that in a lot 
of cases, countries tended to overvalue their water utilities and in so doing, failed to 
come to grips with what they really had to offer investors. 
• The need for a targeted strategy. Respondents felt that government should do 
more to understand investors' motivations and to create win-win situations. 
• The need for less emphasis on the model/contract and more emphasis on 
putting the appropriate framework in place. Referring to the lOA, respondents 
opined that nothing was 'wrong' with it as it was a good first step for Trinidad given 
the state of the sector. Instead, factors such as the delay in setting-up the 
regulatory framework (6 months before the end of the lOA) and the lack of political 
continuity and commitment to the contract contributed to an inadequate 
environment for its success. 
• The need for a consistent strategy. Referring to government's pro-private 
investment strategy in the 1990s and the current less-inclined private investment 
strategy, respondents generally felt that government was inconsistent and 
transitory in its commitment to private investrnent in the sector. STWl's Business 
Development Manager for example, when asked how facilitating 
governmentIWASAiRIC was to private investment responded, "Last week, now or 
next week?" 
• The need for a supported strategy. Respondents generally felt that the failure of 
the lOA and problems encountered by DESALCOTT was a result of a lack of 
support for private investment by various public sector actors. TTWS for example, 
faced strong criticism and resistance throughout the life of the lOA, partly from 
"detractors within WASA who prejudiced government against it, " WASA's Board 
who "crippled it" and were very "anti-TTWS," government who was "consistently 
against us" (especially having inherited the lOA from a previous administration) and 
civil society who was "suspicious and felt excluded from the process." Similarly, 
DESALCOTT described both government and WASA as "less than helpful" which 
they believed contributed to delays in obtaining long-term financing. 
8.7.2 Perception of local financial institutions 
When asked to rate the investment prospects of the sector based on the use of different 
operational models for private investment, respondents showed a slightly greater 
preference for short-term arrangements such as management/service contracts 
(Appendix 6: Figure A3). When asked to indicate their possible role in the sector, the 
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most frequently mentioned roles were project financing (44%) and providing working 
capital in support of WASA's day-to-day operations (40%) (Figure B.4). 
Figure B.4 Role of financial institutions in the sector (Trinidad) 
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8.7.3 Perception of water sector officials 
Respondents strongly asserted their preference for local private investment in the sector, 
particularly in "non-strategic areas' such as rural service provision using the BOT model 
and wherever applicable, community water associations. Strong anti-foreign private 
sector comments such as "I hate privatisation with a passion" and "foreigners don't have 
any interest in this country" typified this sentiment. As provided for in the proposed 
industry model, BOTs were seen as the most appropriate option for private investment as 
they did not interfere with the day-to-day management of WASA. Concession 
arrangements had limited appeal as doable investment options due to the fact that 
investors would have to operate within the existing legislative framework with limited 
control over the industrial relations climate (as was the case of the lOA). 
In terms of the strategy to encourage private investment in the sector, the following points 
were highlighted by the respondents: 
• The need to link the strategy to more profitable investment opportunities. 
Respondents were mindful of the fact that on its own, the sector would not attract 
significant private investment. "The actual balance sheets at WASA are very poor 
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but the country's rating is high - we piggyback on the strength of our energy 
industry." The strength of the economy and the importance of water in shaping 
continued industrial development were however believed to put Trinidad in a 
unique position compared to other Caribbean countries with respect to being able 
to attract private investment. Respondents therefore believed that a strong 
industrial-based economy presented private investors with more opportunities to 
earn competitive returns in the sector (e.g. water improvement rates for the Point 
Lisas Industrial Estate). 
• The need for an appropriate strategy to suit the local context. While 
respondents acknowledged that in theory the lOA was a timely investment option 
for the sector, the general feeling was that the overall experience "did not fit with 
our culture and the state of the utility." Respondents felt that the same experience 
could have been obtained from a less 'invasive' type of arrangement such as a 
twinning arrangemene05. With regards to the regulatory framework, respondents 
opined that RIC's adopted standards (from Jamaica and the UK) were not 
particularly suited to the local context which made compliance difficult. 
• The need for a strategy that includes/involves all major stakeholders in the 
process. Referring to the lOA, respondents felt that WASA had basically been left 
out of the arrangement. With TTWS assuming the majority of top management 
positions, respondents felt that local management had been disempowered and 
there was little regard for local potential. As put by one respondent, "We do not 
need anybody to come and run this place [WASA] - to be above us. We don't 
subscribe to that." With regards to the desalination BOT, some respondents felt 
that the project was a political decision that had been forced on WASA who now 
had to bear the financial burden of paying for expensive desalinated water. 
• The need to select competent investors. The lOA was criticised on a number of 
levels. Most noticeable was respondents' impassioned account of the calibre of 
persons sent by STWI to manage the lOA and the relationship these persons had 
with WASA personnel. "They sent a set of old people here - people who had 
resigned or retired. A fellow who was the requisition clerk in England, he came 
here and became the Director of the Supplies Department." Respondents felt that 
STWI thinking they were going to ''Africa or India or some real backward area 
where they thought people were illiterate" had not approached the lOA with the 
same businesslike acumen they would normally apply if pursuing a similar 
arrangement elsewhere. STWI was also criticised for approaching the lOA with a 
superior attitude which resulted in a lot of friction and distrust. 
205 Twinning is a concept where utilities from geographically distinct areas are paired with the goal of developing 
management and technical expertise and sharing experiences. 
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• The need for a more diverse strategy. WASA's frequent use of the local capital 
market to finance investments and the resultant high level of indebtedness was a 
major cause for concern. As put by one respondent, "They [commercia/ banks] are 
going to own us [WASA] one day if we continue like that." Respondents were 
therefore interested in pursuing a more diverse investment strategy that accessed 
various types of private financing. 
S.S Small size 
8.8.1 Effect of small size 
The majority of water sector officials (71%) felt that small size affected the Caribbean's 
ability to attract private investment to the sector, especially in the smaller countries of the 
Eastern Caribbean. Limited professional capacity in terms of the number of skilled 
persons available and their level of exposure/experience, and a smaller revenue base 
were identified as the most important effects of small size (Table 8.11). Respondents 
opined that professionals in larger countries/utilities benefited from being exposed to a 
wider range of projects and from more direct liaison with international lending institutions, 
many of which had in-country representatives in the larger islands. Access to larger local 
banking institutions also meant that professionals in the larger countries were better able 
to hone their skills in structuring more complex financing arrangements. In terms of 
limited professional capacity, the provision of specialist skills such as utility regulation 
was considered to be most affected by small size. As put by RIC's Executive Director to 
reflect his frustration in trying to recruit for several critical posts over a two-year period, 
"Getting the staff of the calibre we need is not easy in a small country like this. The 
capabilities are very limited. " 
Table 8.11 Small size effects (Trinidad) 
~,Siie:an,is'si.re?~:f( ,£f;>:£\f":'i-::s:<:s:./:::>';"::f;;"'l'-'?:::::::, Main reasons Qiveri~::0;;S';fRh3>(*',;;:0;:;.L_;:t;~,~ 
YES • Scarcity of trained professionals 
(71%) • Specialist services expensive and unavailable 
• Limited exposure to/experience on big projects 
• Smaller revenue base/limited return on investment 
NO • Regulatory framework and macroeconomic environment 
(29%) more important 
• Not an issue for big capital projects 
Respondents who did not consider small size to affect investment prospects in the sector 
felt that the regulatory framework and macroeconomic environment were more important 
issues for attracting private investment. Big capital project opportunities such as the 
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desalination BOT were believed to transcend the issue of small country size and appeal 
to private investors. 
8.8.2 Response strategies to address size constraints 
8.8.2.1 Regional cooperation 
Water sector officials had mixed views about the prospects for regional cooperation in the 
sector. Sharing professional expertise and experiences, training and standardisation 
towards the development of "realistic utility performance targets for the Caribbean" were 
identified as the most likely areas for regional cooperation in the sector. Respondents 
felt that the onus to spearhead such a regional approach was up to the larger islands 
such as Trinidad and Jamaica, which was explained as the basis for the proposed 
professional collaboration between WASA and NWC. Existing regional institutions such 
as CWWA and CBWMP were challenged to play a stronger role in the sector, possibly 
enabled by stronger and more official commitment from CARICOM. As put by one 
respondent, "Integration has to start at the top." 
Likely challenges to a regional approach in the sector were identified as: 
• Difficulty in getting accurate information due to utilities' fear of being judged or 
compared with others. 
• Difficultly in getting politicians and policy-makers committed to the process. 
• Insularity and the tendency to think about "me first. n 
• Differences in the level of sector development throughout the Caribbean. 
8.8.2.2 Other response strategies 
When asked to suggest strategies to improve small-scale investment opportunities in the 
sector, water sector officials proposed: 
• Grouping projects into larger contracts. 
• Government actively encouraging small investors to get involved. 
Local financial institutions were also highly supportive of 'project bundling' as a means of 
responding to small size issues and improving the investment prospects of the sector 
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(Appendix 6: Figure A4). Respondents were least supportive of the formation of multi-
utilities to offset disadvantages from insufficient size. 
8.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the Trinidadian case study which examined the operating 
environment for private investment in the water and sanitation sector and the perceptions 
of public and private sector actors to criteria for private investment, scope and strategy 
for private investment and size-related response strategies to improve conditions for 
private investment in the sector. Findings from documents, survey questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews were systematically presented for further discussion within the 
context of the literature in the cross-case analysis (Chapter 10). 
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CHAPTER 9 INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTORS AND 
CARIBBEAN WATER PROFESSIONALS: PERCEPTIONS 
9.1 Chapter introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 4, Surveys Band C were conducted outside the case study 
framework to determine (a) international investors' criteria for investing in the utilities 
sector; and (b) the level of awareness of Caribbean water utility managers to investors' 
criteria and their views on regional cooperation as a strategic response to address size 
constraints in the sector. This chapter summarises the findings of both surveys. 
9.2 Criteria for private investment 
Investors generally relied on three main sources for information on new investment 
proposals - themselves as they actively searched and pursued investment opportunities, 
project sponsors as they participated as major stakeholders in project financings and 
host country governments and/or their agencies as they responded to invitations to 
tender (Appendix 6; Table A 17). Project type, past experience, the availability of finance 
and project location were the main means of screening new investment proposals 
(Appendix 6, Table A18). Reasons for investing abroad were mainly strategic as fits 
business strategy, large market growth potential and competitive advantage featured 
highly as motives for international activity (Appendix 6; Table A 19). 
To identify investors' priorities when choosing where to invest and to evaluate factors that 
contributed to their investment successes and failures, questions 7 and 8 of Survey B 
asked respondents to rate the importance of factors that influenced these investment 
decisions and outcomes. In assessing country conditions, investors gave top priority to 
factors such as government commitment, market size and regulatory independence 
(Figure 9.1). The degree to which various factors contributed to investors' best and worst 
investment experiences varied which was most likely a reflection of the various 
circumstances in which investments take place. Two factors however emerged as very 
important to both investment success and failure - regulatory commitment throughout the 
life of the contract and the ability to eam reasonable returns from tariffs and good 
revenue collection practices (Figure 9.2). Of note, factors that stood out as very 
important to investment failure included government response or lack of to investors' 
needs, arbitrary regulatory processes and lack of government commitment. 
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Figure 9.1 International investors' priorities when choosing where to invest 
History of govemment honouring its macro- and miCroec:onomic commitments • I I 
Adequate martet size to generate required revenue stream 
I I I 
Regulatory independence from government interference 
I I 
Administrative effICiency resulting in minimum time for approvals and licences ... 
I I I 
Amount and quality of informatioo available 
I I I I 
Track record of oonsumer payment dISCipline and enforcement 
I I I 
Transaction costs compared to size of investment , 
I I 
Good investment grade rating for long-tenn foreign e.o:change debt 
I I I 
Tenure and stability of elected officials in political process 
I I 
Availabilfty of credit enhancement mechanisms , 
I I 
Positive market signals from similar locations/investments 
I I I 
Achievement of standard l1li~ty performance Indicators • I I I Potential for horizontal integration with other utility sectors 
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Figure 9.2 What makes for the best and worst investment experiences 
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Survey B also sought to ascertain investors' specific preferences in terms of investment 
location. Investments in Asia and Europe were most favourably rated while up to 75% of 
investors considered Africa to have low potential as an investment destination (Appendix 
6: Table A20). When asked about investment activity in the Caribbean, 54.5% of 
respondents indicated that they had no knowledge of investment prospects in the region. 
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41.7% of respondents admitted to having invested in the Caribbean and being fairly 
satisfied with these investments. As put by one respondent, "The risk-reward balance of 
investments in the Caribbean is okay if structured correctly.' Investors not active in the 
region either claimed that investing in the Caribbean was not a strategic objective due to 
focus elsewhere or the region was not amenable to investment as "we only permit 
investment in countries which have passed certain regulatory and legal hurdles and are 
allowable markets for investment." 
Using similar constructs as question 7 in Survey B, question 6 of Survey C asked 
Caribbean water utility managers to rate the importance of factors that they believed 
influenced investors' choices when deciding where to invest. The Mann-Whitney test 
was used to discern differences in the relative ranking of factors by international investors 
and Caribbean water utility managers (Appendix 6: Table A21). There was no significant 
difference (p>0.05) in the mean ranking of locational investment decision-making factors 
by both sets of respondents, thereby indicating that Caribbean water utility managers 
were generally aware of investors' priorities when choosing an investment location. 
9.3 Promotion strategy for private investment in water and sanitation 
Survey C also sought to capture Caribbean water utility managers' views on promoting 
private investment in the sector. The majority of respondents (90.5%) felt that a targeted 
investment promotion strategy was necessary for the sector. Respondents gave top 
priority to a promotion strategy focused on image-building activities to improve the 
sector's image within the investment community with 38.1 % considering this the most 
important investment promotion activity (Appendix 6: Table A22). 
9.4 Effect of small size 
Both surveys sought to determine respondents' views on the importance of size-related 
factors to attracting private investment in the sector. In assessing the extent to which 
various factors affected their investments in small countries, international investors 
prioritised economic and financial factors such as high transaction costs and higher 
borrowing costs (Appendix 6: Table A23). Caribbean water utility managers also 
considered economic and financial factors such as a small revenue base to have 
important implications to the success of private investments in the Caribbean. For both 
sets of respondents, project bundling, shared professional expertise across projects and 
financing options to reduce cost emerged as the most favourable responses to improve 
investment opportunities where small size posed as a constraint to private investment in 
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the sector (Appendix 6: Table A24). Investors' preferred project size showed a bias for 
large-valued projects with the majority indicating a preference for projects valued over 
US$50 million (Figure 9.3). 
Figure 9.3 Investors' preferred investment size 
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Caribbean water utility managers were asked a series of question to determine their 
attitudes towards regional cooperation and the range of issues they felt could fall under a 
regional cooperation scheme. Increased bargaining power, achieving economies of 
scale and the opportunity to pool resources to attract external funding were considered 
the most important benefits of regional cooperation in general (Appendix 6: Table A25). 
Specific to the sector, respondents were in strong agreement that a regional approach 
would be more relevant to more generic areas such as information exchange and 
technical training than to areas such as investment promotion, regulation and operations 
which they considered to be very location-specific (Appendix 6: Table A26). Lack of 
political support, different national interests and financial dependency of a regional body 
on national governments were prioritised as the most likely challenges to regional 
cooperation in the sector (Appendix 6: Table A27). 
Finally, to ascertain respondents' preferences for regional membership, question 14 of 
Survey C asked respondents to indicate likely partners for regional cooperation in the 
sector. The results indicated a general tendency for respondents from the smaller 
Caribbean islands to partner with other small islands (Figure 9.4). Conversely, 
respondents from the larger islands of Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad showed greater 
preference to partner with each other. When asked to indicate the basis for these 
209 
Chapter 9 -Intarnational private Investors and Caribbean water professionals: PerceptiOlls 
preferences. dealing with similar issues and level of development featured highly among 
respondents' choices (Appendix 6: Table A28). 
Figure 9.4 Preferences for regional grouping 
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9.S Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the results of Surveys Band C which were conducted outside of 
the case study framework. Survey B determined the interests of international institutional 
investors in the utilities sector to identify factors important when choosing an investment 
destination and factors that impacted on investment performance. Survey C determined 
Caribbean water utility managers' awareness of factors important to investors in the 
sector and assessed their attitudes towards regional cooperation in the sector. The 
findings of both surveys are discussed alongside those of the case studies within the 
context of the literature in the cross-analysis and discussion chapter (Chapter 10). 
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CHAPTER 10 CROSS-CASE ANAL VSIS AND DISCUSSION 
10.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter draws on the findings of case study data presented in chapters 6, 7, and 8 
and the findings of Surveys Band C presented in chapter 9 to answer the research 
questions which are repeated in Figure 10.1 for ease of reference. 
Figure 10.1 Schematic of research hypothesis and questions 
Research hypothesis 
Factors that determine private investment in water and sanitation vary in importance and 
relevance; hence a context-specific approach is needed to attract private investment to the 
Caribbean water and sanitation sector. 
Primary research question 
How can private investment be attracted to the Caribbean water and sanitation sector? 
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 
Conducive Investment Investment Small size 
environment decision- promotion 
makinQ 
Secondary Secondary Secondary Secondary 
question 1 question 2 question 3 question 4 
What is the What are the What is the To what extent 
current state of main scope for and is size an issue 
the operating determinants or strategy to and what is the 
environment criteria for attract private scope for 
and how private investment to addressing 
conducive is it investment in the water and small size as a 
to private the water and sanitation constraint to 
investment? sanitation sector? attracting 
sector? private 
investment? 
Variables Variables Variables Variables 
• Institutional • Drivers • Model for • Constraints 
• Economic • Constraints private • Response 
and financial investment strategies 
• Socio-political • Type of 
investor 
• Promotion 
strategy 
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10.2 Overview of the operating environment 
Sections 6.4, 7.4 and 8.4 provided an overview of the operating environment in the 
Jamaican, Barbadian and Trinidadian water and sanitation sectors respectively. An 
overview of the macroeconomic environment situated the operating environment within a 
broad country context. Policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks specific to the 
sector provided a within industry assessment. Collectively, the macro and micro-outlook 
defined the incumbent operating environment for private investment. To answer the 
question, "What is the current state of the operating environment and how conducive is it 
to private investment?" requires an examination of the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats to the operating environment from an investor's perspective. 
This section therefore discusses the extent to which the operating environment in each 
case location encouraged (discouraged) or had the potential to encourage (discourage) 
private investment in the sector. A SWOT analysis of the operating environment in each 
case location is summarised in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 for reference. To facilitate 
evaluation across case locations, a 1-2-3 ranking system is used where appropriate to 
characterise the operating environment (1 being most favourable and 3 least favourable 
to private investment). Both the SWOT analysis and 1-2-3 numeric ranking are based on 
the author's interpretation of the research data. 
Table 10.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the operating environment 
. . Strengths Weaknesses 
• Separation of institutional responsibilities • NWC's conflicting regulatory powers 
<! 
• Policy sets out criteria and scope for private investment 
0 • Independent economic and service standards regulator 
T • Regulatory framework for private service providers • Provision for return on capital/profit in rate determination 
<! 
• System of gradual tariff increases ..., 
• Stake holder involvement through public consultations 
• Dedicated Water Ministry/corporate division within NWC 
• Evolvina Dro-Drivate leaislative and reQulatory frameworks 
'" 
• Draft policy advocates BOT-type arrangements • Policy still in draft form since 1997 0 
C • Recent revision of tariff structure and rates • Legislation BWA-specific 
<! • Process of policy formulation involves major stakeholders • Poorly-defined institutional arrangements !XI 
IX in the decision-making process • Self-regulation by BWA 
<! • Limited professional capacity !XI 
• BWA's poor financial performance 
• Govemment policy commitment to encourage private • Policy still in draft form since 2002 
C investment • Legislation/regulatory framework WASA-specific 
<! • Regulatory framework expanded to provide for • No dear separation of service provision and water 
C independent regulation of service quality standards resource management responsibilities 
Z • Potential conflict of interest with RIC and WASA reporting a: to same line ministry 
... 
• Rate determination excluded from RIC's mandate 
• Outdated tariff structure and tariffs unchanged since 1993 
• WASA's poor financial performance 
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Table 10.2 Opportunities and threats to the operating environment 
Opportunities Threats 
< • Pending WSSS Act to further empower OUR • High interest rate regime 
tJ • Pending Rural Water Supply Ltd. to separate urban and • High inflation rate 
" 
rural water supply • Fluctuating currency 
:lE 
< • History of small privately operated rural water supply • Large public debt ..., systems 
• Inadequate coverage especially for sewerage services 
• Stable currency • Historic dominance of public investment since 1895 
• Low inflation 
.. :g • Low interest rates 
C • High GOP per capita 
< • Good local and foreign credit rating III 
• Well-developed banking and insurance sectors 
.", 
.. I'i! • Water scarcity providing options for private investment 
• Inadequate sewerage coverage by BWA 
• Pending sector reform to have FTC assume economic/ 
service regulation duties, restrict BWA 10 service provision 
and introduce leqislative framework to support PPPs 
• Stable currency • Strong opposition to foreign private investment 
• Subdued inflation 
• Moderate interest rates 
C • Good local and foreign credit rating 
< • Well-developed banking sector C 
Z • Inadequate serviceJhigh demand from industrial sector 
~ • Proposed Water Industries Act to rationalise institutional 
.... responsibilities 
• Proposed reorganisation of WASA using various 
management models induding BOTs, concessions, etc. 
• Planned sector reform to establish legal and regulatory 
frameworks 
10.2.1 Macroeconomic environment 
There was a clear difference in the macroeconomic environment across case locations. 
The Barbadian and Trinidadian economies were characterised by more stable 
currencies, more subdued inflation and lower interest rates than the Jamaican economy 
to result in a 1-2-3 ranking for Barbados, Trinidad and Jamaica respectively (Table 10.3). 
Anecdotal evidence pointed to the role of the macroeconomic environment in 
encouraging private investment in the sector. In many developing countries, BOT-type 
contracts typically specify payment in a stable currency such as US dollars to mitigate 
fluctuations in interest rates, inflation, taxes and price/cost increases which can affect 
profits (Bond and Carter, 1994; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). In Barbados however, 
investor confidence in the long-term stability of the Barbadian economy was reflected in 
IFL's acceptance of payment in Barbadian dollars over the life of the 15-year BOT even 
though the contract had a significant US dollar component. In Trinidad, the prospect of a 
strong industrial-based economy overshadowed the poor performance of the sector so 
that investors were prepared to overlook obvious shortfalls. Conversely, Jamaica's high 
inflation, currency instability and high interest rates were 'hostile' to private investment 
with local investors discouraged from sourcing finance locally and foreign investors 
keenly aware of inflationary pressure on profits. 
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Table 10.3 Cross-case ranking of the macroeconomic environment 
GDP per capita 3 1 2 
GDP growth 3 2 1 
Inflation 3 1 2 
Exchange rate 3 1 2 
Interest rate 3 1 2 
~Pu~b~lic~d~e~b~t __ -4 __ ~3 __ -+ __ ~2 __ -+ ___ 1 
LO~v.~rn~I~lr~a~nk~i~n~~~3~~~~1~-L __ ~2 
1 = Most favourable; 3 = Least favourable 
Anecdotal and empirical evidence in the privatisation literature also support this intuitive 
positive relationship between the macroeconomic environment and attracting private 
investment. The Asian financial crisis in the mid-1990s for example is generally 
associated with the fall-off in private investment activity in the sector (Baietti, 2001; Green 
and Campos, 2001). In a study of the water sector in several Latin American countries, 
Pargal (2003) established that richer economies generated higher private investment 
flows in the sector and higher interest rates negatively affected investment volume. If 
extrapolated to the research context, such evidence may explain the difference in 
monetary value of BOTs across the case locations with larger-valued BOTs in Barbados 
and Trinidad than in Jamaica. Regardless, the anecdotal evidence from the case studies 
supports the established position that the macroeconomic environment is important in 
creating conducive conditions for private investment in the sector. 
10.2.2 Institutional arrangements 
Of the three cases examined, the institutional arrangements in the Jamaican water and 
sanitation sector were the most conducive to private investment (Table 10.4). The sector 
was characterised by well-defined institutions with the various agencies assigned clear 
roles and responsibilities and given the necessary capacity to carry out their mandate. 
Chief among these was the establishment of a dedicated water ministry with a very 
focused policy mandate for the sector, the presence of an empowered independent 
economic regulator and the establishment of a strategic planning unit within NWC tasked 
to address private investment issues in the sector. Institutional arrangements were 
generally less robust in Barbados and Trinidad with less visible separation of policy, 
service provision and economic regulation responsibilities. 
The importance of institutional arrangements to creating conducive conditions for private 
investment is reflected in the effectiveness of said institutions to implement these 
provisions (Seppala, 2002). So as to avoid repetition, the impact of institutional 
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arrangements on private investment in the sector is assessed alongside the examination 
of the policy, legal and regulatory environment for private investment in Section 10.2.3. 
Table 10.4 Cross-case ranking of institutional arrangements 
Separation of roles 
Institutional caDacitv 
Overall rankina 1 
3 
3 
3 
1 '" Most favourable, 3 '" Least favourable 
10.2.3 Policy, legal and regulatory frameworks 
2 
2 
2 
In accordance with intuition, the case studies highlighted the importance of the policy, 
legal and regulatory environment to encourage private investment in the sector. When 
characterised in terms of the six criteria proposed by Stern and Holder (1999) to assess 
the adequacy of regulatory governance, the Jamaican case study ranked highest in 
terms of the extent to which support for private investment was provided by the 
regulatory framework (Table 10.5). To Jamaica's credit was the presence of an 
independent regulator, pending sector-specific legislation to empower regulatory 
governance and the practice of public consultations on regulatory decisions. As 
mentioned in the previous section, institutions were less robust in Barbados and Trinidad. 
In both cases for example, policy changes to address the role of private investment and 
remedy regulatory uncertainties remained in draft form. In Barbados, the FTC although 
legally identified as the economic regulator had never operated as such. In Trinidad, the 
regulatory authority of RIC was restrictive despite being the location with the longest 
tradition of economic regulation in the sector. 
Table 10.5 Cross-case ranking of the regulatory framework 
*;j:::r;;dridicator,"',~," '( '{"Ja'maica1"':: .:Barbados-', ;" Trinidad; 
Clarity of roles 1 3 2 
Autonomy 1 3 2 
Accountability 1 3 2 
Participation 1 3 2 
Transpar~I~~Y 1 3 2 
Predictabili 1 3 2 
Overall rankinQ 1 3 2 
-
-1 Most favoorable. 3 - Least favourable 
In terms of providing a supportive environment for private investment, the case studies 
demonstrated several instances where policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks 
mattered. In Jamaica, investor confidence in the clear pro-private position of the Water 
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Sector Policy, government commitment despite unresolved legal obstacles and 
occasional NWC interference and OU R's autonomy and commercial focus was reflected 
in a noticeable increase in local investor interest and activity. In addition, the policy, legal 
and regulatory environment was conducive to encouraging a variety of private investment 
options including private utilities and BOTs. In Barbados and Trinidad where the legal 
and regulatory frameworks remained public sector/investment oriented, private activity 
was essentially limited to BOTs which by nature operated independently of the prevailing 
regulatory environment. The importance of having a clearly defined legal and regulatory 
framework was particularly obvious in the Trinidadian case study with the lOA. By not 
modifying legislation governing WASA and delaying the implementation of a new 
regulatory regime under RIC, the lOA was characterised by conflict and tension between 
TTWS and WASA's Board which not only contributed to the unsatisfactory end of the lOA 
but led to the breakdown in negotiations for a longer-term arrangement. 
These observations are largely consistent with anecdotal and empirical evidence in the 
privatisation literature where the regulatory framework is often singled out as the most 
important determinant of private investment in the sector. Case study appraisals by 
economic consultants NERA (1998) of regulatory governance across six developing 
Asia-Pacific countries presented anecdotal evidence on the extent of support for private 
investment provided by the regulatory framework. Basic frameworks capable of 
delivering good standards of regulation in the Philippines water sector for example, 
coincided with the increased (though limited) introduction of private capital in the sector. 
Econometric work by Pargal (2003) on the ability of regulatory frameworks to attract 
private investment in nine Latin American countries found a highly positive correlation 
between private investment levels and the existence of a regulatory body. 
10.2.4 Summary assessment of the operating environment 
Empirical research on the cause and effect relationship between the operating 
environment and private investment generally highlight two issues that can potentially 
affect results. First is that of endogeneity bias where instead of the intuitive expectation 
of the regulatory environment for example driving private investment, the reality may be 
the reverse with private investment driving regulatory reform. The water sector is 
considered particularly susceptible to this error as in many cases private investment has 
preceded sectoral restructuring (Jensen and Blanc-Brude, 2005). In such circumstances, 
the regulatory framework may have been created as a condition for private investment. 
As such, an assumption that causation runs exclusively from the regulatory arrangement 
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to the level of private investment may not be sustainable as unexplored and/or 
interrelated factors are not independently considered. The potential for endogeneity bias 
was also evident in the case studies. In both Barbados and Trinidad, private investment 
became a reality not because of provisions in the legal and regulatory framework but in 
response to crisis situations. Since then however, changes to the legal and regulatory 
framework have been actively considered such as the proposed Water Industries Act in 
Trinidad to rationalise institutional responsibility in the sector. Private utilities existed in 
Jamaica long before the Water Sector Policy and OUR. Subsequently the policy, legal 
and regulatory environment has played catch-up to formally accommodate private 
enterprise. A snapshot examination of the operating environment could therefore lend 
itself to an assumption that certain factors facilitated private investment when in fact other 
forces were also at work. 
Second is the assumption of a nonlinear relationship between determinants of private 
investment and the predicted occurrence of private investment. As Jensen and Blanc-
Brude (2006) assume in their investigation of factors influencing private investment 
- volume in 60 developing countries, relationships are best described by the natural log 
function where beyond a certain threshold the effect of the variables tends to wear off. 
This interestingly raises the question of the level of effort necessary to create a 
conducive environment for private investment and to what extent it is necessary to aspire 
towards 'best practice' recommendations if beyond a certain level, additional 
'improvements' to the operating environment are unlikely to make a significant difference 
in the level of private investment. In the Barbados case for example, despite the 
absence of 'best practice' legal and regulatory provisions such as an independent 
regulator, private investment under a contractual arrangement was still possible. Is it 
therefore necessary considering the cost of developing and maintaining regulatory 
capacity for Barbados to attempt to establish the 'best practice' model for regulatory 
governance? Instead of looking towards developing best practice guidelines, an 
alternate approach may be for countries like those in the Caribbean to first decide what 
level and type of private investment they want and then to strive towards developing the 
minimum facilitative environment to attract this investment. 
Admittedly it is difficult to prove direct causation between the macroeconomic 
environment, institutional arrangements and policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks 
and their propensity to encourage private investment in the sector. This is because it-is 
difficult to 'unpack' and quantify what are essentially cross-cutting and multidimensional 
variables. The evidence from the research however indicated that as a group these 
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variables were important in terms of providing an environment where investors felt 
confident in the rule of law and protection of their investments. 
10.3 Criteria for private investment in the water and sanitation sector 
Sections 6.6, 7.6 and 8.6 presented private service providers' and local financial 
institutions' criteria for investment in the Jamaican, Barbadian and Trinidadian water and 
sanitation sectors respectively. The investment criteria of international investors were 
presented in section 9.2. Caribbean water sector officials' insights into various criteria for 
private investment in the sector were also presented in sections 6.6,7.6,8.6 and 9.2. In 
answering the question, "What are the main determinants or criteria for private 
investment in the water and sanitation sector?" this section discusses the main 
investment criteria of both local and international private investors. 
10.3.1 Investment criteria 
Although assessed independently, the investment criteria of different types of investors 
(local vs. international and service providers vs. financial institutions) shared many 
similarities, thereby supporting the notion that there is wide applicability of investors' 
criteria because of the generic nature of investment decision-making (Feeney et al., 
1999). Profitability and expectations of realising reasonable returns featured highly 
among investors' motivation to invest in the sector. More specifically, opportunities that 
boosted investors' chances of financial success, that is 'controlled risk-high reward' 
situations were important incentives for investment. Service providers for example, were 
keen to respond to opportunities that 'guaranteed' financial success such as serving 
niche markets or capitalising on the utility's failure to provide adequate levels of service. 
Similarly, local financial institutions had high regard for enhancement mechanisms such 
as government guarantees to protect their investments and desired financially viable 
projects to maximise their investments. 
Empirical evidence in the privatisation literature also demonstrates the importance of the 
risk-return relationship to the investment decision. Using a dataset of 460 project 
observations in 45 countries between 1990-2005, Jensen and Blanc-Brude (2005) found 
that investors' decision to invest in the sector was influenced by the expected risk and 
return associated with project-specific and to a lesser extent, macroeconomic 
characteristics (significant at the 10% level). Investors were willing to take on more risk if 
the expected returns from the investment were high enough. Anecdotal evidence in the 
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literature also supports this view. Financing for the US$284 million 20-year BOT in Johor 
Malaysia was achieved in record time (within 3 months after signing) as a result of the 
attractive cash profile of the project and the availability of long-term local finance at 
reasonable rates (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1997). Similarly, after initial disinterest by local 
investors in the sector, the first bond issue by the Tamil Nadu (India) water and sanitation 
pooled fund in November 2000 of US$21.3 million was eventually oversubscribed by 
US$1.3 million after safeguards to ensure repayment were put in place (PADCO, 2003). 
Investors also reiterated the importance of institutional factors such as the existence of 
clear and enabling policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks to their investment 
decisions. Also important was government's commitment and support for private 
investment. There is ample anecdotal evidence in the literature to confirm the 
importance of these criteria to the private investment decision in the sector. During the 
1990s, Latin American countries dominated private investment activity both in terms of 
total investment and number of projects. Besides being attractive in terms of their large 
economies, populations and levels of urbanisation, the level of private investment in the 
region was also attributed to the extent of constitutional and sectoral reforms compared 
to other regions which facilitated international private activity (Sader, 1999; Budds and 
McGranahan, 2003). In Jakarta, the absence of primary legislation or clear regulatory 
principles resulted in problems arising from conflicts of interest with the former public 
utility, discrepancies regarding responsibility for tariff increases and inadequate treatment 
of dispute resolution. Consequently, the Jakarta water concessions have been 
characterised by continuous renegotiations with the concessionaires periodically 
threatening termination (Jensen, 2005). 
Empirical evidence also corroborates the research findings. A 2003 survey of 400 
stakeholders including local/international financiers and public/private operators in the 
LAC region for example, identified features such as inadequate regulatory frameworks 
with respect to pricing policies, the lack of regulatory institutions and the lack of clarity in 
regulatory processes as the most critical barriers to increasing investment in the water 
and sanitation sector (IDB, 2003a). In testing the relationship between commitment and 
investment in the electricity sector using long-term panel data, Bergara et al. (1998) 
found that government commitment (measured by a political constraints index) was a 
significant determinant of investment in the sector. The results are expected to hold for 
the water sector given industry similarities such as high sunk costs and a high degree of 
politicisation, features that make both sectors particularly vulnerable to government 
reneging on promises or changing policies once the initial investment has occurred. 
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Finally, besides the 'predictable' criteria for investment as discussed above, anecdotal 
evidence from the research indicated that investors in the sector were also driven by 
personal motives such as job security, remuneration, recognition and comfort. This was 
particularly relevant to investors affiliated with large overseas companies. Company x in 
Jamaica and STWI in Trinidad both represented small non-core business divisions of 
large multinational companies. Both managers were therefore keen to have successful 
projects that would bring them recognition in the parent company. International service 
providers were also motivated to continue working in the Caribbean water and sanitation 
sector due to pleasant surroundings and working conditions. Similar projects in 'less 
hospitable' locations evoked a 'let's just get it done and get out of here' attitude while in 
the case locations famous for their sun, sea and sand appeal, investors were more 
enthusiastic to 'hang around' by going so far as to actively generate additional projects. 
Such motives although rarely discussed in the privatisation literature, intuitively may 
factor as important supplementary reasons for investment once more traditional criteria 
have been satisfied. Wheeler and Mody (1992) for example, included expatriate comfort 
as a measure of risk and found that the overall risk variable had a positive albeit small 
effect on FDI location. Factors that can potentially affect investor comfort however such 
as infrastructure quality, level of development and cultural compatibility have all been 
proven to have positive significant effects on investment choices (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992; Lim, 2001; Galan and Gonzalez-Benito, 2006). As such, given a choice, investors 
may opt for 'nice' places to do business where amenities are of a certain standard and 
there is minimum cultural distance. 
10.3.2 Investor perception 
Intuitively, investor perception was expected to be important to investment decision-
making in terms of the way in which investors' regard for investment prospects in the 
sector was influenced by their feeling and judgement of the sector. Empirical testing of 
this subjective indicator of investment measured by the UPS found a significant positive 
relationship (p=0.014) between local financiers' perception of the water utility and their 
perception of investment prospects in the sector (Appendix 6: Table A33). This 
correlation indicated a tendency for investors' assessment of investment prospects in the 
sector to improve as their perception of the utility also improved. This relationship was 
very significant for non-investors (p=0.003) (Appendix 6: Table A34) whose low 
perception of the utility (compared to investors) paralleled their views of low investment 
prospects in the sector and their reluctance to invest in the sector. In Trinidad for 
220 
Chapter 10- Cross-casa analysis and discussion 
example, 28% of the financial institutions surveyed indicated that improved utility/sector 
management would be a prerequisite to them investing in the sector. Accordingly, the 
status of the utility/sector and investors' judgement of such were important to their 
investment choices. 
The privatisation literature also places a high premium on the status of the utility as a 
determinant for private investment. In assessing the sector, public water utilities usually 
undergo extensive scrutiny of their operations and finances to determine their productivity 
and viability. This is because public water utilities are often plagued by problems such as 
poor commercial practices (e.g. Iow tariffs and levels of revenue recovery), poor 
operational practices (e.g. irregular maintenance and inadequate service coverage), 
overstaffing, inadequate managerial capacity and political intervention which can render 
them inefficient and uneconomical and hence potentially risky investments (ldelovitch 
and Ringskog, 1995; Briscoe, 1999a; 1999b; Lee and Floris, 2003). The very poor state 
of many water utilities in sub-Saharan African cities for example, has deterred many 
international investors and resulted in situations where investors and governments have 
been unable to reach agreements in contract negotiations such as Nairobi (Kenya) and 
Gweru (Zimbabwe) (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). As is often the case however, once 
government has made the decision to attract private investment to the sector, a 
programme of reform and rehabilitation of the utility is undertaken to establish an 
autonomous, commercially orientated and financially viable entity backed by appropriate 
forms of governance and regulation (Mehta, 2003). In Buenos Aires, Manila, Conakry 
and Cartegena for example, the utility workforce was substantially reduced as a 
productivity enhancing measure in the run-up to privatisation to make them more 
attractive to private investors (Braadbaart, 2002). The assumptions therefore commonly 
underlying such efforts to improve the position of the utility are that without them there 
would be minimal interest for private investment in the sector (Ibid.). 
Empirical research in the privatisation literature rarely focus on investors' perception of 
the utility per se as a determinant for investment but on investors' attitudes towards 
broader issues such as pricing policies and governance. As such, the research was 
unique in its investigation of investors' perception of the utility as a determinant for 
investment in the sector. Given the difficulty in quantifying subjective indicators such as 
perception, the UPS proved to be a good indicator of actual utility performance and 
hence a potentially good predictor of the investment potential of the sector. As shown in 
Table 10.6, utility performance varied in each case location. The working rati0206 which is 
206 The working ratio is the ratio of annual operating costs less depreciation and interest payments to annual 
operating revenues. The best practice working ratio for developed countries is about 0.7. A working ratio of more 
than 1 means that a utility fails to recover its operating costs from annual revenue. Less than 1 means that it 
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an indication of the financial health of an organisation indicated a 1-2-3 rating for NWC, 
BWA and WASA respectively with one representing the best performing utility. NWC's 
performance was characterised by higher collection efficiencies, higher operating profit 
margins and lower staff to connection ratios. Collectively, these features indicated that 
NWC had exhibited a more commercial approach to service provision and was more 
efficient than the other case utilities. NWC's position was also aided by a programme of 
regular tariff adjustments, indexed tariff structures and rates that provided for 
rehabilitation and capital expenditure. Lower tariffs, higher debt service obligations, low 
collection efficiencies and higher staff to connection ratios contributed to WASA's pattern 
of loss-making and poor performance relative to that of NWC and BWA. 
Table 10.6 Cross-case comparison of utility financial and operational data 
. Industry Jamaica Barbados Trinidad 
I benchmark207 (2003) (2003) (2002) 
'. 
Working ratio 
. 
0.7 1.0 1.2 1.2 
Debt seryice ratio, " . 35% 31% 50% 
Operating profit O)ai"gin . -12% -38% ·131% 
: C~lIe~tion effiCie,n'cY, , ' 
•••• 
s3 months 89% 65% 68% 
, Siaffper' 1000 c'6'nriections s5 6 9 11 
EmploY,~e CosUtotal,'cOs(: <40% 46% 36% 45% 
Se'rviCe'coverage (water)" • - 74% 98% 82%208 
: Service coverage (sewage) , 
-
18% 6% 15% 
Unaccounted-for-water-(UFW) <23% 65% 60% 45% 
Investors' perception of their respective case utility captured by the UPS matched actual 
utility performance. There was a very highly significant difference (p=O.OOO) in the UPS 
across case locations (Appendix 6: Table A29). As shown in Figure 10.2, financial 
institutions in Trinidad had a consistently lower opinion of WASA compared to similar 
institutions in Jamaica and Barbados. Barbadian financial institutions had the most 
positive perception of their utility, closely followed by their Jamaican counterparts. 
Statistically however, there was no significant difference (p=0.258) in the UPS between 
the two countries (Appendix 6: Table A30). Trinidad's UPS was found to be significantly 
very different from that of Jamaica's (p=0.001) and Barbados' (p=0.000) (Appendix 6: 
Table A31; Table A32). Respondents' comments during interviews also reflected their 
perception of the local utility (Table 10.7). In general there were more 'negative' remarks 
about WASA than for NWC and BWA thereby corroborating the UPS ranking of case 
utilities. As a rating system therefore, the UPS served as a good indicator and predictor 
of the investment potential of the water and sanitation sector. 
recovers operating costs and some or all of investment costs. A significant number of utilities in developing countries 
fail to cover operating costs leading to under-investment in assets and a lower level and quality of service. The 
working ratio is more than 1 for about 17% of utilities (IBNET. 2005) . 
• " As per IBNET (2005). 
208 Service coverage figure misleading as only 18% of the population receives a continuous water supply. 
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Figure 10.2 Cross-case boxplot of UPS 
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Table 10.7 Quotes pertaining to respondents' perception of case utilities 
Location Respondents' perception of the water utility 
Jamaica "We feel that there is a new spirit in the NWC and we like it.· 
"We have good relations with the NWC." 
·You can't trust them INWC]." 
"They [NWC] are not reliable in making payments," 
"I don't wish to be maligning the NWC but none of their plants are operating 
anywhere close to design." 
"It's a fact that NWC is not so easy to work with." 
Barbados "The BWA is taken as a bit of a joke," 
"They [SWA] have pretty good financial controls and government gives them 
whatever support they need: 
"The BWA for all its problems pays its bills," 
"The BWA needs to take business seriously and operate along commercial lines." 
"The BWA can't stand on its own so we would not be interested in it.M 
gSWA's structure lends itself to weak financial operations.-
Trinidad "WASA is notably known to be very inefficient.-
"WASA is bankrupt. It would be in receivership tomorrow if the govemment 
withdrew support." 
"When we look at WASA's balance sheets and financial statements, we realise 
that this is an entity that doesn't make money." 
"They {tonics] haven't come across a client [WASA] where they have had so 
many problems in getting paid." 
"WASA does not provide you with a product and when they do provide it, they 
don't meter it and don't get paid for the service." 
10.4 Scope and strategy for private investment 
Sections 6.7. 7.7 and 8.7 presented respondents' views on appropriate models for private 
investment and strategies to attract private investment to the Jamaican. Barbadian and 
Trinidadian water and sanitation sectors respectively. In answering the question. What 
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is the scope for and strategy to attract private investment to the water and sanitation 
sector?" this section discusses appropriate forms of private investment and ways to 
encourage this private investment given the local context and conditions. 
10.4.1 Scope for private investment 
BOTs were generally regarded as the most feasible option for private investment in the 
sector. Described as "attractive" and "convenient" by water sector officials, BOT-type 
arrangements were highly favoured because of their use in augmenting supply without 
committing the utility to large upfront service expansion costs, their suitability in areas 
considered "non-strategic" by the utility and their ability to maintain the status quo by not 
interfering with utility operation and management. In all three case locations, BOTs were 
essentially used to address service shortfalls especially where the respective utilities 
were not in a position (financially and/or strategically) to do so. In Barbados and Trinidad 
for example, BOTs were used to deliver large-scale expensive desalination projects at a 
time when BWA and WASA had to respond to crisis situations. In Jamaica, BO projects 
were encouraged at the community level to serve rural communities that were of little 
commercial interest to NWC. In all three locations, the BOT model was also widely used 
in the provision of sewerage services to discrete housing developments that were either 
outside the· utilities' service area or could not be handled by the utilities' oversubscribed 
system. BOTs were also the preferred means of investment by local financiers with the 
majority indicating an interest in providing project financing for the sector. 
The privatisation literature also illustrates a similar appeal for BOTs in many developing 
countries where governments see them as a way to relieve the financial burden of the 
state, fast-track projects and attract international investment and technology (Quartey, 
1996; Vinter, 1998; Wolfs and Wood roffe , 2002). Like the case studies, BOTs are also 
seen as an attractive way to expand systems because they do not require changes in the 
way public utilities operate or are managed and there is no direct transfer from 
government (Spiller and Savedoff, 1999). Investors have likewise shown a preference 
for project finance techniques because of reduced market and credit risks from having 
government or the utility as the only customer, the ability to achieve off-balance sheet 
treatment of debt and overall protection through the contract (Vinter, 1998; Wolfs and 
Woodroffe, 2002). 
In terms of investor origin, local private investment received widespread support as a 
viable financing option for the sector as local investors were believed to be more 
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responsive to local needs and conditions (especially in rural communities). Sader (1999) 
also notes that public officials tend to be more partial to local private investment for 
similar reasons. Local investors are generally perceived to be more familiar with local 
conditions and more sensitive to local issues than their foreign counterparts. 
10.4.2 Strategy for private investment 
The private investment strategy pursued in each case location reflected the respective 
institutional capacity, level of government commitment and different circumstances 
surrounding each specific case. In Barbados and Trinidad for example, the industry 
structure with respect to institutional and regulatory arrangements, the need for quick-fix 
solutions and the depth of local capital markets facilitated a BOT-type investment 
strategy that was effective in bringing in large sums of up-front private capital for specific 
projects and achieving regulatory credibility through a contract, yet operable under strict 
public sector procurement rules. In Jamaica, explicit policy guidelines, the presence of 
an independent regulator, a regulatory framework by which licenSing specified the 
regulatory process for price determination and the prospect of very specific legislation to 
further empower regulatory capacity facilitated a more diverse and dynamic investment 
strategy than the other case locations. 
This observation that the use of different transaction types reveals the overall strategy of 
how to involve private investors is persistent in the privatisation literature. Latin American 
countries for example are typically credited with having a broad approach to sectoral 
liberalisation which is reflected in the dominance of divestitures over BOTs in their water 
and sanitation sectors (Sader, 1999). East Asia on the other hand, is famous for relying 
on the creation of new capacity without parallel sectoral reform which results in a reliance 
on BOTs to attract private investment to the sector. As in the case locations, the 
operating environment in terms of the existing institutional capacity and investment needs 
determine the type of private investment strategy pursued. 
The case studies also found that public officials' attitudes towards private investment 
influenced or had the potential to influence the type of private investment strategy being 
pursued. As previously mentioned, respondents were supportive of private investment 
options that did not affect the day-ta-day management, operation and monopoly status of 
the utility. This attitude particularly endeared BOT-type arrangements which were seen 
as standalone investments. In Trinidad strong anti-foreign private investment sentiments 
resulted in WASA actively lobbying and promoting a new industry model which catered 
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primarily to local private investment. In Jamaica, interest in preserving the monopoly 
status of NWC led to attempts to prevent the establishment of private utilities. Water 
sector officials' potential influence on the type of private investment therefore highlighted 
the importance of their acceptance and cooperation for successful private investment in 
the sector. Empirical evidence in the privatisation literature also demonstrates the 
importance of public officials' attitudes to the type of investment strategy pursued. In 
Jordon for example, a survey of the attitudes of public officials from 24 public enterprises 
(including the Water Authority) found that their attitudes varied for different forms of PSP 
with greater preference for 'milder' forms of PSP such as service contracts and less 
preference for more 'invasive' forms such as divestiture (Awamleh, 2002). In the case 
locations where at least theoretically senior public officials are highly influential due to 
their small numbers, demand for their technical expertise and their multifunctional duties 
(Farrugia, 1993), this potential to influence the type of private investment and impact on 
investment success takes on increased significance. 
10.4.2.1 Strategy recommendations 
The importance of creating enabling conditions to attract private investment to the sector 
has already been established from respondents' accounts of issues important to their 
investment choices. Establishing a conducive business and policy environment was 
understood to be a fundamental part of the promotion strategy for private investment in 
the sector. Respondents however believed that much more could be done to generate 
business opportunities in the sector by purposefully formulating projects/investments in 
such a way to provide specific opportunities for private investment. As shown in Figure 
10.3, recommendations to promote win-win projects, educate investors about investment 
opportunities and pursue investment options appropriate for the local context indicated a 
recurring theme that it was not enough to just focus on creating conducive conditions for 
investment. Respondents were equally concerned about the provision of specific 
opportunities in the sector to win-over investor confidence in the potential of the sector as 
a viable investment option. The potential for such a targeted strategy to encourage 
private investment in the sector is not unfounded. In Jamaica for example, a two-day BO 
workshop with prospective local investors improved investor response to a second call 
for tender. Similar promotional tactics have been used elsewhere to encourage private 
investment. In Brazil for example, a by-invitation-only two-day executive roundtable in 
November 2003 was used to successfully showcase various water and wastewater 
projects to intemational private investors (GWI, 2003). 
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Figure 10.3 Focus on generating business opportunities 
10.5 Small size 
Sections 6.8, 7.8 and 8.8 examined the issue of size to determine whether or not small 
size was a constraint to attracting private investment in the Jamaican, Barbadian and 
Trinidadian water and sanitation sectors respectively. Response strategies, particularly 
regional cooperation to address this size constraint were also examined. In answering 
the question, "To what extent is size an issue and what is the scope for addressing small 
size as a constraint to attracting private investment?" this section discusses the impact of 
small size on the investment potential of the water sector and examines response 
strategies to mitigate against likely disadvantages of small size. 
10.5.1 Effect of small size 
Respondents were unanimous in their belief that small size presented various challenges 
to attracting private investment to the Caribbean water and sanitation sector. Limited 
professional capacity in particular was considered the most important consequence of 
small size to negatively impact on the operating environment for private investment 
through its effect on institutional arrangements in the sector. Capacity and capability 
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constraints were reflected in the 'status' of the operating environment in the case 
locations. In Barbados for example, the absence of a dedicated planning unit in the 
BWA, the absence of an identifiable individual or division within the Ministry with specific 
responsibility for the sector and the multiplicity of roles assumed by BWA contributed to 
the sector being the least conducive of the case locations to private investment. 
Jamaica's larger size on the other hand was able to support a unit within NWG with 
responsibilities specific to sourcing and structuring private investment for the sector. The 
effect of limited professional capacity was also reflected in the limited regulatory capacity 
in Barbados where the FTG lacked sector-specific regulatory abilities and in Trinidad 
where the RIG had been unsuccessful in filling key posts. In Barbados, a transaction 
adviser had to be hired to manage the desalination BOT contract due to the lack of 
requisite skills in the sector. Although there was no direct evidence to prove the extent to 
which the lack of professional capacity affected the sector's ability to establish the 
requisite environment to attract private investment, the implications for regulatory and 
related institutional requirements were clear as pointed out by Stern (2000). 
A review of capital projects in each case location indicated that the majority of projects 
were valued at less than US$10 million. With project financing generally available for a 
minimum project size of US$50-100 million (Winpenny, 2003), very few projects would 
have qualified for this type of financing. This was the position in the case locations with 
projects being financed primarily by a mixture of sources - government, utility revenues 
and funds facilitated by government on behalf of the utility from various commercial, 
bilateral and multilateral sources. Projects financed by project financing included the 
desalination plants in Barbados and Trinidad valued at US$22 million and US$120 million 
respectively. International investors' preferred project size also indicated a distinct size-
investment relationship with investors participating or interested in large-value projects. 
As previously mentioned, the majority of projects in the case locations were valued at 
less than US$10 million. In fact, out of 106 projects, 57 (54%) were valued at less than 
US$1 million, all of which were being financed by government or the utility. Returns to 
scale generally make project financing uneconomical for smaller projects. Pooling or 
bundling projects to form economically viable entities has been used to access private 
capital by providing a larger revenue base to attract private investment. In Malaysia for 
example, the entire sewerage system was bundled under one concession to attract 
private investment (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998c). Although not practiced in the case 
locations, the opportunity to bundle several small projects to form larger more financially 
viable ones was apparent. Investors' support for project bundling to improve investment 
prospects in the sector supported this intuitive finding (Appendix 6: Figure A4). 
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Contrary to conventional wisdom, Zieroth (2001) found that despite the small size of 
water and sanitation markets, difficult logistics and high costs in the South Pacific, private 
investors were still willing to invest in the sector. Of note however, was the fact that 
investors were mainly interested in directly negotiated arrangements that allowed them to 
operate in an informally regulated, non-competitive environment. In such cases, small 
size would not appear to be a constraint to investment. In reality however, the impact of 
small size on regulatory capacity is Significant as the conditions for investment are far 
from ideal in terms of consumer protection and investment in a country's best interest. 
10.5.2 Response strategies to address size constraints 
10.5.2.1 Regional cooperation 
Integration theorists posit that if countries identify the constraints of small size as real or 
important enough, they are more likely to embark on a regional strategy to address those 
constraints (MOllerleile, 1996). For the case studies, limited professional capacity was 
considered the most important consequence of small size to negatively impact on the 
operating environment for private investment through its effect on institutional 
arrangements in the sector. Consequently, respondents' 'vision' of a regional strategy in 
the sector focused on the sharing of professional expertise to address capacity 
constraints either through the work of existing regional institutions such as CWWA and 
OOCUR with their annual conference and networking opportunities or through 
professional exchange programmes between utilities. Similarly in the Asia-Pacific region, 
regional cooperation in the sector provides a forum for learning good institutional 
practices and policies (UNESCAP, 2006). The Pacific Water Association for example 
has a similar mandate as the CWWA and CBWMP in terms of maintaining links between 
water and sanitation utilities and administering training and technical assistance (Zieroth, 
2001 ). 
Respondents' level of enthusiasm for a regional approach to improve conditions for 
private investment in the sector was related to the size of the case locations. The 
greatest support came from Barbados, the smallest case location while the least support 
came from Jamaica, the largest case location. This difference in interest was also 
matched by concerns that cooperating with smaller 'less developed' islands would retard 
progress in larger 'more developed' islands, that smaller countries would have more to 
gain than to offer and that regional initiatives were more likely to be biased towards 
smaller more closely-knit member states. Respondents were also mindful of likely 
challenges to cooperation such as political commitment and support. 
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The cautious attitude of the respondents to the prospects of regional cooperation is not 
uncommon in the integration literature. MOllerleile (1996) for example in his review of 
Caribbean integration experiences observes that while the reciprocity of benefits of 
regional cooperation are evident, the process is often seen as an abstract concept 
viewed with some amount of scepticism. This is because there is generally not enough 
confidence in the impartiality of distribution, the equality in the effects and the benefits of 
transactions. For regional cooperation to succeed, the final objective should not in 
Axline's view (1979) be set too low as the lower the expectations placed on the benefits 
of cooperation, the less prospects there are for its success. In addition, the success of 
regional integration strategies as pointed out by Bryan and Bryan 1999) takes years to 
become visible. Initiatives such as the professional exchange programme between NWC 
and WASA are a good start but their short-term and non-binding nature can mean that 
the benefits of cooperation are not immediately obvious and either party can easily opt 
out without committing to the process. 
10.6 Hypothesis review 
The research hypothesised that factors that determine private investment in water and 
sanitation vary in importance and relevance from location to location; hence a context-
specific approach is needed to attract private investment to the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector. In testing this hypothesis, the research used a case study approach to 
examine the environment for private investment and determine factors influencing 
investors' choices in the sector. In addition, the potential for regional cooperation to 
improve the environment for private investment was also examined given the small size 
of the case locations. 
The research found that while there was general similarity in investors' criteria for 
investment, location-specific factors such as the case locations' sun, sea and sand 
appeal also featured in the investment decisions of international investors. In Jamaica, 
the focus of the public utility on urban service provision, the ensuing opportunities for 
small-scale investors in rural supply and the institutional frameworks for private 
investment realised an investment strategy that encouraged the operation of small 
private utilities. In Barbados and Trinidad however, the provisions (or lack thereof) of the 
policy, legal and regulatory environment were less conducive to a similar approach but 
instead realised a more project-specific, contract-based approach through the use of 
BOT-type arrangements. In the absence of adequate institutional frameworks, the 
macroeconomic environment therefore became more central to influencing investors' 
choices. The criteria for investment were therefore found to differ in importance and 
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relevance throughout the case studies depending on the status of the operating 
environment and the type of investment. The implications of limited professional capacity 
on institutional arrangements as a result of small country size also necessitated a tailored 
approach such as the use of transaction advisers in Barbados. Each country's 
institutional endowment was therefore important in determining the strategy to attract 
private investment and the type of investment. 
10.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter relied on the findings of the case studies and Surveys Band C to answer 
the research questions. The main findings from survey questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews supplemented by documentary evidence were systematically 
presented and discussed within the context of the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Chapter introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the research process, identify the main findings 
of the research, discuss the implications of these findings and suggest areas for further 
research. The research began with a review of the extant literature to develop an 
understanding of important issues related to private investment in the sector. The core 
concepts of investment decision-making and investment promotion were examined to 
develop an analogous framework for the private investment decision in water and 
sanitation. The issue of small size as a constraint to facilitating private investment in the 
sector and regional cooperation as a possible response strategy were also examined due 
to the intended geographical focus of the research. The review of literature highlighted 
the need to incorporate the interests of domestic private investors, the importance of 
investors' perceptions on their investment choices, the relative difference in importance 
of investment criteria and the need to adapt investment promotion strategies to the 
prevailing investment climate. 
To guide the various lines of enquiry, a primary research question and four secondary 
research questions were formulated as follows: 
Primary research question 
• How can private investment be attracted to the Caribbean water and sanitation 
sector? 
Secondary research questions: 
• What is the current state of the operating environment and how conducive is it to 
private investment? 
• What are the main determinants or criteria for private investment in the water and 
sanitation sector? 
• What is the scope for and strategy to attract private investment to the water and 
sanitation sector? 
• To what extent is size an issue and what is the scope for addressing small size as 
a constraint to attracting private investment? 
The research hypothesised that factors that determine private investment in water and 
sanitation vary in importance and relevance from location to location; hence a context-
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specific approach is needed to attract private investment to the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector. 
The research adopted a multiple-case study methodology to examine the private 
investment phenomenon in the water and sanitation sectors in Jamaica, Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago. Three main sources of evidence were used within the case study 
framework to answer the research questions - surveys, interviews and documents. 
Survey questionnaires were also administered outside the case study framework to 
access data sources beyond the case locations. In total, the research database 
consisted of 101 survey questionnaires, 52 interviews and over 250 documents. 
Quantitative data was subjected to various statistical analyses using SPSS while 
qualitative data was organised thematically and retrieved as required. 
Background information on the research study area was then used to contextualise and 
introduce basic physical, geographic, historical, social and contemporary factors pertinent 
to the research problems and issues. The case studies were then presented to highlight 
the operating environment for private investment, provide descriptive accounts of actual 
private investment experiences and identify respondents' attitudes and perceptions of 
private investment in the sector. Finally, research findings outside the case study 
framework along with the case study research findings were discussed within the context 
of the literature from which research conclusions were made and presented below. 
11.2 Conclusions 
The following are key findings from the research: 
• Investors' perception of the utility is a statistically significant determinant of 
investment in the sector. The research found that investors' perception of 
investment prospects in the sector improved as their perception of the water utility 
also improved. The privatisation literature places a high premium on the status of 
the utility in terms of financial performance and operational practice as a 
determinant for private investment in the sector. Both of these variables are 
measurable indicators commonly used to assess the investment climate. 
Indicators such as investors' perception of the utility/sector known to have an 
important impact on investment choices are difficult to quantify due to their 
subjective nature. By developing a utility perception scale (UPS), the research 
provided a measurable index of investor perception to facilitate like-for-like 
comparison between investment locations in the Caribbean. By validating the UPS 
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against actual utility performance (determined from financial and operational data), 
the research found that the UPS is a good indicator/predictor of the investment 
climate which can be used with other assessment tools to gauge investor interest 
in the sector. 
• Behaviour-related factors such as interest in job security, recognition and 
comfort feature as supplementary investment criteria to satisfy the personal 
goals of individual decision-makers. The research found that investors 
(particularly those affiliated with large overseas companies), were keen to have 
successful projects that would bring them recognition in the parent company and 
allow them to continue enjoying the comfortable working conditions in the 
Caribbean. Investors were found to be less enthusiastic about similar projects in 
'less hospitable' locations, preferring the sun, sea and sand appeal of the 
Caribbean islands. The privatisation literature often focuses on the strategic 
motives of the firm (such as risk diversification, transfer of organisational assets 
and competitive advantage) to invest abroad. The research however found that in 
addition to strategic ambitions, individual decision-makers have their own goals 
which factor in their investment choices. 
• In addition to creating a conducive environment for private investment, there 
is a need to simultaneously focus on generating specific investment 
opportunities to build investor confidence. The research found that even 
though the enabling environment paradigm was central to the promotion strategy 
for private investment in the sector, specific opportunities that showcased the 
investment potential of the sector (i.e. a targeted promotion strategy) were also 
important in increasing the likelihood of investors having a positive response to 
investment opportunities in the sector. Creating an enabling environment in terms 
of establishing the right conditions for business and a policy environment 
conducive to private investment tends to dominate the private investment strategy 
in the sector. As such, much attention is given to institutional/governance, 
economic/financial and socio-political factors to tackle problems such as unclear 
policy guidelines, inadequate regulatory frameworks, inappropriate water pricing, 
inadequate cost recovery, excessive government involvement and outdated 
institutional arrangements. The research however found that in addition to what 
amounts to a general sector reform agenda, more specific investor targeting in 
terms of generating business opportunities such as championing model projects 
and packaging 'bankable' projects also requires special attention in the investment 
promotion strategy. 
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• The investment strategy pursued reflects a location's institutional capacity, 
public sector attitudes towards private investment and specific investment 
needs. The research found that the operating environment in terms of the existing 
institutional capacity and investment needs determined the private investment 
strategy pursued. Where the operating environment was characterised by explicit 
policy guidelines, an adequate regulatory framework and supportive legislation, a 
more diverse and dynamic investment strategy was pursued. Conversely, where 
the operating environment was restricted in terms of institutional and regulatory 
arrangements and investment needs were immediate, a more contract-oriented 
and project-specific investment strategy was pursued. The research also found 
that water officials were highly influential in the investment strategy pursued. A 
general preference for local private investment and 'non-intrusive' arrangements 
that safeguarded utility management and operations realised an investment 
strategy geared towards local investors and BOT-type arrangements. 
• Limited professional capacity is the most important consequence of small 
size to negatively impact on the operating environment for private 
investment in the sector through its effect on institutional arrangements. The 
development literature highlights various characteristics of small states which have 
important economic, financial, institutional and socio-political implications for 
creating a conducive environment for private investment in the sector. The 
research found that limited professional capacity was the most important 
consequence of small size to impact on regulatory and related institutional 
requirements necessary to support private investment in the sector. Difficulty in 
filling key posts and achieving genuine separation of roles were just some of the 
size-related issues to affect the sector's ability to establish the requisite 
environment for investment. 
• Sharing professional expertise to address capacity constraints is the most 
feasible opportunity for regional cooperation to improve conditions for 
private investment in the sector. The research found that the scope for regional 
cooperation to improve conditions for private investment in the sector was limited to 
that of sharing professional expertise to counteract issues related to limited 
professional capacity. Networking opportunities during annual conferences and 
professional exchange programmes between utilities were found to be ideal 
opportunities for regional cooperation. 
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The research findings confirmed expectations from the extant literature on the 
importance of creating conducive conditions to attract private investment in the sector, 
the effect of small size on attracting private investment and the potential of regional 
cooperation as a response strategy to address likely size constraints. The findings are 
however advances on previous research in that they add a new depth to our 
understanding of the private investment phenomenon in the water and sanitation sector 
in general and its manifestation in the Caribbean in particular. A lot of the evidence in the 
privatisation literature is anecdotal. An important contribution of this research therefore is 
the empirical analysis of various investment criteria. Most significant is the development 
of a measurable index of investors' perception of the utility to enable the evaluation of a 
rather subjective determinant of investment. By considering small size and the potential 
of regional cooperation to improve the environment for investment, the research makes 
an important contribution to the development literature on infrastructure policy and 
provision in small island developing states. 
11.3 Implications of the research findings 
The research findings have important policy and practical implications for informing and 
directing government's strategy to attract private investment to water and sanitation. 
These are listed below: 
• It is important for countries to set realistic goals once the decision to encourage 
private investment in the sector has been made. An independent regulatory 
agency for example does not guarantee private investment as there are many 
ways of undermining supposedly 'independent' regulators whatever the underlying 
legal framework. Governments should therefore take stock of the environment for 
investment, determine investment needs and the desired level of investment and 
pursue investment strategies that reflect a country's institutional endowment. 
• As part of a foreign private investment promotion strategy, government should 
make the most of locational advantages by promoting a country's status as a 'nice 
place to do business' as an additional incentive for investment as this can be a 
deciding factor between projects of similar type and size in similar operating 
environments. 
• There is a general preference for local investors on the basis that they are more 
familiar with local conditions and more sensitive to local issues than their foreign 
counterparts. Despite this familiarity and sensitivity, local investors share many 
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similarities with their foreign counterparts in terms of investment criteria. The 
strategy to attract local investors should therefore not be 'watered down' with the 
expectation that local investors will compromise on their investment criteria and 
that issues of import at the international level are any less relevant at the domestic 
level. 
• Water sector officials' potential influence on the type of private investment strategy 
pursued and the importance of their acceptance and cooperation to investment 
success stress the importance of involving them as early as possible in the private 
investment promotion strategy. 
• The benefits of regional cooperation to improve conditions for investment are 
evident but there is general scepticism about the scope for and effectiveness of 
cooperation in the sector. As such, the choice of whether or not to embark on a 
regional strategy is an abstract one, especially if countries are not faced with the 
alternative 'integrate or die'. The task is therefore to make cooperation appear to 
be a more attractive choice by showing tangible benefits. Sharing professional 
expertise can form the building blocks of a regional initiative in the sector to raise 
awareness of the prospects of cooperation after which increasingly more complex 
issues such as financing and building regulatory capacity can be accommodated. 
11.4 Areas for further research 
A number of issues were not addressed because of the scope of the research. These 
are detailed below as possible areas for further research: 
• Much of the evidence in the privatisation literature is anecdotal. In addition, the 
relatively recent nature of the private investment phenomenon in water and 
sanitation means that there is no real track record on which to judge whether or not 
what is put forward as best practice is actually sustainable. There is therefore a 
need for research that examines the phenomenon of private investment in the 
sector over a longer-time series so that more conclusive generalisations can be 
made. 
• It is difficult to show direct causation between the status of the operating 
environment and its propensity to encourage private investment in the sector. This 
is because it is difficult to unpack and quantify what are essentially cross-cutting 
and multidimensional variables. There is therefore need for research that 
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separates these variables into their various components and tests each component 
separately. If possible, indicators that adequately reflect underlying attributes 
should be identified and used to empirically test the relevance of these variables to 
the private investment decision in the sector. 
• The informal private sector is considered to be an untapped and potentially 
valuable source of investment in many developing countries. The research 
however focused on the needs and priorities of the formal private sector. There is 
therefore a need for research that incorporates the needs and priorities of the 
informal private sector in the Caribbean so that they can be included in more formal 
government procurement strategies as legitimate sources of financing for the 
sector. 
• The research highlighted various issues relevant to pursuing a targeted investment 
strategy for the sector such as developing and promoting winning projects and 
linking investments in the sector to more profitable investrnent opportunities (see 
Figure 10.3). The scope of the research however prevented a detailed analysis of 
the significance of generating investment opportunities to the private investment 
strategy in the Caribbean water and sanitation sector. There is therefore a need 
for research that validates the concept of generating investment opportunities as 
an integral phase of the private investment strategy in the sector and prioritises the 
various cornponents proposed to contribute to this strategy. 
• The research presumed that small size was an inevitable constraint to developing 
best practice institutional arrangements to attract private investment to the sector. 
There is however need for research to empirically determine the extent to which 
resource constraints such as limited· regulatory capacity actually affect investment 
potential. 
• The research focused on the scope of regional cooperation to identify the range of 
issues that could fall under a regional cooperation strategy to improve the 
investment climate for private investment in the sector. Other concepts relevant to 
the process of regional cooperation such as the extent of coordination, 
mechanisms for cooperation and the nature of decision-making were not 
addressed. There is therefore a need for research that examines regional 
cooperation in its broadest context to fully assess its feasibility to improve the 
investment climate for private investment in the Caribbean water and sanitation 
sector. 
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Appendix 1 - SUfV&Y instruments 
SUfV&Y A 
General Guidance 
Survey of local financial institutions: Investment 
decision-making in the water and sanitation sector 
The purpose of this survey is to obtain the attitude of local financial institutions to the investment 
prospects of the water and sanitation sector. This is an independent survey. The information provided 
will be treated with the strictest confidence and used only for academic purposes. Please indicate your 
response to close-ended questions and statements by placing a cross (x) in the space provided. Unless 
stated. only one choice is valid for each question/statement. For the purposes of the research, 'water' 
refers to a system of delivery of potable water to consumers while 'sanitation' refers to the 
management of excreta and wastewater but not the disposal of solid wastes. Please address queries 
to: 
Nortine Martin 
Email: N.A.Martin@lboro.ac.uk 
Telephone: (876) 345-5547 (Jamaica) 
(246) 425-1406 (Barbados) 
(868) 662-0922 (Trinidad) 
Legal/registered name of organisation 
Country 
Part A - Investment prospects for water and sanitation 
1. How would you rate the investment prospects of the following utility sectors? 
" i:! :a :; 
.!! ." a '1:0 ~ ;; 0 .D 0 Utilities 0 
" 
0 
u 
" " 
a. ~ u 0 
W u Q 
« 
5 4 3 2 1 
Electricity 
Gas 
Roads 
Telecommunications 
Water and sanitation 
2. Considering the following characteristics of water and sanitation, how would you rate the 
investment prospects of the sector? 
i:! " :a :; 
.!! ." a '1:0 ;; 0 .D Characteristics of water & sanitation 0 " u 
" 
" 0 ~ u 
W u Q 
« 
5 4 3 2 
Capital intensive with high initial investment 
Long payback period 
Currency mismatch - large foreign exchange costs while 
product is sold primarily in local currency 
Poor track record of consumer payment discipline and 
enforcement 
Assets not easily redeployed for other uses - sunk assets 
Value of underground assets often uncertain 
Production of non-tradable services 
Close political scrutiny regarding pricing and services 
Weak management structures 
Possibility of government not keeping promises made at time 
of initial investment 
Essentially a monopoly with limited direct competition 
~ 
0 
0 
a. 
1 
254 
3. From a professional viewpoint, how do you perceive the local water utility? 
,., 
" - .. .. 'iij 
"' .. ~ 
" " ~ e'" '" 
.. 
Perception of the local water and sanitation utility 
- .. « 
u 
'" 
" ::::> 
5 4 3 
The utility is a financially robust organisation 
Water and sewerage rates levied by the utility are 
adequate to sustain its operation 
The utility honours commitments to financial institutions 
The utility has a good corporate image 
The utility operates along sound commercial principles 
The utility is a creditworthy organisation 
The utility demonstrates a 'willingness-to-collect' to 
imp~ove revenue 
The utility values its assets and infrastructure 
investments 
The utility is a well-managed organisation 
The utility has a long-term strategic vision and mission 
fO'l"ovidino water and seweraoe services to the countrv 
The utility is content with the way things are 
The utility is doing its best considering constraints 
The utility operates within a well-regUlated environment 
The utility is committed to improving service access and 
delivery 
The utility has the ability to address the water and 
seweraoe needs of the countrv 
The utility has a good track record for project 
conceptualisation and delivery 
The utility has the full backing and support of 
government 
The utility is independent of government control and 
intervention 
The utility has a good public image 
I am confident in the quality of services provided 
Customers are loyal and supportive of the utility 
The utility is vital to the country's socio-economic growth 
Appendix 1 - SUrvey instruments 
SUfV&yA 
.. ~: ~ "'~ 
'" "'" .. 2 : on 
c U5:s 
2 1 
Perception 1 
Perception 2 
Perception 3 
Perception 4 
Perception 5 
Perception {) 
Perception 7 
Perception 8 
Perception 9 
Perception 10 
Perception 11 
Perception 12 
Perception 13 
Perception 14 
Perception 15 
Perception 16 
Perception 17 
Perception 18 
Perception 19 
Perception 20 
Perception 21 
Perception 22 
4. Based on your professional perception of the local water and sanitation utility, what do you think 
about investment prospects in the sector? 
o Excellent o Good o Acceptable o Doubtful o Poor 
Please support your answer. 
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Survey A 
5. Considering the following options and their likely impact. how would you then rate the investment 
prospects of the local water and sanitation sector? 
'l: 
.. 
:c :; 
.!! .., i "l:o 0; 0 .c Incentives for private investment 0 
" 
u Cl .. M U 0 
W u C < 
5 4 3 2 
Issuing of infrastructure bonds for major projects 
Creation of a special infrastructure development fund 
Debt write-off of utility by government 
Use of credit enhancement mechanisms (e.g. guarantees. subsidies) 
Preferential financing for the sector to on-lend to local financial institutions 
Clear identification and separation of roles (e.g. regulation, operation) 
Tariffs adjusted to represent the true cost of service provision 
Government legislation to encourage and support private participation 
Institutional reform and sector restructuring to achieve utility management 
along corporate principles 
Preparation of well-structured capital investment and maintenance plans 
Targeted promotion of projects to investors 
Joint ventures between the utility and the private sector 
Use of service or management contracts to private entities (e.g. meter 
readinQ, bulk water supply, wastewater plant operation) 
Use of build, own, operate type arrangements with the private sector to 
develop new systems 
Use of long-term contracts (concessions) for the private management and 
operation of water and sewerage systems 
Some services merged with those of another utility - multi-utility formation 
Collaboration among Caribbean water and sewerage utilities (e.g. shared 
professional and technical expertise) 
Bundling of small- to medium-size projects to form economically and 
financially viable proiects 
Merging small water and sewerage systems to form more viable systems 
6. What is the possible role of local financial institutions in the local water & sanitation sector? 
7. What would it take for your organisation to become involved in the local water and sanitation 
sector? 
Part C - Investment profile 
8. Which category best describes your organisation? (Choose only one) 
~ Commercial bank Merchant bank Development bank Other (please specify) TrusVUnit trust Insurance Company Securities broker o Pensions fund management o Building society 
:; 
0 
0.. 
1 
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SUlV$yA 
9. What is the current approximate size of your investment portfoIi02 .. ? 
8 Less than US$10 Million US$101 - 500 Million D US$11 - 50 Million D Greater than US$501 Million o US$51-100 Million 
10. What percentage of this investment portfolio is linked to infrastructure2"? 
00% 
011-15% 
D 1-5% D 16-20% D 6-10% D Greater than 21 % 
11. What is the nature of your investments linked to infrastructure? (Select those that apply) 
o Does not apply 
o Bonds 
D Loans and advances D Other (please specify) 
End of questionnaire 
Thank you 
P Equity 
Would you like a copy of the report on the questionnaire results? 
Would you like your organisation·s involvement to remain anonymous? 
This questionnaire was completed by: 
Name (optional): 
Position: 
Tel: 
E-mail: 
Date: 
DvesD 
DVesD 
No 
No 
209 Including but not limited to public securities, private securities, foreign securities, loans and advances, local 
currency, foreign currency, real estate and other assets. 
210 Includes electricity, gas, roads, telecommunications, water and sanitation. 
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General Guidance 
Survey of locational determinants and 
investment decision-making in the utilities sector 
Appendix 1 - Survey instruments 
SurveyB 
The purpose of this survey is to obtain investors' perceptions about factors that impact on the choice of 
investment location, small-scale investment opportunities and investment decision-making in the utilities 
sector. Please indicate your response to close~nded questions and statements by placing a cross (x) 
in the space provided. Please return the completed questionnaire or address queries to: 
Norline Martin 
Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK 
Email: N.A.Martin@lboro.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1509228527/2885 
Fax: +44 (0) 1509211079 
Organisation ~ ____________________________ ~ Count~ 
Part A -Investment profile 
1. What category of investor is your organisation? 
Investing institution (e.g. investment bank, credit export agency) 
Multilateral/bilateral organisation 
Private operator/contractorr-__________________________ -, 
Other (".,,,,,peclfy) LI _________________________ .J 
2. Which utility sector(s) does your organisation and/or your clients invest in? 
D Water and sanitation 
DGas 
D Telecommunications D Other (please specify) o Electricity 
3. What do you think about the investment potential of the following sectors? 
Hiah AveraQe Low 
Water and sanitation 
Telecommunications 
Electricity 
Gas 
Part B - Investment decision-making 
4. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most important and 1 representing the least 
important, please indicate the extent to which your organisation relies on the following sources 
for new investment information: 
" " 
,.." 1: _ .. 
.. ~~ <;; .. 0t: t: 
..t: 
Sources for new investment information 
00 0 ",0 .. 0 
:Ea. a. ::Q. ..la. 
.5 .5 "' .5 .5 
4 3 2 1 
Published information (e.g. advertisements, terms of reference) 
Host country govemmenVcountry"s utilities sector agencies 
Host country's investment promotion agency 
Your organisation's commercial network 
International organisations (e.g. World Bank, European Union) 
Specialist agencies and consultants 
Project sponsors (e.g. private operators, contractors) 
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Survey B 
5. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most important and 1 representing the least 
important, please indicate the extent to which your organisation screens new investment 
proposals based on the following factors: 
= = >0= = _ .. .. - .. 1;; .. mt: t: :Et: 
.. t: 
Screening criteria o 0 0 ",0 " 0 :I; a. a. ::a. ...Ja. 
.5 .5 Cl) .5 .5 
4 3 2 1 
Project size 
Nature of project (e.g. BOT, concession) 
Project location 
Available finance (e.g. multilateral loan, government guarantee) 
Available information 
Past experience (similar location/investment) 
Part C - Investment location assessment 
6. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most important and 1 representing the least 
important, please indicate the extent to which the following reasons have impacted on your 
organisation's decision to invest in the utilities sector overseas: 
~ ~ >o~ ~ 
1;;j!! .. ~j!! -.. t: "t: 00 0 ",0 .. 0 Reasons for investing abroad :I; a. a. :: D. "a. 
.5 .5 (I) .5 ...J .5 
4 3 2 1 
Financial/Economic 
Policy and financial support for privatisation strategy by international 
oroanisations (e.o. World Bank)' 
Larger market growth opportunitieslpotential abroad 
Lower cost of doing business abroad 
Increasing political and economic stability in target markets 
Benefit of economies of scale and scope (utilise excess capacity e.g. 
manaoerial exoertise) 
Ease of foreign market penetration 
Emergence of new markets 
General 
Fits business strategy 
Gain competitive advantage 
Information about opportunities abroad 
Approached by overseas governments/clients 
7. On a four-point scale with 4 representing a critical factor/deal breaker and 1 representing a non-
factor, please respond to the following statements regarding choice of investment destination: 
- ~ -fti - ~ ~ .~ .e J! J! J! 
Factors regarding choice of investment destination 'r: ~ - - .. 0 0 u~ 
·m ~ 0 
:I; iil z 
4 3 2 1 
Financial/Economic 
Good investment grade rating for long-term foreign exchange debt 
Achievement of standard utility performance indicators 
Track record of consumer payment discipline and enforcement 
Availability of credit enhancement or guarantee from government 
Transaction costs compared to size of investment 
Adequate market size to generate required revenue stream 
259 
Positive market signals from similar locations/investments 
Potential for horizontal integration with other utility sectors (i.e. multi-utility 
operations) 
Political 
Administrative efficiency - short lead time to get necessary approvals 
History of government honouring macro- and microeconomic commitments 
Tenure and stability of elected officials in political process 
Independence of regulatory institution and processes from government 
interference 
Amount and quality of information available 
Appendix 1 - Survey instroments 
SurveyS 
8. On a four-point scale with 4 representing a critical factor/deal breaker and 1 representing a non-
factor, please respond to the following statements regarding factors contributing to your best 
and worst investment experiences. 
Best Experience Worst Experience 
~ 5 ~ ~ tl tl tl 0 .. ~ U Factors contributing to best .. ~ u .~e .!! .!! .!! .!:! B .!! .!! 
:e~ ~ ~ .. and worst investment experiences :e g ~ 5 0 0 0 u- .... c 0 u- .... c 
:lE i z :lE i 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 
Tariff levels and collection discipline adequate to meet 
cash flow needs 
Government unresponsive to needs and timeframes of 
investors 
Regulatory commitment sustained through long-term 
contract 
Government did not meet its commitments of state 
enterprise performance and exchanQe conversion 
Arbitrary regulatory process leading to unsatisfactory tariff 
adjustments and outcomes on disputes 
Economic and political sustainability of the investment 
enhanced by a competitive selection process 
Laws and contracts were enforced (e.g. disconnections) 
Ability to exercise effective management and operational 
control over the investment 
Amount and quality of information available 
9. What do you think about the investment potential of the following geographic regions? 
High Average Low 
Africa 
Asia 
Europ-" 
Latin America & the Caribbean 
North America 
Oceania 
10. Please indicate the most frequent size of your investments. 
El Less than US$10 million D US$11 to 50 million Greater than US$101 million D US$51 to 100 million 
11. Please indicate your degree of satisfaction with your smallest investment experience: 
~ 
.!! 
.. 
0 
z 
1 
D High degree of satisfaction o Average satisfaction D Low degree of satisfaction 
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SurveyS 
12. On a four-point scale with 4 representing a critical factor and 1 representing a non-factor, please 
indicate the extent to which the following factors affected your smallest investment 
experience: 
~ 
~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ .~ .s J2 J2 J2 
Factors affecting smallest investment experience ~g ~ ~ .. 0 0 u-
'" " 
~ 
i 0 :!! z 
4 3 2 1 
Small customer base 
High transaction costs compared to size of investment 
Diseconomies of scale and scope (e.g. delivery network, 
.Jl.rocurement, administrative costs) 
Higher cost of borrowing due to lower absolute size of financial 
transaction 
Appropriate technologies for size requirements 
Limited counterpart professional/technical capabilities 
T arill inadequate for revenue generation 
Interference from government and/or state enterprise 
Greater overall risk at a smaller scale 
13. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most favourable response and 1 representing the 
least favourable response, please respond to the following options for improving small-scale 
investment opportunities: 
.. 
., ,.,., 
m: ., f -., • .,.~ " ~ ~ .,. "Cl Options for improving small-scale investment opportunities 0", Cl .. 0 .. ~ .. 0( .. ~ .. 
Ul is ii):g 
4 3 2 1 
Bundling of projects to form economically viable entities 
Horizontal integration of utilities (i.e. multi-utility operation) 
Use of financing options to reduce cost in terms of time and 
resources (e.g. pooled funds) 
Aggregated systems to increase revenue base 
Shared professional/technical expertise across projects 
14. What do you think about investment prospects in the Caribbean Region? 
Very Good Poor Very Good Poor 
Water and wastewater 
Telecommunications 
Electricity 
D My organisation knows nothing about utilities sector investment prospects in the Caribbean 
15. Has your organisation ever invested in the Caribbean Region? 
If yes, please describe your investment experience in the Caribbean; 
If no, please indicate why your organisation has not invested in the Caribbean: 
End of questionnaire 
Thank you 
DYes D No 
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SurveyC 
General Guidance 
Survey of locational determinants and investment promotion 
in the Caribbean water and wastewater sector 
The purpose of this survey is to obtain an overview of Caribbean water utility managers' perceptions 
about factors that impact on the choice of investment location and strategies to attract private 
investment in the water and wastewater sector. Please indicate your response to close-ended 
questions and statements by placing a cross (x) in the space provided. Please retum the completed 
questionnaire or address queries to: 
Organisation 
Part A - Sector profile 
Norline Martin 
Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK 
Email: N.A.Martin@lboro.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1509 228527/2885 
Fax: +44 (0) 1509211079 
Country 
1. What is the scope of activity of the utility beyond water supply? 
Water supply and: 
D No other activity 
D Telecommunications 
n Wastewater D Other (please specify) n Electricity 
2. How would you classify the status of the following aspects of the water and wastewater sector in 
your country? 
Highly Satisfactory Not satisfactory satisfactory 
General 
Population coverage 
Continuity of supply/service 
Water resource developmenVmanagement 
Water and wastewater quality 
Rehabilitation and maintenance programme 
Physical assets (e.g. pumps, treatment plants) 
Unaccounted for water (UFW) 
Number and level of skilled professionals 
Number and frequen!:}' of customer complaints 
Performance of regulatory body 
Financial/Economic 
Govemment budget allocation 
Level of investment other than government 
Level of revenue recovery 
Tariff to recover operation and maintenance costs 
Lonq-term strateqic planninq 
3. Do you think additional investments are needed to improve the sector? DYes 0 No 
If yes, what aspect(s) of the sector are in need of additional investments? 
El Strengthening of institutional capacity Rehabilitation of existing infrastructure El Construction of new infrra"'s"tru=ct"u"'r"e'-___ ---, Other (pi .... ,,,"", LI ________ --' 
4. Has there been any private investment in the sector? DYes 0 No 
If yes, please indicate your degree of satisfaction with these private investments: 
o High degree of satisfaction D Average satisfaction D Low degree of satisfaction 
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SurveyC 
If no, please indicate why you think this has not happened: 
B Sector not in need of private investment Private investors not interested in sector D Strong opposition to private sector involvement D No success sourcing private investment 
5. Compared to the water and wastewater sector, how would you describe the investment potential 
of the following sectors in your country? 
Higher Same lower 
Telecommunications 
Electricity 
Gas 
Part B - Scale and scope assessment 
6. On a four-point scale with 4 representing a critical factor/deal breaker and 1 representing a non-
factor, please indicate the extent to which you think the following statements determine 
investors' choice of investment destination: 
~ 
~ ~ .. ~ ~ ~ .~ .2 :! :! :! 
Factors regarding choice of investment destination :e g ~ ~ m 0 0 u- .... c 
'0 
::; iiii z 
4 3 2 1 
FinanciaUEconomic 
Good investment grade rating for long-term foreign exchange debt 
Achievement of standard utility performance indicators 
Track record of consumer payment discipline and enforcement 
Availability of credit enhancement or guarantee from government 
Transaction costs compared to size of investment 
Adequate market size to generate required revenue stream 
Positive market signals from similar locations/investments 
Potential for horizontal integration with other utility sectors (Le. multi-utility 
operation) 
Political 
Administrative efficiency - short lead time to get necessary approvals 
History of government honouring macro- and microeconomic commitments 
Tenure and stability of elected officials in political process 
Independence of regulatory institution and processes from government 
interference 
Amount and quality of information available 
7. Considering the scale of water and wastewater investments in the Caribbean compared to 
similar investments elsewhere, on a four-point scale with 4 representing a critical factor and 1 
representing a non-factor, please indicate the extent to which you think the following factors 
affect the investment experience: 
~ ~ 
~ 
.. ~ ~ .~ .2 :! :! :! 
Factors affecting the investment experience ·c g " ~ m 0 0 u- .... c 
'0 
::; iiii z 
4 3 2 1 
Small customer base 
High transaction costs compared to size of investment 
Diseconomies of scale and scope (e.g. delivery network, 
procurement, administrative costs) 
Higher cost of borrowing due to lower absolute size of financial 
transaction 
Appropriate technologies for size requirements 
Limited counterpart professional/technical capabilities 
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Tariff inadequate for revenue generation 
Interference from government and/or state enterprise 
Greater overall risk at a smaller scale 
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SUfV8yC 
8. Do you think the Caribbean is disadvantaged by its small size with respect to attracting 
investment to the water and wastewater sector? 
DYes D No 
9. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most favourable response and 1 representing the 
least favourable response, please respond to the following options for improving small-scale 
investment opportunities: 
,., .. ~: a,: .. f f "'~ c ~ 
'" 
cm 
Options for improving small-scale investment opportunities em m ~ o ~ -~ < ~ ~ on Vl i5 US:s 
4 3 2 1 
Bundling of projects to fonn economically viable entities 
Horizontal integration of utilities (i.e. multi-utility operation) 
Use of financing options to reduce cost in terms of time and 
resources (e.Q. pooled funds) 
Aggregated systems to increase revenue base 
Shared professional/technical expertise across projects 
10. For multi-utility operation, which other sector(s) do you think the water and wastewater sector 
could be partnered with? 
D Telecommunications D Electricity DGas 
11. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most favourable response and 1 representing the 
least favourable response, please respond to the following benefits of regional cooperation: 
,., .. ,., .. 
- .. .. f - .. 
"' .. e "'~ c ~ m c'" Benefits of regional cooperation e'" '" 
~ e: < ~ - .. i5 US:s Vl 
4 3 2 1 
Shared investment/transaction costs for capital intensive activities 
Pooled resources to promote and attract external funding through 
improved credibility 
Overcome capacity and/or capability constraints 
Increased bargaining power 
Increased potential for risk diversification 
Economies of scale to overcome limitations of small size 
12. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most favourable response and 1 representing the 
least favourable response, please indicate the extent to which you think a regional approach 
could be applied to aspects of the water and wastewater sector: 
,., ;; ~: m: .. f ~ "'~ Regional approach to aspects of c ~ '" C'" 0", 
'" 
m om 
:Om < .. ~ .. the water and wastewater sector Vl i5 US:c 
4 3 2 1 
Investment promotion and sourcing 
Standardisation of service quality/perfonnance indicators 
Support services (e.g. billing, accounting) 
Professional services (e.g. arbitration, project management) 
Regulation 
Procurement of material/equipment 
Technical training 
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Operations and maintenance 
Research/project development (e.g. appropriate technologies) 
Exchange of information/experiences 
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SurveyC 
13. On a four-point scale with 4 representing a critical factor and 1 representing a non-factor, please 
indicate the extent to which you think the following factors could impact on a regional 
approach to the water and wastewater sector in the Caribbean: 
~ ~ 
;; ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Factors impacting on a regional approach .!:! .2 J! J! J! :c g ~ ~ .. 0 0 to the water and wastewater sector 0-
'" 
c 15 
:I; i z 
4 3 2 1 
Different national interests/priorities/agenda 
Difficulty in enforcing regional agreements 
Inadequate regional institutional structure 
Sustained political support and respect for regional institution 
Satisfactory allocation of investment 
Support from local stakeholders 
Funding for regional institution dependent on national governments 
National rivalry and competition 
14. If a regional approach to pursuing opportunities for increasing the investment potential of the 
water and wastewater sector was adopted, which island(s) do you think could become likely 
partners with your country? 
§ Antigua & Barbuda Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago § Barbados SI. Kills & Nevis Other (plea"'_l Dominica SI. Lucia Grenada SI. Vincent 
15. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most favourable response and 1 representing the 
least favourable response, please indicate the basis for your se/ection(s) to question 15: 
>- .. b: 0,: .. e .. "'~ c ~ ~ 
'" 
c'" Basis for regional grouping 2'" Cl .. e :1 < .. - .. is U):S In 
4 3 2 1 
Similar issues/problems/challenges to be addressed 
Strong history of cooperation 
Already working together on similar issues 
Geographical proximity 
Level of development of the sector 
Part C - Investment promotion 
16. Who has responsibility for sourcing investment for the water and wastewater sector? 
§ Water utility Government finance mi,rn"is"tCL ______ --'_-'-=========:!.l:======'-_--, Other (please specify) 
17. Do you think a promotion strategy specifically targeted at sourcing investment is necessary for 
the water and wastewater sector? 
DYes D No 
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SurveyC 
18. On a four-point scale with 4 representing the most important and 1 representing the least 
important, please indicate the extent to which you think a promotion strategy for the water and 
wastewater sector should focus on the following: 
Focus of promotion strategy 
Image-building for the sector (i.e. improving country's/region's image 
within the investment community as a favourable location for investment) 
Investment generation (i.e. targeting specific investors with a view to 
creatinQ investment leads) 
Pre and post investment service (i.e. providing services to prospective 
and current investors to assist in the analysis of investment decisions, 
investment facilitation and investment maintenance) 
End of questionnaire 
Thank you 
Would you like a copy of the report on the questionnaire results? 
Would you like your organisation's involvement to remain anonymous? 
This questionnaire was completed by: 
Name: 
Position: 
Tel: Fax: 
E-mail: 
Date: 
;: 
~ .. 
~t: 
00 
:2ia. 
.5 
4 
;: ~ ;: ,.,c 
.. ~~ ';i~ 1:: 
0 ~&. .. 0 a. "a. 
.5 en .5 ..J .5 
3 2 1 
DvesD 
DVesD 
No 
No 
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Date 
Respondent's name 
Respondent's job title 
Company name 
Address 
Salutation 
- -- -------------
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Cover letter for Survey A 
Re: Survey of local financial institutions: Investment decision-making in the water and sanitation sector 
I am writing to ask for your assistance in conducting a survey aimed at obtaining the attitude of local banking and 
non-banking private financial institutions to the investment prospects of the water and sanitation sector. The survey 
to be administered in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago fonns part of an independent study towards a 
PhD in Development Engineering at Loughborough University in the United Kingdom. Your organisation was 
randomly selected from a list of registered local financial institutions. In keeping with intemational development 
literature, you are considered a potential source of private financing for water and sanitation infrastructure. 
I appreciate that most local financial institutions have limited investment experience in water and sanitation which has 
traditionally been the responsibility of government. Through this survey, I hope to benefit from your organisation's 
general investment experience and the possible application of this know-how to water and sanitation. The main 
benefit of participation is access to the final report on local and Caribbean investment attitudes to water and 
sanitation-related issues, at no cost to your organisation save for the short time required for completion. 
I would be extremely grateful if you or an appropriate colleague will consent to spend about 15 minutes completing 
the questionnaire as you enjoy a cup of England's finest. Please note that the information requested will be 
treated with the strictest confidence and used only for academic purposes. Verification of my research status may be 
obtained by contacting my supervisor, Dr. M. Sohail at M.Sohail@lboro.ac.uk or at +44 (0)1509-222890/222885. 
Completed questionnaires will be picked up in a week's time. Further queries may be addressed to 
N.A.Martin@lboro.ac.uk. 
I hope that my research will be of interest to your organisation and my request favourably considered. 
Yours sincerely and thanks in advance, 
Norline Martin 
Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) 
Civil and Building Engineering, Loughborough University 
Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK 
Teiephone:(O) 1509228527/222885 
Fax: (0) 1509 211079 
Email: N.A.Martin@lboro.acuk 
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Cover letter for Survey B 
Data 
Respondent's name 
Respondent's job title 
Company name 
Address 
Salutation 
Re: Survey of locational determinants and investment 
decision-making in the utilities sector 
Following my recent contact with your organisatio~ throu~h 
(contact person), I am writing to ask for your ~sslstance In 
conducting a survey aimed at capturing the expenences and/or 
views of global investors on key factors that impact on th~. choice 
of investment location, small-scale investment opportunIties and 
investment decision-making in the utilities sector. This is a 
crucial part of my PhD research programme in the Ci~iI a~d 
Building Engineering department at Loughborough UnLversLty 
which is motivated in part by my experience in the water and 
sanitation sector in the Caribbean. 
The benefits of participation to your organisation indude: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Access to the final report which could help your 
organisation to develop future strategies with respect to 
investment destination in the sector; 
Access to an up-to-date overview of clients' and 
investors' attitudes to these investments at no cost to 
your organisation save for the short time required for 
completion; and 
Expression of your organisation's valued opinion and 
experience to existing and potential clients in the 
Caribbean Region. 
The Questionnaire sent as an e-mail attachment is divided into 
three parts: 
Part A - Investment profile of your organisation 
Part B - Investment decision-making 
Part C - Investment location assessment 
I would be extremely grateful if you or an appropriate colleague 
would consent to spend about 20 minutes completing the 
Questionnaire. Please note that the information requested will ~ 
treated with the stridest confidence and used only for academLc 
purposes. Please return the completed questionnaire and/or 
address further queries to N.A.Martjn@lboro.ac.uk or at 01509-
2285271222885. Verification of my researcher status may be 
obtained by contacting my supervisor, Dr. M. Sohail at 
M.Sohail@lboro.ac.uk or at 01509-222890/222885. 
I hope that my research will be of interest to your organisation 
and my request favolJrably considered. 
Yours sincerely and thanks in advance, 
Norline Martin 
Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC). 
Civil and Building Engineering, Loughborough UniversLty 
Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK 
Telephone: (0) 1509228527/222885 
Fax: (0)1509211079 
Email: N.A.Martin@lboro.ac.uk 
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Cover letter for Survey C 
U~, $ 
Date 
Respondent's name 
Respondent's job title 
Company name 
Address 
Salutation 
Re: Survey of locational determinants and the potential 
for regional cooperation in the Caribbean water and 
sanitation sector 
I am writing to ask for your assistance in conducting a survey 
aimed at capturing the experiences and/or views of caribbean 
water utility managers on key factors that impact on the choice of 
investment location and strategies to attract private investment in 
the Caribbean water and wastewater sector. A brief introduction 
has already been made on my behalf by Ms. Marian Stephen at 
the CWWA Secretariat in Trinidad. This is a crucial part of my 
PhD research programme in the Civil and Building Engineering 
department at Loughborough University which is motivated in 
part by my experience in the water and sanitation sector in 
Jamaica. 
The benefits of participation to your organisation include: 
1. Access to the final report which could help your 
organisation to develop future strategies with respect to 
attracting investment to the sector; and 
2. Access to an up-to-date overview of investors' and your 
Caribbean counterparts' attitudes to these investments 
at no cost to your organisation save for the short time 
required for completion. 
The questionnaire sent as an a-mail attachment is divided into 
three parts: 
Part A - Sector profile 
Part B - Scale and scope assessment 
Part C - Investment promotion 
I would be extremely grateful if you and/or appropriate 
colleagues would consent to spend about 20 minutes completing 
the Questionnaire. Please note that the information requested 
will be treated with the strictest confidence and used only for 
academic purposes. Please return the completed Questionnaire 
and/or address further queries to N.A.Martin@lboro.aC.uk. 
Verification of my researcher status may be obtained by 
contacting my supervisor, Dr. M. Sohail at M.Sohail@lboro.aC.uk 
or at +44 (0) 1509-222890/222885. 
I hope that my research will be of interest to your organisation 
and my request favourably considered. 
Yours sincerely and thanks in advance, 
Norline Martin 
Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) 
Civil and Building Engineering, Loughborough University 
Leicestershire LE11 3TU, UK 
Telephone: (0) 1509 2285271222885 
Fax: (0) 1509 211079 
Emai!;N.A.Martin@lboro.ac.uk 
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Interview guides for ... 
Water sector officials 
1. Compared to other utility services, how would you describe the investment prospects of the water and 
wastewater sector in your country? 
2. What are the local needs and context of the water and wastewater sector in your country? 
3. ConSidering these local needs/context, to what extent do you think the following PSP options (concession, BOT 
and divestiture) appropriate for the water and wastewater sector in your country? 
4. What and how has been your experience with private investment in the water and wastewater sector? 
5. What type of economic, political, regulatory and social environment do you think is necessary to attract private 
investment to the water and wastewater sector? 
6. How does your country's investment dimate attract and/or deter private investment in the water and wastewater 
sector? 
7. How involved is the water utility in investment promotion for the sector? 
8. What more can be done to promote the Caribbean as an investment location for water and wastewater projects? 
9. To what extent is size an issue for the Caribbean with respect to attracting private investment to the water and 
wastewater sector? 
10. What options do you think exist for improving small-scale investment opportunities? 
11. Regional cooperation has been used as a strategic response to overcome size constraints. To what extent can 
regional cooperation in the following areas (investment sourcing, standardisation, professional expertise and 
regulation) improve opportunities for investment in the Caribbean water and wastewater sector? 
12. How would regional cooperation in the sector be effected? 
13. What challenges do you envision for regional cooperation in the Caribbean water and wastewater sector? 
Utility regulators 
1. What is the legaVregulatory framework within which your organisation operates? 
2. What is your organisation's professional responsibility to the water utility, private investors/operators, 
government/political interests and consumers? 
3. What special considerations if any are made when determining the pricing structure for water and sewerage rates 
in your country? 
4. What type of regulatory framework do you think is necessary to encourage and sustain private investment in the 
water and wastewater sector? 
5. How does your current regulatory framework attract and/or deter private investment in the water and wastewater 
sector? 
6. What and how has been your experience with private investment in the water sector? 
7. How would (has) your organisation's role change(d) with the introduction of private investment in your country's 
water sector? 
8. To what extent is size an issue in the scope/effectiveness of utility regulation in the Caribbean? 
9. How can regional cooperation improve the regulatory capacity/framework of the Caribbean water and wastewater 
sector? 
10. What challenges would you envision for a regional approach to water utility regulation in the Caribbean? 
Private service providers 
1. What was your motivation to become a private operator in the sector? 
2. How do you perceive the investment prospects of the sector? What are your expectations? 
3. Describe the 'journey' or process that you had to go through to become established as a private service provider. 
4. What more do you think should be done to encourage other private operators like yourself to enter the sector? 
5. What options for private sector participation do you think are viable conSidering the local environment? 
6. Describe your operations - customer base, production, capital/operational costs, service area, tariff, revenue 
collection, UFW, etc. 
7. What is your source of financing? 
8. How facilitative were the water utility, regulator, government. water ministry? 
9. Please comment on the regulatory framework for private operators in the sector. 
10. What are your long·term plans for the sector? 
11. What is the scope for local and foreign private sector participation given the local context? 
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Interview guides for ... 
Local financial institutions 
1. What are the investment prospects for the water and wastewater sector? 
2. What banking products and services are available to the water and wastewater sector? 
3. What factors impact on your decision to provide financing for water and wastewater projects? 
4. Does the bank make any distinction in its lending policies for (a) rural vs. urban supply (b) public vs. private 
service providers (c) local private vs. international private service providers? 
5. What are (were) the positive and negative aspects of your experience in providing finance to the local water and 
wastewater sector? 
6. What improvements if any are needed to encourage local financial institutions to become more involved in the 
water and wastewater sector? 
7. What opportunities do you see for improving bank lending to the water and wastewater sector? 
8. What do you see as the future for financing the water and wastewater sector? 
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List of interviewees 
March 15, 2004 
March 26, 2004 
March 28, 2004 
March 30, 2004 
March 31, 2004 
April 1,2004 
April 5, 2004 
April 5, 2004 
April 5, 2004 
April 6, 2004 
April 6, 2004 
April 8, 2004 
April 8, 2004 
April 15,2004 
April 15, 2004 
April 19, 2004 
April 20, 2004 
April 22, 2004 
April 22, 2004 
April 23, 2004 
April 27, 2004 
April 30, 2004 
May 4, 2004 
May4,2004 
May 4, 2004 
May4,2004 
May 4, 2004 
May4,2004 
May 5, 2004 
May 5, 2004 
May 6, 2004 
May 6, 2004 
June 10, 2004 
July 29, 2004 
August 26, 2004 
January 10, 2005 
January 19, 2005 
January 20, 2005 
January 20, 2005 
January 24, 2005 
February 1, 2005 
February 2, 2005 
February 4, 2005 
February 9, 2005 
February 10, 2005 
February 15, 2005 
February 24, 2005 
March 2, 2005 
March 3, 2005 
March 7, 2005 
March 22, 2005 
March 22, 2005 
Professor of International Business of University of the West Indies 
Project Manager of NWC 
VP. Corporate and Strategic Planning of NWC 
GM. Systems Development of NWC 
NWC Board Commissioner 
Project Manager of Company x 
Chief Technical Director of MOWH 
Chief Engineer and Senior VP of NWC 
Community Development and Gender Specialist of MOWH 
President of NWC 
Chairman of National Contracts Committee 
Director General of OUR 
GM, Special Projects and Public-Private Sector Partnerships of NWC 
Division Chief, Project Supervision Division of Caribbean Development Bank 
Operations Officer, Project Supervision Division of COB 
Senior Petroleum Engineer of MOEPU 
Manager, Engineering of BWA 
Financial Analyst of FTC 
Director of lonics Freshwater Ltd. 
Project Manager, West Coast Sewerage Project Unit of BWA 
General Manager of BWA 
Head, Action Plan Unit of WASA 
Chief Executive Officer of WASA 
GM, BUsiness Services of WASA 
GM, Operations of WASA 
System Manager, Special Projects in the Office of the CEO of WASA 
Deputy GM, Corporate Services of WAS A 
Chief Operating Officer of Water for the People (NGO) 
Regional Director of Carillion (Caribbean) Ltd. 
GM of the Desalination Company of Trinidad and Tobago 
Executive Director of RIC 
Senior Investment Officer of International Finance Corporation 
Business Development Manager of Severn Trent Water International 
Assistant GM, Corporate Banking of Scotiabank TT 
Director, Corporate Division of FINCOR 
Assistant GM, Corporate Banking Centre of RBTT Bank Jamaica Ltd. 
MD of Dairy Spring Ltd. 
Senior Project Engineer of Carib Engineering Corporation Ltd. 
Programme Director, RUral Water Programme of MOWH 
Project Manager, External Cooperation of Planning Institute of Jamaica 
Project Manager, Capital Works of BWA 
Commercial Banking Manager of Scotiabank 
MD of New Water Inc. 
Senior Trader of Caribbean Money Markey Brokers Ltd. 
Relationship Manager, Corporate Credit of Barbados National Bank 
GM of Barbados National Bank Finance and Trust Corporation 
WASA Standards Engineer of RIC 
Registrar, National Institute of Higher Education 
MD of Lee Young and Partners 
Manager, Structured Finance of FINCOR 
Corporate Manager, FirstCaribbean International Bank 
MD of Can-Cara Environments Ltd. 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
UK 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Barbados 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Trinidad 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 
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Sample interview transcript 
Chief Technical Director, Ministry of Water & Housing - Jamaica (April 5, 2004) 
Q, Compared to other utilities and infrastructure in general, how would you describe the 
investment prospects of the water and wastewater sector in Jamaica? 
A, Simultaneously - very good and very bad. Very good from the standpoint of our needs - we 
clearly have needs in water and wastewater. We need probably more than US$100/200 M worth of 
investments - so the need is there. The bad thing though is that water is necessarily not that attractive, 
especially when it comes onto wastewater it is more of a public good, so the retums are not there and 
people a little bit wary of investing in water and sewerage for those very reasons. In 
telecommunications, there are prospects and a lot of investments are going there because the returns 
are there. In water even though there is probably a greater need we don't find a lot of people coming 
here because (1) the whole perception of water as a social good (2) the ability of people to pay and 
people looking al water as a right. So the attractiveness of the investment is not there even though the 
need is there. In that regard water is probably worse off than electriCity and telecom because you do not 
get back those types of returns. 
Q. What are the local needs and context of the water and wastewater sector in Jamaica? 
A. We have a plan and our plan by policy is to have water accessible to every community in 
Jamaica by 2010 - accessible meaning not necessarily piped water, so we have to use a number of 
non-convectional solutions - rainwater harvesting, wayside tank, etc. In irrigation, we have a National 
Irrigation Development Plan that proposes some 51 projects to put a number of acreages under 
irrigation. The projects range from large scale to small size to rehabilitation projects. In wastewater, 
that is where our needs are greatest right now. Our plan is to put a central sewerage system in every 
parish capital and in some of the major towns by 2020. So the needs are there. The context is what will 
give a little problem. For instance, in potable water where the needs are basically in those areas on the 
north coast which are not now served - virgin areas. We have a project going on now to cover the strip 
from Lucea to Montego Bay by some French investors, we are now looking at a project from Falmouth 
to Duncans and there is also the area from Ocho Rios to Port Maria. Those are huge developmental 
projects for which a large number of foreign investors will come if they can get government guarantee -
so I don't see any problems getting investment for those areas because the potential is there in terms of 
tourism development to ensure the payback over time. 
Where the real need is now in the domestic water sector is in the rural areas and that is where we have 
a problem. Our rural areas are very challenging terrain so there is an excessive pumping cost, they are 
not always near to sources of water so you have to transmit water over long distances and the 
population density is very low which does not auger well for payback. All of those factors combined sort 
of render rural water unattractive and what we have to do is tailor solutions to fit the conditions. So what 
we want are not the conventional pipe systems in some of the rural areas because we will never get 
payback for them and they cannot be sustainable - what we need are more generic systems tailored to 
meet the needs of those communities. So we are experimenting with rainwater harvesting, entombment 
and things that are community-driven and managed. The challenge now is how do you get private 
investment in those sorts of systems that are not conventional, and that's where the local context comes 
in with respect to rural water. 
The challenge in wastewater is that we are now attempting to put in central systems in areas that are 
already populated, having to deal with dislocation and to get people to connect - from our experience 
with our 3 new systems on the north coast, people just don't connect and you literally have to borrow 
money and give them to connect to the system which does not auger well again for an investor who 
would want this to recoup his money. I don't know how feasible it is to ask people to pay back the real 
cost in terms of capital and operational maintenance costs for a central sewerage system because it is 
just very expensive but it is something you have to do for environmental reasons. So the challenge 
there is how to marry private funds with public funds to see how you can get a solution that satisfies 
everybody. 
Finally, we also have a big need in terms of rehabilitating existing systems in NWC. That is where I 
think the prospects are greatest because where as the current tariffs don't make any provisions for 
capital recovery which does not auger well for private investment, they do make provisions for 
rehabilitating existing systems. I think private people should come in and cooperate with the NWC, 
make the investments to fix the system to bring down unaccounted for water, to improve efficiency, to 
replace pumps and so on and to repair sewerage systems, and the extent to which those investments 
translate to greater efficiencies, then they reap some of the efficiency gains and I think that's a model we 
should pursue in respect of rehabilitation of systems. 
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Q. Considering these local needs/context. to what extent do you think the following PSP options 
(concession, BOT and divestiture) appropriate for the water and wastewater sector in Jamaica? 
A. In terms of conceSSion, what I have just alluded to I think can work - either a private investor 
could get a section of the country, they make the necessary investments to expand the infrastructure, 
coverage and to rehabilitate what currently exists and they reap whatever benefits accrue from those 
investments through the tariffs. I think it would be good from 2 standpoints (1) they would have been 
making the investments so that they free-up the government to make those investments that other areas 
so that there would be less demand from us in terms of up-front investments in those areas, and (2) 
when you have a concession running along side a national utility like the NWC, one could compare and 
see where management makes a difference. The problem with that is that I think there is so sort of 
attitude problem in terms of concessions existing within the NWC itself. I don't know that the 
management of NWC is at a point where they would be amenable to that type of intervention and that is 
the greatest challenge in that regard. In terms of BOT etc., that is possible and I think probably is the 
most convenient way of having private sector investment because there is no question as to ownership 
of existing facilities - my understanding is that BOT and BOO are basically added capacity and those 
guys would not interface with the final customer. The challenge is that when you buy water in bulk that 
has been developed by private investors, most times the state of our infrastructure is such that we 
cannot take that water and efficiently distribute it - so then you buy water and then have it leak out. 
Also most private sector people are most comfortable with types of BOT because they don't want to face 
the risk of interfacing with the customer. Divestiture for us is out of the question (chuckles) - it is a 
policy that we have no interest in divesting what already exists. What we are doing people can come 
into virgin areas and operate as utilities but what exists we are committed to reforming the NWC and 
making them more efficient, either by themselves or in corporation with other private sectors by 
whatever means - outsourcing, management contracts, concessions perhaps, but the existing assets 
will remain with the government. 
Q. What and how has been your experience with private investment in the water and wastewater 
sector? 
A. Disappointing - we have been inviting private sector investment over the last 6 years, and 
when I say we have been inviting, not just merely getting up and saying welcome, but concrete things. 
We have an independent body in place by legislation which is the Water Resources Authority that 
allocates the resource such that no private investor can come in a worry as to whether or not they will 
have access to the resource - there is a fair and objective methodology in terms of allocating the 
resource which I think would be a prerequisite for private sector investment. We also have an 
independent economic regulator, the OUR which sets rates independent of the political directorate 
which in and of itself should be an incentive for private sector involvement. We have amended the NWC 
ACT because formerly the NWC had the power to licence other operators. We have removed that 
because that is an inherent conflict of interest. We are now working as we speak with a new legislation 
that is with the chief parliamentary council being drafted (cabinet has okayed it already) called the Water 
and Sewerage Services Act that establishes a licensing regime for the sector. So under that act any 
private investor local or from overseas, can in fact come if they identify an area that has a need for water 
supply and sewerage services, they can apply for a licence from the OUR and get that licence to 
operate like a utility along side the NWC. 
So I think in terms of legislation and institutional development, we have done all that is required of us to 
have private sector investment a reality. However, that has not been the case because what we have, 
we are flooded with all kinds of proposals from private people. Essentially, every one of them asks for 3 
things (1) government guarantee and (2) no interface with the customer (3) and they want exclusive 
relationships. So they will come and say that they want to put a water scheme in Port Maria but I don't 
want to compete with other private sector persons, I want it to be an exclusive deal. So you don't know 
whether or not you are getting the best in terms of price. They want a government guarantee that 
means the risk remains with the public sector and they are only interested in selling the NWC water, 
they don't want to face the risk of going to the customer. So it has been disappointing. We now have 
the French on the north coast - that is the first sort of a real private sector involvement in the sector. But 
then when you look at it, it is not a 'real' private sector thing - they raise the funds but with a government 
guarantee, they are undertaking the construction of the project and of course they will sell the water to 
NWC to be paid back over time. What I want to see is a real transfer of risk from the public to the 
private and that is what I would call real private sector investment. 
Q. What type of economic, political, regulatory, and social environment do you think is necessary 
to attract private investment to the water and wastewater sector? 
A. I have just described what we have done and those turn out not to be sufficient. We have done 
the institutional reform where we have an independent regulator for tariff and also for the water 
resources and we have done legislative changes in terms of the NWC Act being amended and the new 
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Act which we are working on. I think though something that we overlook sometimes in respect of private 
sector is really the changing of the attitude of the private sector itself. In Jamaica for instance even 
though there is this enormous opportunity for investment in the water sector, we find that our banks are 
very conservative and I don't know if that has to do with the many alternatives they have to earn money, 
for certainly is you can buy govemment paper and earn money, why would you want to take on all the 
risks to come into the water sector. I don't think what we have done also necessary is sufficient. What 
is now necessary is to some how nurse our local financial sector which when you look at their balance 
sheet have tons of money. How do you get them to put those monies in the sector? I don't know, 
probably we need to sit down and talk to them and find out what would satisfy them. In recent times the 
USAID came up with this idea of providing guarantees to local banks. If a bank is going to lend a million 
dollars to a private person who wants to put up a water scheme, I mean interest rates in this country are 
very high, you cannot invest in the water sector at 20%+, it just can't work and banks want back their 
money in 5 years. I think what we need to do is for the government to borrow for example, Japanese 
1 % money and lend it the private sector, to banks, so that by the time the money reaches the people 
who want to invest in the water sector, it is probably at 5%. Otherwise we will never move investment in 
this country. 
Q. You have touched on question 6 looking at the investment climate and how this may attract or 
deter private investment in the sector. How involved is the water utility in investment promotion for the 
sector? And here you can include what the MOWH is doing as well. 
A. We are very involved. The truth is one of the problems is that we take a more reactive stance 
in other words, we speak in general terms that we need investment and people come in with proposals 
and we react to them and we waste a lot of time this way for as I mentioned before, invariably these 
people come and want guarantees and exclusive relationships, etc. I think we need to go one step 
further where we actually define what we need and put out requests, that is what has been lacking. So 
we speak in general terms but have not been proactive with it. For instance look at Harbour View and 
operation pride projects in Bull Bay. I believe that the density is there that if a private investor comes in, 
builds a new plant and connects everybody, even from the existing tariff, they can make a retum. But 
we don't go out and request a proposal for Harbour View, we simply sit down and everybody comes and 
puts a proposal and then we say that is not suitable and invariably when people come, they are coming 
with their interests in mind. We have to define what it is we want and put down the parameters and let 
people present us proposals competitively. The ministry is here saying something but the change of 
attitude that is required in the utility is not there. We don't put our proposal for NWC for Harbour View or 
wherever else is their thing and that is what we really need to do, to have the change of attitude inside 
the utility itself where they say what are our needs in terms of rehabilitation, expansion and then you put 
it out there. Even the French that we now have, that is something that was initiated by them - they did 
the Lucea/Negril project which was a normal construction project funded by the Japanese and there was 
a good relationship and they said okay can we raise funds to do this one for you? And we said yes - we 
found it acceptable. We have to package what we want and sell to them. 
Q. What more can be done to promote the Caribbean as an investment location for water and 
wastewater projects? 
A. Essentially what I have just said - it starts with a definition of what is required rather than 
speaking in general terms. For instance, the whole thing about central sewerage, I don't know how it is 
in other countries but I'm sure that that is suppose to be a Sore point all over the Caribbean. I mean if 
Jamaica has a problem, I would suspect that those people would have a bigger problem. These islands 
are just too small to have anything less than proper centralised sewerage systems because we depend 
upon the quality of our coastal water for our survival in terms of tourism. I think that is something we 
need to wake up and start looking into very seriously and perhaps we should do it as a Caribbean. Part 
of the thing with us is that our projects are so small in relative terms that they are not always attractive 
for the private man because the transaction cost alone would eat up a significant amount of the 
investment, so I don't know the extent to which countries can combine and have 2 or 3 projects funded 
under one banner - a sewerage scheme in Kingston, one in Barbados, or something like that so that the 
transaction fee is spread. Also, one of things that is required, I blame us that we don't package our 
things and go out there, but the reason why we don't it is that we don't have any notion as to the 
feasibility. So if we could have a block of funds dedicated to doing feasibility and we do that feasibility, it 
could turn out that most of our projects are feasible and if we establish that in feasibility studies, we can 
now go out and say, "Hi, this is something that is attractive and I am speaking on the basis of fact, from 
an informed position." We don't have that. 
Q. Well, I think you have touched on question 9 with nespect to size and a little on 10, if you could 
elaborate on how size is manifested in transaction costs, professional/technical capability, cost of 
borrowing and revenue general potential. 
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A. Well, transaction costs - people who are involved in project financing are not looking for US$2 
M projects because transaction costs are fairly standard. If you are doing contract documentation for a 
US$10 M project, chances are it is the same amount you will have to pay your lawyer as a US$1 M 
project. So then, the bigger the project, the smaller the proportion of transaction cost to the entire thing 
and it renders the project a little bit more feasible. So that is the problem with us - our projects are 
typically small because you are talking about a 1 million or 2 million gallon sewage plant - there are 
countries that need 10 million gallon sewage plants, it's like a joke. Professional and technical capacity, 
I don't think we have a problem here in Jamaica because I think you would agree that we have a good 
cadre of professionals that know what is to be done. What beats us more in terms of our people is the 
mindsets and attitudes more than the concrete technical capability. The cost of borrowing is a factor 
because the truth is that we always have to look outside our shores for investment dollars because 
borrowing money in Jamaica at 20/30% is not on for infrastructure projects and the irony of the whole 
thing is that a lot of our banks - NCB, BNS, RBTT - they have a lot of money Sitting down and not doing 
anything. Revenue generation potential- that is a problem because where population densities are low, 
there is a definite problem and I think the investment that will payoff very quickly are those that will have 
to do with rehabilitation where you can reap efficiency gains and share it with the investor and in the 
tourist areas where we know that development will come and cities where the population is there, but 
rural water that's the biggest challenge. 
Q. What options do you think exist for improving small-scale investment opportunities? 
A. It all comes back to money - it happens in Jamaica, I don't know the ex1ent to which it happens 
in other Caribbean countries. The truth is water and wastewater are not things you can leave entirely to 
the private sector because of the positive externalities government has to make a contribution. The 
question is if the government has $50 M to spend on water, how should it spend it - should it go out 
there and do 1 single project or use it to leverage financing from elsewhere - that is where I think we 
should begin thinking. For instance, we are saying that rural water may be unattractive but suppose 
there is a man who is willing and goes to a certain community and when he does his assessment to put 
a system in say Wait-a-bit will cost $20 M. I can only recover $15 M over time based on the existing 
tariff and the population density. I think that government should give that man the $5 M to over his debt 
rather than directly investing though NWC where the project takes 20 years to implement and at the end 
of the 20 years the cost has gone up multiplefold. Although water is unattractive, there are creative 
ways to marry public and private funds to make the whole thing more attractive and I think what 
government should do is to move away from the direct investment - those huge budgets where you 
invest millions and say "Private sector, you take the lead and where there is a gap we will fill it." 
Q. Regional cooperation has been used as a strategic response to overcoming size constraints. 
To what ex1ent can regional cooperation in the following areas (investment sourcing, standardisation, 
professional expertise and regulation) improve opportunities for investment in the Caribbean water and 
wastewater sector? 
A. We have this thing called the CWWA. I don't see any reason why in that forum you can't 
organise a regional thing where everybody says, "This is my portfolio of projects and so on." It would 
not cost any ex1ra and rather than going there and listening to papers, that could be going on 
simultaneously, because I don't see us going to New York and doing that. Caribbean embassies abroad 
right in Washington can come together and put on these things in terms of promotion. 
Q. What about standardisation of service, performance indicators, professional expertise? 
A. Well I think all of those can be achieved through cooperation with institutions. For example in 
Jamaica we are a little ahead in terms of institutional development (OUR, WRA, etc) and I don't see any 
reason why we can't cooperate even within the ambit of the CWWA in terms of sharing information and 
standards, etc. We have done that successfully with the Bureau of Standards and other standard 
organisations in the Caribbean. I don't know that we do enough ofthat in the water sector. I don't know 
for instance if there is a forum where a WASA, NWC and BWA come together and share these things-
there isn't, and this is not difficult to do with e-mails and those sorts of things. Same thing with 
professional expertise - we have an investor talking about desalination. They did a project with Trinidad 
and one in Barbados - independently and neither is happy for they get into this deal and find out that 
when everything is said and done, the cost is escalating. Now when we came to do ours someone said, 
"Wait a minute, let us talk to hear from Barbados what is happening." When we heard the nightmare 
that they were going through we just stopped the thing. So there is nothing to stop us from sharing 
information and sometime you have a contractor that does badly in Jamaica and goes to Barbados and 
does the same thing because we just exist independently of each other. We can share information 
especially in terms of negotiation strategy. 
Q. In terms of say regulation and procurement? 
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A. Again, I don't know, we have to start thinking in unconventional ways when we have problems. 
In recent times in Jamaica for instance we have been buying pipes from China - good quality pipes at 
better prices. There is nothing that says that 2 or 3 Caribbean water utilities can't come together and 
make a big order because, say in St. Vincent where they may not need not much pipes so it would not 
make sense to go to China and just by US$2 M worth of pipes for a small country like that but if you pool 
it there may be tremendous benefits. 
Q. How would regional cooperation in the sector be effected? 
A. There has to be some kind of regional structure for as I said before, we don't know what is 
happening elsewhere and I think we all have common problems. An attempt is now being made to fomn 
a Caribbean Water Partnership - I am hoping that that type of forum will lend itself to some of these 
things we are talking about. I hope it is not just a talk-shop where you go and present papers every year 
but where you can have jOint promotion, exchange of ideas, and even joint projects. When you go to 
some of these international conferences the people in SE Asia who are as poor as us, probably a little 
bit bigger in population - they have whole regional institutions that are devoted exclusively to putting 
together proposals, to lobby and get funds. In the Caribbean, that is lacking because the truth is that if 
you have a country with 60,000 people, that's not a viable state in my view, so you would not have 
people to go to these places where there are benefits to be derived. That is what a regional thing could 
do for you. Even within the UN body, the funds that are available at different international forum, you 
find that most of it goes to the Latin Americans and the Asians because they make their presence felt -
they come with their proposals and have joint projects. We are very loose when it comes on to that and 
I think those are some of the things that this Caribbean Water Partnership can address. Nobody stops 
us from making our presence felt as a regional organisation and I think that institutions like CWWA, 
rather than coming together and just presenting papers, these are some of the things we must engage 
our minds with, so I am hoping that this CWP is not just one of those things that you go every year and 
cool out but really take on these kinds of the challenges and present regional projects for funding. 
There is one now for instance in water resources management - a regional project that has to do with 
saline intrusion in Jamaica, Barbados and Antigua. We need more of these kinds of things because 
largely our problems are more or less the same. 
Q. What challenges do you envision for regional cooperation in the Caribbean water and 
wastewater sector? 
A. Somebody has to take the leadership initiative and sometimes I feel there is an inherent 
distrust between some of the bigger islands and the smaller ones. The smaller islands tend to bond 
together. We Jamaicans tend to look north instead of down especially since we have more developed 
institutions. Consider an institution like xxx which is suppose to be a regional institution, you wonder 
sometimes if they understand their mandate. You go to these international places and you see xxx and 
them and it's like they are only answerable to himself and his little team and nothing is disseminated -
you don't know who they speak for and people go to these conferences as if they are going in their 
personal capacity. People really need to understand what a regional mandate is and be accountable, 
because institutions exist but they don't have any mandate from the region so they operate more like 
private individuals. You have a guy called xxx - everywhere you go you see him and who he reports to 
you don't know. You keep seeing the same faces everywhere you go and you wonder who do these 
guys report to? I went to Geneva in December - this World Water and Sanitation Collaboration Council, 
and when we were there I hear people say that they are the national coordinator for this WASH 
promotion - World Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council based in Geneva - they claim 
that they don't deal with governments just with private and NGOs and they are promoting this water 
sanitation and hygiene. They don't have funds but they are just trying to build awareness and fomn 
alliances. I hear people stand up and say, "I am the national coordinator." And I say, "Who is your 
constituency, where do you get your legitimacy from?" And these guys just raise some money and go 
on these trips and claim that they speak for us but they don't speak for anybody. They don't have a 
mandate or a constituency and that is what is beating Caribbean people. When you look at Asian 
people now, they caucus, they come with a programme and their presence is really felt. Now a girl 
come from Guyana saying she is from WASH - what have you done for WASH? You don't have a 
launch you are just the focal point and the focal point means that you go to these meetings every now 
and again. We need to have a notion of accountability, people come together and say I am giving you 
this mandate and holding you accountable - that does not exist in Caribbean institutions, probably 
because they are voluntary, I don't know. 
End of interview 
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TableA1 Perception item loadings and factors 1 to 5 (22-item UPS) 
Scale items 
... Component ,; 
1 2 3 4 5 
Perception 21 0.834 -3.431E-02 0.135 0.275 7.155E-02 
Perception 19 0.832 0.129 0.190 0.170 0.151 
Perception 20 0.744 0.198 -7.456E-02 0.331 8.862E-02 
Perception 4 0.740 0.383 0.269 -1.475E-02 0.107 
Perception 16 0.715 0.266 8.329E-02 0.222 0.280 
Perception 9 1 0.702 0.433 0.245 5.176E-02 0.113 
Perception 8 0.692 0.357 1.808E-02 0.113 -0.193 
Perception 12 0.622 0.436 0.132 -3.937E-02 -1.815E-02 
Perception 5 0.558 0.448 0.405 0.125 0.147 
Perception 13 0.551 0.451 0.273 3.705E-02 4.035E-02 
Perception 7 0:527 0.247 0.464 -0.102 -0.198 
Perception 14 0.477 0.471 1.398E-02 0.264 ·5.083E-02 
Perception 11 0.227 0.827 -8.130E-02 4.278E-02 -5.026E-02 
Perception 3 0.126 2 0.688 8.532E-02 7.900E-02 0.118 
Perception 10 0.461 0.602 6.447E-02 0.215 -7.094E-02 
Perception 6 0.237 0.548 3 0.502 0.265 5.511E-02 Perception 2 -4.501E-02 1.724E-02 0.863 0.148 3.883E-02 
Perception 1 0.312 -2.152E-03 0.775 5.346E-02 8.437E-02 
Perception 17 0.108 0.182 0.278 4 0.71.9 -0.237 
Perception 15 0.344 0.118 2.449E-02 0.716 0.151 
Perception 22 3.382E-03 3.860E-02 2.855E-02 -3.953E-02 5 -0.860 
Perception 18 0.372 0.182 0.273 -0.184 0.606 
Figure A1 Scree plot of eigenvalues for UPS 
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TableA2 Descriptive statistics of UPS for different grouping variables 
Grouping variable Scale Mean .- . MeQian range 
CASE SUMMARY 
All participants 21-70 50.37 51.00 
Banking 21 -70 53.66 58.00 
Non-banking 21 - 69 47.87 47.50 
Investor 21- 69 50.74 51.00 
Non-investor 25-70 48.76 47.00 
JAMAICA 
All participants 21- 69 53.11 56.00 
Banking 21-67 57.00 59.00 
Non-banking 37 -69 50.44 52.00 
Investor 21- 69 54.47 58.00 
Non-investor 38-66 50.80 52.00 
BARBADOS 
All participants 39-70 57.40 58.00 
Banking 48-70 62.00 65.00 
Non-banking 39- 67 54.33 55.00 
Investor 48-67 57.25 56.50 
Non-investor 43-70 58.50 60.50 
TRINIDAD 
All participants 21- 63 43.20 44.00 
Banking 25-63 46.42 45.50 
Non-banking 21 - 51 40.23 42.00 
Investor 21- 63 44.33 45.00 
Non-investor 25-48 40.29 42.00 
TableA3 K-W test comparing respondents' characteristics across case locations 
Test Statistics'-b 
Infrastructure 
Size of Infrastructure as part of Infrastructure Infrastructure Infrastructure 
Organisation investment investment investment investment· investment • investment· 
category portfolio activity _ portfolio loans equity bonds 
ChI-Square .458 .727 .741 .679 .745 .880 7.573 
Of 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Asymp. S~. .795 .695 .690 .712 .689 .644 .023 
a. Kruskal Wallls Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Country 
TableA4 Characteristics of Survey A respondents (Jamaica) 
Percent 
Variable T of institution Infrastructure investment activi 
, ;. ..; 
" 
All Bankin Non-bankin Investor Non-investor 
39.3 60.7 60.7 39.3 
Size of investment portfolio 
<US$10 m 21.4 9.1 29.4 5.9 45.5 
US$11-50 m 28.6 27.3 .29.4 23.5 36.4 
US$51·100 m 7.1 18.2 0.0 11.8 0.0 
US$101-500 m 21.4 27.3 17.6 29.4 9.1 
:>US$501 m 21.4 18.2 23.5 29.4 9.1 
Investments linked to infrastructure 
0% 39.3 9.1 58.8 
-
-
1-5% 21.4 18.2 23.5 35.3 -
6-10% 17.9 38.4 5.9 29.4 -
11-15% 7.1 9.1 5.9 11.8 
-
16·20% 3.6 9.1 0.0 5.9 
-
>21% 10.7 18.2 5.9 17.6 -
Type of infrastructure investment 
Loans 39.3 72.7 17.6 64.7 -
Bo~~ 17.9 9.1 23.5 29.4 -Equi 10.7 18.2 5.9 17.6 
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TableA5 Characteristics of Survey A respondents (Barbados) 
Percent 
Variable Type of institution Infrastructure investment activi All Banking Non..banking Investor Non-4nvestor 
40.0 60.0 66.7 33.3 
Size of investment portfolio 
<US$10 m 25.0 0.0 37.5 12.S 50.0 
US$11-S0 m 8.3 0.0 12.5 12.5 0.0 
US$S1-100 m 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
US$101-S00 m 16.7 25.0 12.5 12.5 25.0 
>US$501 m 25.0 50.0 12.S 37.5 0.0 
Investments linked to infrastructure 
0% 33.3 25_0 37_5 
- -
1-5% 25.0 0.0 37.5 37.5 
-
6-10% 16.7 25.0 12.5 25.0 
-
11-15% 8.3 25.0 0.0 12.5 -
16-20% 8.3 0.0 12.5 12.5 
-
>21% 8.3 2~0 0.0 12.5 
-
Type of infrastructure investment 
Loans 25.0 50.0 12.5 37.S 
-
Bonds 50.0 25.0 62.5 7S.0 -
Equily 16.7 0.0 25.0 25.0 -
Table A6 Characteristics of Survey A respondents (Trinidad) 
Percent 
Variable T e of Institution Infrastructure investment activi 
. 
All Bankin Non..bankln Investor Non-4nvestor 
48.0 52.0 72.0 28.0 
Size of investment portfolio 
<US$10 m 16.7 0.0 33.3 5.9 42.9 
US$11-50 m 20.8 25.0 16.7 17.6 28.6 
US$S1-100 m 8.3 16.7 0.0 5.9 14.3 
US$101-500 m 25.0 25.0 25.0 29.4 14.3 
>US$501 m 29.2 33.3 25.0 41.2 0.0 
Investments linked to infrastructure 
0% 28.0 8.3 46.2 - -
1-5% 28.0 16.7 38.5 38.9 -
6-10% 12.0 16.7 7.7 16.7 -
11-15% 12.0 16.7 7.7 16.7 
16-20% 4.0 8.3 0.0 5.6 -
>21% 16.0 33.3 0.0 22.2 
-
Type of infrastructure investment 
Loans 36.0 66.7 7.7 50.0 -
Bonds 20.0 66.7 38.5 72.2 -
Equity 52.0 25.0 15.4 27.8 
Table A7 Status of the Caribbean water sector: Descriptive statistics 
Percent 
Mean Highly Not 
satisfied Satisfied satisfied 
Population coverage 2.19 28.6 61.9 9.5 
Water resource development/management 1.95 19.0 57.1 23.8 
Water and wastewater quality 1.90 10.0 70.0 20.0 
Continuity of supply/service 1.86 19.0 47.6 33.3 
Number and level of skilled professionals 1.86 19.0 47.6 33.3 
Physical assets (e.g. pumps, storage) 1.75 10.0 55.0 35.0 
Performance of regulatory body 1.71 5.9 58.8 35.3 
Number and frequency of customer complaints 1.62 4.8 52.4 42.9 
Long-term strategiC planning 1.57 4.8 47.6 47.6 
Rehabilitation and maintenance programme 1.35 5.0 25.0 70.0 
Tariff to recover operation and maintenance costs 1.33 0.0 33.3 66.7 
Level of investment other than government 1.21 0.0 21.1 78.9 
Unaccounted for water 1.19 4.8 9.5 85.7 
Government budget allocation 1.11 0.0 11.1 88.9 
Level of revenue recovery 1.05 0.0 4.8 95.2 
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Table AB Frequency table for UPS grouping 
Jamaica 
20-30 3.7 9.1 0.0 
31-40 14.8 0.0 25.0 
41-50 11.1 0.0 18.8 
51-60 44.4 45.5 43.8 
12.5 
Barbados 
20-30 0.0 0.0 0.0 
31-40 6.7 0.0 11.1 
41-50 26.7 16.7 33.3 
51-60 20.0 16.7 22.2 
46.7 
Trinidad 
20-30 12.0 8.3 15.4 
31-40 16.0 16.7 15.4 
41-50 52.0 41.7 61.5 
51-60 16.0 25.0 7.7 
Table A9 M-W test comparing UPS by 
organisation category 
Test Statisticri' 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
Asymp. 5ig. (2·tailed) 
Exact 5ig. [2"(1-tailed 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
Asymp. 5ig. (2-tailad) 
Exact 5ig. (2*(1-tailed 
WilcoxonW 
Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Exact Sig. (2"(1-tailed 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
Utility 
perception 
176.500 
-2.346 
.019 
• 
.017 
61.000 
-1.302 
.193 
• 
.224 
136.500 
-1.771 
.077 
• 
.077 
b. Grouping Variable: Organisation category 
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5.9 0.0 
11.8 20.0 
5.9 20.0 
41.2 50.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
37.5 25.0 
25.0 25.0 
11.1 14.3 
16.7 14.3 
44.4 71.4 
22.2 0.0 
0.0 
Table A10 M-W test comparing UPS 
by investment activity 
Test Statisticri' 
Utility 
perception 
Countrv scal. 
fTamslca Mann-Whitney u 59.000 
WilcoxonW 114.000 
Z -1.306 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .191 
Exact Sig.12*(1-tailed • 
Sig.)J .204 
Barbados Mann-Whilney U 14.000 
WilcoxonW SO.OOO 
Z -.341 
Asyrnp. Sig. (2-tailed) .733 
Exact 5ig. [2"(1-tailed • 
$;9·)] .808 
Trinidad Mann-Whitney U 41.500 
WilcoxonW 69.S00 
Z -1.304 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .192 
Exact Sig. [2"(1-tailed • 
$;g.)] .198 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
b. Grouping Variable: Infrastructure investment activity 
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TableA11 Frequency table for investment prospects of the sector 
Jamaica 
Poor 3.6 0.0 
Doubtful 28.6 18.2 
Acceptable 25.0 45.5 
Good 28.6 27.3 
I 
Barbados 
Poor 0.0 0.0 
Doubtful 6.7 0.0 
Acceptable 33.3 16.7 
Good 53.3 83.3 
Trinidad 
Poor 4.0 0.0 
Doubtful 20.0 16.7 
Acceptable 16.0 25.0 
Good 44.0 33.3 
Table A12 M-W test comparing investment 
prospects of the sector by organisation 
category 
Test StatistlcJ' 
Investment 
prospects 
based on 
perception of 
Country utility 
Jamaica Mann.Whitney U 89.000 
WilcoxonW 242.000 
Z -.219 
Asymp. 5ig. (2-tailed) .827 
Exact 5ig. [2·(1-tailed 
.853 • S;g.)) 
Barbados Mann.Whitney U 18.500 
WilcoxonW 63.S00 
Z -1.110 
Asymp. 5ig. (2-tailed) .267 
Exact gig. [2·(1-tailed • 
S;g.)) .328 
Trinidad Mann-Whitney U 66.000 
WilcoxonW 157.000 
Z -.688 
Asymp. 5ig. (2-tailed) .491 
Exact 5ig. (2·(1-tailed • 
S;g.)) .538 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
b. Grouping Variable: Organisation category 
5.9 0.0 
35.3 29.4 
11.8 35.3 
29.4 29.4 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
11.1 0.0 25.0 
44.4 50.0 25.0 
33.3 50.0 50.0 
1 .1 
7.7 0.0 14.3 
23.1 11.1 42.9 
7.7 16.7 14.3 
53.8 50.0 28.6 
7 22.2 0.0 
Table A13 M-W test comparing investment 
prospects of the sector by investment 
activity 
Test StatlsUcSl' 
Investment 
prospects 
based on 
perception of 
Country utility 
Jamaica Mann-Whitney U 61.500 
Wilcoxon W 234.500 
Z -.583 
Asymp. 5ig. (2-talled) .560 
Exact 51g. [2·(1-tailed • 
S;g.)) .576 
Barbados Mann-Whltney U 14.000 
Wllcoxon W 24.000 
Z ·.378 
Asymp. Slg. (Nailed) .705 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-taHed 
.808 • Slg.)] 
Trinidad Mann-Whirney U 25.500 
WllcoxonW 53.500 
Z -2.392 
Asymp. Slg. (2-tailed) .017 
Exact Slg.(2"(1-talled 
.021 • S;g·)1 
a. Not corroded for ties. 
b. Grouping Variable: Infrastructure investment actMty 
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Table A 14 Matrix of Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between UPS grouping 
and investment prospects of the sector 
ComIlationl 
Investment 
Utility pros-
pen:;eption ba"""", 
scale perception of 
""""try groupil'l(J utility 
I Jamaica ~rmansmo Utility perception CorrelatiOn coeffICIent 1.000 .453" 
scale grouping Sig. (2-taDed) 
.018 
N 27 27 
Investment Correlation CoeffICient 
.453" 1.000 
prospects based on 519. (2-taUed) 
.018 perception of utility 
N 27 28 
Barbados Spearman's rho Utility perception Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .006 
scale grouping 519. (2-tailed) 
.982 
N 15 15 
Investment Correlation coeffICient 
.006 1.000 
prospects based on 8ig. (Nailed) 
.982 perception of utility 
N 15 15 
Trinidad Spearman's rho Utility perception Correlatioo Coefficient 1.000 .462" 
scale grouping Sig. (2-tailed) 
.020 
N 25 25 
Investment Correlation CoeffICient .462- 1.000 
prospects based on 51g. (2-tal1ed) 
.020 perceptioo of utility 
N 25 25 
• CorrelatiOn IS Significant at !he 0.05 level (2-talled). 
Table A15 Contingency table: UPS grouping by investment prospects of the sector 
Invlltmenl prolpectl baslKl on perception of utility· Utility perception sCllle grouping Crolltabulatlon 
Utitity perception scale 
"'"""' Cou"trL 20-30 31-40 41-50 51 ·60 61 - 70 To'" 
Jamaica Investment ~, 
="' 0 0 1 0 0 1 prospects based on % within Utility perception 
.0% .0% 33.3% .0% .0% 3.7% perception of utility scale grouping 
Ooobt1ul Co<m1 1 4 1 1 1 8 
% within Utility pe«:eption 
100.0% 100.0% 33.3% 8.3% 14.3% 29.6% scale grouping 
Acceptable Count 0 0 0 4 3 7 
% within Utility perception 
.0% 
.'" .0% 33.3% 42.9% 25.9% scala grouping 
Good Coo", 0 0 0 5 2 7 
% within Utility perception 
.0% .0% .0% 41.7% 28.6% 25.9% scale grouping 
Exceltent Coo", 0 0 1 2 1 4 
% within Utility percepUon 
.0% .0% 33.3% 16.7% 14.3% 14.8% seale grouping 
To"" Count 1 4 3 12 7 27 
% within Utility perception 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% scale grouping 
BarbadOS Investment Doubtful Count 0 1 0 0 1 
prospects based on % within Utility perception 
.0% 25.0% 
.'" .'" 6.7% perception of uti~ty scale grouping 
-""'~ Coo", 0 1 2 2 5 % within Utility perception 
.0% 25.0% 66.7% 28.6% 33.3% scale grouping 
Good """"\ 0 2 1 5 8 
% within Utility pel"C8ption 
.0% SO.O% 33.3% 71.4% 53.3% scale grouping 
Eltcellent 'Mm\ 1 0 0 0 1 
% within Utility perception 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 6.7% scale grouping 
T.", Coo", 1 4 3 7 15 
% within Utility perception 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% scale grouping 
Trinidad Investmenl .... Coo", 0 1 0 0 0 1 
prospects based 011 % within UtiUty perception 
25.0% .0% perception of uti~ty scale grouping .0% .'" .0% 4.0% 
Doubtful Count 2 1 2 0 0 5 
% within Ulility perception 66.7% 25.0% 15.4% .0% .0% 20.0% scale grouping 
Acceptable 
""""' 
0 0 3 1 0 4 
% within Utility perception 
.0% .0% 23.1% 25.0% .0% 16.0% scale grouping 
Good 
""""' 
1 2 6 2 0 11 
% within Utility perceptjon 33.3% SO.O% 46.2% 50.0% .0% 44.0% scata grouping 
Excellent Coo"\ 0 0 2 1 1 4 
% within Utility perception 
.0% .0% 15.4% 25.0% 100.0% 16.0% scale grouping 
To" """"\ 3 4 13 4 1 25 
% withh Utility perception 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% scale grouping 
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Figure A2 Respondents' rating of factors that would influence their investment 
decision in the sector 
3.4 
3.3 
3.2 
1 j 3.1 
3.0 
2.9 
2.' 
2.7 
J""""" Barbados Trinidad 
C Institutionallactors Q Economic and financial factors 
Table A16 Descriptive statistics of factors that influence the investment decision 
Institutional factors 
Good capital investment planning 3.65 3.73 3.42 
Supportive government legislation 3.59 3.13 3.28 
Institutional reform 3.44 3.60 3.36 
Separation of roles 3.19 3.20 3.24 
Tariffs to represent true cost 3.19 3.00 3.36 
Economiclfinancial factors 
Credit enhancement mechanisms 3.70 3.29 3.64 
Infrastructure bonds 3.58 3.80 3.72 
Infrastructure development fund 3.46 3.15 3.48 
Preferential financing to on-lend 3.38 2.60 3.09 
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Figure A3 Rating of operational models for private investment in the sector 
, 
3 
o 
Jamaica Balbados Trinidad 
~~-------=~~~==--~~--C Management contracts riI Conce5$lOflS [J BOT s IJJoint ventures I 
Figure A4 Rating of size-related responses to improve investment prospects 
,.r--------------------------------------------------------------, 
3.52 
3 
Jamaica Bartledos Trinidad 
I C Project bundling S Caribbean ublity collaboratlon 0 Merging sman systems IJ Multl-utility op8flllion I 
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Table A17 Descriptive statistics of sources for new investment information 
Percent 
Sources Mean Most Slightly Least 
imDortant Important important important 
Organisation's commercial network 3.50 58.3 33.2 8.3 0.0 
Project sponsors 3.08 33.2 50.0 8.3 8.3 
Host country government/utility 2.92 25.0 50.0 16.7 8.3 
Published information 2.67 8.3 50.0 41.7 0.0 
Specialist agencies and consultants 2.50 8.3 41.7 41.7 8.3 
International organisations 2.42 8.3 58.3 0.0 33.2 
Country's investment promotion agency 2.25 8.2 33.3 33.3 25.0 
Table A18 Descriptive statistics of criteria for screening new investment proposals 
I Percent Screening criteria Mean Most Slightly Least 
important Important important im'poi1ant 
Nature of project 3.58 58.3 41.7 0.0 0.0 
Past experience 3.50 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 
Available finance 3.50 58.3 33.4 8.3 0.0 
Project location 3.50 58.3 33.4 8.3 0.0 
Project size 3.17 33.3 50.0 16.7 0.0 
Available information 3.00 16.7 66.6 16.7 0.0 
Table A19 Descriptive statistics of reasons for investing abroad 
Reasons 
,,' Percent " 
.' '. 
Mean Most Im'portant Slightly . Least. 
.. ' ". important imllortant important 
Fits business strategy 3.67 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 
Political and economic stability in target markets 3.33 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 
Larger market growth potential 3.08 33.4 50.0 8.3 8.3 
Ga;n competitive advantage 2.75 25.0 33.3 33.3 8.4 
International support for privatisation 2.75 33.3 33.3 8.4 25.0 
Information about opportunities abroad 2.64 18.1 36.4 36.4 9.1 
Emergence of new markets 2.64 9.1 54.5 27.3 9.1 
Ease of foreign market penetration 2.64 0.0 63.6 36.4 0.0 
Approached by overseas governments/clients 2.45 27.3 18.1 27.3 27.3 
Utilise excess capacity 2.00 0.0 27.3 45.4 27.3 
Lower cost of doing business abroad 1.55 0.0 0.0 54.5 45.5 
TableA20 Descriptive statistics of investors' location preferences 
Location Mean Percent 
High Average Low 
Asia 2.67 75.0 16.7 8.3 
Europe 2.33 58.3 16.7 25.0 
North America 2.17 33.3 50.0 16.7 
LAC 2.00 16.7 66.7 16.7 
Oceania 1.92 16.7 58.3 25.0 
Africa 1.33 8.3 16.7 75.0 
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Table A21 M-W test comparing rating of factors regarding choice of investment 
destination (International investors vs. Caribbean utility managers) 
Test Statisticsb 
Good Utility Consumer Credit Positive 
investment perfonnance payment enhancement Transaction Adequate market 
arade ratina indicators disdoline mechanisms costs market size sionals 
Mann·Whilney U 118.000 54.000 106.500 91.000 111.000 96.500 87.500 
WilcoxonW 349.000 132.000 337.500 169.000 342.000 327.500 318.500 
Z ·.329 -2.881 ·.771 ·1.415 -.598 -1.233 -1.540 
Asymp. 5ig. (2-tailed) 
.742 .004 .441 .157 .550 .217 .124 
Exact 5ig. [2*(1-tailed • • • • • • • 
$;9·)] .782 . 006 .471 .200 .593 .274 .152 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
b. Grouoino Variable: Resoandent 
Test StatisticJ' 
Potential for Government Regulatory 
horizontal Administrative honouring Political independe Information 
integration efficiency. commitments stabiliw nee available 
Mann·Whitney U 92.500 103.500 81.000 104.000 92.000 98.000 
WilcoxonW 170.500 334.500 312.000 335.000 323.000 329.000 
Z -1.352 -.907 -1.887 -.896 -1.372 -1.174 
Asymp. S;g. (2-tailed) .176 .365 .059 .370 .170 .240 
Exact Si9. [2*(1-tailed , , • , • • 
S;9·)] .213 .405 .096 .427 .213 .308 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
b. Grouping Variable: Respondent 
Table A22 Descriptive statistics of promotion strategy for water and sanitation 
Image building for the sector 
I i 
Table A23 Descriptive statistics of factors affecting small investments 
• Mean, 
Survey B -,,-Survey C 
Small customer base 2.36 3.24 
High transaction costs compared to size of investment 3.09 2.90 
Diseconomies of scale and scope 2.82 2.80 
Higher cost of borrowing due to lower absolute size 2.91 2.67 
Appropriate technologies for size requirements 2.64 2.52 
Limited counterpart professional/technical capabilities 2.18 2.15 
Tariff inadequate for revenue generation 2.09 3.57 
Interference from government and/or state enterprise 2.00 3.05 
Greater overall risk at a smaller scale 2.73 2.75 
Table A24 Descriptive statistics of options for improving small-scale investment 
opportunities 
Mean 
Survey B Surv~C 
Project bundling 3.42 3.19 
Shared professional expertise across projects 3.00 3.33 
Financing options to reduce cost 2.92 3.20 
Aggregated systems to increase revenue base 2.91 2.85 
Multi-utilitv ooeration 2.17 2.55 
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TableA25 Benefits of regional cooperation 
Percent 
Benefits Mean Strongly Strongly 
agree Agree Disagree disaaree 
Increased bargaining power 3.24 42.9 47.6 0.0 9.5 
Economies of scale 3.24 42.9 42.8 9.5 4.8 
Pooled resources to attract external funding 3.10 42.9 33.3 14.3 9.5 
Shared transaction costs 3.10 28.6 57.1 9.5 4.8 
Risk diversification 2.95 23.8 52.4 19.0 4.8 
Overcome capack constraints 2.95 19.0 61.9 14.3 4.8 
TableA26 Regional approach to water and sanitation 
" 
, , 
" . Percent " Options Mean Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly agree disagree 
Exchange of information 3.81 81.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 
Technical training 3.76 76.2 23.8 0.0 0.0 
Research/project development 3.57 57.1 42.9 0.0 0.0 
Standardisation of performance indicators 3.52 52.4 47.6 0.0 0.0 
Professional selVices 3.43 42.9 57.1 0.0 0.0 
Investment promotion and sourcing 3.29 47.6 38.1 9.5 4.8 
Regulation 3.24 42.9 47.6 0.0 9.5 
Procurement 3.19 38.1 42.9 19.0 0.0 
Operations and maintenance 3.05 19.0 66.7 14.3 0.0 
Support services 2.90 15.0 60.0 25.0 0.0 
TableA27 Challenges for regional cooperation in water and sanitation 
( Challe"ge. < ", Percent Mean Critical Major Minor>" Not:a 
,," factor factor factor"" factor 
Political support 3.48 57.1 33.4 9.5 0.0 
Different national interests 3.43 61.9 23.8 9.5 4.8 
Funding dependent on national governments 3.43 57.1 33.3 4.8 4.8 
Support from local stakeholders 3.19 42.9 38.1 14.2 4.8 
Difficulty in enforcing regional agreements 3.10 38.1 38.1 19.0 4.8 
Satisfactory allocation of investment 3.00 14.3 71.4 14.3 0.0 
Inadequate regional institutional structure 2.90 28.6 38.1 28.5 4.8 
National rivalrv and comDetition 2.52 23.8 28.6 23.8 23.8 
TableA28 Basis for regional grouping 
, 
. 
, Percent 
Factors Mean Strongly Strongly 
aaree 
Agree Disagree disagree 
Similar issues to be addressed 3.43 47.6 47.6 4.8 0.0 
Level of development in the sector 3.14 28.6 57.1 14.3 0.0 
Already working together on similar issues 3.05 33.3 38.1 28.6 0.0 
Strong history of cooperation 3.00 33.3 38.1 23.8 4.8 
Geographical proxim'ily 2.67 23.8 28.6 38.1 9.5 
Table A29 K-W test comparing the UPS Table A30 M-W test comparing the UPS 
across case locations in Jamaica and Barbados 
Utility Utility 
perception perception 
scale scale 
Chj·Square 16.693 Mann-Whitney U 159.500 
df 2 WilcoxonW 537.500 
Asymp.5ig. 
.000 
a. Kruskal Wallls Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Country 
Z -1.130 
Asymp. 51g. (2-taned) .258 
8. Grouping Variable: Country 
287 
---------------------------------
Appendix 8 - QuantitaUve data 
Table A31 M-W test comparing the UPS Table A32 M-W test comparing the UPS 
in Jamaica and Trinidad in Barbados and Trinidad 
Test Statistlcab 
Test Statistics' 
Utility 
Utility perception 
perception "",I. 
""". Mann-Whitney U 57.500 I MaM-whitney U 163.500 WilcoxonW 382.500 
WitcoxonW 466.500 Z -3.636 
Z -3.189 Asymp. 51g. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact 5ig. [2"{1·laUed 
. 000 • 5ig.») 
Asyrnp. gig. (2-tailed) .001 
a. GroupIng Vanable. Country 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
b. Grouping Variable: Country 
Table A33 Matrix of Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between UPS grouping 
and investment prospects in the sector 
Correlations 
Investment 
Utility prospects 
perception based on 
scale perception of 
grouping utility 
Spearman's mo Utility perception Correlation CoeffiCient 1.000 .299' 
scale grouping Sig. (Nailed) .014 
N 67 67 
Investment Correlation Coefficient .299· 1.000 
prospects based on 5ig. (2-tailed) 
.014 perception of utiUty 
N 67 68 
. Correlation IS SIgnificant at the 0.05 level (2·talled). 
Table A34 Matrix of Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between UPS grouping 
and investment prospects in the sector by investment activity 
Correlations 
Investment 
Utility p~--
perception based on 
InfrastrucWre 
-. 
perception of 
investment activity omu lna utllitv 
nveslor ::.pearman 8 mo utility perce~tion \j()ff8lstion CoeTllClont 1.000 .137 
scale grouPIng 51g. (2-tailed) .381 
N 43 43 
Investment Correlation Coefficient 
.137 1.000 
prospects based on 5ig. (2.tailed) 
.381 perception of utility 
N 43 43 
NOrHnV8stor SpearJTlan's rho Utility perception Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .621 
scale grouping Sig. (2-tailed) .<)1)3 
N 21 21 
investment Correlation Coefficient .621· 1.000 
prospects based on 5ig. (Nailed) 
.003 perception of utility 
N 21 22 
.' • Correlatlon IS Significant at the 0.01 level (2-talted~ 
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NWC: Capital works programme 2004/05 
'on. 
Major water supply and wastewater projects 
KMA water supply & rehab 
Kingston water & sanitation 
Martha Brae/Rio Bueno 
Great RiverlLucea 
5185 
3050 
1952 
2440 
2379 
82 
84.5 
49.7 
31.8 
39.7 
38.8 
1.3 
3.2 
2.0 
2.3 
1.4 
12.5 
9.0 
6.0 
44.7 
GOJ, NWC, JBIC 
GOJ, NWC, Others 
GOJ, NWC, Others 
GOJ, NWC, Others 
Port Antonio water & sewerage 
Milk River WS Phase 2 
ChristianalSpaulding Phase 2 
Hope Bay/St. Margaret's Bay Phase 2 
Shettlewood WS Phase 2 
Essex Valley 
Rural WS Phase 1 
Rural WS Phase 11 
GOJ, NWC, EU 
GOJ, NWC, EU 
GOJ, NWC, EU 
GOJ, NWC, EU 
GOJ, NWC, EU 
NWC, Others 
GOJ, NWC, lOB 
GOJ, NWC, EU 
Harbour View sewerage TP 
Soapberry Phase 1A 
195 
122 
140 
84 
767 
553 
366 
2745 
GOJ, NWC, Others 
GOJ, NWC, Others 
Water supply rehabilitation 
Constant Spring WTP 
HopeWTP 
Mona WTP 
SeaviewWTP 
Pressure reducing & isolating valve replacement 
Berkshire Hall WTP 
Guys Hill TP 
Kellils WTP 
Greater Mandeville WS 
ChristianalOevon/Coleville 
New ForesUBull Savannah WS 
Santa Cruz Phase 1 A 
Roaring River WS 
AskenishWS 
BogueWTP 
Pottinger Spring 
White River WTP 
Mains replacement (islandwide) 
Pumping equipment rehabilitation (islandwide) 
Source metering (islandwide) 
Water storage tanks (islandwide) 
Wells assessments and refurbishing (islandwlde) 
Other water supply rehabilitation (islandwide) 
Wastewater treatment plant rehabilitation 
Bushy Park Housing 
Hayes No. 1 Housing 
Hayes No. 2 Housing 
Mineral Heights Housing 
Boone Hall 
Ellelson Flals 
Hughenden 
Anchovy 
Wood stock 
Bridgeport 
Ensom City Housing 
Horizon Park 
Independence City 
T awes Pen Housing 
Vanzie Lands 
Uandilo Housing 
Other wastewater treatment plant rehabilitation 
Sewerage Rehabilitation 
120 
50 
30 
50 
35 
10 
10 
15 
120 
8 
10 
40 
25 
80 
5 
5 
5 
120 
60 
50 
25 
40 
30 
15 
15 
20 
25 
10 
15 
20 
8 
10 
16 
25 
15 
20 
15 
10 
8 
20 
2.0 
0.8 
0.5 
0.8 
0.6 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
2.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.7 
0.4 
1.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
2.0 
1.0 
0.8 
0.4 
0.7 
0.5 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
NWC 
Duhaney Park 20 0.3 NWC 
Stadium Gardens/Swallowfield 10 0.2 NWC 
UguanealMona Road 40 0.7 NWC 
Other KSA sewerage rehabilitation 35 0.6 -
Ruthven Road 30 0.5 NWC 
Wiggon Loop Sewerage Extension 30 0.5 NWC 
Old Passagefort 15 0.2 NWC 
Portmore 20 0.3 NWC 
Montego Bay 20 0.3 NWC 
Pump station refurbishing (islandwide) 50 0.8 NWC 
Other seweraae rehabilitation-!i'slandwidel 20 0.3 NWC 
Key to sources of funding: European Umon (EU): Government of JamaICa (GOJ), Inter Amerk:an Development Bank (IOBt Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC): National Water Commission (NWC). 
Source: NWC (2004b) 
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Water supply licence (Jamaica) 
SHEDULE 1 
Location of Service 
See Attachment 1 for location Map 
SCHEDULE 2 
Special Conditions of Licence 
A. Water Quality Standards 
1. At least 95% of water samples must be collected from water 
production sources for testing; 
2. At least ninety-five percent (>95%) of water samples must be 
negative with coliform bacteria; and 
3. The level of residual chlorine should be about O.Smgll and 
present in at least 95% of samples. 
B. Enylronmnnta! Standards 
The Ucensee shall conform to all and any standards that may be 
established by NRCA. 
C. Water Pressure 
The Licensee shall ensure that the pressure of water to 
customers is in the range of 20 - 60 psi. and take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that customers receive an adequate supply of 
water at all times. 
D. Quality of Service Standards 
The Ucensee shall meet, as a minimum the following service 
standards: 
Guaranteed Standards 
The Licensee shall give 24 hours' notice to customers for any 
scheduled interruptions of supply for the purpose of maintenance 
or otherwise. 
The Licensee shall, in the event of unscheduled interruptions or 
emergencies restore water supply within 24 hours. 
Should the licensee fail, at any time, to meet these standards. it 
shall make a compensatory payment to the affected customers 
for each breach in an amount equal to the service Charge that is 
payable by the customer. Customer payments are to be effected 
by means of a credit to the customer's bills. 
The Licensee should additionally use all reasonable endeavours 
to achieve the following service standards:· 
a. Monthly meter readings 
b. Processing of billing and non·billing complaints 
c. Repairing faulty meters 
d. Reconnection after payment of overdue amounts 
e. Payment of compensatory payment due to break 
of guaranteed standard 
The Off1C6 may from time to time. introduce additional or vary 
these service standards and will determine from time to time, the 
level of compensatory payment to be paid by the Ucensee to the 
customer should the Licensee breach any standard so 
prescribed. 
Overall Standards 
1. The required notification time should be given for at 
least 90% of planned interruptions. 
2. At least 90% of emergency lock-offs should be restored within 
the required time. 
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The Office may from time to time. introduce additional or 
vary these service standards and will have regard to the 
performance of the Licensee in meeting these standards 
at the tariff review. 
E. Iill!!!m 
The Licensee shall provide bills to its customers on a monthly 
basis (based on meter reading) detailing the volume of water 
consumed for the period and all other relevant charges and 
specifying the conditions for disconnection for non payment. 
The Licensee shall ensure that all supplies are metered. 
F. Reports to the Office 
The Licensee shall provide the following reports to the OffICe 
annually within three months of the end of each financial year 
(hereinafter referred to as the "relevanl period"): 
1. Audited Profit and Loss Account and Balance Sheet for the 
relevant period 
2. Audited Cash Flow Statement for the relevant period 
3. Water supply report for the relevant period detailing: 
a. volume of water produced 
b. volume of water sold 
c. assessment of unaccounted-far-water (UFW) 
d. consumption per customer category 
e. details of any unmet demand 
f. water quality reports 
g. schedules of maintenance programme 
h. reliability of supply report for the relevant period 
detailing: 
• number of planned interruptions; 
• percentage of planned interruptions where the 
required 24-hour periOd of notice is not 
adhered to; 
• number of unplanned interruptions; 
• percentage of unplanned interruptions not 
restored in the required 24--hour period. 
4. Costs and revenues associated with each customer category 
5. Customer based reports showing total number of customers 
per category (that is. industrial, commercial or domestic) 
6. Number and type of connections to other utilities 
7. Number of employees 
8. Total number of new service applications 
9. Total number of delinquent customers (three billing periods in 
arrears) 
10. Water quality reports 
11. Reports in relation to guaranteed and overall standards 
F. Provision of Prescribed Services to other Utilities 
The Licensee is entitled to provide any combination of the 
services specified in the Licensed Business to any other licensed 
service provider or developer by way of a connection or 
connections to the Licensee's infrastructure. 
In such cases the parties may enter into negotiation/commercial 
agreements. Before concluding such agreements. the Ucensee 
must receive the approval of the OffICe. 
Specifically, and for the avoidance of doubt, the rates and 
charges to be applied under this section by the Licensee must be 
approved by the OffICe. 
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"Test Year" shall mean the latest twelve months of operation for 
which there are aUdited accounts and the results of the test year 
adjusted to reflect: 
a. Normal operational conditions, if necessary; 
b. Such changes in revenues and costs as are 
known and measurable INith reasonable 
accuracy at the time of filing and which will 
become effective within twelve months of the 
time of filing. Costs, as used in this paragraph 
shall include depreciation in relation to plant in 
service during the last month of the test period at 
the rates of depreciation agreed with the OffICe. 
Extraordinary or Exceptional items as defined by 
The Institute of Chartered Accounts of Jamaica 
shall be apportioned over a number of years not 
exceeding five years; and 
c. Such changes in accounting principles as may 
be recommended by the independent auditors to 
the Ucensee. 
gRate Base~ means the value of the net investment in the 
Ucensed Business. The Rate Base shall be calCulated on the net 
sewerage system investment made by the Licensee at the time 
the rates are being set and shall include net investment made by 
the Ucensee in the collection, treatment and disposal of sewage 
and plant assets. The Rate BaSe shall include appropriate rate-
making adjustments to take into account known and measurable 
changes in the plant investment base. 
The rates for the supply of services by the Ucensed Business 
shall be set such that provides a reasonable opportunity for the 
Licensee to make a reasonable retum on capital employed after 
taking into account all reasonable costs incurred in the provision 
of the services. 
Revenue Requirement;: operating costs + depreciation + taxes 
+ return on investment, with each component defined as follows: 
Operating costs: All prudently incurred costs which are not 
directly associated with investment in capital plant, other 
operating costs shall include, but not be limited to: salaries and 
other costs related to employees; operating costs of the licensed 
business; interest costs on other borrowings not associated with 
capital investment, if applicable; rents and leases on property 
associated with the Ucensed Business; taxes which the 
Licensee is required to pay other than income taxes of the 
Licensee; and other costs which are determined to be 
reasonably incurred in connection with the Licensed Business. 
Depreciation: The depreciation component will be 
calculated by applying annual depreciation rates, as agreed with 
the OffICe from time to time, to the gross value of the individual 
plant asset accounts. 
Taxes: Taxes which are calculated based on the net income 
of the Licensee (Income Taxes) and payable to the Government 
of Jamaica shall be a component of the revenue requirement. 
loss cany·forwards and any incentives to encourage capital 
investments are not included in the calculation of income taxes. 
Return on Investment: This component is calculated based on 
the approved Rate Base of the Ucensee and the required rate of 
return which allO'NS the Ucensee the opportunity to earn a return 
sufficient to provide for the requirements of consumers and 
acquire new investments at competitive costs. The Office shall 
determine a working capital component of the Rate Base. 
The Ucensee shall provide schedules that support these speCific 
operating costs, depreciation expenses, and taxes. The return on 
investment shall be calculated by multiplying the allowed ratEHlf· 
retum by the Licensee's total investment base (Rate Base) for 
the test year. The allowed rate of return is the Licensee's 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital CHACC). The WACC ("K%-) 
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will balance the interests of both consumers and investors and be 
commensurate with returns in other enterprises having 
corresponding risks which will assure confidence in the financial 
integrity of the enterprise so as to maintain its credit and to attract 
capital. The WACC will be based on the actual capital structure 
or an appropriately adjusted capital struclure which adjustment is 
required to keep parity of the interests of the consumers and 
investors and at the time of the filing such capital structure and 
WACC shall be adjusted by any known and measurable changes 
which are expected to occur during the test year. 
Return on Investment = K%- (Rate Base) 
The Rate Base 
developers or 
development. 
shall be reduced by contributions made by 
customers in respect of infrastructural 
Initial Tariff 
On the granting of this license the Licensee shall submit a 
proposal for the initial tariffs to be charged in respect of services. 
Subsequent Tariff 
At such intervals as the Licensee may determine but no more 
often than once in every two years, the Licensee may submit an 
application for a tariff review. The Application must be supported 
with data and information as the Office will determine. 
Rate Review Process 
The Licensee shall file with the Office proposed rate schedules 
and shall demonstrate that the rates proposed for the various 
rate categories will generate the revenue requirement for the test 
year. 
The Office shall accept such filing within ten (10) working days 
following certified delivery of the filing with the Office unless the 
filing is clearly deficient to the extent that it will not allow the 
complete evaluation of the Ucensee's application including the 
proposed rate schedules. If the Office determines that the filing is 
deficient it shall reject such filing within the said ten working days 
and shall notify the Licensee clearly identifying the deficiencies. 
Upon acceptance of the rate filing the Office shall initiate a rate 
proceeding to conduct its review of the Licensee s proposed 
rates in which the Off1C8 shall have full discretion to accept, 
modify or reject the proposed rates. The Office shall have full 
discretion to determine the format and procedure of such 
proceedings and in making its decision shall observe reasonable 
standards of procedural faimess and the rules of natural justice 
and act in a timely manner. The Office's review shall consist of 
an evaluation of the revenue requirements including prudent 
operating costs, depreciation expenses, taxes and a return on 
investment. 
In the absence of an order from the Office upon the expiry of 
ninety (90) days after acceptance of the filing by the Licensee: 
a. rejecting the rates proposed by the Ucensee on the 
merits; 
b. approving the rates proposed by the Licensee; 
c. modifying the rates proposed by the Licensee; OR 
if the Office issues an order rejecting or modifying any portion of 
the Ucensee's proposed rates, then upon the occurrence of any 
of the said events, the Ucensee may refer the matter to the 
Appeal Tribunal as established to finally settle and the parties 
hereby consent to and agree to be bound by the decision of the 
Tribunal. 
The deCision of the Tribunal shall become effective on the day of 
the Tribunal's ruling. 
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BWA: Capital expenditure 2004/05 
Mains replacement 8.6 4.3 BWA 
Bridgetown sewerage system 0.5 0.3 BWA 
South coast sewerage system 3.4 1.7 GOB,BWA 
West COBst sewerage system 3.5 1.8 GOB,BWA 
Belle feasibility study 0.5 0.3 GOB,BWA 
Water resources development 10.5 5.3 BWA 
Meter installation 1.5 0.8 BWA 
Special projects and construction 0.9 0.5 BWA 
Well pumping 1.1 0.6 BWA 
Distribution 1.4 0.7 BWA 
Septage handling facility 0.5 0.3 BWA 
Source: BWA (2004) 
WASA: Capital expenditure 2004-06 
Water sources development 
Wallerfield and Deep Ground well development 63.5 10.1 
Well rehabilitation in the north and south 22.6 3.6 
Well development in Tobago 24 3.8 
Well development at Mayaro/Guayaguayare 15 2.4 
Development of intakes at Matura and Salybia 55 8.8 
Development of intake at Louis O'or, Tobago 7.5 1.2 
Development of intakes at Ortoire and Pilote 20 3.2 
Distribution expansion 
Booster stations North 5.2 0.8 
Booster stations South 12.3 2.0 
Service reservoirs North 10.2 1.6 
Service reservoirs South 28.6 4.6 
Service reservoirs refurbishment at Mason Hall 2.5 0.4 
Wallerfield 21.9 3.5 
Mayaro grid pipelines 20 3.2 
Extremities of the pipeline network 20 3.2 
Leak detection programme 
Pipe replacement Phase I 30 4.8 
Pipe replacement Phase 11 60 9.6 
Bulk metering 24 3.8 
Domestic metering 70 11.2 
Pipeline replacement programme 
Mayaro 10 1.6 
La Brea 68 10.9 
Tobago 20 3.2 
Part-ai-Spain 10 1.6 
San Femando 10 1.6 
Rural 10 1.6 
Sewerage 
Adoption of National Housing Authority WWTP 225 35.9 
Greater Port-of-Spain 36.5 5.8 
Implementation of south-west Tobago 100 16.0 
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